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Abstract
Based on the generalized user-revenue model constructed by Homma (2009,
2012, 2018), this paper claries the empirical implications of the quiet-life
hypothesis in the Japanese regional banking industry. The quiet-life hypoth-
esis is accepted here but the e¢ cient structure hypothesis is not. Moreover,
the extended generalized-Lerner index (EGLI) on the cost frontier increases
with the Herndahl index in the previous period if and only if the quiet-
life hypothesis is accepted, so it is possible to justify anti-monopoly and
anti-concentration policies using support for the quiet-life hypothesis. Fur-
thermore, intertemporal regular linkages (i.e., cyclical linkages) exist because
the average loans are not large and only the quiet-life hypothesis is accepted.
However, the linkage of the single-period EGLIs of the long-term loans on the
cost frontier leads to convergence and is xed at the very large values in the
initial periods; thus, the linkage is judged to be undesirable to Japanese re-
gional banks, similar to the linkages of single-period dynamic cost e¢ ciencies
and single-period optimal nancial goods.
Keywords: Dynamic cost unneutral e¢ ciency; Dynamic price ine¢ ciency;
Generalized user-revenue model; Generalized user-revenue price; Extended
generalized-Lerner index; E¢ cient structure hypothesis; Quiet-life hypothe-
sis; Intertemporal regular linkage
JEL classication: C33; C51; C61; D24; G21; L13
1 Introduction
Based on the generalized user-revenue model (hereafter the GURM) con-
structed by Homma (2009, 2012, 2018), this paper explores the implications
of the quiet-life hypothesis in the Japanese regional banking industry by
empirically clarifying a series of research topics that are crucial for the in-
dustrial organization of banking. The papers treatment of each of these
topics is briey described below:
1. The static and dynamic cost unneutral e¢ ciencies of Japanese region-
al banks. Thus far, in the extant literature other than Homma (2018), most
empirical models that estimate cost e¢ ciency assume a static cost neutral
e¢ ciency. However, as claried by Homma (2018), the theoretical restriction
of this assumption is very strict from a theoretical perspective. This is due
to the fact that cost neutrality means that all the ine¢ ciency coe¢ cients in
the static factor demand functions are equal and that static cost e¢ ciency
does not consider the e¤ects of either the static cost e¢ ciency in the previous
period or the Herndahl index in the previous period on cost e¢ ciency in
the current period. To explicitly account for both the e¢ cient structure and
quiet-life hypotheses, these e¤ects need to be considered. For these reasons,
this paper estimates the static and dynamic cost unneutral e¢ ciencies of
Japanese regional banks. The main purpose of this estimation is to clarify
the structural ine¢ ciency for which substantial improvement is di¢ cult in
the long term. Where this ine¢ ciency exists, it is very di¢ cult to drastically
improve the dynamic cost unneutral e¢ ciency of Japanese regional banks
under present conditions.
2. The degree of relative risk-aversion for banks on the cost frontier and
the actual cost. Thus far, in the extant literature other than Homma (2009,
2012, 2018), banks are assumed to be risk-neutral, similar to non-nancial
rms. However, it is di¢ cult to consider banks that have experienced -
nancial crises and natural disasters to still be risk-neutral. Furthermore, the
existence of structural ine¢ ciency may a¤ect the risk attitude of banks. Ac-
cordingly, this paper indirectly estimates the degrees of relative risk-aversion
of banks on the cost frontier and the actual cost through the stochastic Euler
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equations derived by Homma (2018, Theorems 1 and 2, pp. 34-37). The risk
attitude of banks on the cost frontier (i.e., the most e¢ cient banks) is spec-
ied by di¤erentiating it from that of banks on the actual cost. Although
the former banks may be risk-neutral, it is highly likely that the latter are
risk-averse.
3. Reference rates on the cost frontier and the actual cost. Thus far, in
the extant literature other than Homma (2009, 2012, 2018), existing interest
rate data (e.g., call rates) are used as the reference rate a priori. However,
as noted by Homma (2018, pp. 39-56), these reference rates are crucial fac-
tors that determine the signs of the stochastic user-revenue prices (hereafter
SURPs) on the cost frontier and the actual cost. Thus, they have a consid-
erable e¤ect on generalized user-revenue prices (hereafter GURPs) and the
extended generalized-Lerner indices (hereafter EGLIs) on the cost frontier
and the actual cost. For this reason, this paper indirectly estimates the ref-
erence rates on the cost frontier and the actual cost through stochastic Euler
equations, similar to the above topics. Furthermore, the e¤ects of the sub-
jective rates of time preferences, quasi-short-run prots, and equity capital
on these reference rates are also claried.
4. The dynamic price ine¢ ciency of each nancial good. Thus far, in the
extant literature other than Homma (2018), this ine¢ ciency has not been
addressed, although static price ine¢ ciency has sometimes been considered.
However, according to Homma ( 2018, pp. 32-56), dynamic price ine¢ ciency
is a main factor that a¤ects the GURP and EGLI on the actual cost; thus, it is
highly possible that it seriously a¤ects them and causes a di¤erence between
the GURP and EGLI on the cost frontier and those on the actual cost.
Consequently, this paper indirectly estimates the dynamic price ine¢ ciency
of each nancial good through the stochastic Euler equations, similar to the
above topics. Furthermore, the factors that a¤ect this ine¢ ciency are also
claried.
5. The generalized user-revenue prices (GURPs) on the cost frontier and
the actual cost. Thus far, in the extant literature other than Homma (2009,
2012, 2018), these GURPs have not been considered. However, as emphasized
by Homma (2009, 2012, 2018), these GURPs are crucial for the industrial
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organization of banking. The reasons are as follows: First, they consider
not only the market structure and conduct e¤ect but also the equity cap-
ital e¤ect, the risk-adjustment e¤ect, and the cost and price ine¢ ciencies.
Second, it is highly possible that the latter e¤ects and ine¢ ciencies a¤ect
their GURPs more than the former e¤ect under the present conditions of
having experienced nancial crises and natural disasters. Third, as claried
by Homma (2018), their GURPs crucially a¤ect the EGLIs on the cost fron-
tier and the actual cost from the theoretical perspective. Accordingly, this
paper indirectly estimates the GURPs on the cost frontier and the actual
cost through the stochastic Euler equations, similar to the above topics. The
following e¤ects are also claried: the e¤ects of the market structure and
conduct, equity capital, and risk-adjustment on the GURP on the cost fron-
tier, and the e¤ects of these factors and the cost and price ine¢ ciencies on
the GURP on the actual cost.
6. The extended generalized-Lerner indices (EGLIs) on the cost frontier
and the actual cost. Thus far, in the extant literature other than Homma
(2009, 2012, 2018), these EGLIs have not been addressed, although the con-
ventional Lerner index has been considered. However, as strongly emphasized
by Homma ( 2009, 2012, 2018), these EGLIs are crucial for the industrial
organization of banking, similar to the GURPs on the cost frontier and the
actual cost. In addition to the rst two reasons given for the GURPs, these
EGLIs become the strict criteria for the implementation and evaluation of
industrial organization policy under the present conditions of having experi-
enced nancial crises and natural disasters.
The desirability of these EGLIs is judged from the truth and actuality
of competition. The truth of competition implies that the bank concerned
does not exhibit any uncompetitive behavior that could lead to cost and
price ine¢ ciencies and is completely devoted to competition. In contrast,
the actuality of competition implies that the bank concerned shows some
uncompetitive behavior that leads to cost and price ine¢ ciencies and is not
always devoted to competition. Where these ine¢ ciencies are relatively small
and easily eliminated, the EGLIs on the cost frontier have not only the truth
of competition, but also the actuality of competition. However, where these
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ine¢ ciencies are large and not easily eliminated, the EGLIs on the cost fron-
tier do not have the actuality of competition. In this case, in order to make
up for the actuality of competition, the EGLIs on the actual cost must also
be considered. The reason for this is that the EGLI on the actual cost, which
is the degree of competition of a bank with average e¢ ciency that is used to
represent all banks, is superior in the actuality of competition to the EGLI
on the cost frontier, which is the degree of competition of the most e¢ cient
bank, although the former is inferior to the latter in terms of the truth of
competition. From the perspective of the actuality of competition, which
makes up for the truth of competition, it is desirable that the competitive
positions of many banks be improved, although the truth of competition is
most important from a policy perspective. Therefore, policies to improve
not only the EGLIs on the cost frontier but also those on the actual cost are
needed.
For the above reasons, this paper indirectly estimates the EGLIs on the
cost frontier and the actual cost through the stochastic Euler equations,
similar to the above topics. Furthermore, the e¤ects similar to the above
GURPs on these EGLIs are claried.
7. Tests of the e¢ cient structure and quiet-life hypotheses on the basis
of the generalized user-revenue model (GURM). Thus far, in the extant lit-
erature, these tests on the basis of the GURM have not been considered,
although tests on the basis of conventional models have been conducted.1
However, as considered by Homma (2018), tests based on the GURM are
more theoretically rigorous and more valid than those based on conventional
models under the present conditions of having experienced the recent nan-
cial crises and natural disasters. The reason for this is that the GURM is
a more general model that relaxes the following six implicit assumptions of
Hancocks (1985, 1987, 1991) user-cost model of nancial rms: (1) nancial
rms are risk-neutral, (2) there is no strategic interdependence between -
nancial rms, (3) there is no asymmetric information in the market regarding
nancial assets and liabilities, (4) there is no uncertainty in holding revenues
1Homma et al. (2014, pp. 144-145) provides the details of these conventional model
tests.
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and costs, (5) the utility function of nancial rms does not depend on eq-
uity capital, and (6) no cost and price ine¢ ciencies exist in nancial rms
(i.e., nancial rms are perfectly cost and price e¢ cient). For this reason,
the present paper tests the e¢ cient structure and quiet-life hypotheses on
the basis of the GURM. Based on the test results, the quiet-life hypothesis
is accepted, but the e¢ cient structure hypothesis is not. This result is di¤er-
ent from that of Homma et al. (2014), where both hypotheses are accepted
for city banks and long-term credit banks operating in a single nationwide
market.
8. The relation between the quiet-life hypothesis and the EGLI on the
cost frontier. Thus far, in the extant literature, this relation has not been
completely considered. However, from Homma (2018, pp. 76-77), it is not
always possible to justify anti-monopoly and anti-concentration policies using
support for the quiet-life hypothesis. Consequently, this relation needs to be
empirically claried. In this study, it is found that the EGLIs on the cost
frontier increase (i.e., the degree of competition on the cost frontier decreases)
with the Herndahl index in the previous period if and only if the quiet-life
hypothesis is accepted. Thus, it is possible to justify anti-monopoly and
anti-concentration policies using support for the quiet-life hypothesis in the
Japanese regional banking industry.
9. The intertemporal regular linkages of single-period dynamic cost e¢ -
ciencies, single-period optimal nancial goods, single-period Herndahl indi-
ces, and single-period EGLIs on the cost frontier. Thus far, in the extant lit-
erature, these linkages have not been fully considered. However, as these
linkages serve to permit long-term forecasts and long-term dynamic analy-
ses, they are absolutely critical for the industrial organization of banking.
In the present study, it is found that all the linkages (i.e., the cyclical link-
ages) are present in the Japanese regional banking industry since the average
loans are not large and only the quiet-life hypothesis is accepted (i.e., the
e¢ cient structure hypothesis is not accepted). However, the linkage of the
single-period EGLIs of the long-term loans on the cost frontier on the basis
of this linkage of single-period dynamic cost e¢ ciencies leads to convergence
and is xed at the very large values in the initial periods. Consequently, this
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linkage is judged to be undesirable for Japanese regional banks, similar to the
linkages of single-period dynamic cost e¢ ciencies and single-period optimal
nancial goods.
As noted above, there are no examples of studies that are rigorously com-
parable to this paper. However, if examples are to be quoted, those relating to
the e¢ cient structure hypothesis include Demsetz (1973), Weiss (1974), Smir-
lock (1985), Tirole (1988), Berger and Hannan (1989), and Berger (1995).
Related to the quiet-life hypothesis is Berger and Hannan (1998). Relevant
to the relationship between market power and rm e¢ ciency are Maudos
and de Guevara (2007), Turk Ariss (2010), Schaeck and Cihak (2010), Färe
et al. (2011), and Koetter et al. (2012). The user-cost model of banking
is addressed in Hancock (1985, 1987, 1991), Barnett (1987), Fixler and Zi-
eschang (1991, 1992a, 1992b, 1993, 1999), Fixler (1993), Barnett and Zhou
(1994), Barnett and Hahm (1994), Barnett et al. (1995), Homma et al.
(1996), Ōmori and Nakajima (2000), Nagano (2002), and Homma and Souma
(2005). The degree of competition in the Japanese nancial industry is a fo-
cus of Tsutsui and Kamesaka (2005), Uchida and Tsutsui (2005), and Souma
and Tsutsui (2010).
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows: In Section 2, we sum-
marize the theoretical concepts of Homma (2018) used in this paper. Section
3 explains our empirical application to the Japanese regional banking in-
dustry, which includes the empirical model specication and the estimation
procedure. Section 4 presents the estimation results. The nal section o¤ers
conclusions.
2 Theoretical Specication: A Summary of
Homma (2018)
The theoretical concepts used in this paper follow those of Homma (2018).
A summary, including sources, is provided in Table 2.1. For added detail,
please refer to the sources listed.
<<Insert Table 2.1 about here>>
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In Homma (2018), on the basis of the GURM of Homma (2009, 2012),
we explored the e¢ cient structure hypothesis proposed by Demsetz (1973)
and the quiet-life hypothesis put forward by Berger and Hannan (1998).
We developed mathematical formulations and theoretical interpretations of
the two hypotheses, the relation between the hypotheses and the EGLI on
the cost frontier proposed by Homma (2009, 2012), and the relation be-
tween the hypotheses and the existence of intertemporal regular linkages of
single-period dynamic cost e¢ ciencies, single-period optimal planned nan-
cial goods, single-period Herndahl indices, and single-period EGLIs on the
cost frontier. From the major results, the following two points are particularly
noteworthy: 1) it is not always possible to justify anti-monopoly and anti-
concentration policies using support for the quiet-life hypothesis, and 2) new
industrial organization policies are required if support for the e¢ cient struc-
ture hypothesis is undesirable. Furthermore, where there is an intertemporal
regular linkage of single-period EGLIs on the cost frontier, the appropriate
industrial organization policies must be determined based on a long-term
perspective. If this linkage shows an upward trend caused mainly by an up-
wardly trending intertemporal regular linkage of single-period Herndahl in-
dices, then anti-monopoly and anti-concentration policies are justied from a
long-term perspective. If the upward trend of the intertemporal regular link-
age of single-period EGLIs on the cost frontier is, however, caused mainly by
the intertemporal regular linkage of single-period dynamic cost e¢ ciencies
or single-period optimal planned nancial goods, then other policies are de-
sirable because, in that case, anti-monopoly and anti-concentration policies
cause an unnecessary distortion in the economy.
3 Empirical Application
In order to apply Homma (2018) as summarized in Section 2 to Japanese
regional banks and estimate the GURM extended by Homma (2018), we need
to specify the model and create the data, and, at the same time, consider the
estimation method for the specied model. These points are discussed next.
The empirical model of the GURM is created according to the follow-
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ing procedure: First, the endogenous state variables are specied, and their
data are created. Furthermore, the exogenous state variables other than the
following are specied, and their data are created: the static cost unneutral
e¢ ciencies from two periods prior through the previous period, the Hernd-
ahl indices in the same periods, and the uncertain or unpredictable compo-
nents of the stochastic dynamic endogenous holding-revenue rates (hereafter
SDEHRRs) and the stochastic dynamic endogenous holding-cost rates (here-
after SDEHCRs). Second, the Herndahl indices are specied, and their
data are created. Moreover, the components of the SDEHRR and SDEHCR
are specied and estimated, and their data are created. Third, the static
variable cost function is specied and estimated, and the data for the static
cost unneutral e¢ ciency are created. Additionally, the dynamic variable cost
function is specied and estimated, and the data for the dynamic cost unneu-
tral e¢ ciency and the dynamic frontier and actual marginal variable costs are
created. Fourth, the utility function and the stochastic Euler equations are
specied. Due to space restrictions, only the most important points, namely,
the third and fourth points, are discussed in this section. The other points
are discussed in the Appendix and in Homma (2012, pp. 22-24, pp. 63-87, p.
92, pp. 111-122). The period covered by the analysis is from scal year 1976
to scal year 2016. However, as stated below, this empirical model includes
lag variables for two periods prior and the next period, so the data period in
the estimate is actually from scal year 1974 to scal year 2017.
3.1 Empirical Model Specication
3.1.1 Static Variable Cost Functions and Static Cost E¢ ciency
3.1.1.1 The Relation Between the Static Actual and Frontier Vari-
able Cost Functions and the Estimation Procedure for the Ine¢ -
ciency Coe¢ cients
The relation between the static actual and frontier variable cost functions
is claried by the following proposition.
Proposition 1 The static actual variable cost function is related to the static
8





























where CSAVi (  ;  ;  ;  ;  ) is the static actual variable cost function dened
by Homma (2018, Denition 3, pp. 10-11), CSFVi (  ;  ;  ;  ) is the static
frontier variable cost function dened by Homma ( 2018, Denition 2, pp.
9-10), aSIEi;j;t (j = 1; : : : ;M) are the ine¢ ciency coe¢ cients of static factor
demand functions (xSFDi;j (  ;  ;  ;  ), j = 1; : : : ;M) given by Homma (2018,
Denition 3, pp. 10-11), and CSSFVi;j (  ;  ;  ;  ) (=

pi;j;t  xSFDi;j (  ;  ;  ;  )

CSFVi (  ;  ;  ;  ) , j = 1; : : : ;M) are the static cost shares of optimal inputs
for cost minimization.






























































































































The ine¢ ciency coe¢ cients (aSIEi;j;t , j = 1; : : : ;M) are estimated according to
the following procedure: First, the static frontier variable cost function is es-
timated, and the data for the discrepancy between the logarithm of the actual
variable cost and the logarithm of the static frontier variable cost function








) are created. Second, from








bSIEi;j;t  CSSFVi;j;t + "SFVi;t ; (3.1.1.1.2)
where bSIEi;j;t = a
SIE







and "SFVi;t is an ordinary error term.
3.1.1.2 Specication of the Static Variable Cost Function and the
Ine¢ ciency Coe¢ cients
Considering the concavity conditions of factor prices, with reference to
Westbrook and Buckley (1990) on the basis of the Laurent expansion pro-












































































































where CVi;t (= pV;i;t xV;i;t+pL;i;t xL;i;t+pK;i;t xK;i;t) is the variable cost, pV;i;t
is the current good price, xV;i;t is the amount (input) of current goods, pL;i;t
is the wage, xL;i;t is the amount (input) of labor, pK;i;t is the physical capital
price, and xK;i;t is the amount (input) of physical capital. Moreover,DBi is the
individual bank dummy variable, and qj;i;t (j 2 fSL;LL; S; C; CL;A;DD; TD;
CM;CDg) are the real balances of nancial goods, namely, short-term loans
(j = SL), long-term loans (j = LL), securities (j = S), cash (j = C), due
from banks and call loans (j = CL), other nancial assets (j = A), demand
deposits (j = DD), time deposits (j = TD), call money and borrowed money
(j = CM), and certicates of deposit and other liabilities (j = CD). Fur-
thermore,  t is the time trend and i;t is the ordinary error term. Variables
other than the time trend marked with * are normalized by dividing them
by their sample mean, and the normalized time trend is  t =  t   1995. j
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(j = L;K) are parameters added in order to ensure that the static variable
cost function in Eq. (3.1.1.2a) satises the concavity condition for the factor
prices for a larger sample. We created this parameter with reference to the
prior a¢ ne transformation presented by Barnett (1985) and we stipulated the
following two conditions: First, the concavity condition for the factor prices
is satised for a larger sample. Second, the coe¢ cients of determination (R2)
of the cost share equations as given below are not small (i.e., they are all
greater than 0.4). ai ( t ) is the coe¢ cient of the individual bank dummy
variable, which is specied as follows:
ai (

t ) = ai + aiT   t + aiTT  ( t )
2 + aiTTT  ( t )
3 : (3.1.1.2.1b)
The purpose of this specication is to make the coe¢ cient time-varying and




(j 2 fSL;LL; S; C; CL;A;
DD; TD;CM;CD;L;Kg) are the linear coe¢ cients of the nancial goods











j 2 fSL;LL; S; C; CL;A;DD; TD;CM;CD;L;Kg ; (3.1.1.2.1c)
where zQh;i;t (h = 1; : : : ;MZ) are the quality variables whose combinations can
vary according to each nancial good and each factor price.2
By taking the partial derivative of the static variable cost function in
Eq. (3.1.1.2.1a) with respect to ln (pj;i;t /pV;i;t ) (j 2 fL;Kg), we can derive
the cost share equations of labor and physical capital. By simultaneously
estimating these cost share equations with the static variable cost function
in Eq. (3.1.1.2.1a), we can obtain a more e¢ cient estimate than if we estimate
Eq. (3.1.1.2.1a) alone.
2For details, see the second note in Table 4.1.1.
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The static cost share equations take the form
Shi;t =
ph;i;t










































	 2  ln  pj;i;t pV;i;t + j	 1
+
X
bQPjh  ln qj;i;t
j2fSL;LL;S;C;CL;A;DD;TD;CM;CDg
+ bPThT   t
35+ "hi;t; h 2 fK;Lg ,
(3.1.1.2.2)















, where xh;i;t is the input of the h-th fac-
tor), and "hi;t (h 2 fK;Lg) are the ordinary error terms.













































































































where mini ai ( t ) is the minimum of ai (

t ) in year t and all others are as
per the static variable cost function in Eq. (3.1.1.2.1a). Using this equation,
data for the discrepancy between the logarithm of the actual variable cost







) can be created.
The specication of the discrepancy between the actual variable cost and
the static frontier variable cost function in Eq. (3.1.1.1.2) needs to consider
the following conditions: First, the ine¢ ciency coe¢ cients can vary according
to each individual bank. Second, their coe¢ cients are time-varying. Third,
to restrict the ine¢ ciency coe¢ cient aSIEi;M;t (M = K) to the range [0; b], the
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following equation is used:





where b is an extremely large value (i.e., b = 10000000),  (  ) is the standard
normal distribution function, and aSIEi;K;t is the ine¢ ciency coe¢ cient to be
estimated. Fourth, to restrict the ine¢ ciency coe¢ cients bSIEi;j;t (= a
SIE
i;j;t  




(i.e., aSIEi;j;t 2 [0; b], j = V; L), the
following equations are used:














; j = V; L;
(3.1.1.2.4b)
where bSIEi;j;t (j = V; L) are the ine¢ ciency coe¢ cients to be estimated, and
all others are as per aSIEi;M;t (M = K). From these conditions, the ine¢ ciency
coe¢ cients aSIEi;K;t , b
SIE
i;j;t (j = V; L), and a
SIE















































i;j   t

















; j = V; L;
(3.1.1.2.4e)
where zQh;i;t (h = 1; : : : ;MZ) are the quality variables in Eq. (3.1.1.2.1c) whose
combinations can vary according to each factor input. If Eq. (3.1.1.1.2) with
Eqs. (3.1.1.2.4a) to (3.1.1.2.4d) are estimated, then aSIEi;j;t (j = V; L) are
derived from Eq. (3.1.1.2.4e). CSSFVi;j;t (j = V; L) are the right-hand side
other than the ordinary error terms of Eq. (3.1.1.2.2).
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3.1.1.3 Static Cost Unneutral E¢ ciency
From Eqs. (3.1.1.2.3), (3.1.1.2.4a) to (3.1.1.2.4e), and Homma (2018, Def-
initions 2 to 4, pp. 9-12), the static cost e¢ ciency dened by Homma (2018,

























































/@pi;j;t , j 2 fV; L;Kg)
are the static factor demand functions referred to in Homma (2018, Denition
3, pp. 10-11).
The di¤erence between this static cost e¢ ciency and existing ones is that
the former is cost unneutral, while the latter is cost neutral. Because the
static cost unneutral e¢ ciency has fewer theoretical restrictions, it is more
desirable than the existing cost neutral ones that have the same ine¢ ciency
coe¢ cient for all static factor demand functions.
3.1.2 Dynamic Variable Cost Functions and Dynamic Cost E¢ -
ciency
3.1.2.1 The Relation Between the Dynamic Actual and Frontier
Variable Cost Functions and the Estimation Procedure for the In-
e¢ ciency Coe¢ cients
Similar to Proposition 1, the relation between the dynamic actual and
frontier variable cost functions is claried by the following proposition:
Proposition 2 The dynamic actual variable cost function is related to the
16



































where CDAVi (  ;  ;  ;  ;  ;  ;  ) is the dynamic actual variable cost function
dened by Homma (2018, Denition 7, pp. 18-19), CDFVi (  ;  ;  ;  ;  ;  ) is
the dynamic frontier variable cost function dened by Homma (2018, Den-
ition 6, p. 17), aDIEi;j;t (j = 1; : : : ;M) are the ine¢ ciency coe¢ cients of dy-
namic factor demand functions (xDFDi;j (  ;  ;  ;  ;  ;  ), j = 1; : : : ;M) given
by Homma (2018, Denition 7, pp. 18-19), and CSDFVi;j (  ;  ;  ;  ;  ;  )
(=

pi;j;t  xDFDi;j (  ;  ;  ;  ;  ;  )
 
CDFVi (  ;  ;  ;  ;  ;  ) , j = 1; : : : ;M) are
the dynamic cost shares of optimal inputs for cost minimization.
Proof. The proof of this proposition is similar to the proof of Proposition
1, so we omit the derivation.
Similar to the ine¢ ciency coe¢ cients of the static factor demand func-
tions, those of the dynamic factor demand functions are estimated according
to the following procedure: First, the dynamic frontier variable cost func-
tion is estimated, and the data for the discrepancy between the logarithm of
actual variable cost and the logarithm of the dynamic frontier variable cost



















bDIEi;j;t  CSDFVi;j;t + "DFVi;t ; (3.1.2.1.2)
where bDIEi;j;t = a
DIE









, and "DFVi;t is an ordinary error term.
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3.1.2.2 Specication of the Dynamic Variable Cost Function and
the Ine¢ ciency Coe¢ cients
In order to explicitly account for the e¤ects of the Herndahl index of loans
in the previous period and static cost unneutral e¢ ciency in the previous
period, Eqs. (3.1.1.2.1b) and (3.1.1.2.1c) are respectively replaced as follows:
ai
 




= ai + a
EF








= aj + a
EF














= aj + a
SIE






j 2 fL;Kg ; (3.1.2.2.1c)
where HIL;t 1 is the Herndahl index of loans (i.e., the sum of the short-term
and long-term loans) in the previous period, EF Si;t 1 is the static cost unneu-
tral e¢ ciency in the previous period, ASIEi;j;t 1 (j 2 fL;Kg) are the ine¢ ciency
coe¢ cients of the static factor demand functions in the previous period, and
all others are as per Eqs. (3.1.1.2.1b) and (3.1.1.2.1c). The specications
other than Eqs. (3.1.2.2.1a) to (3.1.2.2.1c) of the dynamic variable cost func-
tion, the dynamic cost share equations, and the dynamic frontier variable
cost function are respectively similar to Eqs. (3.1.1.2.1a), (3.1.1.2.2), and
(3.1.1.2.3) other than Eqs. (3.1.1.2.1b) and (3.1.1.2.1c). Using this dynamic
frontier variable cost function, data for the discrepancy between the loga-
rithm of the actual variable cost and the logarithm of the dynamic frontier







EF Si;t 1;  i;t

) can be created.
Similar to Eqs. (3.1.1.2.4a) to (3.1.1.2.4e), the ine¢ ciency coe¢ cients in
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Eq. (3.1.2.1.2) are specied as follows:


























(M = K) ; (3.1.2.2.2a)
















































































































































(j = V; L) ; (3.1.2.2.2c)
where all parameters, functions, and variables are as per Eqs. (3.1.1.2.4a) to
(3.1.1.2.4e), and (3.1.2.2.1a).
3.1.2.3 Dynamic Cost Unneutral E¢ ciency
From the above dynamic frontier variable cost function, Eqs. (3.1.2.2.2a)
to (3.1.2.2.2c), and Homma (2018, Denitions 6 to 8, pp. 17-20), the dynamic
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is the dynamic fron-
tier variable cost function, aDIEi;j
 
EF Si;t 1; HIL;t 1;  t

(j 2 fV; L;Kg) are ex-



















/@pi;j;t , j 2 fV; L;Kg) are the dynamic factor demand functions referred
to in Homma (2018, Denition 7, pp. 18-19).
The di¤erence between this dynamic cost e¢ ciency and the existing ones
can be described as follows: First, the former is formulated to dynamically
account for the e¤ects of the Herndahl index in the previous period and
the static cost e¢ ciency in the previous period, so it can explicitly account
for both the e¢ cient structure and quiet-life hypotheses; however, the latter
cannot. Second, the former is cost unneutral, while the latter is cost neutral.
Because the former has important policy implications and fewer theoretical
restrictions, it is more desirable than the latter.
3.1.3 Utility Functions and Stochastic Euler Equations
3.1.3.1 Specications of Utility Functions
The following three points need to be considered in the specication of
the utility function used in Homma (2018, Eq. (2.2.2.2), p. 30): First,
although it is di¢ cult to directly estimate the utility function, it is possible
to indirectly estimate it through the stochastic Euler equations derived by
20
Homma (2018, Theorems 1 and 2, pp. 34-37). Second, it is not desirable for
the nal empirical results to heavily depend on the restrictive functional form
of the utility function, which has numerous theoretical restrictions assumed a
priori. Third, it is possible for the risk attitude of banks on the cost frontier
(i.e., the most e¢ cient banks) to di¤er from that of banks on the actual cost.
From the rst and second points, considering the restriction on estimation
in the rst point, it is desirable to specify the utility function by as exible a
functional form as possible. Furthermore, from the third point, it is necessary
to specify the risk attitude of banks on the cost frontier by di¤erentiating it
from that of banks on the actual cost.
In consideration of these points, the utility function of banks on the cost






























where uF (  ;  ) is the utility function of banks on the cost frontier, QSFi;t
is the quasi-short-run prot based on the dynamic frontier cost dened by
Homma ( 2018, Denition 9, pp. 25-26), F is the parameter established
taking into account the possibility that the QSFi;t becomes negative, and qe;i;t
is the equity capital given by Homma (2018, Eq. (2.2.2.5), p. 31).
Here, F is the risk attitude parameter of banks on the cost frontier.













where DYs is the period dummy variable for cases where the period covered
by the analysis is split into several sub-periods (i.e., the dummy variable
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equals 1 in period s and 0 in the other periods); sin2 (  ) is the square of a
sine function, and Fs is the risk attitude parameter to be estimated. This
replacement introduces the following restriction:





Although this restriction excludes the risk-lover case (i.e., Fs > 1), it is
imposed for two reasons: First, it is unrealistic for such a case to actually oc-
cur. Second, in case of no restriction, it often happens that
F  is extremely
large. From Eqs. (3.1.3.1.1) and (3.1.3.1.2), 1   Fs indicates the degree of
relative risk-aversion, which is expressed as
























Here, 0  Fs < 1 (= 1) (i.e., 1   Fs > 0 (= 0)) indicates risk-averse (risk-
neutral).
In order to interpret Fe and 
F
























and uFE (qe;i;t) are respectively the unit utilities of the
quasi-short-run prot based on the dynamic frontier cost and equity capital.
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 uFE (qe;i;t) :
(3.1.3.1.6)


































From Eq. (3.1.3.1.7b), Fe indicates the cross e¤ect of the two unit utilities.
From Eq. (3.1.3.1.7a), Fe demonstrates the subtraction of the product of
this cross e¤ect and the unit utility of the quasi-short-run prot based on
the dynamic frontier cost from the marginal e¤ect of the unit utility of the
equity capital. Similar to F , taking into account the possibility that the
value of Fe varies depending on the period, 
F




Fe;s DYs . (3.1.3.1.8)
If Fe = 0, then the unit utility of the quasi-short-run prot based on the
dynamic frontier cost is separable from that of the equity capital, meaning
their marginal utilities are independent of each other. However, if Fe 6= 0,
then they are mutually dependent.
Next, similar to the utility function of banks on the cost frontier, the
utility function of banks on the actual cost is specied by using the Box-Cox
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F   DA 
(qe;i;t)
F DA   1
F   DA ;
(3.1.3.1.9)
where uA (  ;  ) is the utility function of banks on the actual cost, QSAi;t
is the quasi-short-run prot based on the dynamic actual cost dened by
Homma ( 2018, Denition 10, pp. 26-27), and A is, similar to 
F
 , the
parameter determined when taking into account the possibility that QSAi;t
becomes negative.
Here, DA is the di¤erence parameter indicating the di¤erence from F .
Taking into account the possibility that its value varies depending on the












In this case, DAs is the di¤erence between the degree of relative risk-aversion




) and that of banks on the
cost frontier (i.e., 1 Fs ). If DAs > (=; <) 0, then the former is greater than
(equal to, less than) the latter.
Furthermore, DAe is the additive parameter to 
F
e , and 
DA
e is the ad-
ditive parameter to Fe. Similar to 
F
e , taking into account the possibility




DAe;s DYs . (3.1.3.1.11)
Similar to Fe and 
F































and uAE (qe;i;t) are respectively the unit utilities of the
quasi-short-run prot based on the dynamic actual cost and the equity cap-
ital.



























 uAE (qe;i;t) : (3.1.3.1.13)












































From Eq. (3.1.3.1.14b), Fe + 
DA
e indicates the cross e¤ect of the two unit
utilities; thus, DAe demonstrates the subtraction of Eq. (3.1.3.1.7b) from this
cross e¤ect. From Eq. (3.1.3.1.14a), Fe +
DA
e indicates the subtraction of the
product of this cross e¤ect and the unit utility of the quasi-short-run prot
based on the dynamic actual cost from the marginal e¤ect of the unit utility
of the equity capital. Therefore, DAe is the subtraction of Eq. (3.1.3.1.7a)
from this subtraction. If Fe + 
DA
e = 0, then the unit utility of the quasi-
short-run prot based on the dynamic actual cost is separable from that of
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the equity capital, so their marginal utilities are independent on each other.
However, if Fe+
DA
e 6= 0, then they are mutually dependent. Furthermore, if
DA = DAe = 
DA




 , then u
A (  ;  ) = uF (  ;  ). However, if
at least one of these assumptions is not supported, then uA (  ;  ) 6= uF (  ;  ).
Especially, if DA 6= 0, then the risk attitude of banks on the cost frontier is
di¤erent from that of banks on the actual cost.
3.1.3.2 Specications of Stochastic Euler Equations
For the subjective rate of time preference (hereafter SRTP) rDi;t, which
appears directly in Homma (2018, Eq. (2.2.2.2), p. 30) and indirectly in
Homma (2018, Theorems 1 and 2, Eqs. (2.2.3.1) and (2.2.3.2), pp. 34-
37), rather than using the existing interest rate data a priori, we consider
estimating the SRTP indirectly through the stochastic Euler equations in
Homma (2018, Theorems 1 and 2, Eqs. (2.2.3.1) and (2.2.3.2), pp. 34-37),
just as we did with the utility function. The reason for this is that, as can
be seen in Homma (2018, Eqs. (2.2.3.4) to (2.2.3.10), pp. 39-44), the SRTP
plays an important role in classifying nancial goods as outputs or inputs,
so that estimating the SRTP that is most suitable for the GURM is more
desirable than trying to forcibly relate the existing interest rate data to our




2 (s)  rCRt ; (3.1.3.2.1)
where rDi;t = r
D
t implies that the SRTP is identical for all banks. The reason
for this is two-fold: First, if this is not assumed, then the estimation of
the stochastic Euler equations becomes somewhat di¢ cult. Second, even
though this is assumed, the reference rates in Homma (2018, Eqs. (2.2.3.4)
to (2.2.3.7), pp. 39-42) can vary according to each bank. Here, s is the
parameter to be estimated, and rCRt is the call rate, which is the interest rate
for the most representative interbank market in Japan. If sin2 (s) 6= 1, then
rDt is di¤erent from r
CR
t . In this case, 0  sin2 (s) < 1, regarding rCRt , as rDt
overestimates its value.
From Eqs. (3.1.3.1.1) and (3.1.3.1.9), because the utility functions of
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banks on the cost frontier and the banks on actual cost are di¤erent, the
respective stochastic Euler equations using these are estimated. From Eq.
(3.1.3.1.9), the specication of the utility function of banks with respect to
the actual cost uses the parameters of the banks on the cost frontier. For this
reason, the stochastic Euler equations using the utility functions of banks on
the cost frontier are estimated; next, taking these estimated parameters as
given, the stochastic Euler equations using the utility functions of banks on
the actual cost are estimated.
In these cases, the stochastic Euler equations in Homma (2018, Theo-
rems 1 and 2, Eqs. (2.2.3.1) and (2.2.3.2), pp. 34-37) are expressed with
an expectation operator or integral sign, so that it is extremely di¢ cult to
estimate these equations as is.For this reason, we consider deriving estima-
tion equations in a form that does not depend on an expectation operator or
integral sign. First, we transform the stochastic Euler equations in Homma (
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2018, Theorems 1 and 2, Eqs. (2.2.3.1) and (2.2.3.2), pp. 34-37) as follows:3
1 =






























(j = 1; : : : ; NA +NL) ; (3.1.3.2.2)
1 =






























bj  pG;t 

1 + (bj  pG;t) 1 MCDAVi;j;t  MRSAe;i;t
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 zi;t = Z
Z
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 zi;t = Z
Z
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 zi;tiQ (zi;t;dzi;t+1) :
Next, from these equations, Eqs. (3.1.3.2.2) and (3.1.3.2.3) can be expressed
3For the purpose of simplication, hereafter the symbol *in Homma (2018, Theorems





24 1 + bC   hRi;j;t + i;j;t










 i;j;t+1   E

 i;j;t+1
 zi;t  @uFi;t+1.@QSFi;t+1   E h@uFi;t+1.@QSFi;t+1  zi;ti





 1]Q (zi;t;dzi;t+1) = 0; j = 1; : : : ; NA +NL; (3.1.3.2.4)Z
Z
24 1 + bC   hRi;j;t + i;j;t










 i;j;t+1   E

 i;j;t+1
 zi;t  @uAi;t+1.@QSAi;t+1   E h@uAi;t+1.@QSAi;t+1  zi;ti






bj  pG;t 

1 + (bj  pG;t) 1 MCDAVi;j;t  MRSAe;i;t
	   1#Q (zi;t;dzi;t+1) = 0;
j = 1; : : : ; NA +NL: (3.1.3.2.5)
Consequently, we consider making the expression inside the brackets the esti-














). From Homma (2018, Theorems 1 and 2, Eqs. (2.2.3.1)
and (2.2.3.2), pp. 34-37), E

 i;j;t+1
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where DBi is the individual bank dummy variable, zi;t is the vector of ex-
ogenous (state) variables a¤ecting @uFi;t+1
.
@QSFi;t+1 , b
MU is the vector of co-
e¢ cients corresponding to the exogenous (state) variables, and "MUFi;t+1 is the












 zi;ti = bMUA  X
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@QSAi;t+1   bMUA 
 X
i


























) is the parameter to be estimated,
which assumes that this ratio is constant, "MUAi;t+1 is the ordinary error term,
and all others are as per Eqs. (3.1.3.2.6a) and (3.1.3.2.6b). Regarding



























j = 1; : : : ; NA +NL; (3.1.3.2.8b)
HIj;t 1 (j = 1; : : : ; NA+NL) are the Herndahl indices corresponding to each
nancial good, and all others are as per Eqs. (3.1.1.2.4c) and (3.1.2.2.2a).
Taking into account the above considerations, the estimation equations
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inside the brackets are expressed as follows:4


































 1 = "EUFj;i;t+1; j = SL;LL; S; C; CL;A;DD; TD;CM;CD; (3.1.3.2.9)

















@QSAi;t+1   bMUA 
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bj  pG;t 






 1 = "EUAj;i;t+1; j = SL;LL; S; C; CL;A;DD; TD;CM;CD; (3.1.3.2.10)
where "EUFj;i;t+1 and "
EUA
j;i;t+1 (j = SL;LL; S; C; CL;A;DD; TD;CM;CD) are the
ordinary error terms, and all others are as per the above equations. From
Homma (2012, Eq. (6.2.1.1), p. 72) and Homma (2018, Eq. (2.2.3.8), p. 42),






















j;i;t   hDj;i;t (j = S;A)
0 (j = C)











+ hIj;i;t + r
D
i;t  j;i;t   hSj;i;t (j = DD;TD)
,
(3.1.3.2.11)






























(j = SL;LL;DD; TD)






j;s DYs is the parameterization of the conjectural derivative (i.e.,XNF
k 6=i
@qj;k;t /@qj;i;t ). Essentially, the conjectural derivative di¤ers for each
individual bank and for each scal year. However, with a simple parameteri-
zation, making this type of estimate is impossible. For this reason, we assume
that the conjectural derivative is identical for all of the banks and that it is
identical in each of the several sub-periods split from the period covered by
the analysis. Where these types of assumptions are made, the number of pa-
rameters to be estimated is limited to the number of sub-periods. To avoid
the identication problem, j;s (j = SL;LL;DD; TD) are obtained by the

















j;i;t; j = SL;LL;DD; TD; (3.1.3.2.13)
where Qj; i;t (j = SL;LL;DD; TD) are the total j-th nancial goods in the
j-th nancial goods market other than the j-th nancial good of the i-th bank
(i.e., qj;i;t), "CVj;i;t (j = SL;LL;DD; TD) are the ordinary error terms, and all
others are as per Eq. (3.1.3.2.8b). From Eqs. (3.1.3.1.1) and (3.1.3.1.9), the
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From Eq. (3.1.2.1.1), MCDAVj;i;t (j = SL;LL; S; C; CL;A;DD; TD;CM;CD)































@ ln qj;i;t@ ln pi;h;t
#
;
j = SL;LL; S; C; CL;A;DD; TD;CM;CD; (3.1.3.2.16a)
where, from Eqs. (3.1.1.2.3), and (3.1.2.2.1a) to (3.1.2.2.1c), CDFVi;t , @ lnC
DFV
i;t
/@ ln qj;i;t , and @2 lnCDFVi;t /@ ln qj;i;t@ ln pi;h;t (j = SL;LL; S; C; CL;A;DD;
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+ bQTjT   t ;
j = SL;LL; S; C; CL;A;DD; TD;CM;CD; (3.1.3.2.16c)
@2 lnCDFVi;t
@ ln qj;i;t@ ln pi;h;t
=
ph;i;t
ph;i;t + h  pV;i;t
 bQPjh ;
j = SL;LL; S; C; CL;A;DD; TD;CM;CD: (3.1.3.2.16d)













j = SL;LL; S; C; CL;A;DD; TD;CM;CD; (3.1.3.2.16e)
whereCDFVi;t and @ lnC
DFV
i;t /@ ln qj;i;t (j = SL;LL; S; C; CL;A;DD; TD;CM;
CD) are respectively given by Eqs. (3.1.3.2.16b) and (3.1.3.2.16c). Fur-
thermore, from Eq. (3.1.3.2.1), the subjective discount factor (i.e., i;t) is
obtained as






1 + s  rCRt

: (3.1.3.2.17)
Finally, from Homma (2012, Eq. (6.2.1.18), p. 81), the uncertainty factors







j;i;t+1   Dj;i;t+1 (j = SL;LL)
Sj;i;t+1 + 
C
j;i;t+1   Dj;i;t+1 (j = S;A)









All estimations in this paper use the Free Time Series Processor Ver.5.1
(hereafter FTSP Ver.5.1) (Clint Cummins (google.com)). FTSP Ver.5.1 was
chosen because of its strength in nonlinear estimation and its ability to easily
estimate implicit equations such as the stochastic Euler equations in Eqs.
(3.1.3.2.9) and (3.1.3.2.10).
The estimation of the empirical model described in the previous sub-
section is executed in six stages. In the rst stage, to obtain hRj;i;t and
j;i;t+1 (j = SL;LL; S; C; CL;A;DD; TD;CM;CD) in Eqs. (3.1.3.2.9) and
(3.1.3.2.10), as in Homma (2012, Eq. (6.2.1.1), p. 72), the actual SDEHRR
or SDEHCR (Hj;i;t+1) at the end of scal year t (= the beginning of scal
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year t + 1) is broken down into the certain or predictable components at
the beginning of scal year t (hRj;i;t) and the uncertain or unpredictable com-
ponents at the end of scal year t (j;i;t+1). Basically, H
k
j;i;t+1 (k = R;Q;
j = SL;LL;DD; TD) and HDj;i;t+1 (j = SL;LL) in Homma (2012, p. 73,
p. 75, pp. 78-79) are respectively estimated using multivariate regression
analyses of the modied equations that add the Herndahl index of each
nancial good in the previous period and the static cost unneutral e¢ ciency
in the previous period to the independent variables in Homma (2012, Eqs.
(6.2.3.1.6a), (6.2.3.1.6b), (6.2.3.1.7a), (6.2.3.1.7b), and (6.2.3.2.3), pp. 73-87,
pp. 111-122), broken down into the certain or predictable components of the
independent variables and the uncertain or unpredictable components of the
error term. The other components of Hj;i;t+1 (j = S;CL;A;CM;CD) are
broken down into hRj;i;t and j;i;t+1, as shown in Homma (2012, pp. 72-87, pp.
111-122).
In the second stage, to obtain the static frontier variable cost function in
Eq. (3.1.1.2.3), the static variable cost function in Eq. (3.1.1.2.1a) is simul-
taneously estimated with the static cost share equations in Eq. (3.1.1.2.2)
by the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM). In this case, three poten-
tial problems in the estimation are addressed. First, the conditional het-
eroskedasticity of the error term is explicitly controlled. Second, autocorre-
lation is corrected when found. This is of particular importance because our
panel data have a large T (time period). When including the moving average
of the error term in the estimate of the covariance matrix of the orthogonality
conditions, we use Bartletts spectral density kernel proposed by Newey and
West (1987) in order to guarantee that the estimate of the covariance matrix
is a positive denite matrix. Furthermore, it is assumed that the moving
average has a degree of three. Third, the endogeneity of some variables is
taken into account by using di¤erent instrumental variables for each equation.
These instrumental variables are the individual bank dummies, the products
of these dummies and the normalized time trend, the products of these dum-
mies and its square, the products of these dummies and its cube, and the
logarithms of the nancial goods in the previous period and the factor prices
in the current period for all equations, the endogenous quality variables in the
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previous period, and the exogenous quality variables in the current period for
all static cost share equations, the products of these quality variables and the
logarithms of the factor prices in the current period, and the products of re-
gional dummies and their logarithms for the static variable cost function and
each static cost share equation, the products of the logarithms of the nancial
goods in the previous period and their quality variables, the products of the
logarithms of their nancial goods and the regional dummies, the products of
two logarithms of their nancial goods, the products of the logarithms of their
nancial goods and factor prices, the products of the logarithms of their -
nancial goods and the normalized time trend, the products of two logarithms
of their factor prices, the products of the logarithms of their factor prices and
the normalized time trend, and other control dummies for the static variable
cost function. Using the static frontier variable cost function resulting from
this estimation, data for the discrepancy between the logarithm of the actual
variable cost and the logarithm of the static frontier variable cost function








) are created. Furthermore,




, j = V; L;K) are estimated ac-
cording to Eqs. (3.1.1.1.2), and (3.1.1.2.4a) to (3.1.1.2.4e). The details of
this estimation are explained in the next subsection. Using these estimation
results, the static cost unneutral e¢ ciency in Eq. (3.1.1.3) is obtained.
In the third stage, to obtain the dynamic frontier variable cost function
in Eq. (3.1.3.2.16b) and the dynamic frontier marginal variable costs in
Eq. (3.1.3.2.16e), the dynamic variable cost function explained in Subsec-
tion 3.1.2.2 is simultaneously estimated with the dynamic cost share equa-
tions explained in the same subsection by GMM. Similar to the estimation
of the static variable cost function in the second stage, this estimation takes
into account the conditional heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation of the
error terms. For the instrumental variables, in addition to those used in
the estimation of the static variable cost function in the second stage (other
than the products of the individual bank dummies and the square of the
normalized time trend, and the products of these dummies and their cube),
the following variables are used: the products of the individual bank dum-
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mies and the static cost unneutral e¢ ciency in the previous period, and the
products of these dummies and the Herndahl index of loans in the pre-
vious period for all equations, the ine¢ ciency coe¢ cients of static factor
demand functions in the previous period for each dynamic cost share equa-
tion, the Herndahl index of loans in the previous period for all dynamic
cost share equations, the products of the logarithms of the factor prices in
the current period and the ine¢ ciency coe¢ cients of static factor demand
functions in the previous period, and the products of the logarithms of their
factor prices and the Herndahl index of loans in the previous period for
the dynamic variable cost function and each dynamic cost share equation,
the products of the logarithms of the nancial goods in the previous pe-
riod and the static cost unneutral e¢ ciency in the previous period, and the
products of the logarithms of their nancial goods and the Herndahl in-
dex of loans in the previous period for the dynamic variable cost function.
Using the dynamic frontier variable cost function resulting from this estima-
tion, data for the discrepancy between the logarithm of the actual variable














ated. Furthermore, the ine¢ ciency coe¢ cients (aDIEi;j
 
EF Si;t 1; HIL;t 1;  t

,
j = V; L;K) are estimated according to Eqs. (3.1.2.1.2), and (3.1.2.2.2a) to
(3.1.2.2.2c). The details of this estimation are explained in the next sub-
section. Using these estimation results, the dynamic cost unneutral e¢ -
ciency in Eq. (3.1.2.3) and the dynamic actual marginal variable costs in Eq.
(3.1.3.2.16a) are obtained.
In the fourth stage, the conjectural derivative parameters (j;s, j =
SL;LL;DD; TD, s = 1; : : : ; NY , N
Y
 = 5; 6; or 7) are obtained by the esti-
mations of Eq. (3.1.3.2.13). These estimations are individually executed by
GMM. Similar to the estimation of the dynamic variable cost function in the
third stage, this estimation takes into account the conditional heteroskedas-
ticity and autocorrelation of the error terms. It is assumed that the degrees
of the moving averages are respectively eight, fteen, nine, and eight for the
equations (j = SL;LL;DD; TD). For the instrumental variables, the follow-
ing variables are used: the individual bank dummies, the products of these
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dummies and the normalized time trend, the products of these dummies and
the Herndahl index of each nancial good in the previous period, the static
cost unneutral e¢ ciency in the previous period, the Herndahl index of each
nancial good in the previous period, each nancial good in the previous pe-
riod, the endogenous quality variables in the previous period, the exogenous
quality variables in the current period, and the products of period dummies
and each nancial good in the previous period.
In the fth stage, the stochastic Euler equations using the utility functions
of banks on the cost frontier in Eq. (3.1.3.2.9) are simultaneously estimated
by GMM only for j = SL;LL;C;CL;DD; TD. The reasons for this limita-
tion are as follows: First, the simultaneous estimation for all nancial goods
(j = SL;LL; S; C; CL;A;DD; TD;CM;CD) exceeds the practical capac-
ity of my computer. Second, the limited simultaneous estimation only for
j = SL;LL;C;CL;DD; TD can produce the estimates of all the parameters
in Eq. (3.1.3.2.9), although the e¢ ciency of the estimation decreases. Similar
to the estimation in the fourth stage, this estimation takes into account the
conditional heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation of the error terms. It is
assumed that the degree of the moving average is two. For the instrumental
variables, the following variables are used: the individual bank dummies, the
static cost unneutral e¢ ciency in the previous period, the Herndahl index
of loans in the previous period, the estimates of the dynamic actual variable
costs in the current and next periods, the period dummies, the interest rates
of some nancial goods, some exogenous components of the actual SDE-
HCR for time deposits, some endogenous quality variables in the previous
period, some exogenous quality variables in the current period, and the call
rates in the previous and current periods for all stochastic Euler equations,
the products of the individual bank dummies and the estimates of the dy-
namic frontier marginal variable costs with respect to some nancial goods,
the estimates of the dynamic actual marginal variable costs with respect to
some nancial goods, the market shares of some nancial goods in the pre-
vious period, the elasticities of the certain or predictable components of the
SDEHRRs and SDEHCRs for some nancial goods with respect to the total
market balances in the next period, these certain or predictable components
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in the same period, the uncertainty components of the actual SDEHRRs
and SDEHCRs for some nancial goods, and some exogenous components of
the actual SDEHCRs of demand and time deposits for each stochastic Euler
equation.
In the last stage, taking the estimated parameters in the fth stage as
given, the stochastic Euler equations using the utility functions of banks on
the actual cost in Eq. (3.1.3.2.10) are simultaneously estimated by GMM
only for j = SL;LL;DD; TD. The reasons of this limitation are the same as
those for the fth stage. For the remaining stochastic Euler equations (j =
S;C;CL;A;CM;CD), taking the estimated parameters in this simultaneous
estimation as given, only "Pi;j;t (j = S;C;CL;A;CM;CD) in Eq. (3.1.3.2.8b)
are individually estimated by GMM. Similar to the estimation in the fth
stage, these estimations take into account the conditional heteroskedasticity
and autocorrelation of the error terms. For the instrumental variables in the
simultaneous estimation, in addition to those in the estimation in the fth
stage, the following variables are used: the products of the individual bank
dummies and the estimate of the quasi-short-run prot based on the dynamic
frontier cost, the estimates of the quasi-short-run prots based on the dy-
namic actual costs in the current and next periods, the equity capital in the
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Euler equations, and the Herndahl indices corresponding to each nancial
good for each stochastic Euler equation. For the instrumental variables of
the single estimations, the following variables are used: the individual bank
dummies, the products of these dummies and the normalized time trend,
the products of these dummies and the estimate of the quasi-short-run prot
based on the dynamic frontier cost, the products of these dummies and the
estimate of the dynamic frontier marginal variable cost with respect to the
nancial good concerned, the static cost unneutral e¢ ciency in the previous
period, the Herndahl index of loans in the previous period, the estimates
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of the dynamic actual variable costs in the current and next periods, the
estimates of the dynamic actual marginal variable costs with respect to some
nancial goods, the period dummies, the market shares of some nancial
goods in the previous period, the elasticities of the certain or predictable
components of the SDEHRRs and SDEHCRs for some nancial goods with
respect to the total market balances in the next period, these certain or pre-
dictable components in the same period, the uncertainty components of the
actual SDEHRRs and SDEHCRs for some nancial goods, some exogenous
components of the actual SDEHCRs of demand and time deposits, the inter-
est rates of some nancial goods, some exogenous components of the actual
SDEHCR for time deposits, some endogenous quality variables in the previ-
ous period, some exogenous quality variables in the current period, the call
rate, and the Herndahl indices close to each nancial good.
3.2.1 Estimation of Ine¢ ciency Coe¢ cients
The estimations of Eqs. (3.1.1.1.2) and (3.1.2.1.2) are executed in three steps.
In the rst step, the following equation is estimated:
yi;t = DF +DA  aIEi;K;t + "FVLV;i;t; (3.2.1.1)









DF is the frontier dummy (i.e., the dummy variable equals 1 if the bank
concerned is on the cost frontier and 0 if it is on the actual cost), DA is the
actual dummy (i.e., the dummy variable equals 1 if the bank concerned is
on the actual cost and 0 if it is on the cost frontier), aIEi;K;t is a
SIE










and "FVLV;i;t is the ordinary error term.
In the second step, the following equation is estimated:
"FVLV;i;t

CSFVi;L;t = DA  bIEi;L;t + "FVV;i;t; (3.2.1.2)



















in Eq. (3.1.2.1.2), and "FVV;i;t is the ordinary error term.




CSFVi;V;t = DA  bIEi;V;t + "FVB;i;t; (3.2.1.3)
where "FVV;i;t, CS
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in Eq. (3.1.1.1.2) and
CSDFVi;V;t and b
DIE




in Eq. (3.1.2.1.2), and "FVB;i;t is the
ordinary error term.
These estimations are executed by GMM. Similar to the estimations in
the previous subsection, these estimations take into account the conditional
heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation of the error terms. For instrumental
variables, the following variables are used: the individual bank dummies,
the products of these dummies and the estimate of the static cost share of
the current goods, and the products of these dummies and the normalized
time trend for Eqs. (3.2.1.1) to (3.2.1.3) in Eqs. (3.1.1.1.2) and (3.1.2.1.2),
the products of these dummies and some endogenous quality variables in
the previous period for Eqs. (3.2.1.1) to (3.2.1.3) in Eq. (3.1.1.1.2), the
products of these dummies and the estimate of the static cost share of the
physical capital, and the products of these dummies, the normalized time
trend, and this estimate for Eq. (3.2.1.1) in Eqs. (3.1.1.1.2) and (3.1.2.1.2),
the products of these dummies, quality variables, and this estimate for Eq.
(3.2.1.1) in Eq. (3.1.1.1.2), the products of these dummies and the estimate
of the static cost share of the labor, the products of these dummies, the
normalized time trend, and this estimate for Eq. (3.2.1.2) in Eqs. (3.1.1.1.2)
and (3.1.2.1.2), the products of these dummies, quality variables, and this
estimate for Eq. (3.2.1.2) in Eq. (3.1.1.1.2), the products of these dummies
and this estimate, the products of these dummies, the normalized time trend,
and the estimate of the static cost share of the current goods for Eq. (3.2.1.3)
in Eqs. (3.1.1.1.2) and (3.1.2.1.2), the products of these dummies, quality
variables, and this estimate for Eq. (3.2.1.3) in Eq. (3.1.1.1.2), the products
of these dummies and the static cost unneutral e¢ ciency in the previous
period, and the products of these dummies and the Herndahl index of loans
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in the previous period for Eqs. (3.2.1.1) to (3.2.1.3) in Eq. (3.1.2.1.2).
4 Estimation Results
4.1 Static Variable Cost Function and Static Cost Un-
neutral E¢ ciency
Tables 4.1.1 and 4.1.2 show the results for the simultaneous GMM estimation
of the static variable cost function in Eq. (3.1.1.2.1a) with the static cost
share equations in Eq. (3.1.1.2.2). Table 4.1.1 shows the estimates of the
parameters other than the coe¢ cients of the individual bank dummies in Eq.
(3.1.1.2.1b), while Table 4.1.2 shows the estimates of the coe¢ cients.
<<Insert Table 4.1.1 about here>>
<<Insert Table 4.1.2 about here>>
From Table 4.1.1, the following three points can be inferred. First,
the test statistic for the overidentication restriction is far from signicant
(p = 0:483). Therefore, we cannot reject the null hypothesis of overidentica-
tion. This means that the likelihood that there is an error in the specication
of the static variable cost function is small. Second, the number of parame-
ters with a p-value less than 0:1 is 190 out of 267 (i.e., the total number
of parameters), meaning that these parameters account for 71 percent of all
the parameters. Overall, then, this estimation result is highly reliable from
a statistical perspective. Third, the coe¢ cients of determination (R2) for all
equations are greater than 0:5, so there is no lack of explanatory power. Es-
pecially, the coe¢ cient of determination of the static variable cost function is
very high (above 0:99), making the specication of this cost function entirely
appropriate. In addition, from Table 4.1.2, the number of the parameters
with a p-value less than 0:1 is 355 out of 483, meaning that these parame-
ters account for 73 percent of all the parameters. This estimation result is,
therefore, highly reliable overall, similar to the case of Table 4.1.1. Conse-
quently, the static frontier variable cost function in Eq. (3.1.1.2.3) resulting
from these tables is also highly reliable from the same perspective.
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Tables 4.1.3 to 4.1.5 show the results for the GMM estimations of Eqs.
(3.2.1.1) to (3.2.1.3) composing Eq. (3.1.1.1.2), respectively.
<<Insert Table 4.1.3 about here>>
<<Insert Table 4.1.4 about here>>
<<Insert Table 4.1.5 about here>>
From these tables, the following two points can be inferred: First, similar
to Tables 4.1.1 and 4.1.2, the test statistics for the overidentication restric-
tion are far from signicant (the p-values are 0:300 in Table 4.1.3, 0:457 in
Table 4.1.4, and 0:456 in Table 4.1.5). Therefore, we cannot reject the null
hypothesis of overidentication. This means that the likelihood that there is
an error in the specication of the ine¢ ciency coe¢ cients in Eqs. (3.1.1.2.4c)
to (3.1.1.2.4e) is small. Second, also similar to Tables 4.1.1 and 4.1.2, the
total number of parameters for which the p-value is less than 0:1 in these
tables is 1032 (= 392+ 354+ 286) out of 1424 (= 480+ 472+ 472), meaning
that these parameters account for 72 percent of all the parameters. These
estimation results are, therefore, highly reliable overall from the perspective
of statistics. Consequently, the ine¢ ciency coe¢ cients in Eqs. (3.1.1.2.4c) to
(3.1.1.2.4e) resulting from these tables are also highly reliable from the same
perspective.
From the above, we can draw the following conclusion: The static cost
unneutral e¢ ciency in Eq. (3.1.1.3) resulting from the above tables is statis-
tically highly reliable.
Fig. 4.1.1 shows the static cost neutral and unneutral e¢ ciencies resulting
from the above tables.
<<Insert Fig. 4.1.1 about here>>
From this gure, the following three points can be made: First, the mean
of the static cost unneutral e¢ ciency is 0:319, indicating a large ine¢ ciency
in the Japanese regional banking industry. Second, the static cost unneutral
e¢ ciency is relatively stable compared to the static cost neutral e¢ ciency.
Third, the static cost unneutral e¢ ciency shows a falling trend for forty-three
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years. There is, therefore, a structural ine¢ ciency in the Japanese regional
banking industry whose substantial improvement is di¢ cult over the long
term.
4.2 Dynamic Variable Cost Function and Dynamic Cost
Unneutral E¢ ciency
Tables 4.2.1 and 4.2.2 show the results of the simultaneous GMM estimation
of the dynamic variable cost function explained in Subsection 3.1.2.2, with
the dynamic cost share equations explained in the same subsection. Table
4.2.1 gives the estimates of the parameters other than the coe¢ cients of the
individual bank dummies in Eq. (3.1.2.2.1a); Table 4.2.2 gives the estimates
of the coe¢ cients.
<<Insert Table 4.2.1 about here>>
<<Insert Table 4.2.2 about here>>
From Table 4.2.1, the following three inferences can be drawn: First, sim-
ilar to Table 4.1.1, the test statistic for the overidentication restriction is far
from signicant (p = 0:889). Therefore, we cannot reject the null hypothesis
of overidentication. This means that the likelihood that there is an error
in the specication of the dynamic variable cost function is small. Second,
the number of parameters for which the p-value is less than 0:1 is 215 out
of 272, meaning that these parameters account for 79 percent of all the pa-
rameters. Similar to Table 4.1.1, this estimation result is, therefore, highly
reliable overall from a statistical perspective. Third, also similar to Table
4.1.1, the coe¢ cients of determination (R2) for all equations are greater than
0:5, so there is no lack of explanatory power. In particular, the coe¢ cient of
determination of the dynamic variable cost function is very high (> 0:99),
making the specication of this cost function entirely appropriate. In ad-
dition, from Table 4.2.2, the number of parameters for which the p-value is
less than 0:1 is 368 out of 474, thus accounting for 78 percent of all the pa-
rameters. This estimation result is, therefore, highly reliable overall, similar
to Table 4.2.1. Consequently, the dynamic frontier variable cost function
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in Eq. (3.1.3.2.16b) and the dynamic frontier marginal variable costs in Eq.
(3.1.3.2.16e) resulting from these tables are also highly reliable from the same
perspective.
Tables 4.2.3 to 4.2.5 show the results for the GMM estimations of Eqs.
(3.2.1.1) to (3.2.1.3) composing Eq. (3.1.2.1.2), respectively.
<<Insert Table 4.2.3 about here>>
<<Insert Table 4.2.4 about here>>
<<Insert Table 4.2.5 about here>>
From these tables, the following two points can be inferred: First, similar
to Tables 4.2.1 and 4.2.2, the test statistics for the overidentication restric-
tion are far from signicant (the p-values are 0:589 in Table 4.2.3; 0:198 in
Table 4.2.4; and 0:346 in Table 4.2.5). Therefore, we cannot reject the null
hypothesis of overidentication. This means that the likelihood that there is
an error in the specication of the ine¢ ciency coe¢ cients in Eqs. (3.1.2.2.2a)
to (3.1.2.2.2c) is small. Second, also similar to Tables 4.2.1 and 4.2.2, the
total number of parameters with a p-value less than 0:1 in these tables is
1355 (= 467+451+437) out of 1425 (= 475+475+475), meaning that these
parameters account for 95 percent of all the parameters. These estimation
results are, therefore, highly reliable overall from the perspective of statistics.
Consequently, the ine¢ ciency coe¢ cients in Eqs. (3.1.2.2.2a) to (3.1.2.2.2c)
resulting from these tables are also highly reliable from the same perspective.
From the above, we can draw the following conclusion: The dynamic cost
unneutral e¢ ciency in Eq. (3.1.2.3) and the dynamic actual marginal variable
costs in Eq. (3.1.3.2.16a) resulting from the above tables are statistically
highly reliable.
Fig. 4.2.1 shows the dynamic cost neutral and unneutral e¢ ciencies re-
sulting from the above tables.
<<Insert Fig. 4.2.1 about here>>
From this gure, the following three points can be established: First,
similar to the static cost unneutral e¢ ciency in Fig. 4.1.1, the mean of the
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dynamic cost unneutral e¢ ciency is 0:311, meaning that there is a large inef-
ciency in the Japanese regional banking industry. Second, unlike the static
cost unneutral and neutral e¢ ciencies, the di¤erence between the dynamic
cost unneutral and neutral e¢ ciencies is small. The unneutrality has little
e¤ect on the dynamic cost e¢ ciency. Third, contrary to the static cost un-
neutral e¢ ciency, the dynamic cost unneutral e¢ ciency shows a rising trend
for forty-one years. However, the improvement of the dynamic cost unneu-
tral e¢ ciency is very small (i.e., less than 5%) over these forty-one years.
Therefore, even if we regard the economic behavior of regional banks as in-
tertemporally dynamic, structural ine¢ ciency is still observed. Under the
present conditions, it is very di¢ cult to drastically improve the dynamic cost
unneutral e¢ ciency of Japanese regional banks.
4.3 Conjectural Derivative Parameters
Tables 4.3.1 and 4.3.2 show the results for the GMM estimation of the conjec-
tural derivative parameters in Eq. (3.1.3.2.13) for short-term loans (j = SL).
Table 4.3.1 shows the estimates of the parameters other than the coe¢ cients
of the individual bank dummies; Table 4.3.2 shows the estimates of these
coe¢ cients. Similarly, Tables 4.3.3 and 4.3.4, Tables 4.3.5 and 4.3.6, and Ta-
bles 4.3.7 and 4.3.8 show the results for long-term loans (j = LL), demand
deposits (j = DD), and time deposits (j = TD), respectively.
<<Insert Table 4.3.1 about here>>
<<Insert Table 4.3.2 about here>>
<<Insert Table 4.3.3 about here>>
<<Insert Table 4.3.4 about here>>
<<Insert Table 4.3.5 about here>>
<<Insert Table 4.3.6 about here>>
<<Insert Table 4.3.7 about here>>
<<Insert Table 4.3.8 about here>>
From Table 4.3.1, we can infer the following: First, the test statistic for
the overidentication restriction is far from signicant (p = 0:255). There-
48
fore, we cannot reject the null hypothesis of overidentication. This means
that the likelihood that there is an error in the specication of the conjec-
tural derivative is small. Second, the number of the parameters for which the
p-value is less than 0:1 is 12 out of 13, accounting for 92 percent of all the
parameters. This estimation result is, therefore, highly reliable overall from
a statistical perspective. Third, the coe¢ cient of determination (R2) for this
equation is greater than 0:75; thus, there is no lack of explanatory power.
Fourth, the conjectural derivative parameters for all periods are signicantly
positive, so the relation between the bank concerned and rival banks is un-
conictive or cooperative. This relation is strongest in the 1987-1989 period
(i.e., the bubble period), but is weakest in the 1976-1986 period (i.e., before
the bubble period). In addition, from Table 4.3.2, all parameters are signi-
cant at the 1% level, indicating that this estimation result is, overall, highly
reliable, similar to the case in Table 4.3.1.
FromTable 4.3.3, we can make the following inferences: First, the test sta-
tistic for the overidentication restriction is far from signicant (p = 0:203),
so the likelihood that there is an error in the specication of the conjectural
derivative is small. Second, the parameters for which the p-value is less than
0:1 account for 77 percent of all parameters, indicating that this estimation
result is, overall, highly reliable from a statistical perspective. Third, the
coe¢ cient of determination (R2) for this equation is greater than 0:73, in-
dicating that there is no lack of explanatory power. Fourth, the conjectural
derivative parameter for the 1990-1995 period (i.e., after the bubble period
and before the nancial crisis and big bang period) is signicantly positive,
indicating that the relation between the bank concerned and rival banks is un-
conictive or cooperative. In contrast, the conjectural derivative parameters
for the 1996-2001 period (i.e., the nancial crisis and big bang period) and
the 2002-2007 period (i.e., after the nancial crisis and big bang period and
before the Lehman collapse and Great East Japan Earthquake period) are
signicantly negative, implying that the relation between the bank concerned
and rival banks is conictive. The conjectural derivative parameters for the
other periods are not signicant, making the bank concerned a Cournot rm.
In addition, from Table 4.3.4, the parameters showing a p-value less than 0:1
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account for 99 percent of all the parameters, indicating that this estimation
result is, overall, highly reliable, similar to Table 4.3.3.
From Table 4.3.5, the rst to third conclusions noted above are also sup-
ported. In addition, the conjectural derivative parameters for all periods
other than the 1992-1995 period (i.e., before the nancial crisis and big bang
period) are signicantly negative, so the relation between the bank concerned
and rival banks is conictive. Notably, this relation is strongest in the 1996-
2001 period (i.e., the nancial crisis and big bang period), but weakest in the
2011-2016 period (i.e., after the Great East Japan Earthquake period). The
conjectural derivative parameter for the 1992-1995 period is not signicant,
so the bank concerned is a Cournot rm. Furthermore, from Table 4.3.6,
all parameters are signicant at the 1% level, indicating that this estimation
result is, overall, highly reliable, similar to Table 4.3.5.
Finally, from Table 4.3.7, the rst to third conclusions above are similarly
supported. Moreover, the conjectural derivative parameters for the 1985-1989
period (i.e., before the bubble collapse), the 2002-2007 period, and the 2008-
2010 period (i.e., the Lehman collapse and Great East Japan Earthquake
period) are signicantly negative, so the relation between the bank concerned
and rival banks is conictive. However, the conjectural derivative parameters
for the other periods are not signicant, indicating that the bank concerned is
a Cournot rm. In addition, from Table 4.3.8, all parameters are signicant
at the 1% level, showing that this estimation result is, overall, highly reliable,
similar to Table 4.3.7.
4.4 Stochastic Euler Equations Using the Utility Func-
tions of Banks on the Cost Frontier
Tables 4.4.1 and 4.4.2 show the results for the simultaneous GMM estima-
tion of the stochastic Euler equations using the utility functions of banks on
the cost frontier in Eq. (3.1.3.2.9) for j = SL;LL;C;CL;DD; TD. Table
4.4.1 shows the estimates of the parameters other than the coe¢ cients of the
individual bank dummies in Eqs. (3.1.3.2.6a) and (3.1.3.2.6b); Table 4.4.2
shows the estimates of these coe¢ cients.
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<<Insert Table 4.4.1 about here>>
<<Insert Table 4.4.2 about here>>
From Table 4.4.1, we can make the following inferences: First, the test
statistic for the overidentication restriction is not at all signicant (p =
1:000). Therefore, we cannot reject the null hypothesis of overidentication.
The implication is that the likelihood that there is an error in the specication
of the stochastic Euler equations using the utility functions of banks on the
cost frontier is near zero. Second, the number of the parameters whose
p-value is less than 0:1 is 34 out of 39 (87%). This estimation result is,
therefore, highly reliable overall from a statistical perspective. Third, Fe in
Eq. (3.1.3.1.1) (i.e., the cross e¤ect of the unit utilities of the quasi-short-
run prot based on the dynamic frontier cost and the equity capital in Eq.
(3.1.3.1.7b)) is signicantly negative. This means that the unit utility of the
quasi-short-run prot based on the dynamic frontier cost is not separable
from that of the equity capital, so their marginal utilities are negatively
dependent on each other. Fourth, the parameters Fe;s (s = 1; : : : ; 7) other
than Fe;4 (i.e., 
F
e;s in the 1996-2001 period) in Eq. (3.1.3.1.8) are signicantly
positive. This means that the marginal e¤ect of the unit utility of equity
capital is greater than the product of the above cross e¤ect and the unit
utility of quasi-short-run prot based on the dynamic frontier cost in the
periods other than the 1996-2001 period. Fifth, 1   sin2 (s) (= 0:249) is
not signicant (t = 1:388), so rDt (i.e., the subjective rate of time preference)
is not statistically di¤erent from rCRt (i.e., the call rate). In addition, from
Table 4.4.2, all parameters are signicant at the 5% level, so this estimation
result is, overall, highly reliable, similar to Table 4.4.1.
4.5 Stochastic Euler Equations Using the Utility Func-
tions of Banks on the Actual Cost
Tables 4.5.1 to 4.5.5 show the results for the simultaneous GMM estimation
of the stochastic Euler equations using the utility functions of banks on the
actual cost in Eq. (3.1.3.2.10) for j = SL;LL;DD; TD, taking the estimated
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parameters in the previous subsection as given. Table 4.5.1 shows the esti-
mates of the parameters other than the parameters of "Pi;j;t in Eq. (3.1.3.2.8b);
Tables 4.5.2 to 4.5.5 show the estimates of the rest of the parameters. Sim-
ilarly, Tables 4.5.6 to 4.5.11 show the results for the GMM estimations of
"Pi;j;t in Eq. (3.1.3.2.8b) for j = S;C;CL;A;CM;CD, respectively, taking
the estimated parameters in this simultaneous estimation as given.
<<Insert Table 4.5.1 about here>>
<<Insert Table 4.5.2 about here>>
<<Insert Table 4.5.3 about here>>
<<Insert Table 4.5.4 about here>>
<<Insert Table 4.5.5 about here>>
<<Insert Table 4.5.6 about here>>
<<Insert Table 4.5.7 about here>>
<<Insert Table 4.5.8 about here>>
<<Insert Table 4.5.9 about here>>
<<Insert Table 4.5.10 about here>>
<<Insert Table 4.5.11 about here>>
From Table 4.5.1, the following ve points can be inferred: First, similar
to Table 4.4.1, the test statistic for the overidentication restriction is not at
all signicant (p = 1:000), so the likelihood that there is an error in the spec-
ication of the stochastic Euler equations using the utility functions of banks
on the actual cost is near zero. Second, the parameters for which the p-value
is less than 0:1 account for 94 percent of all the parameters (i.e., 16 out of 17),
so this estimation result is, overall, highly reliable from a statistical perspec-
tive. Third, DAs (s = 2; : : : ; 7) in Eq. (3.1.3.1.10) are signicantly positive,
so the degree of relative risk-aversion of banks on the actual cost is larger
than that of banks on the cost frontier in the periods other than the 1976-
1986 period (i.e., before the bubble period). Fourth, DAe;s (s = 1; : : : ; 5; 7) in
Eqs. (3.1.3.1.9) and (3.1.3.1.11) are signicantly negative, so Fe +
DA
e in Eq.
(3.1.3.1.14a) is smaller than Fe in Eq. (3.1.3.1.7a) in the periods other than
the 2008-2010 period (i.e., the Lehman collapse and Great East Japan Earth-
quake period). In contrast, DAe;6 in Eq. (3.1.3.1.11) is signicantly positive,
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so Fe + 
DA
e in Eq. (3.1.3.1.14a) is larger than 
F
e in Eq. (3.1.3.1.7a) in the
2008-2010 period. Furthermore, DAe in Eqs. (3.1.3.1.9) is signicantly posi-
tive, so Fe+
DA
e in Eq. (3.1.3.1.14b) is, in terms of absolute value, smaller
than Fe in Eq. (3.1.3.1.7b) because 
F
e is signicantly negative. Fifth, b
MUA















. Consequently, from this point in addi-
tion to the third and fourth points, the utility function of banks on the actual
cost is di¤erent from that of banks on the cost frontier. In addition, from
Tables 4.5.2 to 4.5.5, respectively, the parameters that the p-value is less
than 0:1 account for 92, 94, 99, and 95 percent of all parameters (where the
numbers are 132, 135, 138, and 133 out of 143, 143, 140, and 140, respec-
tively), so this estimation result is, overall, highly reliable, similar to Table
4.5.1. The details of these estimation results are explained in Subsection 4.8.
Similarly, from Tables 4.5.6 to 4.5.11, we can infer the following: First,
the test statistics for the overidentication restriction are far from signicant
(the p-values are 0:401 in Table 4.5.6; 0:781 in Table 4.5.7; 0:423 in Table
4.5.8; 0:211 in Table 4.5.9; 0:620 in Table 4.5.10; and 0:845 in Table 4.5.11),
so the likelihood that there is an error in the specication of PIE i;j;t in Eq.
(3.1.3.2.8a) for j = S;C;CL;A;CM;CD is small. Second, the parameters
for which the p-value is less than 0:1 account for 97, 100, 100, 99, 99, and
100 percent of all parameters, respectively (where the numbers are 131, 135,
134, 134, 134, and 135 out of 135, 135, 134, 135, 135, and 135, respectively),
so this estimation result is, overall, highly reliable, similar to Tables 4.5.2 to
4.5.5. The details of these estimation results are explained in Subsection 4.8.
4.6 Risk Attitude and Coe¢ cient Parameters of Util-
ity Functions
Table 4.6.1 shows the estimates of the degrees of relative risk-aversions of
banks on the cost frontier and the actual cost, and the coe¢ cient parameters
of the utility functions of these banks (i.e., Fe in Eq. (3.1.3.1.7a) and 
F
e +
DAe in Eq. (3.1.3.1.14a)).
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<<Insert Table 4.6.1 about here>>
From this table, we can infer the following seven points:
1. The estimates of the degree of relative risk-aversion of banks on the cost
frontier are very small and not signicant, meaning that these banks
are risk-neutral in all periods.
2. The estimates of the degree of relative risk-aversion of banks on the
actual cost are signicantly positive in the periods other than the 1976-
1986 period (i.e., before the bubble period), indicating that these banks
are risk-averse during these periods. Notably, the values are largest in
the 2008-2010 period (i.e., the Lehman collapse and Great East Japan
Earthquake period), while they are smallest in the 1996-2001 (i.e., the
nancial crisis and big bang period) because of the injection of public
funds into nancial institutions.
3. The estimates of the degree of relative risk-aversion of banks on the
actual cost increase due to an increase in the standard deviation of the
equity capital in the periods other than the 2008-2010 period. Similarly,
they increase due to an increase in the standard deviation of the quasi-
short-run prot based on the dynamic actual cost in periods other than
the 1996-2001 and 2008-2010 periods.
4. In the 2008-2010 period, the growth rate of real GDP is only negative,
and its standard deviation is largest. Furthermore, the degree of de-
crease in stock price is largest, the return on equity of borrower rms
is lowest, and the loan loss provision rate is highest. For these reasons,
although the standard deviations of the quasi-short-run prot based on
the dynamic actual cost and equity capital are small, the estimate of
the degree of relative risk-aversion of banks on the actual cost is largest.
5. In the 1996-2001 period, the standard deviation of the quasi-short-run
prot based on the dynamic actual cost is large, but that of equity
capital is small because of the injection of public funds into nancial
institutions. For this reason, although this period includes the nancial
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crisis, the estimate of the degree of relative risk-aversion of banks on
the actual cost is small.
6. Fe in Eq. (3.1.3.1.7a) increases due to an increase in the standard de-
viation of the quasi-short-run prot based on the dynamic frontier cost
in the periods other than the 2008-2010 period. Similarly, it increases
due to an increase in the standard deviation of equity capital in the
periods other than the 1996-2001 and 2008-2010 periods.
7. Fe + 
DA
e in Eq. (3.1.3.1.14a) increases due to an increase in the
estimate of the degree of relative risk-aversion of banks on the actual
cost, so the third point applies in this case.
4.7 Reference Rate (Risk-Free Rate)
From Homma (2018, Corollary 1, pp. 39-40), the reference rate on the cost






































Substituting Eqs. (3.1.3.2.14a) and (3.1.3.2.14b) into Eq. (4.7.1), under











































































From Eq. (3.1.3.1.2), 0  F  1, and from Table 4.4.1, Fe < 0. Therefore,
the larger the increase in the quasi-short-run prot based on the dynamic
frontier cost and the equity capital from the current period to the next period,
the higher is the reference rate on the cost frontier. Furthermore, the higher
the subjective rate of time preference, the higher is the reference rate on the




















are referred to as the e¤ects of the subjective rate of time preference, quasi-
short-run prot, and equity capital, respectively.














































From Eq. (3.1.3.1.10), 0  F   DA  1, and from Tables 4.4.1 and 4.5.1,
Fe + 
DA
e < 0. Therefore, the larger the increase in the quasi-short-run
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prot based on the dynamic actual cost and the equity capital from the
current period to the next period, the higher is the reference rate on the
actual cost. Furthermore, the higher the subjective rate of time preference,
the higher is the reference rate on the actual cost. Similar to the refer-



















o are referred to as the e¤ects of the sub-
jective rate of time preference, quasi-short-run prot, and equity capital,
respectively.
Table 4.7.1 shows the estimates of the reference rates on the cost frontier
and the actual cost.
<<Insert Table 4.7.1 about here>>
From this table, we can infer the following eight points:
1. Over the entire period, the e¤ect of the subjective rate of time pref-
erence is largest, followed by the e¤ect of equity capital. The e¤ect
of quasi-short-run prot is, however, extremely small. The e¤ect of
equity capital on the reference rate on the cost frontier is larger than
its e¤ect on the reference rate on the actual cost, so the reference rate
on the cost frontier is higher than the reference rate on the actual cost.
Furthermore, although the subjective rate of time preference is lower
than the call rate, the reference rate on the cost frontier is higher than
the call rate because of the e¤ect of the equity capital. However, the
e¤ect of equity capital on the reference rate on the actual cost is small,
so the reference rate on the actual cost is lower than the call rate.
2. The trend in the 1976-1986 period is similar to that over the entire
period, other than a decrease in the quasi-short-run prot.
3. In the 1987-1989 period, with respect to the e¤ect on the reference rate
on the cost frontier, the e¤ect of equity capital is largest, followed by
the e¤ect of the subjective rate of time preference. However, the e¤ect
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of quasi-short-run prot is extremely small. With respect to the e¤ect
on the reference rate on the actual cost, the e¤ect of the subjective rate
of time preference is largest, followed by the e¤ect of quasi-short-run
prot. The e¤ect of equity capital is, however, extremely small. The
e¤ect of equity capital on the reference rate on the cost frontier is very
large, so the reference rate on the cost frontier is much higher than
the call rate and the reference rate on the actual cost. The e¤ects of
quasi-short-run prot and equity capital on the reference rate on the
actual cost are small, so the reference rate on the actual cost is lower
than the call rate.
4. In the 1990-1995 period, with respect to the e¤ect on the reference rate
on the cost frontier, the e¤ect of the subjective rate of time preference
is largest, followed by the decreasing e¤ect of equity capital. How-
ever, the decreasing e¤ect of quasi-short-run prot is extremely small.
Moreover, with respect to the e¤ect on the reference rate on the actual
cost, the e¤ect of the subjective rate of time preference is largest. The
decreasing e¤ects of equity capital and quasi-short-run prot are, how-
ever, very small. Comparing the reference rate on the cost frontier with
the reference rate on the actual cost, the decreasing e¤ects of equity
capital on the former is relatively large, making the former lower than
the latter. Furthermore, the subjective rate of time preference is lower
than the call rate, and the quasi-short-run prot and the equity capital
decrease, making the reference rates on the cost frontier and the actual
cost lower than the call rate.
5. In the 1996-2001 period, with respect to the e¤ect on the reference rate
on the cost frontier, the decreasing e¤ect of equity capital is largest,
followed by the e¤ect of the subjective rate of time preference. The
decreasing e¤ect of quasi-short-run prot is, however, extremely small.
Notably, the decreasing e¤ect of equity capital is much larger than the
e¤ect of the subjective rate of time preference; thus, the reference rate
on the cost frontier is negative and, in terms of absolute value, relatively
large. With respect to the e¤ect on the reference rate on the actual cost,
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the same results are observed. Consequently, the reference rate on the
actual cost is also negative. Comparing the reference rate on the cost
frontier with the reference rate on the actual cost, the decreasing e¤ect
of equity capital on the former is larger than it is on the latter, making
the former much lower than the latter (i.e., the former is negative and,
in terms of absolute value, much larger than the latter). Moreover, the
call rate is positive, so the reference rates on the cost frontier and the
actual cost are lower than the call rate. Indeed, the reference rates on
the cost frontier are remarkably low.
6. In the 2002-2007 period, with respect to the e¤ect on the reference rate
on the cost frontier, similar to the 1996-2001 period, the decreasing ef-
fect of equity capital is largest, followed by the e¤ect of the subjective
rate of time preference. The e¤ect of quasi-short-run prot is, however,
almost zero. With respect to the e¤ect on the reference rate on the ac-
tual cost, the e¤ects of quasi-short-run prot and equity capital are
equally large, and the decreasing e¤ect of equity capital is extremely
small. Comparing the reference rate on the cost frontier with the refer-
ence rate on the actual cost, the decreasing e¤ect of the equity capital
on the former is larger than on the latter, and the e¤ect of quasi-short-
run prot on the latter is larger than on the former, making the latter
much higher than the former. Consequently, the former is much lower
than the call rate, while the latter is higher.
7. In the 2008-2010 period, with respect to the e¤ect on the reference rate
on the cost frontier, the same results as in the 1996-2001 and 2002-2007
periods are observed. With respect to the e¤ect on the reference rate
on the actual cost, the decreasing e¤ect of the quasi-short-run prot is
largest, followed by the e¤ect of the subjective rate of time preference.
The e¤ect of equity capital is, however, extremely small. Comparing
the reference rate on the cost frontier with the reference rate on the
actual cost, the e¤ect of equity capital on the former is larger than
on the latter, and the decreasing e¤ect of quasi-short-run prot on the
latter is larger than on the former, making the former much higher than
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the latter. Consequently, the former is much higher than the call rate,
while the latter is much lower.
8. In the 2011-2016 period, with respect to the e¤ect on the reference rate
on the cost frontier, the same results as in the 1996-2001, 2002-2007,
and 2008-2010 periods are observed. With respect to the e¤ect on the
reference rate on the actual cost, the e¤ect of quasi-short-run prot is
largest, followed by the e¤ects of equity capital and the subjective rate
of time preference. Comparing the reference rate on the cost frontier
with the reference rate on the actual cost, the e¤ect of equity capital on
the former is much larger than the e¤ect of quasi-short-run prot on the
latter; thus, the former is much higher than the latter. As compared
with the call rate, these e¤ects are relatively large; consequently, both
reference rates are much higher than the call rate.
Finally, from Eqs. (3.1.3.2.6b), (3.1.3.2.7b), (4.7.2), and (4.7.3), and Ta-
bles 4.4.1 and 4.5.1, the factors that have a positive e¤ect on both reference
rates include the following: the static cost unneutral e¢ ciency in the pre-
vious period, the long-term prime rate, the capital ratio of borrower rms,
the loan per case, the proportion of loans for small and medium rms, the
Herndahl index of loan proportions classied by industry, the disposable
income for workershouseholds (except farmers), the TOPIX, the interest
rate of securities, and the interest rate of call money and borrowed money.
In contrast, the factors that have a negative e¤ect on both reference rates
are as follows: the default loss rate for long-term loans, the proportion of
loans for the real estate business, the proportion of loans secured by real
estate, the proportion of loans without collateral and without warranty, the
yield on government bonds, the postal savings interest rate, the interest rate
due from banks and call loans, the interest rate of certicates of deposit and
other liabilities, and the reserve requirement ratio for time deposits.
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4.8 Dynamic Price Ine¢ ciencies
Table 4.8.1 shows the estimates of the dynamic price ine¢ ciencies (normal-
ized by the marginal utility of quasi-short-run prots based on dynamic
actual cost), PIE i;j;t (j = SL;LL; S; C; CL;A;DD; TD;CM;CD) in Eq.
(3.1.3.2.8a).
<<Insert Table 4.8.1 about here>>
Based on this table, we can make the following inferences:
1. For the entire period, the dynamic price ine¢ ciencies of all nancial
goods are signicant (p  0:1), meaning that these ine¢ ciencies exist.
Comparing these ine¢ ciencies with the absolute values of the dynamic
actual marginal variable costs, the former is much larger than the latter.
2. The dynamic price ine¢ ciencies of nancial assets are positive, while
those of liabilities are negative. Therefore, the former is short, while
the latter is over. Thus, equity capital is short.
3. For each nancial good, the dynamic price ine¢ ciency of demand de-
posits is smallest, while that of securities is largest. Comparing (short-
term and long-term) loans with (demand and time) deposits, the latter
is smaller than the former.
4. Comparing by period, the dynamic price ine¢ ciency in the 2008-2010
period (i.e., the Lehman collapse and Great East Japan Earthquake
period) is largest, followed, in order, by the 1987-1989 and 2011-2016
periods (i.e., the bubble period and after the Great East Japan Earth-
quake period). It is smallest in the 1976-1986 period (i.e., before the
bubble period), with the next smallest occurring in the 1996-2001 pe-
riod (i.e., the nancial crisis and big bang period).
In addition, from Tables 4.5.2 to 4.5.11, we can infer the following ve
points:
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1. The factors having a negative e¤ect on the dynamic price ine¢ ciency of
short-term loans include the Herndahl index of short-term loans in the
previous period, the short-term prime rate, the capital ratio of borrower
rms, and the proportion of loans for real estate business. The factors
having a positive e¤ect include the static cost unneutral e¢ ciency in the
previous period and the Herndahl index of loan proportions classied
by industry.
2. The factors having a negative e¤ect on the dynamic price ine¢ ciency
of long-term loans include the Herndahl index of long-term loans in
the previous period, the long-term prime rate, the capital ratio of bor-
rower rms, the proportion of loans for real estate business, and the
proportion of loans without collateral and without warranty. The fac-
tors having a positive e¤ect are the static cost unneutral e¢ ciency in
the previous period and the proportion of loans for small and medium
rms.
3. The factors that have a negative e¤ect on the dynamic price ine¢ ciency
of demand deposits include the Herndahl index of demand deposits
in the previous period, the disposable income for workershouseholds
(except farmers), the postal savings interest rate of ordinary savings,
the TOPIX, and the reserve requirement ratio for demand deposits,
while only the static cost unneutral e¢ ciency in the previous period
has a positive e¤ect.
4. The factors that negatively a¤ect the dynamic price ine¢ ciency of time
deposits are the Herndahl index of time deposits in the previous pe-
riod and the postal savings interest rate of postal savings certicates,
while the static cost unneutral e¢ ciency in the previous period, the
disposable income for workershouseholds (except farmers), the yield
on government bonds, and the TOPIX have a positive e¤ect
5. For other nancial goods, similar to the above nancial goods, the
Herndahl indices in the previous period have a negative e¤ect on the
dynamic price ine¢ ciencies of other nancial goods, while the static
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cost unneutral e¢ ciency in the previous period and the interest rates
of other nancial goods have a positive e¤ect.
4.9 GURPs on the Cost Frontier and the Actual Cost
FromHomma (2018, Denition 12, p. 41) and Eqs. (3.1.3.2.12) and (3.1.3.2.18),






















e;i;t ; j = C;CL;CM;CD; (4.9.1c)
where pSURFj;i;t is the SURP on the cost frontier similarly dened by Homma
(2009, 2012), BPFj;i;t expresses the market structure and conduct e¤ect based
on the cost frontier, MRSBPFe;i;t expresses the equity capital e¤ect based on
the cost frontier, and $BPFj;i;t expresses the risk-adjustment e¤ect based on the
cost frontier.5
Similarly, fromHomma (2018, Denition 13, pp. 41-42) and Eqs. (3.1.3.2.12)























e;i;t ; j = C;CL;CM;CD; (4.9.2c)
where pSURAj;i;t is the SURP on the actual cost similarly dened by Homma
(2009, 2012), BPAj;i;t expresses the market structure and conduct e¤ect based
on the actual cost, MRSBPAe;i;t expresses the equity capital e¤ect based on
5In accordance with the notation in the present section, the order of subscripts i and
j is reversed. Furthermore, for the purpose of simplication, the symbol *in Homma (
2018, Denition 12, p. 41) is omitted.
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the actual cost, and $BPAj;i;t expresses the risk-adjustment e¤ect based on the
actual cost.6
From Homma (2009, pp. 13-14), the positive (or negative) signs of
MRSBPFe;i;t and MRS
BPA
e;i;t indicate that the e¤ect of reducing the risk of
the burden of nancial distress costs is greater (or less) than the e¤ect of
increasing the opportunity, transaction, and agency costs of equity capital,
and diminishing earnings prospects.
From Homma (2018, pp. 37-39), if the bank concerned is risk-averse,
then the positive (or negative) signs of $BPFj;i;t and $
BPA
j;i;t indicate that the
risks (variances) of quasi-short-run prots based on the dynamic frontier cost
and dynamic actual cost in the next period decrease (or increase) due to an
increase in the nancial asset or liability in the current period. However,
if the bank concerned is risk-neutral (i.e., F = F   DA = 1), then this
relation is not established. In this case, from Eqs. (3.1.3.2.14a), (3.1.3.2.14b),
(3.1.3.2.14d), and (3.1.3.2.14e), the following equations are obtained:
@uFi;t
.
@QSFi;t = 1 + 
F
e  (qe;i;t   1) ; (4.9.3a)
@uFi;t+1
.
@QSFi;t+1 = 1 + 
F
e  (qe;i;t+1   1) ; (4.9.3b)
@uAi;t
.






 (qe;i;t   1) ; (4.9.3c)
@uAi;t+1
.






 (qe;i;t+1   1) : (4.9.3d)
Therefore, from Homma (2018, Theorems 1 and 2 and Denitions 12 and 13,
6In accordance with the notation in the present section, the order of subscripts i and
j is reversed. Furthermore, for the purpose of simplication, the symbol *in Homma (
2018, Denition 13, pp. 41-42) is omitted.
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pp. 34-42), $BPFj;i;t and $
BPA
j;i;t are expressed as follows:
$BPFj;i;t = bj  pG;t $Fj;i;t












= bj  pG;t  i;t 
cov
 
j;i;t+1; 1 + 
F
e  (qe;i;t+1   1)
 zi;t
1 + Fe  (qe;i;t   1)





1 + Fe  (qe;i;t   1)
; (4.9.4a)
$BPAj;i;t = bj  pG;t $Aj;i;t
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1 + (Fe + 
DA
e )  (qe;i;t   1)
:
(4.9.4b)
From these equations, even if the bank concerned is risk-neutral, if cov
 
j;i;t+1;
qe;i;t+1j zi;t) 6= 0, then $BPFj;i;t and $BPAj;i;t are not zero. It is for empirical stud-
ies to explore whether this case actually occurs. From Tables 4.4.1 and 4.5.1,
Fe =  0:132753  10 5 and DAe = 0:0400069  10 5, so Fe + DAe =
 0:092746  10 5. Furthermore, the mean of qe;i;t is 1:98995  105, so






 (qe;i;t   1) > 0. Consequently, if the
j-th nancial good is a nancial asset (i.e., bj = 1), the signs of $BPFj;i;t and
$BPAj;i;t are positive (or negative) if the sign of cov
 
j;i;t+1; qe;i;t+1
 zi;t is neg-
ative (or positive). Similarly, if the j-th nancial good is a liability (i.e.,




 zi;t is positive (or negative).
FromHomma (2018, Remark 1, p. 43), the classication of nancial goods
into inputs and outputs based on the sign of each GURP on the cost frontier
is consistent with the classication based on the sign of each dynamic frontier
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marginal variable cost. The sign of the dynamic frontier marginal variable
cost is the same as the sign of the GURP on the cost frontier, indicating that
a nancial good is an output if positive and a xed input if negative.
However, from Homma (2018, Remark 2, pp. 43-44), the classication of
nancial goods into inputs and outputs based on the sign of each GURP on
the actual cost is not always consistent with the classication based on the
sign of each dynamic actual marginal variable cost. The two classications
are consistent in the following two limited cases: 1) the sign of dynamic actual
marginal variable cost is the same as the sign of price ine¢ ciency normalized
by the marginal utility of quasi-short-run prots based on dynamic actual
cost, and 2) if the two signs are not equal, then the absolute value of dynamic
actual marginal variable cost is greater than the absolute value of normalized
price ine¢ ciency.
From the above reasons, the classication of nancial goods on the cost
frontier into inputs and outputs is based on the sign of each GURP on the
cost frontier, while on the actual cost it is based on the sign of each dynamic
actual marginal variable cost.
Tables 4.9.1 and 4.9.2 show the estimates of the GURPs on the cost
frontier and the actual cost over the entire period, respectively; Tables 4.9.3
and 4.9.4 show them in each period.
<<Insert Table 4.9.1 about here>>
<<Insert Table 4.9.2 about here>>
<<Insert Table 4.9.3 about here>>
<<Insert Table 4.9.4 about here>>
From Tables 4.9.1 and 4.9.2, the following four points can be inferred:
1. The sign of each GURP on the cost frontier is consistent with that
of each dynamic actual marginal variable cost for all nancial goods
other than certicates of deposit and other liabilities (j = CD). For
short-term and long-term loans (j = SL;LL), securities (j = S), and
time deposits (j = TD), these signs are positive, so they are regarded
as outputs. On the other hand, for cash (j = C), amount due from
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banks and call loans (j = CL), other nancial assets (j = A), demand
deposits (j = DD), and call money and borrowed money (j = CM),
the signs are negative, and thus they are regarded as xed inputs. For
certicates of deposit and other liabilities (j = CD), the sign of the
GURP on the cost frontier is negative, meaning that this nancial good
is regarded as a xed input on the cost frontier, while for the dynamic
actual marginal variable cost the sign is positive, so this nancial good
is regarded as an output on the actual cost.
2. A comparison of the absolute value of the GURPs on the cost frontier
with those on the actual cost shows that the latter is much larger than
the former. From Homma (2018, Eq. (2.2.3.5), p. 40), this is due to
the fact that the dynamic price ine¢ ciencies are very large from a cost
perspective, while from a revenue perspective this is due to the fact
that the equity capital e¤ects are very large.
3. For each e¤ect in Eqs. (4.9.1a) to (4.9.1c), the equity capital e¤ect
and the risk-adjustment e¤ect are, in terms of absolute value, large,
while the market structure and conduct e¤ect is very small. The signs
of the equity capital e¤ects of the nancial assets are negative, while
those of the liabilities are positive. For the nancial assets (or the li-
abilities), this is because the e¤ect of reducing the risk of the burden
of nancial distress costs is less (or greater) than the e¤ect of increas-
ing the opportunity, transaction, and agency costs of equity capital,
and diminishing earnings prospects. In contrast, the signs of the risk-
adjustment e¤ects of the nancial assets are positive, while those of
the liabilities are negative. From Table 4.6.1, the banks on the cost
frontier are risk-neutral, so, from Eqs. (4.9.4a) and (4.9.4b), these




is signicantly negative. In other words, the uncertainty factors, j;i;t+1
(j = SL;LL; S;A;DD; TD), decrease due to an increase in equity cap-
ital, qe;i;t+1. For other nancial assets (j = A), the negative equity
capital e¤ect is, in terms of absolute value, signicantly larger than
the positive risk-adjustment e¤ect, while for demand and time deposits
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(j = DD;TD), the negative risk-adjustment e¤ect is, in terms of ab-
solute value, signicantly larger than the positive equity capital e¤ect.
However, for short-term and long-term loans (j = SL;LL) and secu-
rities (j = S), the absolute values of the equity capital e¤ects are not
signicantly di¤erent from those of the risk-adjustment e¤ects.
4. For each e¤ect in Eqs. (4.9.2a) to (4.9.2c), similar to each e¤ect in Eqs.
(4.9.1a) to (4.9.1c), the equity capital e¤ect and the risk-adjustment
e¤ect are, in terms of absolute value, large, while the market structure
and conduct e¤ect is very small. Contrary to the GURP on the cost
frontier in Eqs. (4.9.1a) to (4.9.1c), the signs of the equity capital ef-
fects of the nancial assets are positive, while those of the liabilities
are negative. For the nancial assets (or liabilities), this is because the
e¤ect of reducing the risk of the burden of nancial distress costs is
greater (or less) than the e¤ect of increasing the opportunity, trans-
action, and agency costs of equity capital, and diminishing earnings
prospects. On the other hand, the signs of the risk-adjustment e¤ects
of the nancial assets are negative, while those of the liabilities are pos-
itive. Under the actual situation that cost and price ine¢ ciencies exist,
the risks (variances) of quasi-short-run prots based on dynamic actual
cost in the next period increase due to an increase in nancial assets in
the current period, while they decrease due to an increase in liabilities
in the current period. Therefore, they increase due to an increase in
equity capital in the current period. For the nancial assets (or the
liabilities), the positive (or negative) equity capital e¤ect is, in terms
of absolute value, signicantly larger than the negative (or positive)
risk-adjustment e¤ect.
From Tables 4.9.3 and 4.9.4, we can infer the following:
1. The periods in which the sign of the GURP of the short-term loans on
the cost frontier is di¤erent from the sign for the entire period are the
periods 1987-1989, 2008-2010, and 2011-2016: in each period, the sign
is negative. In the 1987-1989 period (i.e., the bubble period), the reason
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for this is that the signs of the SURP and the risk-adjustment e¤ect are
negative and their component ratios are large, although the sign of the
equity capital e¤ect is positive and its component ratio is large. The
reason that the signs of the SURP are negative and its absolute value is
large is that the reference rate becomes much higher due to the increase
in equity capital. In the 2008-2010 period (i.e., the Lehman collapse and
Great East Japan Earthquake period), the reason that the sign of the
GURP of the short-term loans on the cost frontier is negative is that,
although the equity capital e¤ect increases, its sign is still negative and
the positive risk-adjustment e¤ect largely decreases. In the 2011-2016
period (i.e., after the Great East Japan Earthquake period), the reason
is that, although the equity capital e¤ect and the risk-adjustment e¤ect
are positive and their component ratios are large, the sign of the SURP
is negative and its absolute value is larger than their sum. Similar
to the 1987-1989 period, the reason for this is that the reference rate
becomes much higher due to the increase in equity capital. These
periods include abnormal situations, suggesting that, even if cost and
price ine¢ ciencies do not exist, the GURP of the short-term loans on
the cost frontier is signicantly a¤ected by abnormal situations.
2. The signs of the GURPs of the long-term loans on the cost frontier
in all periods are positive, similar to the sign of the GURP of these
loans for the entire period. In contrast to the GURP of the short-term
loans on the cost frontier, the GURP of the long-term loans on the
cost frontier is stable. In the periods 1976-1986 (i.e., before the bubble
period), 1987-1989, and 2011-2016, even if the sign of the SURP is
negative, the sign of the GURP is positive. In the 1976-1986 period,
the reason for this is that the positive risk-adjustment e¤ect is, in terms
of absolute value, larger than the sum of the negative SURP and equity
capital e¤ect. In the 1987-1989 period, the reason is that the positive
equity capital e¤ect is, in terms of absolute value, larger than the sum
of the negative SURP and the risk-adjustment e¤ect. In the 2011-2016
period, the reason is that the sum of the positive equity capital and
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risk-adjustment e¤ects is, in terms of absolute value, larger than the
negative SURP. In these periods, either or both of the equity capital
and risk-adjustment e¤ects cancel out the negative SURP, indicating
that these e¤ects are very important for the GURP of the long-term
loans on the cost frontier.
3. The signs of the GURPs of the securities on the cost frontier in all
periods other than the 2008-2010 period are positive, similar to the sign
of the GURP of securities for the entire period. So long as the situation
is not abnormal, the GURP of the securities on the cost frontier is
stable. In the 2008-2010 period, the sign of the risk-adjustment e¤ect
is negative and its absolute value is large, making the sign of the GURP
also negative. In the 1987-1989 and 2011-2016 periods, even if the sign
of the SURP is negative, the sign of the GURP is positive. The reason
for this is similar to the long-term loans case, meaning the equity capital
and risk-adjustment e¤ects are also very important for the GURP of
the securities on the cost frontier.
4. The signs of the GURPs of the other nancial assets on the cost frontier
in all periods other than the 1996-2001 period are negative, similar
to the sign of the GURP of the other nancial assets for the entire
period. So long as the situation is not critical, the GURP of the other
nancial assets on the cost frontier is stable. Similar to the entire
period, the periods in which the sign of the GURP is di¤erent from that
of the SURP are the periods 1990-1995 (i.e., after the bubble period and
before the nancial crisis and big bang period), 2002-2007 (i.e., after
the nancial crisis and big bang period and before the Lehman collapse
and Great East Japan Earthquake period), and 2008-2010. In each of
these periods, the reason for this is that the sum of the equity capital
and risk-adjustment e¤ects is negative and its absolute value is larger
than the positive SURP. Similar to the long-term loans and securities
cases, the equity capital and risk-adjustment e¤ects are also important
for the GURP of the other nancial assets on the cost frontier.
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5. The periods in which the sign of the GURP of the demand deposits
on the cost frontier is di¤erent from the sign for the entire period are
the periods 1987-1989, 1990-1995, 2008-2010, and 2011-2016; in each
case, the sign in the period is positive. In the 1987-1989 and 2011-
2016 periods, the reason for this is that the sum of the negative equity
capital and risk-adjustment e¤ects is, in terms of absolute value, less
than the positive SURP. In the 1990-1995 and 2008-2010 periods, the
reason that the signs of the GURPs are positive is that the sum of the
positive equity capital e¤ect and SURP is, in terms of absolute value,
larger than the negative risk-adjustment e¤ects. For all periods, the
sign of the GURP of the demand deposits on the cost frontier changes
three times, indicating that it is unstable compared to the case of the
long-term nancial goods.
6. The periods in which the sign of the GURP of the time deposits on the
cost frontier is di¤erent from the sign for the entire period are the peri-
ods 1987-1989, 1990-1995, and 1996-2001, where the signs are negative.
In the 1987-1989 period, the reason for this is that the negative equity
capital e¤ect is, in terms of absolute value, larger than the sum of the
positive SURP and risk-adjustment e¤ect. In the 1990-1995 period,
the reason that the sign of the GURP is negative is that the sum of
the negative SURP and risk-adjustment e¤ect is, in terms of absolute
value, larger than the positive equity capital e¤ect. In the 1996-2001
period, the reason that the sign is negative is that the sum of the neg-
ative SURP and equity capital e¤ect is, in terms of absolute value,
larger than the positive risk-adjustment e¤ect. For all periods, the sign
of the GURP of the time deposits on the cost frontier changes twice,
indicating that it is unstable compared to the case of the long-term
loans, although it is relatively stable compared to demand deposits.
7. The signs of the GURPs of the nancial goods on the actual cost in
all periods, which have a risk-adjustment e¤ect, are the same as those
for the entire period, indicating that they are stable compared to the
GURPs on the cost frontier. From a cost perspective, the reason is
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that the dynamic price ine¢ ciencies are, in terms of absolute value,
much larger than the dynamic actual marginal variable costs, and they
are stable. From a revenue perspective, the reason that the GURPs on
the actual cost are stable compared to the GURPs on the cost frontier
is that the equity capital e¤ect is, in terms of absolute value, largest,
and it is stable. The reason that the dynamic price ine¢ ciencies and
equity capital e¤ect are, in terms of absolute value, large is primarily
the fact that the marginal utility of the quasi-short-run prot based
on the dynamic actual cost, which is denominator here, is very small,
as the degree of relative risk-aversion of banks on the actual cost is
high. The GURPs on the actual cost are a¤ected by risk attitude.
As compared to the stable equity capital e¤ect, the risk-adjustment
e¤ect is unstable, indicating that the cost and price ine¢ ciencies are
destabilizing.
4.10 EGLIs on the Cost Frontier and the Actual Cost
As shown in Tables 4.9.1 and 4.9.2, based on the signs of the GURPs on the
cost frontier and the dynamic actual marginal variable costs, short-term and
long-term loans (j = SL;LL), securities (j = S), and time deposits (j = TD)
are considered to be outputs, whereas cash (j = C), the amount due from
banks and call loans (j = CL), other nancial assets (j = A), demand
deposits (j = DD), and call money and borrowed money (j = CM) are
considered xed inputs. Certicates of deposit and other liabilities (j = CD)
are considered to be a xed input on the cost frontier, whereas they are
considered to be an output on the actual cost. We narrow our focus to the
imperfect output market, which is more important from the perspective of
industrial organization, and consider the markets for short-term and long-
term loans (j = SL;LL) and time deposits (j = TD).
From Homma (2018, Denition 14, p. 46), the EGLI on the cost frontier,
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j = SL;LL; TD; (4.10.1)
whereMCDFVj;i;t is the dynamic frontier marginal variable cost in Eq. (3.1.3.2.16e)
and all others are as per the GURP on the cost frontier in Eq. (4.9.1a).7
Similarly, on the basis of Homma (2018, Denition 15, pp. 46-47), the









































j = TD; (4.10.2b)
whereMCDAVj;i;t is the dynamic actual marginal variable cost in Eq. (3.1.3.2.16a),
PIE j;i;t is the dynamic price ine¢ ciency (normalized by the marginal utility
of quasi-short-run prots based on dynamic actual cost) in Eq. (3.1.3.2.8a),
pG;t is the general price index, hRj;i;t is the certain or predictable component
of the stochastic dynamic endogenous holding-cost rate, rFAi;t is the reference
rate on the actual cost, and all others are as per the GURP on the actual
cost in Eq. (4.9.2a).8
7In accordance with the notation in the present section, the order of subscripts i and
j is reversed. Furthermore, for the purpose of simplication, the symbol *in Homma (
2018, Denition 14, p. 46) is omitted.
8In accordance with the notation in the present section, the order of subscripts i and
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The reason that the EGLI of the time deposits on the actual cost (i.e.,
EGLIATD;i;t) is dened as Eq. (4.10.2b) is that the sign of the dynamic actual
marginal variable cost of the time deposits is positive (i.e.,MCDAVTD;i;t > 0) and
the sign of the SURP of the time deposits on the actual cost is negative (i.e.,










is regarded as the price of the time deposits that are considered to be an
output.
Table 4.10.1 shows the estimates of the EGLIs on the cost frontier and
the actual cost for the entire period. Table 4.10.2 shows the estimates of the
EGLIs of the long-term loans on the actual cost in each period. The reason
that Table 4.10.2 gives these values is that only the EGLIs of the long-term
loans on the actual cost show signs of the SURPs that are consistent with
those of the dynamic marginal variable costs in all periods.
<<Insert Table 4.10.1 about here>>
<<Insert Table 4.10.2 about here>>
From Table 4.10.1, we can infer the following:
1. Although there are no examples of studies comparing EGLIs on the
cost frontier and the actual cost, all EGLIs are at least larger than 0:6,
indicating that the markets for short-term and long-term loans and time
deposits in the Japanese regional banking industry are uncompetitive.
2. For each component ratio in the EGLI on the cost frontier, the com-
ponent ratios of the equity capital e¤ects are positive and largest for
short-term and long-term loans, indicating that the equity capital ef-
fects are crucial factors increasing the EGLIs (i.e., decreasing the de-
gree of competition) of the short-term and long-term loans on the cost
frontier. The positive equity capital e¤ects in the EGLIs on the cost
frontier mean negative equity capital e¤ects in the GURPs on the cost
frontier, making this the leading cause of increasing the EGLIs (i.e.,
decreasing the degree of competition) of the short-term and long-term
j is reversed. Furthermore, for the purpose of simplication, the symbol *in Homma (
2018, Denition 15, pp. 46-47) is omitted.
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loans on the cost frontier, resulting in a state in which the e¤ect of
reducing the risk of the burden of nancial distress costs is less than
the e¤ect of increasing the opportunity, transaction, and agency costs
of equity capital, and diminishing earnings prospects. On the other
hand, it is the risk-adjustment e¤ects that result in component ratios
that are negative and, in terms of absolute value, largest; thus, they
are the crucial factors that decrease the EGLIs (i.e., increase the de-
gree of competition) of the short-term and long-term loans on the cost
frontier. The negative risk-adjustment e¤ects in the EGLIs on the cost
frontier mean positive risk-adjustment e¤ects in the GURPs on the cost
frontier, making this the leading cause of decreasing the EGLIs of the
short-term and long-term loans on the cost frontier (i.e., increasing the
degree of competition of the short-term and long-term loans on the cost
frontier), resulting in a state in which the uncertainty factors, j;i;t+1
(j = SL;LL), decrease due to an increase in equity capital. For time
deposits, the component ratio of the equity capital e¤ect is negative
and, in terms of absolute value, large, making this the leading cause of
decreasing the EGLI (i.e., increasing the degree of competition) of the
time deposits on the cost frontier, resulting in a state in which the e¤ect
of reducing the risk of the burden of nancial distress costs is greater
than the e¤ect of increasing the opportunity, transaction, and agency
costs of equity capital, and diminishing earnings prospects. In contrast,
the component ratio of the risk-adjustment e¤ect is positive and largest,
making this the leading cause of increasing the EGLI (i.e., decreasing
the degree of competition) of the time deposits on the cost frontier,
resulting in a state in which the uncertainty factor, TD;i;t+1, decreases
due to an increase in equity capital. Compared to the component ratios
of the equity capital and risk-adjustment e¤ects, the component ratio
of the market structure and conduct e¤ect, which has a prominent role
in conventional industrial organization, is, in terms of absolute value,
very small.
3. In contrast to the EGLI on the cost frontier, for each component ra-
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tio in the EGLI on the actual cost, the component ratios of the risk-
adjustment e¤ects are positive, and largest, for short-term and long-
term loans, making the risk-adjustment e¤ects the crucial factors in-
creasing the EGLIs of the short-term and long-term loans on the actual
cost (i.e., decrease the degree of competition of the short-term and long-
term loans on the actual cost). This is the leading cause of increasing
their EGLIs (i.e., decreasing the degree of competition) on the actual
cost, resulting in a state in which the risks (variances) of quasi-short-
run prots based on dynamic actual cost in the next period increase
due to an increase in the short-term or long-term loans in the current
period. The component ratios of the dynamic price ine¢ ciencies are
positive and second largest to those of the risk-adjustment e¤ects for
short-term and long-term loans, making the dynamic price ine¢ ciencies
the second most crucial factors that increase their EGLIs (i.e., decrease
the degrees of competition) on the actual cost. The positive price inef-
ciencies mean that these nancial goods are short, indicating that this
shortage is the second leading cause of increasing their EGLIs (i.e., de-
creasing the degrees of competition) on the actual cost. In contrast to
the EGLI on the cost frontier, it is the equity capital e¤ects where the
component ratios are negative and, in terms of absolute value, largest,
making them the crucial factors that decrease the EGLIs (i.e., increase
the degrees of competition) of the short-term and long-term loans on
the actual cost. This is the leading cause of decreasing their EGLIs (i.e.,
increasing the degrees of competition) on the actual cost, resulting in a
state in which the e¤ect of reducing the risk of the burden of nancial
distress costs is greater than the e¤ect of increasing the opportunity,
transaction, and agency costs of equity capital, and diminishing earn-
ings prospects. With respect to time deposits, in contrast to the case of
short-term and long-term loans, it is the equity capital e¤ect where the
component ratio is positive and largest, meaning that this is the crucial
factor that increases the EGLI (i.e., decreases the degree of competi-
tion) of time deposits on the actual cost. This is the leading cause of
increasing the EGLI (i.e., decreasing the degree of competition) of time
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deposits on the actual cost, resulting in a state in which the e¤ect of
reducing the risk of the burden of nancial distress costs is less than the
e¤ect of increasing the opportunity, transaction, and agency costs of
equity capital, and diminishing earnings prospects. On the other hand,
it is the risk-adjustment e¤ect where the component ratio is negative
and, in terms of absolute value, largest, that makes it the most crucial
factor in decreasing the EGLI (i.e., increases the degree of competition)
of the time deposits on the actual cost. This is the leading cause of
decreasing the EGLI (i.e., increasing the degree of competition) on the
actual cost that the risks (variances) of quasi-short-run prots based
on dynamic actual cost in the next period decrease due to an increase
in the time deposits in the current period. It is this dynamic price inef-
ciency that makes the component ratio also negative and, in terms of
absolute value, second to the component ratio of the risk-adjustment
e¤ect and thus the second crucial factor in decreasing their EGLI (i.e.,
increasing the degree of competition) on the actual cost. The negative
price ine¢ ciency means that the time deposits are over, making this
surplus the second leading cause of decreasing their EGLIs (i.e., increas-
ing the degrees of competition) on the actual cost. Similar to the EGLI
on the cost frontier, the component ratio of the market structure and
conduct e¤ect, which has a prominent role in conventional industrial
organization, is, in terms of absolute value, very small compared to the
component ratios of the equity capital and risk-adjustment e¤ects.
4. Comparing the EGLI on the cost frontier with the EGLI on the actual
cost, the former is smaller than the latter for short-term and long-term
loans; consequently, the cost and price ine¢ ciencies increase their EGLI
(i.e., decrease the degree of competition). In particular, the EGLI of
the short-term loans largely increases, while the increase in the EGLI of
the long-term loans is very small. The reason for this is that the degree
to which the sum of the component ratios of the positive dynamic price
ine¢ ciency and risk-adjustment e¤ect is larger than the absolute value
of the equity capital e¤ect is greater in the case of short-term loans,
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although the component ratio of the equity capital e¤ect in the EGLI
of the short-term loans on the actual cost is negative and, in terms of
absolute value, larger than for the long-term loans. With respect to
time deposits, a rigorous comparison between the EGLI on the cost
frontier and the EGLI on the actual cost is impossible, as the output
price of the time deposits on the cost frontier is di¤erent from that on
the actual cost.
Finally, from Table 4.10.2, the EGLI of the long-term loans on the actual
cost, which is the degree of competition of a representative bank operating
with average e¢ ciency, indicates an upward trend for the entire period (i.e.,
the degree of competition of these banks on the actual cost shows a down-
ward trend over the entire period). The reason for this is that the degree
to which the component ratio of the positive dynamic price ine¢ ciency is
larger than the sum of the component ratios of the negative equity capi-
tal and risk-adjustment e¤ects gradually increases over the entire period,
other than the 1976-1986 period (i.e., the period before the bubble). Thus,
dynamic price ine¢ ciency gradually becomes important. What is needed
is industrial organization policy that aims not only at the decrease of the
EGLI on the cost frontier, which mainly implies the truth of competition,
but also at the decrease of the EGLI on the actual cost, which mainly implies
the actuality of competition. In the 1976-1986 period, the reason that the
EGLI of the long-term loans on the actual cost is smallest is that the degree
to which the component ratio of the positive dynamic price ine¢ ciency and
risk-adjustment e¤ect is larger than the negative equity capital e¤ect is small.
4.11 Tests of the E¢ cient Structure and Quiet-Life
Hypotheses
From Homma (2018, p. 59), the e¢ cient structure hypothesis is a composite
that suggests three stages of causal relations from rm e¢ ciency to rm
growth (i.e., the rst stage), then to market structure (i.e., the second stage),
and nally to market performance (i.e., the third stage). There is no scope
for improving on Demsetz (1973) vis-à-vis the rst stage causality from rm
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e¢ ciency to rm growth. As noted by Homma et al. (2014), this rst stage
causality is the fundamental feature of the e¢ cient structure hypothesis;
consequently, this paper also regards this causality as the e¢ cient structure
hypothesis. Specically, on the basis of Homma (2018, Denition 17, p. 59),
under the assumption that the planned optimal nancial good equals the
actual optimal nancial good (i.e., qpj;i;t = qj;i;t), if the optimal nancial good
(e.g., the optimal loan) in the current period increases because of improved
dynamic cost e¢ ciency in the previous period (i.e., @qj;i;t

@EFDi;t 1 > 0),
then the e¢ cient structure hypothesis is accepted.9 From Homma (2018,
Proposition 5, p. 60), @qj;i;t

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D
i;t are dened as Eq. (3.1.2.3), p
GURF
j;i;t is dened as Eq.
(4.9.1), CDAVi;t is expressed as Eq. (3.1.2.1.1), MC
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j;i;t is expressed as Eq.
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From Homma (2018, p. 68), the quiet-life hypothesis concerns the rela-
tionship between market concentration and rm e¢ ciency. Similar to Homma
et al. (2014), this is regarded as the relationship between the Herndahl in-
dex and dynamic cost e¢ ciency. Specically, on the basis of Homma (2018,
Denition 18, p. 68), if dynamic cost e¢ ciency in the current period de-
9In accordance with the notation in the present section, the order of subscripts i and
j is reversed. Furthermore, for the purpose of simplication, the symbol *in Homma (
2018, Section 3, pp. 57-70) is omitted.
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creases because of an increase in the Herndahl index in the previous period
(i.e., @EFDi;t /@HIL;t 1 < 0), then the quiet-life hypothesis is accepted. From























where HIL;t 1 is the Herndahl index of loans (i.e., the sum of the short-term

















and all others are as per Eq. (4.11.1).
Table 4.11.1 shows the estimates of Eq. (4.11.1) over the entire period;
Table 4.11.2 shows the estimates of Eq. (4.11.3) in each period.
<<Insert Table 4.11.1 about here>>
<<Insert Table 4.11.2 about here>>
From Table 4.11.1, @qj;i;t

@EFDi;t 1 for all nancial assets other than
other nancial assets (i.e., j = SL;LL; S; C; CL) are not signicant or are
signicantly negative (p = 0:068), and thus the e¢ cient structure hypoth-
esis is not accepted for the Japanese regional banking industry. Although
@qj;i;t

@EFDi;t 1 for other nancial assets (i.e., j = A) is signicantly posi-
tive, these other nancial assets are regarded as a xed input in Tables 4.9.1
and 4.9.2; thus, we will not refer to this factor further. However, from Table
4.11.2, the values of @EFDi;t /@HIL;t 1 for all periods are signicantly negative
(p < 0:1), so the quiet-life hypothesis is accepted for the Japanese regional
banking industry. According to Homma (2018, pp. 76-77), it is not always
possible to justify anti-monopoly and anti-concentration policies using sup-
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port for the quiet-life hypothesis; thus, the relation between the quiet-life
hypothesis and the EGLI on the cost frontier needs to be empirically clari-
ed.
4.12 Quiet-Life Hypothesis and the EGLI on the Cost
Frontier
The relation between the quiet-life hypothesis and the EGLI on the cost
frontier is theoretically claried in Homma (2018, Propositions 13 and 14,
pp. 81-82).10 From Homma (2018, Proposition 13, pp. 81-82), the EGLI
on the cost frontier decreases with the Herndahl index in the previous
period (i.e., the degree of competition on the cost frontier increases with
it, @EGLIFLL;i;t /@HIL;t 1 < 0) if and only if the quiet-life hypothesis is
accepted (i.e., @EFDi;t /@HIL;t 1 < 0). Thus, the EGLI on the cost fron-
tier increases with dynamic cost e¢ ciency in the "current" period (i.e.,
@EGLIFLL;i;t

@EFDi;t > 0) under the following assumptions: (A1) the j-
th nancial good (i.e., long-term loans) is an output (i.e., pSURFLL;i;t > 0 and
MCDFVLL;i;t > 0) and the sign of MC
DAV
LL;i;t is the same as the sign of MC
DFV
LL;i;t

























and all others are as per Eq. (4.11.3).
10In accordance with the notation in the present section, hereafter the order of subscripts
i and j is reversed. Furthermore, for the purpose of simplication, the symbol * in
Homma ( 2018, Propositions 13 and 14, pp. 81-82) is omitted.
81
Similarly, from Homma (2018, Proposition 14, p. 82), the EGLI on the
cost frontier increases with the Herndahl index in the previous period (i.e.,
the degree of competition on the cost frontier decreases, @EGLIFLL;i;t /@HIL;t 1 >
0) if and only if the quiet-life hypothesis is accepted (i.e., @EFDi;t /@HIL;t 1 <
0). The EGLI on the cost frontier decreases with dynamic cost e¢ ciency in
the "current" period (i.e., @EGLIFLL;i;t

@EFDi;t < 0) under the following as-














where MHLL;i;t is expressed as Eq. (4.12.1) and all others are as per Eq.
(4.11.3).
Table 4.12.1 shows the relation between the quiet-life hypothesis and the
EGLI on the cost frontier.
<<Insert Table 4.12.1 about here>>
From this table, the above assumptions (A3) and (A4) hold, so the
EGLI on the cost frontier increases with the Herndahl index in the pre-
vious period (i.e., the degree of competition on the cost frontier decreases,
@EGLIFLL;i;t /@HIL;t 1 > 0) if and only if the quiet-life hypothesis is ac-
cepted (i.e., @EFDi;t /@HIL;t 1 < 0). Consequently, it is possible to justify
anti-monopoly and anti-concentration policies using support for the quiet-
life hypothesis in the Japanese regional banking industry.
4.13 Intertemporal Regular Linkages
Homma (2018, pp. 85-101) theoretically claried the relations between the
e¢ cient structure and quiet-life hypotheses and the intertemporal regular
linkages (i.e., cyclical linkages, monotonic trending linkages, and terminal up-
and-down volatile linkages) of single-period dynamic cost e¢ ciencies, single-
period optimal planned nancial goods, single-period Herndahl indices, and
single-period EGLIs on the cost frontier. As these linkages serve to allow
long-term forecasts and long-term dynamic analyses, they are critical from
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the perspective of industrial organization. In this subsection, these linkages
in the Japanese regional banking industry are empirically claried.11
4.13.1 Intertemporal Regular Linkage of Single-Period Dynamic
Cost E¢ ciencies
The intertemporal regular linkage of single-period dynamic cost e¢ ciencies
is dened in Homma (2018, Denition 20, p. 85). The relations between this
linkage and the e¢ cient structure and quiet-life hypotheses are claried in
Homma (2018, Propositions 15 to 18, pp. 85-89).
Table 4.13.1 shows this linkage.
<<Insert Table 4.13.1 about here>>
From the table, the assumptions (A0), (B1), and (B2) in Homma (2018,
Proposition 16, pp. 86-87) hold, as the average loans are not large and only
the quiet-life hypothesis is accepted (i.e., the e¢ cient structure hypothesis
is not accepted), meaning that this linkage (i.e., the cyclical linkage) ex-
ists in all periods. To add detail, the estimates of @EFDi;t 1+2T

@EFDi;t 1
decrease with T and become almost zero at T = 14. The estimates of
@EFDi;t 2+2T

@EFDi;t 3+2T are also extremely small (the estimates are from
3:9034 10 8 to 5:3065 10 7). As explained below, this indicates that the
linkage leads to convergence and is xed at the value in the initial period
(i.e., 0:2939). This value is second smallest in all periods; thus, this linkage
xes the single-period dynamic cost e¢ ciencies at a small value. This is one
reason for the structural ine¢ ciency mentioned in Subsections 4.1 and 4.2.
Consequently, this linkage is judged to be undesirable to Japanese regional
banks.
The above is explained as follows: First, @EFDi;t 2+2T

@EFDi;t 3+2T and
11In accordance with the notation in the present section, hereafter the order of subscripts
i and j is reversed. Furthermore, for the purpose of simplication, the symbol * in

























Transforming Eq. (4.13.1.1a) with respect toEFDi;t 2+2T and then rearranging
gives









Next, considering this equation from the t period gives
EFDi;t 2+2T = EF
D
i;t ; (for T = 1) ; (4.13.1.3a)








(for T  2) : (4.13.1.3b)
Transforming Eq. (4.13.1.1b) with respect to EFDi;t 1+2T and then rearrang-
ing gives








(for T  1) :(4.13.1.4)
As mentioned above, the estimates of @EFDi;t 1+2T

@EFDi;t 1 decrease with T ,
becoming almost zero at T = 14. Furthermore, the estimates of @EFDi;t 2+2T
@EFDi;t 3+2T are also extremely small. Therefore, Equations (4.13.1.3b) and
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(4.13.1.4) can be approximately expressed as
EFDi;t 2+2T t EFDi;t 3+2T ; (for T  2) ; (4.13.1.5a)
EFDi;t 1+2T t EFDi;t 2+2T ; (for T  1) : (4.13.1.5b)
From these equations and Eq. (4.13.1.3a), Eq. (4.13.1.5b) is approximately
expressed as
EFDi;t 1+2T t EFDi;t ; (for T = 1) ; (4.13.1.6a)
EFDi;t 1+2T t EFDi;t 2+2T t EFDi;t 3+2T ; (for T  2) : (4.13.1.6b)
From Eq. (4.13.1.6a), for T = 1, EFDi;t 1+2T = EF
D
i;t+1 t EFDi;t . From
Eq. (4.13.1.6b), for T = 2, EFDi;t+3 t EFDi;t+2 t EFDi;t+1. Therefore,
EFDi;t+3 t EFDi;t+2 t EFDi;t+1 t EFDi;t . Similarly, for T  3, EFDi;t 1+2T t
   t EFDi;t+5 t EFDi;t+4 t EFDi;t+3 t EFDi;t+2 t EFDi;t+1 t EFDi;t . Conse-
quently, for all T , EFDi;t 1+2T t EFDi;t .
4.13.2 Intertemporal Regular Linkage of Single-Period Optimal
Financial Goods
The intertemporal regular linkage of single-period optimal nancial goods is
dened in Homma (2018, Denition 21, pp. 89-90). The relations between
this linkage and the e¢ cient structure and quiet-life hypotheses are claried
in Homma (2018, Propositions 19 to 22, pp. 89-92).
Table 4.13.2 shows this linkage.
<<Insert Table 4.13.2 about here>>
From the table, assumptions (E0), (B1), and (D2) in Homma (2018,
Proposition 20, pp. 91-92) hold for a similar reason to that for assump-
tions (B1) and (B2) in the intertemporal regular linkage of single-period dy-
namic cost e¢ ciencies, indicating that this linkage (i.e., the cyclical linkage)
exists in all periods. In more detail, the estimates of @qLL;i;t+2T /@qLL;i;t
decrease with T and become almost zero at T = 14. The estimates of
@qLL;i;t 1+2T /@qLL;i;t 2+2T are also extremely small (the estimates range from
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6:5236 10 8 to 4:7888 10 7). Similar to the intertemporal regular linkage
of single-period dynamic cost e¢ ciencies, this means that this linkage leads to
convergence and is xed at the value in the initial period (i.e., 150449:1692).
This value is the smallest in all periods, indicating that this linkage xes
single-period optimal nancial goods (i.e., long-term loans) at the smallest
value. Consequently, this linkage is judged to be undesirable to Japanese
regional banks.
4.13.3 Intertemporal Regular Linkage of Single-Period Herndahl
Indices
The intertemporal regular linkage of single-period Herndahl indices is de-
ned in Homma (2018, Denition 22, p. 93). The relations between this
linkage and the e¢ cient structure and quiet-life hypotheses are claried in
Homma (2018, Propositions 23 to 26, pp. 93-96).
Table 4.13.3 shows this linkage.
<<Insert Table 4.13.3 about here>>
From the table, assumptions (H0), (F1), and (D2) in Homma (2018,
Proposition 24, pp. 94-95) hold for a similar reason to that for assump-
tions (B1) and (B2) in the intertemporal regular linkage of single-period
dynamic cost e¢ ciencies, indicating that this linkage (i.e., the cyclical link-
age) exists in all periods, similar to the single-period dynamic cost e¢ cien-
cies and single-period optimal nancial goods. To add detail, the estimates
of @HIL;t+2T /@HIL;t decrease with T and become almost zero at T = 14.
Furthermore, the estimates of @HIL;t 1+2T /@HIL;t 2+2T are also extremely
small (i.e., the estimates range from 5:689110 8 to 4:846510 7). Similar
to the intertemporal regular linkages of single-period dynamic cost e¢ ciencies
and single-period optimal nancial goods, this means that this linkage leads
to convergence and is xed at the value in the initial period (i.e., 0:5157).
This value is sixth smallest in all periods, indicating that the linkage xes
the Herndahl indices of loans at a small value. Consequently, this linkage
is judged to be desirable to Japanese regional banks, in contrast to the in-
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tertemporal regular linkages of single-period dynamic cost e¢ ciencies and
single-period optimal nancial goods.
4.13.4 Intertemporal Regular Linkage of Single-Period EGLIs on
the Cost Frontier
The intertemporal regular linkage of single-period EGLIs on the cost frontier
is dened in Homma (2018, Denition 23, pp. 96-97). The relations between
this linkage and the e¢ cient structure and quiet-life hypotheses are claried
in Homma (2018, Propositions 27 to 30, pp. 96-100).
Table 4.13.4 shows the linkage of the single-period EGLIs of long-term
loans on the cost frontier on the basis of the intertemporal regular linkage of
single-period dynamic cost e¢ ciencies.
<<Insert Table 4.13.4 about here>>
From this table, assumptions (SA1) and (SA2) in Homma (2018, Propo-
sition 28, pp. 98-99) hold for a similar reason to that for assumptions (B1)
and (B2) in the intertemporal regular linkage of single-period dynamic cost
e¢ ciencies, meaning that this linkage (i.e., the cyclical linkage) exists in peri-
ods 1977-1981, 1989-2001, and 2005-2009. In these periods, the estimates of
@EGLIFLL;i;t+2T

@EGLIFLL;i;t decrease dramatically with T . The estimates
of @EGLIFLL;i;t 1+2T

@EGLIFLL;i;t 2+2T are also extremely small. Similar to
the intertemporal regular linkages of single-period dynamic cost e¢ ciencies,
single-period optimal nancial goods, and single-period Herndahl indices,
this means that this linkage leads to convergence and is xed at the values
in the initial periods (i.e., 0:8113, 0:9129, and 0:9694). Since these values are
much larger than the smallest value in all periods (i.e., 0:2849), this linkage
xes single-period EGLIs on the cost frontier at large values (i.e., the single-
period degrees of competition on the cost frontier are xed at small values).
Consequently, this linkage is judged to be undesirable to Japanese regional
banks, similar to the intertemporal regular linkages of single-period dynamic
cost e¢ ciencies and single-period optimal nancial goods.
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5 Conclusions
Based on the GURM constructed by Homma (2009, 2012, 2018), this pa-
per explored the empirical implications of the quiet-life hypothesis in the
Japanese regional banking industry by empirically clarifying a number of
research topics that are crucial for the industrial organization of banking,
including static and dynamic cost unneutral e¢ ciencies, the degrees of rela-
tive risk-aversions of banks on the cost frontier and the actual cost, reference
rates on the cost frontier and the actual cost, the dynamic price ine¢ ciency
of each nancial good, the GURPs on the cost frontier and the actual cost,
the EGLIs on the cost frontier and the actual cost, tests of the e¢ cient struc-
ture and quiet-life hypotheses, the relation between the quiet-life hypothesis
and the EGLI on the cost frontier, and the intertemporal regular linkages of
single-period dynamic cost e¢ ciencies, single-period optimal nancial goods,
single-period Herndahl indices, and single-period EGLIs on the cost frontier.
The studys major results, along with conclusions, are summarized below:
1. The quiet-life hypothesis is accepted, but the e¢ cient structure hy-
pothesis is not accepted in the Japanese regional banking industry.
Furthermore, the EGLI on the cost frontier increases (i.e., the degree
of competition on the cost frontier decreases) with the Herndahl in-
dex in the previous period if and only if the quiet-life hypothesis is
accepted, meaning that it is possible to justify anti-monopoly and anti-
concentration policies using support for the quiet-life hypothesis in the
Japanese regional banking industry.
2. The intertemporal regular linkages (i.e., the cyclical linkages) of single-
period dynamic cost e¢ ciencies, single-period optimal nancial goods,
single-period Herndahl indices, and single-period EGLIs on the cost
frontier exist in the Japanese regional banking industry, as the average
loans are not large and only the quiet-life hypothesis is accepted (i.e.,
the e¢ cient structure hypothesis is not accepted). However, this link-
age of the single-period EGLIs of long-term loans on the cost frontier on
the basis of the linkage of single-period dynamic cost e¢ ciencies leads
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to convergence and is xed at the very large values in the initial peri-
ods. Consequently, this linkage is judged to be undesirable to Japanese
regional banks, similar to the linkages of single-period dynamic cost
e¢ ciencies and single-period optimal nancial goods.
Other major results include the following:
3. Similar to the static cost unneutral e¢ ciency, the mean of the dynamic
cost unneutral e¢ ciency is 0:311, indicating that there is substantial
ine¢ ciency in the Japanese regional banking industry. Furthermore,
contrary to the static cost unneutral e¢ ciency, the dynamic cost un-
neutral e¢ ciency shows a rising trend over 41 years. However, the
improvement in the dynamic cost unneutral e¢ ciency is very small
(i.e., less than 5%) over this period. Therefore, even if we regard the
economic behavior of regional banks as intertemporally dynamic, struc-
tural ine¢ ciency is still observed. Under the present conditions, it is
very di¢ cult to drastically improve the dynamic cost unneutral e¢ -
ciency of Japanese regional banks.
4. The estimates of the degree of relative risk-aversion of banks on the cost
frontier are very small and not signicant, meaning that these banks
are risk-neutral in all periods. However, the estimates of the degree
of relative risk-aversion of banks on the actual cost are signicantly
positive in the periods other than 1976-1986 (i.e., the period before the
bubble), indicating that these banks are risk-averse in these periods.
5. The e¤ect of equity capital on the reference rate on the cost frontier is
larger than its e¤ect on the reference rate on the actual cost, meaning
that the reference rate on the cost frontier is higher than the reference
rate on the actual cost. Furthermore, although the subjective rate of
time preference is lower than the call rate, the reference rate on the
cost frontier is higher than the call rate because of the e¤ect of equity
capital. The e¤ect of equity capital on the reference rate on the actual
cost is, however, small; thus, the reference rate on the actual cost is
lower than the call rate.
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6. For the entire period, the dynamic price ine¢ ciencies of all nancial
goods are signicant (p  0:1), meaning that these ine¢ ciencies exist.
In comparing these ine¢ ciencies with the absolute values of the dy-
namic actual marginal variable costs, the former is much larger than
the latter. Furthermore, the dynamic price ine¢ ciencies of the nancial
assets are positive, while those of the liabilities are negative. Therefore,
the former is short, while the latter is over, indicating equity capital is
short.
7. For each e¤ect in the GURP on the actual cost, similar to each ef-
fect in the GURP on the cost frontier, the equity capital e¤ect and
the risk-adjustment e¤ect are, in terms of absolute value, large, while
the market structure and conduct e¤ect is very small. Contrary to the
GURP on the cost frontier, the signs of the equity capital e¤ects of the
nancial assets are positive, while the signs of the liabilities are nega-
tive. For the nancial assets (or liabilities), this is because the e¤ect
of reducing the risk of the burden of nancial distress costs is greater
(or less) than the e¤ect of increasing the opportunity, transaction, and
agency costs of equity capital, and diminishing earnings prospects. On
the other hand, the signs of the risk-adjustment e¤ects of the nancial
assets are negative, while those of the liabilities are positive. In the
actual situation in which cost and price ine¢ ciencies exist, the risks
(variances) of quasi-short-run prots based on the dynamic actual cost
in the next period increase due to an increase in nancial assets in
the current period, while they decrease due to an increase in liabilities
in the current period. Therefore, they increase due to an increase in
equity capital in the current period. For the nancial assets (or li-
abilities), the positive (or negative) equity capital e¤ect is, in terms
of absolute value, signicantly larger than the negative (or positive)
risk-adjustment e¤ect.
8. Although there are no examples of studies comparing the EGLIs on the
cost frontier and the actual cost, all EGLIs are at least larger than 0:6,
indicating that the markets for short-term and long-term loans and time
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deposits in the Japanese regional banking industry are uncompetitive.
Furthermore, comparing the EGLI on the cost frontier with the EGLI
on the actual cost, the former is smaller than the latter for short-term
and long-term loans, so the cost and price ine¢ ciencies increase their
EGLI (i.e., decrease the degree of competition). Notably, the EGLI of
short-term loans increases substantially, while the increase of the EGLI
of long-term loans is very small. The reason for this is that the degree
to which the sum of the component ratios of the positive dynamic price
ine¢ ciency and risk-adjustment e¤ect is larger than the absolute value
of the equity capital e¤ect for the long-term loan is greater than for
short-term loans, although the component ratio of the equity capital
e¤ect in the EGLI of short-term loans on the actual cost is negative
and, in terms of absolute value, larger than that of long-term loans.
With respect to time deposits, a rigorous comparison of the EGLI on
the cost frontier and the EGLI on the actual cost is impossible, as the
output price of time deposits on the cost frontier is di¤erent from that
on the actual cost.
9. The intertemporal regular linkage (i.e., the cyclical linkage) of single-
period dynamic cost e¢ ciencies exists in the Japanese regional banking
industry because the average loans are not large and only the quiet-
life hypothesis is accepted (i.e., the e¢ cient structure hypothesis is not
accepted). However, this linkage leads to convergence and is xed at the
small value in the initial period. This is one reason for the structural
ine¢ ciency. Consequently, this linkage is judged to be undesirable for
Japanese regional banks.
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6 Appendix: Endogenous and Exogenous State
Variables and Components of Stochastic Dy-
namic Endogenous Holding-Revenue Rates
and Holding-Cost Rates
As stated in Subsection 3.1.1.2, the real balance of nancial goods qj;i;t (j 2
fSL;LL; S; C; CL;A;DD; TD;CM;CDg) consists of short-term loans (j =
SL), long-term loans (j = LL), securities (j = S), cash (j = C), amount due
from banks and call loans (j = CL), other nancial assets (j = A), demand
deposits (j = DD), time deposits (j = TD), call money and borrowed money
(j = CM), and certicates of deposit and other liabilities (j = CD). Thus,
these nancial goods become the endogenous state variables. The data for
these nancial goods used here, as well as the creation of the data and the
sources of the data, are mostly the same as in Homma (2012, pp. 22-24, p.
92). The di¤erences between this paper and Homma (2012, pp. 22-24, p.
92) are as follows: First, as stated below, the general price index (pG;t+1) is
the GDP deator for the nance and insurance sector in this paper, whereas
it is the GDP deator for all sectors in Homma (2012, pp. 22-24, p. 92).
Second, certicates of deposit and other liabilities are a nancial good (i.e.,
an output or a xed input) in this paper, whereas they are a variable input
in Homma (2012, pp. 22-24, p. 92).
According to Homma (2018, pp. 25-33), the exogenous state variable vec-
tor (zi;t (= zi;t)) comprises the vector of exogenous variables (z
DH
i;t 1), which
have an impact on the certain or predictable components of the SDEHRR and
SDEHCR, the vector (i;t) comprising the uncertain or unpredictable compo-
nents of the SDEHRR and SDEHCR, the general price index (pG;t), the input
price vector (pi;t), the vector (z
Q
i;t) a¤ecting the quality of nancial goods,
the vector of Herndahl indices (HIt 1), the static cost e¢ ciency (EF Si;t 1),
and the variable ( i;t), which expresses exogenous technical progress. Among
these components, pG;t uses the GDP deator for the nance and insurance
sector as stated above. Furthermore, pi;t is mostly the same as in Homma
(2012, pp. 63-71), other than the certicates of deposit and other liabil-
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D;i;t in Homma (2012, pp.
113-114, p. 121). In addition, HIt 1 is regarded as the Herndahl index of
the sum of the short-term and long-term loans (HIL;t 1), and EF Si;t 1 was
previously explained in Subsection 3.1.1.3. With respect to the data for  i;t,
time trend data are created, and the normalized version of these data is used.
The specications of the components of the SDEHRR and SDEHCR-related
zDHi;t 1 and i;t, and their data creation, are mostly the same as Homma (2012,
pp. 72-87, pp. 111-122). The di¤erences between this paper and Homma
(2012, pp. 72-87, pp. 111-122) are as follows: First, zDHi;t 1 in this paper
di¤ers from zHi;t 1 in Homma ( 2012, pp. 72-87, pp. 111-122) in its inclusion
of HIt 2 and EF Si;t 2. Second, this paper adds the Herndahl index of each
nancial good in the previous period and the static cost unneutral e¢ ciency
in the previous period to the independent variables in Homma (2012, Eqs.
(6.2.3.1.6a), (6.2.3.1.6b), (6.2.3.1.7a), (6.2.3.1.7b), and (6.2.3.2.3); pp. 73-87,
pp. 111-122). The specications of the other components of the SDEHRR
and SDEHCR and their data creation are also mostly the same as in Homma
(2012, pp. 72-87, pp. 111-122).
Tables 6.1 to 6.9 show the results for the estimations of the modied
equations that add the Herndahl index of each nancial good in the previ-
ous period and the static cost unneutral e¢ ciency in the previous period to
the independent variables in Homma (2012, Eqs. (6.2.3.1.6a), (6.2.3.1.6b),
(6.2.3.1.7a), (6.2.3.1.7b), and (6.2.3.2.3); pp. 73-87, pp. 111-122).
<<Insert Table 6.1 about here>>
<<Insert Table 6.2 about here>>
<<Insert Table 6.3 about here>>
<<Insert Table 6.4 about here>>
<<Insert Table 6.5 about here>>
<<Insert Table 6.6 about here>>
<<Insert Table 6.7 about here>>
<<Insert Table 6.8 about here>>
<<Insert Table 6.9 about here>>
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Table 2.1. Theoretical Concepts Used in This Paper 
Theoretical Concept Source 
(Homma (2018)) 
[1] Static Efficient Production Technology 
Represented by ( ), , , ,, , , 0S Qi i t i t i t i tφ τ =q x z  
Given by Eq. (2.1.1.1) 
Definition 1, pp. 6-9 
[2] Static Frontier Variable Cost Function 
Denoted by ( ), , , ,, , ,SFV Qi i t i t i t i tC τp q z  
Given by Eq. (2.1.2) 
Definition 2, pp. 9-10 
[3] Static Actual Variable Cost Function 
Denoted by ( ), , , , ,, , , ,SAV SIE Qi i t i t i t i t i tC τa p q z  
Given by Eq. (2.1.3.1) 
Definition 3, pp. 10-11 
[4] Static Cost Efficiency 
Denoted by ,
S
i tEF  
Given by Eq. (2.1.4) 
Definition 4, p. 12 
[5] Dynamic Efficient Production Technology 
Represented by ( ), , , 1 1 1 , 1 ,, , , , , 0D Q Si i t i t i t t i t i tb b EFφ τ− −⋅ ⋅ =q x z HI  
Given by Eq. (2.1.6.1) 
Definition 5, pp. 14-17 
[6] Dynamic Frontier Variable Cost Function 
Denoted by ( ), , , 1 1 1 , 1 ,, , , , ,DFV Q Si i t i t i t t i t i tC b b EF τ− −⋅ ⋅p q z HI  
Given by Eq. (2.1.7) 
 
Definition 6, pp. 17-18 
[7] Dynamic Actual Variable Cost Function 
Denoted by ( ), , , , 1 1 1 , 1 ,, , , , , ,DAV DIE Q Si i t i t i t i t t i t i tC b b EF τ− −⋅ ⋅a p q z HI  
Given by Eq. (2.1.8.1) 
Definition 7, pp. 18-20 
[8] Dynamic Cost Efficiency 
Denoted by ,
D
i tEF  
Definition 8, p. 20 
100 
 
Given by Eq. (2.1.9) 
[9] Quasi-Short-Run Profit Based on Dynamic Frontier Cost 
Denoted by ( ), 1 , ,, ,QSFi i t i t i tππ −q q z  
Given by Eqs. (2.2.1.1) and (2.2.1.2) 
Definition 9, pp. 25-26 
[10] Quasi-Short-Run Profit Based on Dynamic Actual Cost 
Denoted by ( ), , 1 , ,, , ,QSA DIEi i t i t i t i tππ −a q q z  
Given by Eqs. (2.2.1.3) and (2.2.1.4) 
Definition 10, pp. 26-28 
[11] Dynamic-Uncertainty Behavior of Financial Firms 
Formulated as Eqs. (2.2.2.1)-(2.2.2.5) 
pp. 28-31 
[12] Stochastic Euler Equations 
Expressed as Eqs. (2.2.2.6) and (2.2.2.8) 
pp. 31-33 
[13] Risk Corrections 
Expressed as Eqs. (2.2.3.1)-(2.2.3.5) 
Theorems 1 and 2 and  
Corollaries 1 and 2,  
pp. 33-41 
[14] Generalized User-Revenue Price on the Cost Frontier 
Denoted by , ,
GURF
i j tp  
Defined as Eq. (2.2.3.6) 
Definition 12, p. 41 
[15] Generalized User-Revenue Price on the Actual Cost 
Denoted by , ,
GURA
i j tp  
Defined as Eq. (2.2.3.7) 
Definition 13, p. 41 
[16] Classification of Financial Goods 
Based on Eqs. (2.2.3.9) and (2.2.3.10) 
Remarks 1 and 2,  
pp. 43-44 
[17] Discrepancy Between the SURP and the Dynamic 
Marginal Variable Cost 
Expressed as Eqs. (2.2.4.1) and (2.2.4.2) 
Remarks 4 and 5,  
pp. 45-46 
[18] Extended Generalized-Lerner Index on the Cost 
Frontier 
Denoted by , ,
F
i j tEGLI  
Defined as Eq. (2.2.4.3) 
Definition 14, p. 46 
[19] Extended Generalized-Lerner Index on the Actual Cost Definition 15, pp. 46-47 
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Denoted by , ,
A
i j tEGLI  
Defined as Eq. (2.2.4.4) 
[20] Equity Capital Effect on the EGLI 
Derived as Proposition 2 
Proposition 2, pp. 48-49 
[21] Risk-Adjustment Effect on the EGLI 
Derived as Proposition 3 
Proposition 3, pp. 49-50 
[22] Acceptance of the Efficient Structure Hypothesis 
Defined as Definition 17 
Definition 17, p. 59 
[23] Mathematical Formulation of the Efficient Structure 
Hypothesis 
Expressed as Eqs. (3.1.1) and (3.1.2) 
Proposition 5, pp. 60-66 
[24] Acceptance of the Quiet-Life Hypothesis 
Defined as Definition 18 
Definition 18, p. 68 
[25] Mathematical Formulation of the Quiet-Life 
Hypothesis 
Expressed as Eqs. (3.2.1) and (3.2.2) 
Proposition 7, p. 69 
[26] Relation between the Efficient Structure Hypothesis 
and the EGLI on the Cost Frontier 
Derived as Propositions 11 and 12 
Propositions 11 and 12,  
pp. 77-81 
[27] Relation between the Quiet-Life Hypothesis and the 
EGLI on the Cost Frontier 
Derived as Propositions 13 and 14 
Propositions 13 and 14,  
pp. 81-84 
[28] Intertemporal Regular Linkages of Single-Period 
Dynamic Cost Efficiencies 
Defined as Definition 20 
Derived as Propositions 15-18 
Definition 20 and  
Propositions 15-18,  
pp. 85-89 
[29] Intertemporal Regular Linkages of Single-Period 
Optimal Planned Financial Goods 
Defined as Definition 21 
Derived as Propositions 19-22 
Definition 21 and  
Propositions 19-22,  
pp. 89-92 
[30] Intertemporal Regular Linkages of Single-Period 
Herfindahl Indices 
Defined as Definition 22 
Derived as Propositions 23-26 
Definition 22 and  




[31] Intertemporal Regular Linkages of Single-Period 
EGLIs on the Cost Frontier 
Defined as Definition 23 
Derived as Propositions 27-30 
Definition 23 and  






Table 4.1.1 Estimation Results for the Static Variable Cost Function (1) 
Parameter Estimate t-statistic p-value 
SLa   -0.066216 -0.847734 0.397 
,1
Z
SLa   -0.269549 -0.864420 0.387 
,2
Z
SLa   0.569746 4.58150 0.000 
,3
Z
SLa   -7.74149 -8.97650 0.000 
,4
Z
SLa   -0.00430464 -6.00390 0.000 
,5
Z
SLa   -0.040755 -0.637239 0.524 
,6
Z
SLa   -0.025460 -0.164186 0.870 
,7
Z
SLa   -0.184825 -6.57774 0.000 
,8
Z
SLa   -0.152645 -5.69405 0.000 
,9
Z
SLa   -0.185363 -6.54275 0.000 
,10
Z
SLa   -0.144301 -2.31177 0.021 
,11
Z
SLa   -0.170097 -4.84907 0.000 
,12
Z
SLa   0.301600 5.97710 0.000 
,13
Z
SLa   0.231513 5.07295 0.000 
LLa   -0.196390 -1.99072 0.047 
,14
Z





LLa   -0.806271 -5.27222 0.000 
,3
Z
LLa   11.3197 8.70477 0.000 
,4
Z
LLa   0.00265785 3.16072 0.002 
,5
Z
LLa   0.060059 1.10198 0.270 
,6
Z
LLa   -0.069343 -0.360588 0.718 
,15
Z
LLa  -0.030694 -1.04792 0.295 
,16
Z
LLa  -0.216558 -7.34459 0.000 
,17
Z
LLa  0.148570 1.26892 0.204 
,10
Z
LLa  -0.120933 -2.13107 0.033 
,11
Z
LLa  -0.102698 -2.35385 0.019 
,12
Z
LLa  -0.041089 -0.510831 0.609 
,13
Z
LLa  0.332514 5.39133 0.000 
DDa  -0.179495 -2.88004 0.004 
,18
Z
DDa  2.53931 4.07347 0.000 
,19
Z
DDa  0.536633 0.740560 0.459 
,20
Z
DDa  0.0000612298 7.19731 0.000 
,16
Z





DDa  -0.031724 -0.335210 0.737 
,9
Z
DDa  -0.029689 -0.394256 0.693 
,12
Z
DDa  0.067141 1.00222 0.316 
,13
Z
DDa  -0.067862 -0.899974 0.368 
TDa  0.599851 6.15920 0.000 
,18
Z
TDa  -4.55314 -6.00817 0.000 
,22
Z
TDa  0.830797 1.15776 0.247 
,20
Z
TDa  -0.0000421276 -4.02884 0.000 
,17
Z
TDa  -0.416352 -4.53007 0.000 
,12
Z
TDa  -0.292924 -3.18021 0.001 
,13
Z
TDa  -0.182645 -1.72082 0.085 
Sa  -0.080789 -1.76039 0.078 
,23
Z
Sa  0.242795 6.06297 0.000 
,7
Z
Sa  0.040737 1.57877 0.114 
,16
Z
Sa  0.195341 6.79893 0.000 
,9
Z
Sa  -0.053351 -1.76623 0.077 
,10
Z





Sa  -0.020409 -0.786811 0.431 
,12
Z
Sa  0.012762 0.281142 0.779 
,13
Z
Sa  0.099125 1.60407 0.109 
Ca  0.065713 2.02683 0.043 
,12
Z
Ca  0.173777 5.11559 0.000 
,13
Z
Ca  -0.043241 -1.15954 0.246 
CLa  -0.095425 -6.70009 0.000 
,24
Z
CLa  -0.058432 -4.70534 0.000 
,21
Z
CLa  0.047192 2.27331 0.023 
,12
Z
CLa  0.046303 3.38425 0.001 
,13
Z
CLa  0.075740 4.23825 0.000 
Aa  0.021982 1.38715 0.165 
,23
Z
Aa  -0.105241 -6.14359 0.000 
,7
Z
Aa  -0.052196 -5.28714 0.000 
,25
Z
Aa  -0.013175 -1.46948 0.142 
,12
Z
Aa  0.042045 3.49502 0.000 
,13
Z
Aa  -0.048181 -2.74594 0.006 
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CMa  0.00879126 1.89271 0.058 
,7
Z
CMa  0.00424175 1.41029 0.158 
,16
Z
CMa  -0.00539907 -1.59224 0.111 
,21
Z
CMa  0.00318783 1.13484 0.256 
,17
Z
CMa  0.032313 3.18863 0.001 
,9
Z
CMa  -0.015274 -2.60840 0.009 
,10
Z
CMa  0.021210 1.29105 0.197 
,11
Z
CMa  0.00149218 0.826799 0.408 
,12
Z
CMa  -0.00812527 -3.06708 0.002 
,13
Z
CMa  -0.000794310 -0.188331 0.851 
CDa  -0.026136 -2.49070 0.013 
,21
Z
CDa  0.076220 5.57422 0.000 
,12
Z
CDa  0.045703 5.84057 0.000 
,13
Z
CDa  0.022314 1.74926 0.080 
La  0.465611 81.5003 0.000 
,14
Z
La  -1.94639 -12.1201 0.000 
,2
Z





La  -0.328959 -8.48363 0.000 
,4
Z
La  0.0000500068 0.808888 0.419 
,5
Z
La  -0.036466 -10.7595 0.000 
,6
Z
La  -0.070779 -8.04448 0.000 
,26
Z
La  0.078440 13.0867 0.000 
,15
Z
La  0.011781 3.73989 0.000 
,27
Z
La  0.00288033 1.09322 0.274 
,18
Z
La  0.020083 0.165699 0.868 
,22
Z
La  1.84008 17.5111 0.000 
,20
Z
La  0.00000889181 10.7240 0.000 
,23
Z
La  0.00762292 3.52892 0.000 
,7
Z
La  0.00685699 4.00264 0.000 
,16
Z
La  0.018494 10.6113 0.000 
,24
Z
La  0.012728 6.46645 0.000 
,21
Z
La  0.013168 6.58383 0.000 
,25
Z
La  0.015125 8.11204 0.000 
,8
Z





La  0.010353 5.40454 0.000 
,9
Z
La  0.015665 7.95542 0.000 
,10
Z
La  0.024792 13.3333 0.000 
,11
Z
La  0.00201326 1.20784 0.227 
,12
Z
La  0.014703 18.0732 0.000 
,13
Z
La  -0.00908485 -9.46810 0.000 
B
La  0.000000139326 2.78928 0.005 
Ka  0.026286 14.4245 0.000 
,14
Z
Ka  0.813718 16.3493 0.000 
,2
Z
Ka  -0.100696 -18.1649 0.000 
,3
Z
Ka  -0.072205 -4.83364 0.000 
,4
Z
Ka  -0.0000848023 -4.00418 0.000 
,5
Z
Ka  0.00913486 8.59836 0.000 
,6
Z
Ka  -0.011343 -4.46500 0.000 
,26
Z
Ka  -0.030135 -17.1420 0.000 
,15
Z
Ka  0.000255168 0.339425 0.734 
,27
Z





Ka  -0.310525 -7.40256 0.000 
,22
Z
Ka  0.468809 12.7521 0.000 
,20
Z
Ka  0.00000612644 23.3185 0.000 
,23
Z
Ka  -0.00285125 -4.61497 0.000 
,7
Z
Ka  -0.00361315 -8.13486 0.000 
,16
Z
Ka  -0.00478219 -10.2834 0.000 
,24
Z
Ka  -0.00345988 -6.54999 0.000 
,21
Z
Ka  -0.00526147 -9.83077 0.000 
,25
Z
Ka  -0.00266363 -5.43087 0.000 
,8
Z
Ka  -0.00224179 -4.47863 0.000 
,17
Z
Ka  0.00244669 4.46577 0.000 
,9
Z
Ka  -0.000530782 -0.949721 0.342 
,10
Z
Ka  -0.00168423 -3.17051 0.002 
,11
Z
Ka  0.00250338 5.44716 0.000 
,12
Z
Ka  -0.000271598 -1.13089 0.258 
,13
Z
Ka  0.000422820 1.39083 0.164 
B
Ka  -0.00000284155 -2.59662 0.009 
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Va  0.365819 40.9197 0.000 
,14
Z
Va  2.19861 8.63851 0.000 
,2
Z
Va  -0.099770 -4.26076 0.000 
,3
Z
Va  0.587747 10.0519 0.000 
,4
Z
Va  0.00000936843 0.097482 0.922 
,5
Z
Va  0.047489 9.18499 0.000 
,6
Z
Va  0.122139 8.99219 0.000 
,26
Z
Va  -0.091344 -9.79160 0.000 
,15
Z
Va  -0.018647 -3.80149 0.000 
,27
Z
Va  0.00336613 0.832583 0.405 
,18
Z
Va  0.288706 1.53502 0.125 
,22
Z
Va  -3.35456 -19.6651 0.000 
,20
Z
Va  -0.0000201896 -15.4290 0.000 
,23
Z
Va  -0.00895662 -2.63364 0.008 
,7
Z
Va  -0.00697616 -2.55288 0.011 
,16
Z
Va  -0.023930 -8.61416 0.000 
,24
Z





Va  -0.015126 -4.74927 0.000 
,25
Z
Va  -0.020857 -6.99234 0.000 
,8
Z
Va  -0.025350 -8.33185 0.000 
,17
Z
Va  -0.018678 -6.17605 0.000 
,9
Z
Va  -0.023898 -7.63861 0.000 
,10
Z
Va  -0.036951 -12.4439 0.000 
,11
Z
Va  -0.00572175 -2.13139 0.033 
,12
Z
Va  -0.022663 -18.5470 0.000 
,13
Z
Va  0.013741 9.44380 0.000 
QQ
SLSLb   -0.052677 -1.09659 0.273 
QQ
SLLLb  -0.154689 -1.82196 0.068 
QQ
SLDDb  -0.182664 -2.64117 0.008 
QQ
SLTDb  0.118259 1.28701 0.198 
QQ
SLSb  0.109666 3.01781 0.003 
QQ
SLCb  0.014144 0.408419 0.683 
QQ
SLCLb  0.069564 3.19897 0.001 
QQ




SLCMb  -0.00639988 -2.05673 0.040 
QQ
SLCDb  -0.00300617 -0.319063 0.750 
QQ
LLLLb  0.377046 2.47792 0.013 
QQ
LLDDb  -0.361557 -4.26442 0.000 
QQ
LLTDb  0.016999 0.095417 0.924 
QQ
LLSb  0.041256 0.591692 0.554 
QQ
LLCb  -0.067180 -1.25383 0.210 
QQ
LLCLb  0.015715 0.570930 0.568 
QQ
LLAb  -0.059816 -2.97243 0.003 
QQ
LLCMb  0.011488 1.98768 0.047 
QQ
LLCDb  -0.012947 -1.19133 0.234 
QQ
DDDDb  0.042329 0.659968 0.509 
QQ
DDTDb  0.175921 1.84642 0.065 
QQ
DDSb  -0.00174850 -0.050611 0.960 
QQ
DDCb  0.349253 8.72299 0.000 
QQ
DDCLb  -0.079620 -3.33704 0.001 
QQ




DDCMb  -0.013299 -3.29676 0.001 
QQ
DDCDb  -0.00355730 -0.432579 0.665 
QQ
TDTDb  -0.102783 -0.436384 0.663 
QQ
TDSb  -0.320626 -5.60770 0.000 
QQ
TDCb  0.177220 2.50363 0.012 
QQ
TDCLb  -0.137705 -3.69691 0.000 
QQ
TDAb  0.031098 1.16614 0.244 
QQ
TDCMb  0.00982662 1.69188 0.091 
QQ
TDCDb  0.027140 1.73579 0.083 
QQ
SSb  -0.00282189 -0.997410 0.319 
QQ
SCb  -0.092455 -3.30815 0.001 
QQ
SCLb  0.127110 6.33939 0.000 
QQ
SAb  -0.00127490 -0.122089 0.903 
QQ
SCMb  0.000992523 1.21046 0.226 
QQ
SCDb  0.00772131 1.59413 0.111 
QQ
CCb  -0.280853 -8.34414 0.000 
QQ




CAb  -0.021257 -2.24807 0.025 
QQ
CCMb  0.00664656 2.74394 0.006 
QQ
CCDb  0.00436546 1.16566 0.244 
QQ
CLCLb  -0.038922 -4.51447 0.000 
QQ
CLAb  0.00260025 0.395380 0.693 
QQ
CLCMb  0.000232716 0.164240 0.870 
QQ
CLCDb  -0.012518 -3.25520 0.001 
QQ
AAb  0.000195627 0.053260 0.958 
QQ
ACMb  -0.00316116 -3.23898 0.001 
QQ
ACDb  0.00119278 0.565178 0.572 
QQ
CMCMb  0.00112193 3.04675 0.002 
QQ
CMCDb  -0.00191958 -4.79606 0.000 
QQ
CDCDb  0.00574286 4.29348 0.000 
PP
LLb   0.176916 178.466 0.000 
PP
LKb  -0.00697449 -24.1753 0.000 
PP
LVb  -0.095456 -40.0888 0.000 
PP




KVb  0.00726881 14.9032 0.000 
PP
VVb  0.088187 35.5484 0.000 
B
LLb   -0.154093
1310−×  -0.112851 0.910 
B
LKb  0.179141
610−×  2.90810 0.004 
B
KKb  0.623060
1010−×  2.75272 0.006 
QP
SLLb   -0.00101838 -0.778451 0.436 
QP
SLKb  0.00306635 9.69072 0.000 
QP
SLVb  -0.00157121 -0.798586 0.425 
QP
LLLb   -0.047203 -27.3383 0.000 
QP
LLKb  -0.00680957 -12.0455 0.000 
QP
LLVb  0.080677 30.7482 0.000 
QP
DDLb   -0.00436649 -2.65623 0.008 
QP
DDKb  -0.00210325 -4.50320 0.000 
QP
DDVb  0.00898148 3.57329 0.000 
QP
TDLb   0.030367 14.1981 0.000 
QP
TDKb  0.013317 23.2963 0.000 
QP




SLb   -0.000485226 -0.601367 0.548 
QP
SKb  0.000889330 5.48431 0.000 
QP
SVb  -0.000159417 -0.124105 0.901 
QP
CLb   0.00747509 11.4623 0.000 
QP
CKb  -0.00136884 -5.63703 0.000 
QP
CVb  -0.010254 -10.5445 0.000 
QP
CLLb   0.00289726 6.30252 0.000 
QP
CLKb  0.00185801 14.0623 0.000 
QP
CLVb  -0.00643604 -9.12661 0.000 
QP
ALb   -0.00217770 -4.70350 0.000 
QP
AKb  -0.00230740 -15.9054 0.000 
QP
AVb  0.00577636 8.18255 0.000 
QP
CMLb   -0.000514735 -5.78139 0.000 
QP
CMKb  0.0000273818 1.30504 0.192 
QP
CMVb  0.000775004 5.37457 0.000 
QP
CDLb   0.00223646 20.2966 0.000 
QP




CDVb  -0.00353084 -20.4632 0.000 
QT
SLTb  -0.00186255 -0.472929 0.636 
QT
LLTb  -0.024610 -4.55758 0.000 
QT
DDTb  0.029609 5.82113 0.000 
QT
TDTb  0.023694 3.11970 0.002 
QT
STb  -0.00529425 -1.37377 0.170 
QT
CTb  -0.012020 -4.55914 0.000 
QT
CLTb  0.00332698 2.26682 0.023 
QT
ATb  -0.00129790 -1.12819 0.259 
QT
CMTb  -0.000205179 -0.897953 0.369 
QT
CDTb  -0.00149982 -2.44734 0.014 
PT
LTb  -0.00319700 -19.8305 0.000 
PT
KTb  0.00133996 18.9201 0.000 
PT
VTb  0.00360776 14.4307 0.000 
R-squared Variable Cost Function 0.990316 
Share of Labor 0.502177 






Order of MA for 







Value Function 0.233216 
Note: 1. Tables 4.1.1 and 4.1.2 show the results for the simultaneous GMM estimation of 
the static variable cost function in Eq. (3.1.1.2.1a) with the static cost share 
equations in Eq. (3.1.1.2.2). Table 4.1.1 shows the estimates of the parameters 
other than the coefficients of the individual bank dummies in Eq. (3.1.1.2.1b), 
while Table 4.1.2 shows the estimates of these coefficients. 
    2. The details of Eq. (3.1.1.2.1c) are as follows:  
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where , ,
Q
h i tz  ( 1, ,27h =  ) are the short-term prime rate ( 1h = ), the capital ratio of 
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borrower firms ( 2h = ), the loan loss provision rate ( 3h = ), the loan per case 
( 4h = ), the proportion of loans for small and medium firms ( 5h = ), the Herfindahl 
index of loan proportions classified by industry ( 6h = ), the regional dummy in the 
Tohoku area, which takes a value of unity if the bank concerned operates in the 
Tohoku area ( 7h = ), the regional dummy in the Kinki area ( 8h = ), the regional 
dummy in the Chugoku area ( 9h = ), the regional dummy in the Sikoku area 
( 10h = ), the regional dummy in the Kyusyu area ( 11h = ), the bank dummy in the 
second-tier regional banks, which takes a value of unity if the bank concerned is 
the member bank of the Second Association of Regional Banks ( 12h = ), the bank 
dummy in the large banks, which takes a value of unity if the total financial asset 
of the bank concerned is larger than that of the average bank ( 13h = ), the long-
term prime rate ( 14h = ), the proportion of loans secured by real estate ( 15h = ), 
the regional dummy in the Kanto area ( 16h = ), the regional dummy in the Sanin 
area ( 17h = ), the yield on government bonds ( 18h = ), the postal savings interest 
rate of ordinary savings ( 19h = ), the TOPIX ( 20h = ), the regional dummy in the 
Hokuriku area ( 21h = ), the postal savings interest rate of postal savings certificates 
( 22h = ), the regional dummy in the Hokkaido area ( 23h = ), the regional dummy 
in the Koshinetsu area ( 24h = ), the regional dummy in the Tokai area ( 25h = ), 
the proportion of loans for real estate business ( 26h = ), and the proportion of loans 
without collateral and without warranty ( 27h = ). 
   3. The conditional heteroskedasticity of the error term is explicitly controlled. 
Furthermore, autocorrelation is corrected when it is found. When including the 
moving average of the error term in the estimate of the covariance matrix of the 
orthogonality conditions, we use Bartlett’s spectral density kernel proposed by 
Newey and West (1987) in order to guarantee that the estimate of the covariance 
matrix is a positive definite matrix. 
   4. The endogeneity of some variables is taken into account by using different 
instrumental variables for each equation. For these instrumental variables, the 
following variables are used: the individual bank dummies, the products of these 
dummies and the normalized time trend, the products of these dummies and its 
square, the products of these dummies and its cube, and the logarithms of the 
financial goods in the previous period and the factor prices in the current period for 
all equations, the endogenous quality variables in the previous period, and the 
exogenous quality variables in the current period for all static cost share equations, 
the products of these quality variables and the logarithms of the factor prices in the 
current period, and the products of regional dummies and their logarithms for the 
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static variable cost function and each static cost share equation, the products of the 
logarithms of the financial goods in the previous period and their quality variables, 
the products of the logarithms of their financial goods and the regional dummies, 
the products of two logarithms of their financial goods, the products of the 
logarithms of their financial goods and factor prices, the products of the logarithms 
of their financial goods and the normalized time trend, the products of two 
logarithms of their factor prices, the products of the logarithms of their factor prices 
and the normalized time trend, and other control dummies for the static variable 
cost function. 
5. The estimates of parameters related to the current goods price ( , ,V i tp
∗ ) are calculated 
from the condition of linear homogeneity with respect to factor prices. 
   6. The number of the samples that violate the concavity conditions for factor prices is 
2456 out of 4821 (the number of all samples), meaning that these samples account 











Table 4.1.2 Estimation Results for the Static Variable Cost Function (2): ( )i ta τ ∗  
Parameter Estimate t-statistic p-value 
Yachiyo Bank (The present Kiraboshi Bank) (i=1) 
1a  9.96356 202.231 0.000 
1Ta  -0.00526458 -0.641420 0.521 
1TTa  0.00143251 3.41901 0.001 
Hokkaido Bank (i=2) 
2a  10.2639 300.331 0.000 
2Ta  -0.023094 -5.64369 0.000 
2TTa  0.0000684312 0.383869 0.701 
2TTTa   0.0000555944 5.49672 0.000 
Aomori Bank (i=3) 
3a  10.0791 415.996 0.000 
3Ta  -0.00677500 -1.96167 0.050 
3TTa  -0.000614175 -4.37060 0.000 
3TTTa   0.0000162395 2.37089 0.018 
Seiwa Bank (i=4) 
Seiwa Bank and Michinoku Bank (i=5) 
5a  9.91569 329.970 0.000 
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5Ta  -0.027141 -6.60947 0.000 
5TTa  -0.000212129 -1.43204 0.152 
5TTTa   0.0000775778 6.89049 0.000 
Akita Bank (i=6) 
6a  10.1444 326.317 0.000 
6Ta  -0.000418649 -0.103401 0.918 
6TTa  -0.000674003 -4.58082 0.000 
6TTTa   0.00000514880 0.676109 0.499 
Ugo Bank (i=7) 
7a  9.35105 134.709 0.000 
7Ta  -0.010133 -1.67859 0.093 
Hokuto Bank (i=8) 
8a  9.90237 225.845 0.000 
8Ta  -0.048300 -7.14359 0.000 
8TTa  0.00108252 4.05583 0.000 
Shonai Bank (i=9) 
9a  9.28031 143.113 0.000 
9Ta  -0.012355 -3.03993 0.002 
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9TTa  0.000286994 1.67645 0.094 
9TTTa   0.0000381170 4.42171 0.000 
Yamagata Bank (i=10) 
10a  9.91825 280.717 0.000 
10Ta  -0.00149482 -0.401233 0.688 
10TTa  -0.000190834 -1.40554 0.160 
10TTTa   0.0000116254 1.77826 0.075 
Bank of Iwate (i=11) 
11a  10.0801 278.542 0.000 
11Ta  0.00435416 1.15036 0.250 
11TTa  -0.000312264 -2.25953 0.024 
11TTTa   -0.00000186823 -0.277954 0.781 
Tohoku Bank (i=12) 
12a  9.11257 124.747 0.000 
12Ta  -0.010671 -2.37998 0.017 
12TTa  0.000168102 1.17084 0.242 
12TTTa   -0.0000152320 -1.75595 0.079 
77 Bank (i=13) 
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13a  10.7706 326.236 0.000 
13Ta  -0.00806930 -1.87545 0.061 
13TTa  -0.000449692 -3.07443 0.002 
13TTTa   0.0000239369 3.80545 0.000 
Toho Bank (i=14) 
14a  10.3505 538.990 0.000 
14Ta  -0.00869740 -2.19536 0.028 
14TTa  -0.000393887 -2.61222 0.009 
14TTTa   0.0000570794 7.03506 0.000 
Gunma Bank (i=15) 
15a  10.7691 243.020 0.000 
15Ta  0.022400 5.20881 0.000 
15TTa  0.000270677 1.70652 0.088 
15TTTa   0.0000233087 2.86079 0.004 
Ashikaga Bank (i=16) 
16a  10.9161 196.942 0.000 
16Ta  0.010469 2.37439 0.018 
16TTa  -0.000187543 -1.09260 0.275 
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16TTTa   0.0000312545 3.26138 0.001 
Joyo Bank (i=17) 
17a  11.1271 173.504 0.000 
17Ta  0.012650 2.85317 0.004 
17TTa  -0.000128485 -0.827923 0.408 
17TTTa   0.0000265568 3.26030 0.001 
Kanto Bank (i=18) 
18a  9.34024 150.700 0.000 
18Ta  0.00613546 0.989867 0.322 
18TTa  0.000117794 0.304641 0.761 
Kanto Tsukuba Bank (i=19) 
19a  9.65756 177.532 0.000 
Tsukuba Bank (i=20) 
20a  10.3460 158.147 0.000 
Musashino Bank (i=21) 
21a  10.1565 438.097 0.000 
21Ta  0.035989 6.79220 0.000 
21TTa  -0.0000824707 -0.501102 0.616 
21TTTa   0.00000974839 0.943228 0.346 
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Chiba Bank (i=22) 
22a  11.2785 145.856 0.000 
22Ta  0.015245 2.66202 0.008 
22TTa  0.0000291784 0.176063 0.860 
22TTTa   0.0000679844 7.80967 0.000 
Chiba Kogyo Bank (i=23) 
23a  9.88517 344.061 0.000 
23Ta  0.010790 2.61614 0.009 
23TTa  -0.000707411 -3.81199 0.000 
23TTTa   0.0000491459 4.39731 0.000 
Tokyo Tomin Bank (i=24) 
24a  9.99108 289.428 0.000 
24Ta  0.00616984 1.24124 0.215 
24TTa  -0.0000682049 -0.288087 0.773 
24TTTa   0.0000387549 3.30618 0.001 
Bank of Yokohama (i=25) 
25a  11.6151 127.009 0.000 
25Ta  0.012902 2.12209 0.034 
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25TTa  0.000382616 2.37212 0.018 
25TTTa   0.0000503604 5.22541 0.000 
Daishi Bank (i=26) 
26a  10.3742 348.457 0.000 
26Ta  -0.00166379 -0.474368 0.635 
26TTa  0.000171813 1.28771 0.198 
26TTTa   0.0000276352 3.66290 0.000 
Hokuetsu Bank (i=27) 
27a  9.89886 264.611 0.000 
27Ta  0.00278647 0.788458 0.430 
27TTa  -0.000126946 -0.800725 0.423 
27TTTa   0.0000107735 1.42239 0.155 
Yamanashi Chuo Bank (i=28) 
28a  10.1344 422.296 0.000 
28Ta  0.012869 3.15840 0.002 
28TTa  -0.000334718 -2.16852 0.030 
28TTTa   -0.0000121351 -1.54791 0.122 
Hachijuni Bank (i=29) 
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29a  10.7595 252.920 0.000 
29Ta  -0.00727303 -1.91840 0.055 
29TTa  -0.000297248 -2.01387 0.044 
29TTTa   0.0000402860 4.44528 0.000 
Hokuriku Bank (i=30) 
30a  10.5263 143.262 0.000 
30Ta  -0.00920207 -1.68922 0.091 
30TTa  0.000525455 3.16151 0.002 
30TTTa   -0.00000749293 -0.511165 0.609 
Bank of Toyama (i=31) 
31a  9.23041 36.5521 0.000 
31Ta  0.020247 3.20969 0.001 
31TTa  0.00103077 3.80877 0.000 
31TTTa   -0.000130089 -8.00408 0.000 
Hokkoku Bank (i=32) 
32a  10.3230 341.655 0.000 
32Ta  0.013243 2.39827 0.016 
32TTa  -0.000152975 -0.877905 0.380 
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32TTTa   -0.0000619405 -4.45098 0.000 
Fukui Bank (i=33) 
33a  10.0873 247.822 0.000 
33Ta  -0.00653242 -1.25283 0.210 
33TTa  0.000181907 1.06025 0.289 
33TTTa   -0.00000624911 -0.573875 0.566 
Shizuoka Bank (i=34) 
34a  10.9199 205.303 0.000 
34Ta  -0.00586314 -1.45634 0.145 
34TTa  -0.0000344612 -0.221118 0.825 
34TTTa  0.0000100770 1.43746 0.151 
Suruga Bank (i=35) 
35a  10.1807 414.012 0.000 
35Ta  -0.010665 -2.31073 0.021 
35TTa  0.000126616 0.766524 0.443 
35TTTa  0.00000602080 0.595744 0.551 
Shimizu Bank (i=36) 
36a  9.54964 213.870 0.000 
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36Ta  -0.00184323 -0.470252 0.638 
36TTa  0.000286358 1.76582 0.077 
36TTTa  -0.0000143954 -1.88753 0.059 
Ogaki Kyoritsu Bank (i=37) 
37a  10.2861 385.051 0.000 
37Ta  0.010154 2.65258 0.008 
37TTa  -0.0000260522 -0.164877 0.869 
37TTTa  0.00000418993 0.577019 0.564 
Juroku Bank (i=38) 
38a  10.3335 345.948 0.000 
38Ta  -0.00275882 -0.659027 0.510 
38TTa  0.000319827 2.18210 0.029 
38TTTa  0.0000326021 3.91673 0.000 
Juroku Bank (merged with the Gifu Bank) (i=39) 
39a  10.5240 141.510 0.000 
Mie Bank (i=40) 
40a  9.56148 202.084 0.000 
40Ta  0.00581544 1.45733 0.145 
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40TTa  0.000375145 2.34967 0.019 
40TTTa  0.00000646261 0.796256 0.426 
Hyakugo Bank (i=41) 
41a  10.3398 333.267 0.000 
41Ta  0.00439978 1.29989 0.194 
41TTa  -0.000194852 -1.40638 0.160 
41TTTa  0.00000342139 0.570437 0.568 
Shiga Bank (i=42) 
42a  10.4890 395.894 0.000 
42Ta  -0.00269146 -0.788310 0.431 
42TTa  -0.000344738 -2.49619 0.013 
42TTTa  0.00000767547 1.17749 0.239 
Bank of Kyoto (i=43) 
43a  10.5778 334.682 0.000 
43Ta  0.00364627 0.879037 0.379 
43TTa  0.000215228 1.39929 0.162 
43TTTa  0.0000314315 4.19094 0.000 
Osaka Bank (i=44) 
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44a  10.0912 331.693 0.000 
44Ta  -0.020746 -3.72658 0.000 
44TTa  -0.00241199 -4.43708 0.000 
Kinki Osaka Bank (The present Kansai Mirai Bank) (i=45) 
45a  10.4574 186.799 0.000 
Senshu Bank (i=46) 
46a  9.66587 242.372 0.000 
46Ta  -0.010690 -2.06436 0.039 
46TTa  -0.000315415 -0.881549 0.378 
46TTTa  0.0000393240 1.83265 0.067 
Ikeda Bank (i=47) 
47a  9.78865 239.840 0.000 
47Ta  -0.012711 -2.42818 0.015 
47TTa  0.000107359 0.326884 0.744 
47TTTa  0.000117638 5.61050 0.000 
Senshu Ikeda Bank (i=48) 
48a  10.4094 142.342 0.000 
Nanto Bank (i=49) 
49a  10.5634 321.457 0.000 
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49Ta  0.000471875 0.123150 0.902 
49TTa  -0.000664754 -4.63510 0.000 
49TTTa  0.0000197522 2.75212 0.006 
Kiyo Bank (i=50) 
50a  10.3483 368.980 0.000 
50Ta  -0.014476 -3.66198 0.000 
50TTa  -0.000653906 -2.31665 0.021 
50TTTa  0.0000436642 2.86375 0.004 
Kiyo Bank (merged with the Wakayama Bank) (i=51) 
51a  10.2435 147.233 0.000 
51Ta  0.00440866 0.854849 0.393 
Tajima Bank (i=52) 
52a  9.24107 129.848 0.000 
52Ta  -0.013889 -3.04316 0.002 
52TTa  -0.000352411 -2.21163 0.027 
52TTTa  0.0000203722 2.17741 0.029 
Tottori Bank (i=53) 
53a  9.32165 93.8781 0.000 
135 
 
53Ta  -0.014056 -2.11962 0.034 
53TTa  -0.0000189014 -0.110325 0.912 
53TTTa  0.0000136014 1.39555 0.163 
San-in Godo Bank (i=54) 
54a  10.4368 136.141 0.000 
54Ta  0.021511 2.74500 0.006 
San-in Godo Bank (merged with the Fuso Bank) (i=55) 
55a  10.5511 295.338 0.000 
55Ta  -0.010091 -1.62727 0.104 
55TTa  -0.000155228 -0.601575 0.547 
Chugoku Bank (i=56) 
56a  10.8218 235.435 0.000 
56Ta  0.010787 1.67104 0.095 
56TTa  0.000176573 0.974332 0.330 
56TTTa  0.00000452775 0.457556 0.647 
Hiroshima Bank (i=57) 
57a  11.0004 202.245 0.000 
57Ta  -0.00598330 -1.21250 0.225 
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57TTa  -0.000271204 -1.61317 0.107 
57TTTa  0.0000443713 5.00351 0.000 
Yamaguchi Bank (i=58) 
58a  10.6812 262.657 0.000 
58Ta  -0.000996227 -0.222755 0.824 
58TTa  -0.000968242 -6.17165 0.000 
58TTTa  -0.00000764299 -1.08138 0.280 
Awa Bank (i=59) 
59a  10.0312 344.075 0.000 
59Ta  0.00817748 1.60981 0.107 
59TTa  -0.000549759 -3.56651 0.000 
59TTTa  0.00000486336 0.662852 0.507 
Hyakujushi Bank (i=60) 
60a  10.3664 185.397 0.000 
60Ta  0.00632375 1.35467 0.176 
60TTa  -0.000340232 -2.08701 0.037 
60TTTa  0.0000226105 3.28932 0.001 
Iyo Bank (i=61) 
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61a  10.7317 150.583 0.000 
61Ta  0.035215 5.14959 0.000 
Iyo Bank (merged with the Toho Sogo Bank) (i=62) 
62a  10.5670 227.494 0.000 
62Ta  0.00998014 1.64672 0.100 
62TTa  0.000342760 1.14066 0.254 
Shikoku Bank (i=63) 
63a  10.2484 242.971 0.000 
63Ta  -0.00662037 -1.53985 0.124 
63TTa  -0.000857181 -4.86744 0.000 
63TTTa  0.0000187273 2.63661 0.008 
Bank of Fukuoka (i=64) 
64a  11.0497 209.133 0.000 
64Ta  -0.00287703 -0.530933 0.595 
64TTa  0.000323958 1.91542 0.055 
64TTTa  0.0000552470 5.18730 0.000 
Chikuho Bank (i=65) 
65a  8.78222 93.6991 0.000 
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65Ta  -0.00636566 -1.35697 0.175 
65TTa  0.000229416 1.20602 0.228 
65TTTa  0.0000256164 2.68817 0.007 
Bank of Saga (i=66) 
  66a  9.91589 316.201 0.000 
66Ta  0.012478 3.35850 0.001 
66TTa  -0.000521322 -3.63127 0.000 
66TTTa  -0.0000111058 -1.56002 0.119 
Eighteenth Bank (i=67) 
67a  10.1390 467.224 0.000 
67Ta  0.00953107 2.45685 0.014 
67TTa  -0.000528268 -3.70273 0.000 
67TTTa  -0.0000116874 -1.48891 0.137 
Shinwa Bank (i=68) 
68a  10.0656 326.216 0.000 
68Ta  0.00579403 1.96650 0.049 
68TTa  -0.000127453 -0.583978 0.559 
Shinwa Bank (merged with the Kyushu Bank) (i=69) 
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69a  10.6242 111.364 0.000 
69Ta  -0.040513 -5.47911 0.000 
Higo Bank (i=70) 
70a  10.4435 423.340 0.000 
70Ta  0.00493275 1.43524 0.151 
70TTa  -0.000742493 -5.40757 0.000 
70TTTa  0.0000379835 5.11772 0.000 
Oita Bank (i=71) 
71a  10.1984 392.554 0.000 
71Ta  0.00167925 0.392501 0.695 
71TTa  -0.000405866 -2.81469 0.005 
71TTTa  0.0000155418 2.45672 0.014 
Miyazaki Bank (i=72) 
72a  9.89597 335.755 0.000 
72Ta  0.018335 4.78862 0.000 
72TTa  0.0000443408 0.327367 0.743 
72TTTa  0.00000396133 0.551187 0.582 
Kagoshima Bank (i=73) 
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73a  10.3913 570.916 0.000 
73Ta  0.015139 3.94751 0.000 
73TTa  -0.000447673 -3.33858 0.001 
73TTTa  0.00000402849 0.544676 0.586 
Bank of Ryukyu (i=74) 
74a  10.0001 257.856 0.000 
74Ta  -0.00368722 -0.874712 0.382 
74TTa  -0.000153921 -0.960313 0.337 
74TTTa  0.0000126903 1.16999 0.242 
Bank of Okinawa (i=75) 
75a  9.99371 231.352 0.000 
75Ta  -0.00888146 -1.95980 0.050 
75TTa  -0.000647925 -3.48505 0.000 
75TTTa  0.0000384202 3.36165 0.001 
North Pacific Bank (i=76) 
76a  10.1041 331.123 0.000 
76Ta  -0.00360604 -0.652236 0.514 
76TTa  0.00155431 6.74039 0.000 
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North Pacific Bank (merged with the Sapporo Bank) (i=77) 
77a  10.3498 109.966 0.000 
Sapporo Bank (i=78) 
78a  10.0600 184.042 0.000 
78Ta  -0.019564 -4.87904 0.000 
78TTa  0.000932762 3.27419 0.001 
Syokusan Bank (i=79) 
79a  9.76159 155.137 0.000 
79Ta  -0.000440781 -0.096006 0.924 
79TTa  0.000473356 2.17013 0.030 
79TTTa  -0.0000533327 -3.96579 0.000 
Kirayaka Bank (i=80) 
80a  9.92591 72.2948 0.000 
80Ta  0.000680363 0.098746 0.921 
Kita-Nippon Bank (i=81) 
81a  9.90978 199.346 0.000 
81Ta  -0.00504479 -1.31624 0.188 
81TTa  0.000108487 0.669819 0.503 
81TTTa  -0.0000179112 -2.11353 0.035 
142 
 
Tokuyo City Bank (i=82) 
82a  9.70460 161.851 0.000 
82Ta  -0.033728 -4.24887 0.000 
82TTa  -0.000396054 -0.942183 0.346 
Sendai Bank (i=83) 
83a  9.87530 146.046 0.000 
83Ta  -0.00554786 -1.15550 0.248 
83TTa  0.000134769 0.843942 0.399 
83TTTa  -0.00000754950 -0.786261 0.432 
Fukushima Bank (i=84) 
84a  9.83917 150.374 0.000 
84Ta  -0.00163059 -0.370129 0.711 
84TTa  0.000102617 0.700076 0.484 
84TTTa  -0.0000487945 -4.54398 0.000 
Daito Bank (i=85) 
85a  9.81792 144.861 0.000 
85Ta  0.00120231 0.290542 0.771 
85TTa  0.000187500 1.17590 0.240 
143 
 
85TTTa  -0.0000333552 -3.90386 0.000 
Towa Bank (i=86) 
86a  10.0849 202.538 0.000 
86Ta  0.028617 6.11904 0.000 
86TTa  0.000188287 1.14735 0.251 
86TTTa  -0.0000455242 -4.94098 0.000 
Tochigi Bank (i=87) 
87a  9.97226 218.535 0.000 
87Ta  0.049030 9.12079 0.000 
87TTa  0.000668018 4.21726 0.000 
87TTTa  -0.0000722820 -7.65368 0.000 
Keiyo Bank (i=88) 
88a  10.2205 263.407 0.000 
88Ta  0.055369 10.4022 0.000 
88TTa  0.000883275 5.39435 0.000 
88TTTa  -0.0000454090 -4.70808 0.000 
Taiheiyo Bank (i=89) 
89a  9.18937 74.3790 0.000 
144 
 
89Ta  0.011617 0.756947 0.449 
89TTa  0.00170087 2.36619 0.018 
Higashi-Nippon Bank (i=90) 
90a  9.88478 220.270 0.000 
90Ta  0.022507 4.66099 0.000 
90TTa  0.000896737 6.47999 0.000 
90TTTa  -0.0000208161 -2.20326 0.028 
Tokyo Sowa Bank (i=91) 
91a  10.0222 183.861 0.000 
91Ta  -0.015996 -1.54792 0.122 
91TTa  -0.000674657 -1.20412 0.229 
Heiwa Sogo Bank (i=92) 
92a  9.49042 77.6749 0.000 
92Ta  -0.043973 -5.11889 0.000 
Kanagawa Bank (i=93) 
93a  9.13177 85.7680 0.000 
93Ta  0.011799 1.82173 0.068 
93TTa  0.00159038 7.92463 0.000 
145 
 
93TTTa  -0.0000621539 -4.56854 0.000 
Niigata Chuo Bank (i=94) 
94a  9.88959 169.546 0.000 
94Ta  0.00368490 0.493320 0.622 
94TTa  0.00143485 3.23099 0.001 
Taiko Bank (i=95) 
95a  9.92329 205.161 0.000 
95Ta  0.019069 4.78684 0.000 
95TTa  0.000716804 4.97780 0.000 
95TTTa  -0.0000630038 -9.01175 0.000 
Nagano Bank (i=96) 
96a  9.91173 169.887 0.000 
96Ta  0.00784727 1.65252 0.098 
96TTa  0.000586500 4.00860 0.000 
96TTTa  -0.0000455544 -4.60057 0.000 
First Bank of Toyama (i=97) 
97a  10.0461 71.7448 0.000 
97Ta  0.025741 4.87551 0.000 
146 
 
97TTa  0.00124973 7.34815 0.000 
97TTTa  -0.000107098 -7.22238 0.000 
Fukuho Bank (i=98) 
98a  10.0393 47.6936 0.000 
98Ta  0.023619 3.91413 0.000 
98TTa  0.00306729 9.46052 0.000 
98TTTa  -0.000174671 -7.81274 0.000 
Shizuokachuo Bank (i=99) 
99a  9.64032 130.602 0.000 
99Ta  0.00898142 1.76451 0.078 
99TTa  0.000851604 4.96866 0.000 
99TTTa  -0.0000459006 -5.18109 0.000 
Gifu Bank (i=100) 
100a  9.88303 175.871 0.000 
100Ta  -0.00511517 -1.17830 0.239 
100TTa  0.000974493 5.37174 0.000 
100TTTa  -0.0000122192 -1.28347 0.199 
Aichi Bank (i=101) 
147 
 
101a  10.1631 338.647 0.000 
101Ta  0.020001 4.41202 0.000 
101TTa  0.000325918 2.25157 0.024 
101TTTa  -0.0000569028 -6.16291 0.000 
Bank of Nagoya (i=102) 
102a  10.1938 373.250 0.000 
102Ta  0.017233 4.15855 0.000 
102TTa  0.000428935 2.66422 0.008 
102TTTa  -0.0000549937 -6.95481 0.000 
Chukyo Bank (i=103) 
103a  10.1002 286.574 0.000 
103Ta  0.00313506 0.719568 0.472 
103TTa  0.000619554 3.99448 0.000 
103TTTa  -0.0000366565 -3.86930 0.000 
Daisan Bank (i=104) 
104a  10.0903 291.128 0.000 
104Ta  0.021481 5.96458 0.000 
104TTa  0.000700584 5.21163 0.000 
148 
 
104TTTa  -0.0000571111 -8.32583 0.000 
Biwako Bank (i=105) 
105a  9.88752 229.391 0.000 
105Ta  -0.017124 -3.08318 0.002 
105TTa  0.000168095 0.736386 0.461 
105TTTa  0.00000412672 0.260741 0.794 
Bank of Kinki (i=106) 
106a  10.2619 296.860 0.000 
106Ta  0.011192 1.97739 0.048 
106TTa  0.00106479 3.20549 0.001 
Fukutoku Bank (i=107) 
107a  10.1143 226.046 0.000 
107Ta  -0.000474788 -0.076059 0.939 
107TTa  0.000750189 1.69991 0.089 
Kansai Bank (i=108) 
108a  9.79007 193.746 0.000 
108Ta  0.00209442 0.368368 0.713 
108TTa  0.00107047 3.15547 0.002 
Kansai Urban Banking Corporation (i=109) 
149 
 
109a  10.2551 119.961 0.000 
Kansai Urban Banking Corporation (merged with the Biwako Bank) (The present 
Kansai Mirai Bank) (i=110) 
110a  10.5638 83.7337 0.000 
Taisho Bank (i=111) 
111a  9.42416 101.179 0.000 
111Ta  -0.017012 -2.88060 0.004 
111TTa  0.000868151 3.58824 0.000 
111TTTa  -0.0000260359 -1.93423 0.053 
Hanwa Bank (i=112) 
112a  9.81509 79.7291 0.000 
112Ta  0.042966 1.61715 0.106 
112TTa  0.00390389 3.34153 0.001 
Hyogo Bank (i=113) 
113a  10.0268 125.192 0.000 
113Ta  -0.032541 -2.83821 0.005 
113TTa  -0.000852189 -1.70400 0.088 
Hanshin Bank (i=114) 
114a  9.81398 183.465 0.000 
150 
 
114Ta  -0.012265 -2.24527 0.025 
114TTa  0.000168531 0.451050 0.652 
Minato Bank (i=115) 
115a  10.4789 229.738 0.000 
115Ta  0.00619389 1.46048 0.144 
Shimane Bank (i=116) 
116a  9.63967 74.0679 0.000 
116Ta  0.00558909 0.951576 0.341 
116TTa  0.000612666 3.72660 0.000 
116TTTa  -0.0000514937 -4.87939 0.000 
Tomato Bank (i=117) 
117a  9.57497 97.5141 0.000 
117Ta  0.010181 1.69908 0.089 
117TTa  0.000656489 4.01955 0.000 
117TTTa  -0.0000206194 -2.70271 0.007 
Setouchi Bank (i=118) 
118a  9.56212 98.7659 0.000 
118Ta  -0.00163219 -0.314733 0.753 
151 
 
118TTa  -0.0000280986 -0.095911 0.924 
Hiroshima Sogo Bank (i=119) 
119a  10.0173 227.925 0.000 
119Ta  0.00180266 0.314999 0.753 
119TTa  0.000253906 0.806180 0.420 
Momiji Bank (i=120) 
120a  10.8520 124.843 0.000 
120Ta  -0.044505 -5.64458 0.000 
Saikyo Bank (i=121) 
121a  9.50856 97.0302 0.000 
121Ta  0.00343636 0.638929 0.523 
121TTa  0.000543294 3.81056 0.000 
121TTTa  -0.00000379310 -0.553427 0.580 
Tokushima Bank (i=122) 
122a  9.78316 141.728 0.000 
122Ta  0.014187 3.03985 0.002 
122TTa  0.000366487 2.34673 0.019 
122TTTa  -0.0000452914 -6.10453 0.000 
Kagawa Bank (i=123) 
152 
 
123a  9.85519 187.915 0.000 
123Ta  0.021015 4.25854 0.000 
123TTa  0.000385525 2.08900 0.037 
123TTTa  -0.0000452764 -5.46875 0.000 
Ehime Bank (i=124) 
124a  9.94308 224.602 0.000 
124Ta  0.024104 5.01461 0.000 
124TTa  0.000487590 3.11686 0.002 
124TTTa  -0.0000438233 -4.28760 0.000 
Bank of Kochi (i=125) 
125a  9.94921 168.396 0.000 
125Ta  0.00291811 0.655472 0.512 
125TTa  0.000268273 1.64087 0.101 
125TTTa  -0.0000337452 -4.81918 0.000 
Nishi-Nippon Sogo Bank (i=126) 
126a  10.1874 113.610 0.000 
Nishi-Nippon Bank (i=127) 
127a  10.4123 236.858 0.000 
153 
 
127Ta  0.021429 3.93949 0.000 
Nishi-Nippon City Bank and Nishi-Nippon City Bank (merged with the Bank of 
Nagasaki) (i=128) 
128a  10.9142 235.467 0.000 
128Ta  0.00962173 1.44825 0.148 
Nishi-Nippon City Bank (merged with the Bank of Nagasaki) (i=129) 
Fukuoka City Bank (i=130) 
130a  10.1555 248.762 0.000 
130Ta  0.018879 4.17090 0.000 
130TTa  0.000424681 1.91481 0.056 
Fukuoka Chuo Bank (i=131) 
131a  9.35418 118.468 0.000 
131Ta  0.019595 3.57494 0.000 
131TTa  0.000529085 3.43116 0.001 
131TTTa  -0.0000576376 -5.62777 0.000 
Saga Kyoei Bank (i=132) 
132a  9.35202 96.2482 0.000 
132Ta  0.025531 4.25879 0.000 
132TTa  0.000601105 2.77724 0.005 
154 
 
132TTTa  -0.0000712108 -5.52676 0.000 
Bank of Nagasaki (i=133) 
133a  9.39579 112.866 0.000 
133Ta  0.00241395 0.423334 0.672 
133TTa  0.000506807 1.87218 0.061 
133TTTa  0.0000143088 0.949654 0.342 
Kyushu Bank (i=134) 
  134a  9.68836 180.318 0.000 
134Ta  0.00642706 1.49084 0.136 
134TTa  0.00102195 3.90928 0.000 
Kumamoto Bank (i=135) 
135a  9.29435 157.664 0.000 
135Ta  -0.015559 -2.10012 0.036 
Kumamoto Family Bank (i=136) 
  136a  9.97818 209.743 0.000 
136Ta  -0.00968011 -1.40377 0.160 
136TTa  0.000362224 1.15493 0.248 
Higo Family Bank (i=137) 
137a  9.45640 102.695 0.000 
155 
 
137Ta  -0.036065 -4.36749 0.000 
Howa Bank (i=138) 
138a  9.56718 136.919 0.000 
138Ta  0.00501801 1.10728 0.268 
138TTa  0.000315751 2.01206 0.044 
138TTTa  -0.0000436851 -5.71389 0.000 
Miyazaki Taiyo Bank (i=139) 
139a  9.58731 139.722 0.000 
139Ta  0.016132 3.63707 0.000 
139TTa  0.000211603 1.40300 0.161 
139TTTa  -0.0000450162 -6.45652 0.000 
Minami-Nippon Bank (i=140) 
140a  9.76313 153.673 0.000 
140Ta  -0.000266590 -0.063495 0.949 
140TTa  0.000450267 3.23225 0.001 
140TTTa  -0.0000390770 -4.85325 0.000 
Okinawa Kaiho Bank (i=141) 
141a  9.97439 139.362 0.000 
156 
 
141Ta  0.00679863 1.42446 0.154 
141TTa  0.000590125 3.53971 0.000 
141TTTa  -0.0000282400 -2.96290 0.003 
Tokyo Star Bank (i=142) 
142a  8.95411 55.4897 0.000 
142Ta  0.113633 10.1578 0.000 
Saitama Resona Bank (i=143) 
143a  10.1490 55.9763 0.000 
143Ta  0.101606 8.70392 0.000 
Note: 1. Tables 4.1.1 and 4.1.2 show the results for the simultaneous GMM estimation of 
the static variable cost function in Eq. (3.1.1.2.1a) with the static cost share 
equations in Eq. (3.1.1.2.2). Table 4.1.1 shows the estimates of the parameters 
other than the coefficients of the individual bank dummies in Eq. (3.1.1.2.1b), 
while Table 4.1.2 shows the estimates of these coefficients. 
2. When new banks emerge due to consolidation, we treat the new banks and their 
predecessors as different entities. 
     3. The Seiwa Bank (i=4) is added to the Michinoku Bank (i=5) because of a lack 
of samples. For the same reason, the Nishi-Nippon City Bank (merged with the 






Table 4.1.3 Estimation Results for Eq. (3.2.1.1) Composing Eq. (3.1.1.1.2) 
Parameter Estimate t-statistic p-value 
Yachiyo Bank (The present Kiraboshi Bank) (i=1) 
1,
SIE
Ka  -4.93732 -25.6274 0.000 
1, ,5
SIEZ
Ka  -0.050225 -0.262947 0.793 
1,
SIET
Ka  0.00363439 1.75336 0.080 
Hokkaido Bank (i=2) 
2,
SIE
Ka  -4.88481 -178.061 0.000 
2, ,4
SIEZ
Ka  0.00174160 5.26168 0.000 
2, ,5
SIEZ
Ka  -0.084438 -2.21671 0.027 
2,
SIET
Ka  -0.00123427 -4.45172 0.000 
Aomori Bank (i=3) 
3,
SIE
Ka  -5.18092 -121.245 0.000 
3, ,4
SIEZ
Ka  0.00234208 3.47614 0.001 
3, ,5
SIEZ
Ka  0.277261 4.73168 0.000 
3,
SIET
Ka  0.000513646 1.53952 0.124 
Seiwa Bank (i=4) 
Seiwa Bank and Michinoku Bank (i=5) 
5,
SIE





Ka  0.00255266 1.48617 0.137 
5, ,5
SIEZ
Ka  0.039988 0.211743 0.832 
5,
SIET
Ka  -0.00158002 -1.88806 0.059 
Akita Bank (i=6) 
6,
SIE
Ka  -5.26284 -117.526 0.000 
6, ,4
SIEZ
Ka  0.00530056 4.80132 0.000 
6, ,5
SIEZ
Ka  0.315959 6.28696 0.000 
6,
SIET
Ka  0.000636156 2.43000 0.015 
Ugo Bank (i=7) 
7,
SIE
Ka  -5.10157 -5064.24 0.000 
7,
SIET
Ka  -0.00191738 -20.5754 0.000 
Hokuto Bank (i=8) 
8,
SIE
Ka  -4.95620 -336.577 0.000 
8, ,5
SIEZ
Ka  -0.038230 -2.46039 0.014 
8,
SIET
Ka  -0.00670421 -21.4518 0.000 
Shonai Bank (i=9) 
9,
SIE
Ka  -4.96056 -273.902 0.000 
9, ,4
SIEZ





Ka  -0.137101 -8.24794 0.000 
9,
SIET
Ka  0.000577073 2.53503 0.011 
Yamagata Bank (i=10) 
10,
SIE
Ka  -5.07372 -239.039 0.000 
10, ,4
SIEZ
Ka  0.00186817 2.61415 0.009 
10, ,5
SIEZ
Ka  0.089540 3.13017 0.002 
10,
SIET
Ka  0.000369696 3.52198 0.000 
Bank of Iwate (i=11) 
11,
SIE
Ka  -5.10831 -243.447 0.000 
11, ,4
SIEZ
Ka  0.0000738387 0.148294 0.882 
11, ,5
SIEZ
Ka  0.231747 8.32337 0.000 
11,
SIET
Ka  0.00120297 6.18557 0.000 
Tohoku Bank (i=12) 
12,
SIE
Ka  -5.00981 -105.271 0.000 
12, ,4
SIEZ
Ka  -0.00622415 -4.72887 0.000 
12, ,5
SIEZ
Ka  -0.085993 -1.90691 0.057 
12,
SIET
Ka  -0.00203147 -16.4533 0.000 





Ka  -5.06378 -271.530 0.000 
13, ,4
SIEZ
Ka  -0.0000344723 -0.090035 0.928 
13, ,5
SIEZ
Ka  0.370486 14.2746 0.000 
13,
SIET
Ka  0.000147232 1.35526 0.175 
Toho Bank (i=14) 
14,
SIE
Ka  -5.05191 -95.6778 0.000 
14, ,4
SIEZ
Ka  0.000945060 0.564819 0.572 
14, ,5
SIEZ
Ka  0.186203 3.55611 0.000 
14,
SIET
Ka  0.00177660 5.19534 0.000 
Gunma Bank (i=15) 
15,
SIE
Ka  -4.88986 -31.9933 0.000 
15, ,4
SIEZ
Ka  -0.00218012 -1.63672 0.102 
15, ,5
SIEZ
Ka  0.168534 0.825569 0.409 
15,
SIET
Ka  0.00568192 4.19599 0.000 
Ashikaga Bank (i=16) 
16,
SIE
Ka  -4.89125 -356.869 0.000 
16, ,4
SIEZ
Ka  0.000372618 2.47295 0.013 
16, ,5
SIEZ





Ka  0.00356660 24.1753 0.000 
Joyo Bank (i=17) 
17,
SIE
Ka  -4.89937 -429.664 0.000 
17, ,4
SIEZ
Ka  0.000647105 5.14853 0.000 
17, ,5
SIEZ
Ka  0.223717 13.4872 0.000 
17,
SIET
Ka  0.00327375 41.4366 0.000 
Kanto Bank (i=18) 
18,
SIE
Ka  -5.12876 -194.627 0.000 
18, ,5
SIEZ
Ka  0.040542 1.29852 0.194 
18,
SIET
Ka  0.00130635 6.84991 0.000 
Kanto Tsukuba Bank (i=19) 
19,
SIE
Ka  -5.03394 -7882.33 0.000 
Tsukuba Bank (i=20) 
20,
SIE
Ka  -4.91284 -7154.54 0.000 
Musashino Bank (i=21) 
21,
SIE
Ka  -5.02452 -460.106 0.000 
21, ,4
SIEZ
Ka  -0.00121910 -5.84179 0.000 
21, ,5
SIEZ
Ka  0.129892 7.89537 0.000 
21,
SIET
Ka  0.00761750 137.164 0.000 
162 
 
Chiba Bank (i=22) 
22,
SIE
Ka  -4.48924 -58.1432 0.000 
22, ,4
SIEZ
Ka  -0.00275428 -1.60016 0.110 
22, ,5
SIEZ
Ka  -0.262312 -2.99926 0.003 
22,
SIET
Ka  0.00966515 9.83616 0.000 
Chiba Kogyo Bank (i=23) 
23,
SIE
Ka  -5.32015 -67.1865 0.000 
23, ,4
SIEZ
Ka  -0.000728051 -0.736831 0.461 
23, ,5
SIEZ
Ka  0.398765 4.47645 0.000 
23,
SIET
Ka  0.00290968 10.2529 0.000 
Tokyo Tomin Bank (i=24) 
24,
SIE
Ka  -4.94367 -181.177 0.000 
24, ,4
SIEZ
Ka  -0.00167023 -2.01372 0.044 
24, ,5
SIEZ
Ka  0.012214 0.358257 0.720 
24,
SIET
Ka  0.00377661 9.07298 0.000 
Bank of Yokohama (i=25) 
25,
SIE
Ka  -4.41654 -90.4982 0.000 
25, ,4
SIEZ





Ka  -0.303008 -5.01443 0.000 
25,
SIET
Ka  0.00971857 10.6164 0.000 
Daishi Bank (i=26) 
26,
SIE
Ka  -4.96258 -204.264 0.000 
26, ,4
SIEZ
Ka  0.000519381 2.50813 0.012 
26, ,5
SIEZ
Ka  0.089411 2.63581 0.008 
26,
SIET
Ka  0.00132415 9.75464 0.000 
Hokuetsu Bank (i=27) 
27,
SIE
Ka  -5.08279 -515.953 0.000 
27, ,4
SIEZ
Ka  0.00000961415 0.025993 0.979 
27, ,5
SIEZ
Ka  0.114135 7.71020 0.000 
27,
SIET
Ka  0.00133335 11.1684 0.000 
Yamanashi Chuo Bank (i=28) 
28,
SIE
Ka  -5.16849 -194.008 0.000 
28, ,4
SIEZ
Ka  0.00102607 1.58189 0.114 
28, ,5
SIEZ
Ka  0.288595 9.48957 0.000 
28,
SIET
Ka  0.00210152 9.93730 0.000 





Ka  -4.94373 -156.056 0.000 
29, ,4
SIEZ
Ka  0.00148590 7.11963 0.000 
29, ,5
SIEZ
Ka  0.138794 3.03867 0.002 
29,
SIET
Ka  0.000779171 4.01649 0.000 
Hokuriku Bank (i=30) 
30,
SIE
Ka  -4.68839 -106.261 0.000 
30, ,4
SIEZ
Ka  -0.00150984 -6.85665 0.000 
30, ,5
SIEZ
Ka  -0.198590 -3.21351 0.001 
30,
SIET
Ka  -0.00177386 -13.4234 0.000 
Bank of Toyama (i=31) 
31,
SIE
Ka  -4.43406 -16.7920 0.000 
31, ,4
SIEZ
Ka  -0.00843701 -1.29915 0.194 
31, ,5
SIEZ
Ka  -0.692830 -2.48386 0.013 
31,
SIET
Ka  -0.00452331 -2.57834 0.010 
Hokkoku Bank (i=32) 
32,
SIE
Ka  -4.83121 -96.4661 0.000 
32, ,4
SIEZ
Ka  -0.00225577 -3.94208 0.000 
32, ,5
SIEZ





Ka  -0.000316127 -0.807731 0.419 
Fukui Bank (i=33) 
33,
SIE
Ka  -4.96406 -308.642 0.000 
33, ,4
SIEZ
Ka  -0.00120320 -4.27810 0.000 
33, ,5
SIEZ
Ka  0.053073 2.41277 0.016 
33,
SIET
Ka  -0.00121272 -12.5477 0.000 
Shizuoka Bank (i=34) 
34,
SIE
Ka  -4.86712 -173.131 0.000 
34, ,4
SIEZ
Ka  -0.000643831 -3.11824 0.002 
34, ,5
SIEZ
Ka  0.123927 2.92594 0.003 
34,
SIET
Ka  -0.000703954 -3.66170 0.000 
Suruga Bank (i=35) 
35,
SIE
Ka  -4.94320 -318.526 0.000 
35, ,4
SIEZ
Ka  -0.0000522042 -0.354740 0.723 
35, ,5
SIEZ
Ka  0.012354 0.655943 0.512 
35,
SIET
Ka  -0.00170966 -9.68281 0.000 
Shimizu Bank (i=36) 
36,
SIE





Ka  -0.00105805 -3.63070 0.000 
36, ,5
SIEZ
Ka  -0.233973 -6.73545 0.000 
36,
SIET
Ka  -0.000267508 -1.17995 0.238 
Ogaki Kyoritsu Bank (i=37) 
37,
SIE
Ka  -4.97564 -331.567 0.000 
37, ,4
SIEZ
Ka  -0.00140770 -5.51242 0.000 
37, ,5
SIEZ
Ka  0.105505 5.31050 0.000 
37,
SIET
Ka  0.00234492 24.2217 0.000 
Juroku Bank (i=38) 
38,
SIE
Ka  -4.86849 -823.316 0.000 
38, ,4
SIEZ
Ka  0.000171222 3.39141 0.001 
38, ,5
SIEZ
Ka  -0.047311 -6.64805 0.000 
38,
SIET
Ka  0.00110338 28.9521 0.000 
Juroku Bank (merged with the Gifu Bank) (i=39) 
39,
SIE
Ka  -4.87495 -5720.37 0.000 
Mie Bank (i=40) 
40,
SIE
Ka  -4.97658 -93.7047 0.000 
40, ,4
SIEZ





Ka  -0.084302 -1.30918 0.190 
40,
SIET
Ka  0.00206521 10.2718 0.000 
Hyakugo Bank (i=41) 
41,
SIE
Ka  -5.04508 -258.499 0.000 
41, ,4
SIEZ
Ka  0.000436116 1.30836 0.191 
41, ,5
SIEZ
Ka  0.189334 8.31486 0.000 
41,
SIET
Ka  0.000907093 6.62865 0.000 
Shiga Bank (i=42) 
42,
SIE
Ka  -5.05639 -446.274 0.000 
42, ,4
SIEZ
Ka  -0.0000244721 -0.060476 0.952 
42, ,5
SIEZ
Ka  0.231598 12.4691 0.000 
42,
SIET
Ka  -0.000315971 -3.62480 0.000 
Bank of Kyoto (i=43) 
43,
SIE
Ka  -4.71056 -174.510 0.000 
43, ,4
SIEZ
Ka  -0.00183608 -3.49954 0.000 
43, ,5
SIEZ
Ka  -0.149172 -5.05995 0.000 
43,
SIET
Ka  0.00285823 16.8228 0.000 





Ka  -4.94160 -36.2694 0.000 
44, ,5
SIEZ
Ka  -0.00803496 -0.053530 0.957 
44,
SIET
Ka  0.00374704 1.62588 0.104 
Kinki Osaka Bank (The present Kansai Mirai Bank) (i=45) 
45,
SIE
Ka  -4.87780 -3056.58 0.000 
Senshu Bank (i=46) 
46,
SIE
Ka  -5.16440 -128.937 0.000 
46, ,4
SIEZ
Ka  0.00174044 7.75145 0.000 
46, ,5
SIEZ
Ka  0.127128 2.71398 0.007 
46,
SIET
Ka  -0.000169997 -0.331925 0.740 
Ikeda Bank (i=47) 
47,
SIE
Ka  -5.30940 -144.437 0.000 
47, ,4
SIEZ
Ka  0.00419259 5.97379 0.000 
47, ,5
SIEZ
Ka  0.272323 7.41945 0.000 
47,
SIET
Ka  -0.000120290 -0.275523 0.783 
Senshu Ikeda Bank (i=48) 
48,
SIE
Ka  -4.90036 -12657.7 0.000 
Nanto Bank (i=49) 
49,
SIE





Ka  0.00279401 3.92501 0.000 
49, ,5
SIEZ
Ka  0.672232 11.5501 0.000 
49,
SIET
Ka  0.000918933 5.63550 0.000 
Kiyo Bank (i=50) 
50,
SIE
Ka  -5.24673 -87.2705 0.000 
50, ,4
SIEZ
Ka  0.00415229 9.95468 0.000 
50, ,5
SIEZ
Ka  0.382088 4.89417 0.000 
50,
SIET
Ka  -0.00108153 -2.10744 0.035 
Kiyo Bank (merged with the Wakayama Bank) (i=51) 
51,
SIE
Ka  -4.91841 -881.483 0.000 
51,
SIET
Ka  0.000186769 0.543739 0.587 
Tajima Bank (i=52) 
52,
SIE
Ka  -5.32552 -156.110 0.000 
52, ,4
SIEZ
Ka  -0.000830016 -1.41566 0.157 
52, ,5
SIEZ
Ka  0.252958 6.55722 0.000 
52,
SIET
Ka  -0.00119758 -7.71408 0.000 
Tottori Bank (i=53) 
53,
SIE





Ka  -0.000567634 -3.94994 0.000 
53, ,5
SIEZ
Ka  0.064155 11.4892 0.000 
53,
SIET
Ka  -0.00154005 -53.2374 0.000 
San-in Godo Bank (i=54) 
54,
SIE
Ka  -4.89367 -5122.47 0.000 
54,
SIET
Ka  0.00411158 47.9819 0.000 
San-in Godo Bank (merged with the Fuso Bank) (i=55) 
55,
SIE
Ka  -4.97275 -338.856 0.000 
55, ,5
SIEZ
Ka  0.168511 7.91559 0.000 
55,
SIET
Ka  -0.00276944 -17.9516 0.000 
Chugoku Bank (i=56) 
56,
SIE
Ka  -4.86325 -176.548 0.000 
56, ,4
SIEZ
Ka  -0.000195160 -0.706145 0.480 
56, ,5
SIEZ
Ka  0.088414 2.62430 0.009 
56,
SIET
Ka  0.00266828 46.5388 0.000 
Hiroshima Bank (i=57) 
57,
SIE
Ka  -4.92469 -113.840 0.000 
57, ,4
SIEZ





Ka  0.168290 2.85535 0.004 
57,
SIET
Ka  0.000771483 2.66156 0.008 
Yamaguchi Bank (i=58) 
58,
SIE
Ka  -5.15016 -177.748 0.000 
58, ,4
SIEZ
Ka  0.00247625 4.09653 0.000 
58, ,5
SIEZ
Ka  0.382942 6.45026 0.000 
58,
SIET
Ka  -0.000508237 -1.45129 0.147 
Awa Bank (i=59) 
59,
SIE
Ka  -5.33234 -128.492 0.000 
59, ,4
SIEZ
Ka  0.00158277 3.75653 0.000 
59, ,5
SIEZ
Ka  0.407271 7.45273 0.000 
59,
SIET
Ka  -0.000762477 -2.21159 0.027 
Hyakujushi Bank (i=60) 
60,
SIE
Ka  -5.11794 -346.333 0.000 
60, ,4
SIEZ
Ka  0.000988108 6.32878 0.000 
60, ,5
SIEZ
Ka  0.279167 12.7741 0.000 
60,
SIET
Ka  0.00152290 14.8303 0.000 





Ka  -4.83380 -4586.38 0.000 
61,
SIET
Ka  0.00697251 88.1775 0.000 
Iyo Bank (merged with the Toho Sogo Bank) (i=62) 
62,
SIE
Ka  -4.90116 -453.212 0.000 
62, ,5
SIEZ
Ka  0.054254 4.09334 0.000 
62,
SIET
Ka  0.00292494 62.3738 0.000 
Shikoku Bank (i=63) 
63,
SIE
Ka  -5.33974 -109.725 0.000 
63, ,4
SIEZ
Ka  0.000382051 0.171457 0.864 
63, ,5
SIEZ
Ka  0.518287 6.77278 0.000 
63,
SIET
Ka  -0.000271312 -0.958357 0.338 
Bank of Fukuoka (i=64) 
64,
SIE
Ka  -4.38900 -53.2284 0.000 
64, ,4
SIEZ
Ka  -0.00193163 -2.09623 0.036 
64, ,5
SIEZ
Ka  -0.526873 -4.74790 0.000 
64,
SIET
Ka  0.00512066 6.83662 0.000 
Chikuho Bank (i=65) 
65,
SIE
Ka  -5.17569 -1047.61 0.000 





Ka  -5.34142 -119.561 0.000 
66, ,4
SIEZ
Ka  0.00557186 6.63584 0.000 
66, ,5
SIEZ
Ka  0.366739 5.27387 0.000 
66,
SIET
Ka  -0.000586158 -2.48876 0.013 
Eighteenth Bank (i=67) 
67,
SIE
Ka  -5.24681 -285.186 0.000 
67, ,4
SIEZ
Ka  0.000916678 2.83447 0.005 
67, ,5
SIEZ
Ka  0.385286 15.2412 0.000 
67,
SIET
Ka  0.000882670 8.54529 0.000 
Shinwa Bank (i=68) 
68,
SIE
Ka  -4.95890 -212.779 0.000 
68, ,5
SIEZ
Ka  0.00210911 0.073447 0.941 
68,
SIET
Ka  0.00204652 27.0210 0.000 
Shinwa Bank (merged with the Kyushu Bank) (i=69) 
69,
SIE
Ka  -4.83110 -967.716 0.000 
69,
SIET
Ka  -0.00928298 -22.9239 0.000 
Higo Bank (i=70) 
70,
SIE





Ka  -0.00190508 -1.35524 0.175 
70, ,5
SIEZ
Ka  0.474914 5.22538 0.000 
70,
SIET
Ka  0.00303061 8.41390 0.000 
Oita Bank (i=71) 
71,
SIE
Ka  -5.12831 -108.497 0.000 
71, ,4
SIEZ
Ka  -0.000709095 -1.58231 0.114 
71, ,5
SIEZ
Ka  0.282818 4.04933 0.000 
71,
SIET
Ka  0.00149497 4.87721 0.000 
Miyazaki Bank (i=72) 
72,
SIE
Ka  -5.10505 -269.342 0.000 
72, ,4
SIEZ
Ka  0.000119685 0.644302 0.519 
72, ,5
SIEZ
Ka  0.147968 5.86161 0.000 
72,
SIET
Ka  0.00407020 87.7542 0.000 
Kagoshima Bank (i=73) 
73,
SIE
Ka  -4.62379 -235.874 0.000 
73, ,4
SIEZ
Ka  -0.00151965 -5.92004 0.000 
73, ,5
SIEZ
Ka  -0.400875 -15.8287 0.000 
73,
SIET
Ka  0.00310438 59.0417 0.000 
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Bank of Ryukyu (i=74) 
74,
SIE
Ka  -5.04079 -705.404 0.000 
74, ,4
SIEZ
Ka  -0.000759475 -4.28272 0.000 
74, ,5
SIEZ
Ka  0.081372 10.8593 0.000 
74,
SIET
Ka  0.0000827615 0.835197 0.404 
Bank of Okinawa (i=75) 
75,
SIE
Ka  -5.26930 -224.783 0.000 
75, ,4
SIEZ
Ka  0.000172731 0.421246 0.674 
75, ,5
SIEZ
Ka  0.306629 12.0955 0.000 
75,
SIET
Ka  0.000347772 1.99191 0.046 
North Pacific Bank (i=76) 
76,
SIE
Ka  -4.65949 -88.7502 0.000 
76, ,5
SIEZ
Ka  -0.356901 -5.16325 0.000 
76,
SIET
Ka  -0.00502272 -10.8924 0.000 
North Pacific Bank (merged with the Sapporo Bank) (i=77) 
77,
SIE
Ka  -4.90999 -2879.59 0.000 
Sapporo Bank (i=78) 
78,
SIE
Ka  -5.27381 -122.906 0.000 
78, ,5
SIEZ





Ka  -0.00586792 -18.0632 0.000 
Syokusan Bank (i=79) 
79,
SIE
Ka  -5.48895 -110.970 0.000 
79, ,4
SIEZ
Ka  0.020338 7.47336 0.000 
79, ,5
SIEZ
Ka  0.387666 9.68809 0.000 
79,
SIET
Ka  -0.00396296 -11.9700 0.000 
Kirayaka Bank (i=80) 
80,
SIE
Ka  -4.98790 -830.058 0.000 
80,
SIET
Ka  -0.000124148 -0.346057 0.729 
Kita-Nippon Bank (i=81) 
81,
SIE
Ka  -4.92789 -116.500 0.000 
81, ,4
SIEZ
Ka  -0.00288626 -6.65664 0.000 
81, ,5
SIEZ
Ka  -0.034666 -0.731868 0.464 
81,
SIET
Ka  -0.00186673 -5.83552 0.000 
Tokuyo City Bank (i=82) 
82,
SIE
Ka  -5.02453 -641.233 0.000 
82, ,5
SIEZ
Ka  -0.00113819 -0.121146 0.904 
82,
SIET
Ka  -0.00467629 -175.340 0.000 





Ka  -5.01054 -411.422 0.000 
83, ,4
SIEZ
Ka  -0.00271844 -5.91934 0.000 
83, ,5
SIEZ
Ka  0.048541 3.51346 0.000 
83,
SIET
Ka  -0.00100987 -7.58214 0.000 
Fukushima Bank (i=84) 
84,
SIE
Ka  -4.83818 -89.3062 0.000 
84, ,4
SIEZ
Ka  -0.00750091 -8.24169 0.000 
84, ,5
SIEZ
Ka  -0.118998 -1.96151 0.050 
84,
SIET
Ka  -0.00328537 -15.4018 0.000 
Daito Bank (i=85) 
85,
SIE
Ka  -5.02780 -135.594 0.000 
85, ,4
SIEZ
Ka  -0.00392130 -3.71809 0.000 
85, ,5
SIEZ
Ka  0.077951 1.99006 0.047 
85,
SIET
Ka  -0.00112130 -5.64242 0.000 
Towa Bank (i=86) 
86,
SIE
Ka  -5.15279 -52.1890 0.000 
86, ,4
SIEZ
Ka  0.00464570 4.58962 0.000 
86, ,5
SIEZ





Ka  0.00212398 11.4855 0.000 
Tochigi Bank (i=87) 
87,
SIE
Ka  -5.31330 -42.5074 0.000 
87, ,4
SIEZ
Ka  0.00273637 3.65999 0.000 
87, ,5
SIEZ
Ka  0.355111 2.58947 0.010 
87,
SIET
Ka  0.00778852 6.86862 0.000 
Keiyo Bank (i=88) 
88,
SIE
Ka  -4.84677 -34.8566 0.000 
88, ,4
SIEZ
Ka  -0.000992361 -2.07641 0.038 
88, ,5
SIEZ
Ka  -0.055790 -0.352170 0.725 
88,
SIET
Ka  0.00963801 23.0406 0.000 
Taiheiyo Bank (i=89) 
89,
SIE
Ka  -4.91197 -153.466 0.000 
89, ,5
SIEZ
Ka  -0.244990 -7.72826 0.000 
89,
SIET
Ka  -0.00201461 -4.94215 0.000 
Higashi-Nippon Bank (i=90) 
90,
SIE
Ka  -4.95327 -62.1308 0.000 
90, ,4
SIEZ





Ka  -0.074186 -0.903557 0.366 
90,
SIET
Ka  0.00353475 6.17645 0.000 
Tokyo Sowa Bank (i=91) 
91,
SIE
Ka  -5.04064 -216.035 0.000 
91, ,5
SIEZ
Ka  0.084253 3.27340 0.001 
91,
SIET
Ka  -0.00119355 -5.77409 0.000 
Heiwa Sogo Bank (i=92) 
92,
SIE
Ka  -5.09207 -2618.79 0.000 
92,
SIET
Ka  -0.00953798 -74.3976 0.000 
Kanagawa Bank (i=93) 
93,
SIE
Ka  -5.66424 -17.4226 0.000 
93, ,4
SIEZ
Ka  0.00101256 0.346697 0.729 
93, ,5
SIEZ
Ka  0.585016 1.72598 0.084 
93,
SIET
Ka  0.000348310 0.305391 0.760 
Niigata Chuo Bank (i=94) 
94,
SIE
Ka  -4.74159 -94.4147 0.000 
94, ,5
SIEZ
Ka  -0.270947 -5.12075 0.000 
94,
SIET
Ka  -0.00228200 -4.99777 0.000 





Ka  -4.97656 -108.542 0.000 
95, ,4
SIEZ
Ka  -0.00375613 -2.00713 0.045 
95, ,5
SIEZ
Ka  0.056128 1.49065 0.136 
95,
SIET
Ka  0.00107962 3.16610 0.002 
Nagano Bank (i=96) 
96,
SIE
Ka  -5.10698 -83.1373 0.000 
96, ,4
SIEZ
Ka  0.00343657 1.81761 0.069 
96, ,5
SIEZ
Ka  0.108919 1.61393 0.107 
96,
SIET
Ka  -0.000434224 -1.20101 0.230 
First Bank of Toyama (i=97) 
97,
SIE
Ka  -5.15961 -34.9134 0.000 
97, ,4
SIEZ
Ka  0.00639663 2.37612 0.017 
97, ,5
SIEZ
Ka  0.183279 1.32457 0.185 
97,
SIET
Ka  -0.000995785 -2.05705 0.040 
Fukuho Bank (i=98) 
98,
SIE
Ka  -2.03988 -4.50010 0.000 
98, ,4
SIEZ
Ka  -0.033561 -6.50192 0.000 
98, ,5
SIEZ





Ka  -0.00581105 -2.72724 0.006 
Shizuokachuo Bank (i=99) 
99,
SIE
Ka  -5.78630 -21.8284 0.000 
99, ,4
SIEZ
Ka  0.00000505135 0.00623312 0.995 
99, ,5
SIEZ
Ka  0.862151 2.90873 0.004 
99,
SIET
Ka  -0.00113030 -1.36253 0.173 
Gifu Bank (i=100) 
100,
SIE
Ka  -5.05543 -142.856 0.000 
100, ,4
SIEZ
Ka  0.013028 7.85581 0.000 
100, ,5
SIEZ
Ka  -0.056828 -1.57975 0.114 
100,
SIET
Ka  -0.00583452 -11.4450 0.000 
Aichi Bank (i=101) 
101,
SIE
Ka  -4.45907 -41.0678 0.000 
101, ,4
SIEZ
Ka  -0.00546066 -4.61967 0.000 
101, ,5
SIEZ
Ka  -0.452817 -3.77935 0.000 
101,
SIET
Ka  0.00359028 8.03536 0.000 
Bank of Nagoya (i=102) 
102,
SIE





Ka  0.000768839 0.819428 0.413 
102, ,5
SIEZ
Ka  0.181252 4.15330 0.000 
102,
SIET
Ka  0.000335667 0.566301 0.571 
Chukyo Bank (i=103) 
103,
SIE
Ka  -4.91357 -62.3845 0.000 
103, ,4
SIEZ
Ka  0.000908434 1.02569 0.305 
103, ,5
SIEZ
Ka  -0.040890 -0.416589 0.677 
103,
SIET
Ka  -0.00135626 -3.51350 0.000 
Daisan Bank (i=104) 
104,
SIE
Ka  -4.99344 -86.2918 0.000 
104, ,4
SIEZ
Ka  0.00190627 2.92946 0.003 
104, ,5
SIEZ
Ka  0.042473 0.649968 0.516 
104,
SIET
Ka  0.00117529 3.67918 0.000 
Biwako Bank (i=105) 
105,
SIE
Ka  -4.91863 -776.668 0.000 
105, ,4
SIEZ
Ka  -0.000556601 -11.7772 0.000 
105, ,5
SIEZ
Ka  -0.068569 -9.47951 0.000 
105,
SIET
Ka  -0.00243296 -36.5452 0.000 
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Bank of Kinki (i=106) 
106,
SIE
Ka  -4.73933 -63.3179 0.000 
106, ,5
SIEZ
Ka  -0.206966 -2.52669 0.012 
106,
SIET
Ka  0.00000998423 0.013728 0.989 
Fukutoku Bank (i=107) 
107,
SIE
Ka  -5.09025 -243.346 0.000 
107, ,5
SIEZ
Ka  0.163823 6.59186 0.000 
107,
SIET
Ka  -0.00330201 -11.6064 0.000 
Kansai Bank (i=108) 
108,
SIE
Ka  -4.61491 -128.075 0.000 
108, ,5
SIEZ
Ka  -0.427574 -10.9115 0.000 
108,
SIET
Ka  0.000167014 0.589230 0.556 
Kansai Urban Banking Corporation (i=109) 
109,
SIE
Ka  -4.91900 -6227.20 0.000 
Kansai Urban Banking Corporation (merged with the Biwako Bank) (The present 
Kansai Mirai Bank) (i=110) 
110,
SIE
Ka  -4.86956 -4264.58 .000 
Taisho Bank (i=111) 
111,
SIE
Ka  -4.70868 -71.1447 0.000 
111, ,4
SIEZ





Ka  -0.400698 -4.72440 0.000 
111,
SIET
Ka  -0.00439855 -4.69167 0.000 
Hanwa Bank (i=112) 
112,
SIE
Ka  -5.07287 -94.6302 0.000 
112, ,5
SIEZ
Ka  0.024703 0.332462 0.740 
112,
SIET
Ka  -0.00652994 -5.83214 0.000 
Hyogo Bank (i=113) 
113,
SIE
Ka  -4.92661 -698.058 0.000 
113, ,5
SIEZ
Ka  -0.032818 -4.14951 0.000 
113,
SIET
Ka  -0.00217683 -19.7469 0.000 
Hanshin Bank (i=114) 
114,
SIE
Ka  -5.11090 -128.321 0.000 
114, ,5
SIEZ
Ka  0.119656 2.63368 0.008 
114,
SIET
Ka  -0.00324893 -11.4475 0.000 
Minato Bank (i=115) 
115,
SIE
Ka  -4.86375 -4673.13 0.000 
115,
SIET
Ka  0.000216053 1.51168 0.131 
Shimane Bank (i=116) 
116,
SIE





Ka  0.000708648 0.153746 0.878 
116, ,5
SIEZ
Ka  -0.034380 -0.226749 0.821 
116,
SIET
Ka  -0.00169213 -8.53103 0.000 
Tomato Bank (i=117) 
117,
SIE
Ka  -5.06796 -146.960 0000 
117, ,4
SIEZ
Ka  -0.00203722 -2.29443 0.022 
117, ,5
SIEZ
Ka  0.055987 1.58740 0.112 
117,
SIET
Ka  0.00223463 4.91713 0.000 
Setouchi Bank (i=118) 
118,
SIE
Ka  -5.04297 -447.515 0.000 
118, ,5
SIEZ
Ka  -0.011969 -0.960963 0.337 
118,
SIET
Ka  0.000372991 3.95707 0.000 
Hiroshima Sogo Bank (i=119) 
119,
SIE
Ka  -5.00960 -222.174 0.000 
119, ,5
SIEZ
Ka  0.052948 2.03409 0.042 
119,
SIET
Ka  0.000426580 2.28194 0.022 
Momiji Bank (i=120) 
120,
SIE





Ka  -0.00989187 -25.3974 0.000 
Saikyo Bank (i=121) 
121,
SIE
Ka  -5.09004 -242.209 0.000 
121, ,4
SIEZ
Ka  0.000980187 0.847004 0.397 
121, ,5
SIEZ
Ka  0.031479 1.72099 0.085 
121,
SIET
Ka  0.000859794 5.33775 0.000 
Tokushima Bank (i=122) 
122,
SIE
Ka  -5.18017 -98.7422 0.000 
122, ,4
SIEZ
Ka  0.00469427 7.06397 0.000 
122, ,5
SIEZ
Ka  0.143158 2.43889 0.015 
122,
SIET
Ka  0.0000797746 0.401450 0.688 
Kagawa Bank (i=123) 
123,
SIE
Ka  -5.06207 -65.4660 0.000 
123, ,4
SIEZ
Ka  0.00390977 3.81126 0.000 
123, ,5
SIEZ
Ka  0.030763 0.372454 0.710 
123,
SIET
Ka  0.00132305 3.55590 0.000 
Ehime Bank (i=124) 
124,
SIE





Ka  -0.00155715 -1.44916 0.147 
124, ,5
SIEZ
Ka  0.101131 1.07431 0.283 
124,
SIET
Ka  0.00319731 5.61100 0.000 
Bank of Kochi (i=125) 
125,
SIE
Ka  -5.16579 -88.5752 0.000 
125, ,4
SIEZ
Ka  -0.000828060 -0.664432 0.506 
125, ,5
SIEZ
Ka  0.233885 4.18227 0.000 
125,
SIET
Ka  -0.000104760 -0.483253 0.629 
Nishi-Nippon Sogo Bank (i=126) 
126,
SIE
Ka  -4.94195 -6382.16 0.000 
Nishi-Nippon Bank (i=127) 
127,
SIE
Ka  -4.88853 -21067.1 0.000 
127,
SIET
Ka  0.00528089 77.9180 0.000 




Ka  -4.75655 -3038.41 0.000 
128,
SIET
Ka  -0.000765308 -7.06615 0.000 
Nishi-Nippon City Bank (merged with the Bank of Nagasaki) (i=129) 
Fukuoka City Bank (i=130) 
130,
SIE





Ka  0.402658 5.45252 0.000 
130,
SIET
Ka  0.00113254 2.11742 0.034 
Fukuoka Chuo Bank (i=131) 
131,
SIE
Ka  -5.48251 -32.4109 0.000 
131, ,4
SIEZ
Ka  0.00130512 0.587325 0.557 
131, ,5
SIEZ
Ka  0.422436 2.32505 0.020 
131,
SIET
Ka  0.00102879 1.58333 0.113 
Saga Kyoei Bank (i=132) 
132,
SIE
Ka  -4.77326 -51.6234 0.000 
132, ,4
SIEZ
Ka  0.00897713 2.90113 0.004 
132, ,5
SIEZ
Ka  -0.430909 -3.88563 0.000 
132,
SIET
Ka  -0.000675184 -1.00751 0.314 
Bank of Nagasaki (i=133) 
133,
SIE
Ka  -5.02596 -106.921 0.000 
133, ,4
SIEZ
Ka  0.00219866 3.00681 0.003 
133, ,5
SIEZ
Ka  -0.079392 -1.40660 0.160 
133,
SIET
Ka  0.00152455 12.1374 0.000 





Ka  -4.70733 -54.7232 0.000 
134, ,5
SIEZ
Ka  -0.364794 -3.70979 0.000 
134,
SIET
Ka  -0.00132244 -3.07269 0.002 
Kumamoto Bank (i=135) 
135,
SIE
Ka  -5.11364 -4508.68 0.000 
135,
SIET
Ka  -0.00304944 -38.1191 0.000 
Kumamoto Family Bank (i=136) 
136,
SIE
Ka  -5.01987 -597.290 0.000 
136, ,5
SIEZ
Ka  0.051920 5.64746 0.000 
136,
SIET
Ka  -0.000964663 -33.7528 0.000 
Higo Family Bank (i=137) 
137,
SIE
Ka  -5.08471 -2106.50 0.000 
137,
SIET
Ka  -0.00710085 -44.8870 0.000 
Howa Bank (i=138) 
138,
SIE
Ka  -5.15090 -297.945 0.000 
138, ,4
SIEZ
Ka  -0.00108080 -1.01301 0.311 
138, ,5
SIEZ
Ka  0.129207 7.73701 0.000 
138,
SIET
Ka  -0.000811916 -1.89945 0.058 





Ka  -5.20353 -30.1128 0.000 
139, ,4
SIEZ
Ka  0.00675987 4.47132 0.000 
139, ,5
SIEZ
Ka  0.113894 0.614742 0.539 
139,
SIET
Ka  0.000324090 0.416500 0.677 
Minami-Nippon Bank (i=140) 
140,
SIE
Ka  -5.19450 -132.474 0.000 
140, ,4
SIEZ
Ka  -0.000157803 -0.143672 0.886 
140, ,5
SIEZ
Ka  0.217106 5.62048 0.000 
140,
SIET
Ka  -0.00231805 -6.96259 0.000 
Okinawa Kaiho Bank (i=141) 
141,
SIE
Ka  -4.81513 -249.337 0.000 
141, ,4
SIEZ
Ka  0.000778777 0.412765 0.680 
141, ,5
SIEZ
Ka  -0.170840 -5.06792 0.000 
141,
SIET
Ka  0.000107813 1.28524 0.199 
Tokyo Star Bank (i=142) 
142,
SIE
Ka  -5.17289 -500.454 0.000 
142,
SIET
Ka  0.021868 33.6807 0.000 





Ka  -4.94619 -832.228 0.000 
143,
SIET




Order of MA for 







Value Function 0.132539 
Note: 1. Tables 4.1.3 to 4.1.5 show the results for the GMM estimations of Eqs. (3.2.1.1) 
to (3.2.1.3) composing Eq. (3.1.1.1.2), respectively. 
2. The details of Eq. (3.1.1.2.4c) are as follows: 
( ), , , , , ,4 4, , , ,5 5, , ,,SIE Q SIE SIEZ Q SIEZ Q SIETi K K i t t i K i K i t i K i t i K ta a a z a z aτ τ∗ ∗= + ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅z , i=2, 3, 5, 6, 9-17, 21-38, 
40-43, 46, 47, 49, 50, 52, 53, 56-60, 63, 64, 66, 67, 70-75, 79, 81, 83-88, 90, 93, 
95-105, 111, 116, 117, 121-125, 131-133, 138-141,  
( ), , , , , ,5 5, , ,,SIE Q SIE SIEZ Q SIETi K K i t t i K i K i t i K ta a a z aτ τ∗ ∗= + ⋅ + ⋅z , i=1, 8, 18, 44, 55, 62, 68, 76, 78, 82, 
89, 91, 94, 106-108, 112-114, 118, 119, 130, 134, 136,  
( ), , , , ,,SIE Q SIE SIETi K K i t t i K i K ta a aτ τ∗ ∗= + ⋅z , i=7, 51, 54, 61, 69, 80, 92, 115, 120, 127, 128, 
135, 137, 142, 143,  
( ), , , ,,SIE Q SIEi K K i t t i Ka aτ ∗ =z , i=19, 20, 39, 45, 48, 65, 77, 109, 110, 126,  
where 4, ,
Q
i tz , 5, ,
Q
i tz , and tτ
∗  are respectively the loan per case, the proportion of 
loans for small and medium firms, and the normalized time trend.  
3. This estimation takes into account the conditional heteroskedasticity and 
autocorrelation of the error terms. For instrumental variables, the following 
variables are used: the individual bank dummies, the products of these dummies 
and the estimate of the static cost share of the current goods, the products of these 
dummies and the normalized time trend, the products of these dummies and some 
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endogenous quality variables in the previous period, the products of these 
dummies and the estimate of the static cost share of the physical capital, the 
products of these dummies, the normalized time trend, and this estimate, and the 
products of these dummies, quality variables, and this estimate. 
4. When new banks emerge due to consolidation, we treat the new banks and their 
predecessors as different entities. 
   5. The Seiwa Bank (i=4) is added to the Michinoku Bank (i=5) because of a lack of 
samples. For the same reason, the Nishi-Nippon City Bank (merged with the Bank 




Table 4.1.4 Estimation Results for Eq. (3.2.1.2) Composing Eq. (3.1.1.1.2) 
Parameter Estimate t-statistic p-value 
Yachiyo Bank (The present Kiraboshi Bank) (i=1) 
1,
SIE
Lb  -4.93978 -12.8458 0.000 
1, ,5
SIEZ
Lb  -0.045248 -0.118100 0.906 
1,
SIET
Lb  0.00301594 0.711232 0.477 
Hokkaido Bank (i=2) 
2,
SIE
Lb  -4.88363 -98.3813 0.000 
2, ,4
SIEZ
Lb  0.00158105 2.52188 0.012 
2, ,5
SIEZ
Lb  -0.082207 -1.29465 0.195 
2,
SIET
Lb  -0.00121226 -2.57881 0.010 
Aomori Bank (i=3) 
3,
SIE
Lb  -5.17215 -81.7112 0.000 
3, ,4
SIEZ
Lb  0.00197577 1.61288 0.107 
3, ,5
SIEZ
Lb  0.272886 3.08514 0.002 
3,
SIET
Lb  0.000408521 0.810684 0.418 
Seiwa Bank (i=4) 
Seiwa Bank and Michinoku Bank (i=5) 
5,
SIE





Lb  0.00293402 1.08127 0.280 
5, ,5
SIEZ
Lb  0.062718 0.186523 0.852 
5,
SIET
Lb  -0.00130438 -0.938522 0.348 
Akita Bank (i=6) 
6,
SIE
Lb  -5.27009 -66.1060 0.000 
6, ,4
SIEZ
Lb  0.00490325 3.64927 0.000 
6, ,5
SIEZ
Lb  0.331875 3.67470 0.000 
6,
SIET
Lb  0.000977495 2.47032 0.013 
Ugo Bank (i=7) 
7,
SIE
Lb  -5.10011 -1800.76 0.000 
7,
SIET
Lb  -0.00175017 -5.52669 0.000 
Hokuto Bank (i=8) 
8,
SIE
Lb  -4.93086 -250.754 0.000 
8, ,5
SIEZ
Lb  -0.066093 -2.96955 0.003 
8,
SIET
Lb  -0.00717184 -23.1431 0.000 
Shonai Bank (i=9) 
9,
SIE
Lb  -4.97116 -154.973 0.000 
9, ,4
SIEZ





Lb  -0.130749 -4.14487 0.000 
9,
SIET
Lb  0.000362296 0.831050 0.406 
Yamagata Bank (i=10) 
10,
SIE
Lb  -5.09451 -137.668 0.000 
10, ,4
SIEZ
Lb  0.00140475 1.25194 0.211 
10, ,5
SIEZ
Lb  0.127927 2.42935 0.015 
10,
SIET
Lb  0.000442421 2.39131 0.017 
Bank of Iwate (i=11) 
11,
SIE
Lb  -5.13077 -164.539 0.000 
11, ,4
SIEZ
Lb  0.000413909 0.677818 0.498 
11, ,5
SIEZ
Lb  0.261036 6.15489 0.000 
11,
SIET
Lb  0.00123714 4.09255 0.000 
Tohoku Bank (i=12) 
12,
SIE
Lb  -5.05493 -91.3842 0.000 
12, ,4
SIEZ
Lb  -0.00472766 -2.40551 0.016 
12, ,5
SIEZ
Lb  -0.049573 -0.851279 0.395 
12,
SIET
Lb  -0.00212636 -7.08526 0.000 





Lb  -5.07115 -156.840 0.000 
13, ,4
SIEZ
Lb  0.000143034 0.264429 0.791 
13, ,5
SIEZ
Lb  0.378898 8.30540 0.000 
13,
SIET
Lb  0.000112824 0.752452 0.452 
Toho Bank (i=14) 
14,
SIE
Lb  -5.04419 -76.1420 0.000 
14, ,4
SIEZ
Lb  0.000391804 0.148315 0.882 
14, ,5
SIEZ
Lb  0.184911 2.69234 0.007 
14,
SIET
Lb  0.00194681 2.66056 0.008 
Gunma Bank (i=15) 
15,
SIE
Lb  -4.38347 -12.4208 0.000 
15, ,4
SIEZ
Lb  -0.00547481 -2.33585 0.019 
15, ,5
SIEZ
Lb  -0.484007 -1.03951 0.299 
15,
SIET
Lb  0.010217 3.37660 0.001 
Ashikaga Bank (i=16) 
16,
SIE
Lb  -4.88010 -278.491 0.000 
16, ,4
SIEZ
Lb  0.000872873 2.64534 0.008 
16, ,5
SIEZ





Lb  0.00363015 17.1974 0.000 
Joyo Bank (i=17) 
17,
SIE
Lb  -4.89227 -266.259 0.000 
17, ,4
SIEZ
Lb  0.000551510 2.94639 0.003 
17, ,5
SIEZ
Lb  0.214702 7.31689 0.000 
17,
SIET
Lb  0.00341717 22.8289 0.000 
Kanto Bank (i=18) 
18,
SIE
Lb  -5.12069 -91.1785 0.000 
18, ,5
SIEZ
Lb  0.030007 0.452714 0.651 
18,
SIET
Lb  0.00133460 2.83542 0.005 
Kanto Tsukuba Bank (i=19) 
19,
SIE
Lb  -5.03423 -4825.42 0.000 
Tsukuba Bank (i=20) 
20,
SIE
Lb  -4.91285 -4106.41 0.000 
Musashino Bank (i=21) 
21,
SIE
Lb  -5.01049 -219.609 0.000 
21, ,4
SIEZ
Lb  -0.00130618 -3.58924 0.000 
21, ,5
SIEZ
Lb  0.114580 3.73224 0.000 
21,
SIET
Lb  0.00763753 73.4856 0.000 
198 
 
Chiba Bank (i=22) 
22,
SIE
Lb  -4.48725 -26.3529 0.000 
22, ,4
SIEZ
Lb  -0.000695771 -0.331433 0.740 
22, ,5
SIEZ
Lb  -0.325486 -1.64083 0.101 
22,
SIET
Lb  0.00991409 4.34297 0.000 
Chiba Kogyo Bank (i=23) 
23,
SIE
Lb  -5.30885 -62.3169 0.000 
23, ,4
SIEZ
Lb  -0.000276851 -0.117354 0.907 
23, ,5
SIEZ
Lb  0.376901 3.45913 0.001 
23,
SIET
Lb  0.00278485 3.88405 0.000 
Tokyo Tomin Bank (i=24) 
24,
SIE
Lb  -4.94685 -111.524 0.000 
24, ,4
SIEZ
Lb  -0.00187632 -1.84527 0.065 
24, ,5
SIEZ
Lb  0.020780 0.472067 0.637 
24,
SIET
Lb  0.00389782 8.71642 0.000 
Bank of Yokohama (i=25) 
25,
SIE
Lb  -4.43545 -58.5900 0.000 
25, ,4
SIEZ





Lb  -0.309536 -2.77866 0.005 
25,
SIET
Lb  0.00992558 5.68530 0.000 
Daishi Bank (i=26) 
26,
SIE
Lb  -4.97301 -123.873 0.000 
26, ,4
SIEZ
Lb  0.000741915 2.14639 0.032 
26, ,5
SIEZ
Lb  0.100598 1.79837 0.072 
26,
SIET
Lb  0.00134503 6.47955 0.000 
Hokuetsu Bank (i=27) 
27,
SIE
Lb  -5.08339 -263.182 0.000 
27, ,4
SIEZ
Lb  0.0000559567 0.087985 0.930 
27, ,5
SIEZ
Lb  0.114452 4.47608 0.000 
27,
SIET
Lb  0.00130638 6.14899 0.000 
Yamanashi Chuo Bank (i=28) 
28,
SIE
Lb  -5.14706 -114.814 0.000 
28, ,4
SIEZ
Lb  0.000348651 0.409715 0.682 
28, ,5
SIEZ
Lb  0.276489 5.25229 0.000 
28,
SIET
Lb  0.00242751 6.27427 0.000 





Lb  -4.96584 -65.0216 0.000 
29, ,4
SIEZ
Lb  0.00174149 3.87733 0.000 
29, ,5
SIEZ
Lb  0.166550 1.46944 0.142 
29,
SIET
Lb  0.000678330 2.35667 0.018 
Hokuriku Bank (i=30) 
30,
SIE
Lb  -4.69723 -81.9855 0.000 
30, ,4
SIEZ
Lb  -0.00185083 -4.83705 0.000 
30, ,5
SIEZ
Lb  -0.174699 -2.18561 0.029 
30,
SIET
Lb  -0.00183850 -9.02559 0.000 
Bank of Toyama (i=31) 
31,
SIE
Lb  -4.45271 -9.24130 0.000 
31, ,4
SIEZ
Lb  -0.00617936 -0.626867 0.531 
31, ,5
SIEZ
Lb  -0.702407 -1.38805 0.165 
31,
SIET
Lb  -0.00419572 -1.62628 0.104 
Hokkoku Bank (i=32) 
32,
SIE
Lb  -4.85811 -53.0022 0.000 
32, ,4
SIEZ
Lb  -0.00257061 -3.86270 0.000 
32, ,5
SIEZ





Lb  -0.000273859 -0.432464 0.665 
Fukui Bank (i=33) 
33,
SIE
Lb  -4.95864 -223.425 0.000 
33, ,4
SIEZ
Lb  -0.000997282 -3.16994 0.002 
33, ,5
SIEZ
Lb  0.039029 1.30980 0.190 
33,
SIET
Lb  -0.00122415 -8.32502 0.000 
Shizuoka Bank (i=34) 
34,
SIE
Lb  -4.86102 -107.189 0.000 
34, ,4
SIEZ
Lb  -0.000393523 -0.801146 0.423 
34, ,5
SIEZ
Lb  0.109349 1.52645 0.127 
34,
SIET
Lb  -0.000665491 -1.97408 0.048 
Suruga Bank (i=35) 
35,
SIE
Lb  -4.95137 -172.057 0.000 
35, ,4
SIEZ
Lb  -0.000125083 -0.489781 0.624 
35, ,5
SIEZ
Lb  0.023889 0.712897 0.476 
35,
SIET
Lb  -0.00179182 -6.18221 0.000 
Shimizu Bank (i=36) 
36,
SIE





Lb  -0.00121052 -2.84459 0.004 
36, ,5
SIEZ
Lb  -0.237458 -5.58786 0.000 
36,
SIET
Lb  -0.000228640 -0.706975 0.480 
Ogaki Kyoritsu Bank (i=37) 
37,
SIE
Lb  -4.97463 -187.743 0.000 
37, ,4
SIEZ
Lb  -0.00131343 -2.86287 0.004 
37, ,5
SIEZ
Lb  0.102642 3.00275 0.003 
37,
SIET
Lb  0.00231107 12.3789 0.000 
Juroku Bank (i=38) 
38,
SIE
Lb  -4.86696 -490.596 0.000 
38, ,4
SIEZ
Lb  0.000173608 2.13949 0.032 
38, ,5
SIEZ
Lb  -0.049328 -4.23216 0.000 
38,
SIET
Lb  0.00111764 16.3478 0.000 
Juroku Bank (merged with the Gifu Bank) (i=39) 
39,
SIE
Lb  -4.87491 -3278.75 0.000 
Mie Bank (i=40) 
40,
SIE
Lb  -5.01829 -71.6661 0.000 
40, ,4
SIEZ





Lb  -0.033471 -0.379963 0.704 
40,
SIET
Lb  0.00206486 7.48212 0.000 
Hyakugo Bank (i=41) 
41,
SIE
Lb  -5.04003 -168.987 0.000 
41, ,4
SIEZ
Lb  0.000243596 0.710132 0.478 
41, ,5
SIEZ
Lb  0.186589 5.06490 0.000 
41,
SIET
Lb  0.00100165 4.67526 0.000 
Shiga Bank (i=42) 
42,
SIE
Lb  -5.05171 -244.180 0.000 
42, ,4
SIEZ
Lb  0.000399440 0.984011 0.325 
42, ,5
SIEZ
Lb  0.212328 7.21536 0.000 
42,
SIET
Lb  -0.000450933 -3.48281 0.000 
Bank of Kyoto (i=43) 
43,
SIE
Lb  -4.69718 -104.142 0.000 
43, ,4
SIEZ
Lb  -0.00178340 -2.61638 0.009 
43, ,5
SIEZ
Lb  -0.165804 -3.30853 0.001 
43,
SIET
Lb  0.00281260 10.8349 0.000 





Lb  -5.00127 -18.7121 0.000 
44, ,5
SIEZ
Lb  0.053587 0.175558 0.861 
44,
SIET
Lb  0.00236246 0.667708 0.504 
Kinki Osaka Bank (The present Kansai Mirai Bank) (i=45) 
45,
SIE
Lb  -4.87825 -1668.22 0.000 
Senshu Bank (i=46) 
46,
SIE
Lb  -5.10613 -89.7106 0.000 
46, ,4
SIEZ
Lb  0.00163783 2.93494 0.003 
46, ,5
SIEZ
Lb  0.054558 0.841728 0.400 
46,
SIET
Lb  0.000427800 0.793720 0.427 
Ikeda Bank (i=47) 
47,
SIE
Lb  -5.28951 -103.427 0.000 
47, ,4
SIEZ
Lb  0.00458362 4.13812 0.000 
47, ,5
SIEZ
Lb  0.234697 4.28111 0.000 
47,
SIET
Lb  0.000201792 0.328797 0.742 
Senshu Ikeda Bank (i=48) 
48,
SIE
Lb  -4.90027 -6865.02 0.000 
Nanto Bank (i=49) 
49,
SIE





Lb  0.00301097 3.60530 0.000 
49, ,5
SIEZ
Lb  0.647262 6.70153 0.000 
49,
SIET
Lb  0.000696929 2.40869 0.016 
Kiyo Bank (i=50) 
50,
SIE
Lb  -5.22766 -49.0046 0.000 
50, ,4
SIEZ
Lb  0.00458425 6.30692 0.000 
50, ,5
SIEZ
Lb  0.348224 2.55534 0.011 
50,
SIET
Lb  -0.000841157 -0.963875 0.335 
Kiyo Bank (merged with the Wakayama Bank) (i=51) 
51,
SIE
Lb  -4.91740 -460.219 0.000 
51,
SIET
Lb  0.000128469 0.202088 0.840 
Tajima Bank (i=52) 
52,
SIE
Lb  -5.35998 -104.737 0.000 
52, ,4
SIEZ
Lb  -0.00113879 -0.696753 0.486 
52, ,5
SIEZ
Lb  0.299003 5.44669 0.000 
52,
SIET
Lb  -0.00120502 -3.26623 0.001 
Tottori Bank (i=53) 
53,
SIE





Lb  -0.000603459 -2.61190 0.009 
53, ,5
SIEZ
Lb  0.059184 5.35321 0.000 
53,
SIET
Lb  -0.00155249 -32.7485 0.000 
San-in Godo Bank (i=54) 
54,
SIE
Lb  -4.89348 -2906.25 0.000 
54,
SIET
Lb  0.00414944 26.9419 0.000 
San-in Godo Bank (merged with the Fuso Bank) (i=55) 
55,
SIE
Lb  -4.97456 -198.723 0.000 
55, ,5
SIEZ
Lb  0.174242 4.79314 0.000 
55,
SIET
Lb  -0.00279440 -11.1206 0.000 
Chugoku Bank (i=56) 
56,
SIE
Lb  -4.89964 -162.051 0.000 
56, ,4
SIEZ
Lb  0.000523671 2.00164 0.045 
56, ,5
SIEZ
Lb  0.120167 3.22878 0.001 
56,
SIET
Lb  0.00267307 36.6911 0.000 
Hiroshima Bank (i=57) 
57,
SIE
Lb  -4.88476 -55.8472 0.000 
57, ,4
SIEZ





Lb  0.104614 0.833645 0.404 
57,
SIET
Lb  0.00109094 2.37160 0.018 
Yamaguchi Bank (i=58) 
58,
SIE
Lb  -5.12473 -124.058 0.000 
58, ,4
SIEZ
Lb  0.00318935 3.74685 0.000 
58, ,5
SIEZ
Lb  0.326051 3.90818 0.000 
58,
SIET
Lb  -0.000934403 -2.50813 0.012 
Awa Bank (i=59) 
59,
SIE
Lb  -5.29857 -85.4397 0.000 
59, ,4
SIEZ
Lb  0.00218925 2.88290 0.004 
59, ,5
SIEZ
Lb  0.352736 4.67834 0.000 
59,
SIET
Lb  -0.000707430 -1.23522 0.217 
Hyakujushi Bank (i=60) 
60,
SIE
Lb  -5.11678 -216.319 0.000 
60, ,4
SIEZ
Lb  0.00107413 5.75480 0.000 
60, ,5
SIEZ
Lb  0.274303 7.55054 0.000 
60,
SIET
Lb  0.00151239 8.62953 0.000 





Lb  -4.83223 -2326.62 0.000 
61,
SIET
Lb  0.00710311 33.6024 0.000 
Iyo Bank (merged with the Toho Sogo Bank) (i=62) 
62,
SIE
Lb  -4.85713 -9033.35 0.000 
62,
SIET
Lb  0.00271900 16.7405 0.000 
Shikoku Bank (i=63) 
63,
SIE
Lb  -5.28954 -62.8524 0.000 
63, ,4
SIEZ
Lb  0.00297920 1.44427 0.149 
63, ,5
SIEZ
Lb  0.402006 3.83584 0.000 
63,
SIET
Lb  -0.000442897 -0.811349 0.417 
Bank of Fukuoka (i=64) 
64,
SIE
Lb  -4.34706 -27.0698 0.000 
64, ,4
SIEZ
Lb  -0.00142249 -1.05484 0.292 
64, ,5
SIEZ
Lb  -0.605995 -2.69049 0.007 
64,
SIET
Lb  0.00554815 3.90918 0.000 
Chikuho Bank (i=65) 
65,
SIE
Lb  -5.16932 -2491.69 0.000 
Bank of Saga (i=66) 
66,
SIE





Lb  0.00490083 2.84469 0.004 
66, ,5
SIEZ
Lb  0.473385 3.35529 0.001 
66,
SIET
Lb  -0.000533439 -0.855273 0.392 
Eighteenth Bank (i=67) 
67,
SIE
Lb  -5.22713 -119.737 0.000 
67, ,4
SIEZ
Lb  0.000241207 0.359174 0.719 
67, ,5
SIEZ
Lb  0.367196 6.10618 0.000 
67,
SIET
Lb  0.000944546 3.96194 0.000 
Shinwa Bank (i=68) 
68,
SIE
Lb  -5.00215 -246.688 0.000 
68, ,5
SIEZ
Lb  0.055941 2.28625 0.022 
68,
SIET
Lb  0.00195751 16.6632 0.000 
Shinwa Bank (merged with the Kyushu Bank) (i=69) 
69,
SIE
Lb  -4.82777 -1050.43 0.000 
69,
SIET
Lb  -0.00954359 -27.8433 0.000 
Higo Bank (i=70) 
70,
SIE
Lb  -5.14929 -49.5412 0.000 
70, ,4
SIEZ





Lb  0.401082 2.59869 0.009 
70,
SIET
Lb  0.00273689 4.19706 0.000 
Oita Bank (i=71) 
71,
SIE
Lb  -5.19768 -83.3648 0.000 
71, ,4
SIEZ
Lb  -0.000435744 -0.423437 0.672 
71, ,5
SIEZ
Lb  0.385198 4.18472 0.000 
71,
SIET
Lb  0.00154015 2.72163 0.006 
Miyazaki Bank (i=72) 
72,
SIE
Lb  -5.12421 -129.573 0.000 
72, ,4
SIEZ
Lb  0.000162739 0.464976 0.642 
72, ,5
SIEZ
Lb  0.171352 3.29181 0.001 
72,
SIET
Lb  0.00414055 49.6219 0.000 
Kagoshima Bank (i=73) 
73,
SIE
Lb  -4.65238 -113.574 0.000 
73, ,4
SIEZ
Lb  -0.00139182 -2.41410 0.016 
73, ,5
SIEZ
Lb  -0.360886 -6.99914 0.000 
73,
SIET
Lb  0.00311444 26.1125 0.000 





Lb  -5.04609 -318.602 0.000 
74, ,4
SIEZ
Lb  -0.000864889 -2.81546 0.005 
74, ,5
SIEZ
Lb  0.088160 5.22824 0.000 
74,
SIET
Lb  0.0000222548 0.130807 0.896 
Bank of Okinawa (i=75) 
75,
SIE
Lb  -5.28068 -130.457 0.000 
75, ,4
SIEZ
Lb  0.000449907 0.658230 0.510 
75, ,5
SIEZ
Lb  0.315881 7.36155 0.000 
75,
SIET
Lb  0.000316126 1.03562 0.300 
North Pacific Bank (i=76) 
76,
SIE
Lb  -4.53058 -38.1719 0.000 
76, ,5
SIEZ
Lb  -0.514855 -3.30909 0.001 
76,
SIET
Lb  -0.00495146 -6.19127 0.000 
North Pacific Bank (merged with the Sapporo Bank) (i=77) 
77,
SIE
Lb  -4.90991 -1556.44 0.000 
Sapporo Bank (i=78) 
78,
SIE
Lb  -5.29679 -77.7781 0.000 
78, ,5
SIEZ





Lb  -0.00574392 -12.0372 0.000 
Syokusan Bank (i=79) 
79,
SIE
Lb  -5.56434 -53.7953 0.000 
79, ,4
SIEZ
Lb  0.017173 4.72475 0.000 
79, ,5
SIEZ
Lb  0.502334 4.38136 0.000 
79,
SIET
Lb  -0.00443401 -6.00769 0.000 
Kirayaka Bank (i=80) 
80,
SIE
Lb  -4.98634 -505.879 0.000 
80,
SIET
Lb  -0.000173199 -0.313168 0.754 
Kita-Nippon Bank (i=81) 
81,
SIE
Lb  -5.00804 -92.0838 0.000 
81, ,4
SIEZ
Lb  -0.00270030 -3.74227 0.000 
81, ,5
SIEZ
Lb  0.059367 0.915428 0.360 
81,
SIET
Lb  -0.00133655 -3.32214 0.001 
Tokuyo City Bank (i=82) 
82,
SIE
Lb  -5.05601 -275.971 0.000 
82, ,5
SIEZ
Lb  0.036387 1.65105 0.099 
82,
SIET
Lb  -0.00474260 -125.372 0.000 





Lb  -5.01024 -264.427 0.000 
83, ,4
SIEZ
Lb  -0.00284978 -4.13635 0.000 
83, ,5
SIEZ
Lb  0.049835 2.29839 0.022 
83,
SIET
Lb  -0.000897210 -6.07320 0.000 
Fukushima Bank (i=84) 
84,
SIE
Lb  -4.82073 -50.5102 0.000 
84, ,4
SIEZ
Lb  -0.00677283 -4.46406 0.000 
84, ,5
SIEZ
Lb  -0.142637 -1.29918 0.194 
84,
SIET
Lb  -0.00314245 -8.48907 0.000 
Daito Bank (i=85) 
85,
SIE
Lb  -5.03108 -80.7808 0.000 
85, ,4
SIEZ
Lb  -0.00341903 -1.61834 0.106 
85, ,5
SIEZ
Lb  0.073689 1.22754 0.220 
85,
SIET
Lb  -0.00122967 -3.13556 0.002 
Towa Bank (i=86) 
86,
SIE
Lb  -5.14516 -32.9936 0.000 
86, ,4
SIEZ
Lb  0.00443215 3.51933 0.000 
86, ,5
SIEZ





Lb  0.00213177 6.34744 0.000 
Tochigi Bank (i=87) 
87,
SIE
Lb  -5.22363 -28.6599 0.000 
87, ,4
SIEZ
Lb  0.00267418 2.39299 0.017 
87, ,5
SIEZ
Lb  0.256013 1.28206 0.200 
87,
SIET
Lb  0.00706495 4.46735 0.000 
Keiyo Bank (i=88) 
88,
SIE
Lb  -4.72265 -25.4465 0.000 
88, ,4
SIEZ
Lb  -0.000861527 -1.25719 0.209 
88, ,5
SIEZ
Lb  -0.202522 -0.929544 0.353 
88,
SIET
Lb  0.00932320 14.8366 0.000 
Taiheiyo Bank (i=89) 
89,
SIE
Lb  -4.89858 -100.420 0.000 
89, ,5
SIEZ
Lb  -0.259430 -5.41470 0.000 
89,
SIET
Lb  -0.00194738 -2.93798 0.003 
Higashi-Nippon Bank (i=90) 
90,
SIE
Lb  -4.96917 -41.2171 0.000 
90, ,4
SIEZ





Lb  -0.058074 -0.485114 0.628 
90,
SIET
Lb  0.00350650 3.35301 0.001 
Tokyo Sowa Bank (i=91) 
91,
SIE
Lb  -5.03823 -195.657 0.000 
91, ,5
SIEZ
Lb  0.081874 2.88346 0.004 
91,
SIET
Lb  -0.00114807 -3.90984 0.000 
Heiwa Sogo Bank (i=92) 
92,
SIE
Lb  -5.09015 -1582.26 0.000 
92,
SIET
Lb  -0.00942373 -45.1652 0.000 
Kanagawa Bank (i=93) 
93,
SIE
Lb  -5.09184 -503.811 0.000 
Niigata Chuo Bank (i=94) 
94,
SIE
Lb  -4.73491 -54.0232 0.000 
94, ,5
SIEZ
Lb  -0.278701 -2.99546 0.003 
94,
SIET
Lb  -0.00220835 -2.61338 0.009 
Taiko Bank (i=95) 
95,
SIE
Lb  -5.01731 -58.3752 0.000 
95, ,4
SIEZ
Lb  -0.000815204 -0.277897 0.781 
95, ,5
SIEZ





Lb  0.000951830 1.42708 0.154 
Nagano Bank (i=96) 
96,
SIE
Lb  -5.01512 -57.1554 0.000 
96, ,4
SIEZ
Lb  0.00340638 0.737077 0.461 
96, ,5
SIEZ
Lb  0.00731497 0.098038 0.922 
96,
SIET
Lb  -0.000731455 -1.57024 0.116 
First Bank of Toyama (i=97) 
97,
SIE
Lb  -5.26175 -26.5826 0.000 
97, ,4
SIEZ
Lb  0.00888838 2.31965 0.020 
97, ,5
SIEZ
Lb  0.267278 1.43431 0.151 
97,
SIET
Lb  -0.00125284 -1.34735 0.178 
Fukuho Bank (i=98) 
98,
SIE
Lb  -2.69354 -3.52952 0.000 
98, ,4
SIEZ
Lb  -0.032802 -3.55939 0.000 
98, ,5
SIEZ
Lb  -2.08238 -2.30615 0.021 
98,
SIET
Lb  -0.00409622 -1.31436 0.189 
Shizuokachuo Bank (i=99) 
99,
SIE





Lb  -0.000119699 -0.095442 0.924 
99, ,5
SIEZ
Lb  0.841157 2.22722 0.026 
99,
SIET
Lb  -0.000980792 -0.841743 0.400 
Gifu Bank (i=100) 
100,
SIE
Lb  -4.99543 -52.2651 0.000 
100, ,4
SIEZ
Lb  0.015021 3.96525 0.000 
100, ,5
SIEZ
Lb  -0.150671 -1.83946 0.066 
100,
SIET
Lb  -0.00651329 -8.89181 0.000 
Aichi Bank (i=101) 
101,
SIE
Lb  -4.49408 -22.7560 0.000 
101, ,4
SIEZ
Lb  -0.00679179 -4.57348 0.000 
101, ,5
SIEZ
Lb  -0.385356 -1.70797 0.088 
101,
SIET
Lb  0.00399066 6.66171 0.000 
Bank of Nagoya (i=102) 
102,
SIE
Lb  -5.04582 -108.926 0.000 
102, ,4
SIEZ
Lb  0.000902622 0.583751 0.559 
102, ,5
SIEZ
Lb  0.126749 1.91761 0.055 
102,
SIET
Lb  0.000427090 0.514424 0.607 
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Chukyo Bank (i=103) 
103,
SIE
Lb  -5.00385 -49.0491 0.000 
103, ,4
SIEZ
Lb  0.0000373486 0.043103 0.966 
103, ,5
SIEZ
Lb  0.080201 0.648642 0.517 
103,
SIET
Lb  -0.000876477 -1.89819 0.058 
Daisan Bank (i=104) 
104,
SIE
Lb  -4.96970 -60.2088 0.000 
104, ,4
SIEZ
Lb  0.00196217 2.18557 0.029 
104, ,5
SIEZ
Lb  0.012387 0.136692 0.891 
104,
SIET
Lb  0.00114654 2.06675 0.039 
Biwako Bank (i=105) 
105,
SIE
Lb  -4.90812 -407.303 0.000 
105, ,4
SIEZ
Lb  -0.000580321 -4.72833 0.000 
105, ,5
SIEZ
Lb  -0.080139 -6.20430 0.000 
105,
SIET
Lb  -0.00238688 -16.1630 0.000 
Bank of Kinki (i=106) 
106,
SIE
Lb  -4.72202 -33.7263 0.000 
106, ,5
SIEZ





Lb  0.000420265 0.369755 0.712 
Fukutoku Bank (i=107) 
107,
SIE
Lb  -5.08149 -113.748 0.000 
107, ,5
SIEZ
Lb  0.153991 2.80695 0.005 
107,
SIET
Lb  -0.00319670 -8.24782 0.000 
Kansai Bank (i=108) 
108,
SIE
Lb  -4.48722 -49.2398 0.000 
108, ,5
SIEZ
Lb  -0.563664 -5.70724 0.000 
108,
SIET
Lb  0.00102638 1.52912 0.126 
Kansai Urban Banking Corporation (i=109) 
109,
SIE
Lb  -4.91937 -3799.98 0.000 
Kansai Urban Banking Corporation (merged with the Biwako Bank) (The present 
Kansai Mirai Bank) (i=110) 
110,
SIE
Lb  -4.86952 -2308.19 0.000 
Taisho Bank (i=111) 
111,
SIE
Lb  -4.43224 -30.2210 0.000 
111, ,4
SIEZ
Lb  0.00115343 0.524590 0.600 
111, ,5
SIEZ
Lb  -0.719573 -4.29010 0.000 
111,
SIET
Lb  -0.00379737 -2.31002 0.021 





Lb  -5.06276 -52.2304 0.000 
112, ,5
SIEZ
Lb  -0.00487569 -0.031440 0.975 
112,
SIET
Lb  -0.00760794 -2.55652 0.011 
Hyogo Bank (i=113) 
113,
SIE
Lb  -4.90778 -278.770 0.000 
113, ,5
SIEZ
Lb  -0.054407 -2.69698 0.007 
113,
SIET
Lb  -0.00190270 -6.61236 0.000 
Hanshin Bank (i=114) 
114,
SIE
Lb  -5.16241 -68.1548 0.000 
114, ,5
SIEZ
Lb  0.177602 2.10238 0.036 
114,
SIET
Lb  -0.00350060 -6.30626 0.000 
Minato Bank (i=115) 
115,
SIE
Lb  -4.85907 -1712.87 0.000 
115,
SIET
Lb  -0.000344522 -1.44868 0.147 
Shimane Bank (i=116) 
116,
SIE
Lb  -4.99810 -18.0522 0.000 
116, ,4
SIEZ
Lb  0.000700022 0.096051 0.923 
116, ,5
SIEZ





Lb  -0.00173890 -6.15276 0.000 
Tomato Bank (i=117) 
117,
SIE
Lb  -5.09038 -65.4932 0.000 
117, ,4
SIEZ
Lb  -0.000376179 -0.198319 0.843 
117, ,5
SIEZ
Lb  0.062722 0.857362 0.391 
117,
SIET
Lb  0.00190668 2.10173 0.036 
Setouchi Bank (i=118) 
118,
SIE
Lb  -5.03295 -277.622 0.000 
118, ,5
SIEZ
Lb  -0.023660 -1.14542 0.252 
118,
SIET
Lb  0.000390530 2.24804 0.025 
Hiroshima Sogo Bank (i=119) 
119,
SIE
Lb  -4.97504 -153.264 0.000 
119, ,5
SIEZ
Lb  0.013348 0.351791 0.725 
119,
SIET
Lb  0.000499879 2.09913 0.036 
Momiji Bank (i=120) 
120,
SIE
Lb  -4.78605 -918.086 0.000 
120,
SIET
Lb  -0.010181 -28.2136 0.000 
Saikyo Bank (i=121) 
121,
SIE





Lb  0.000529658 0.359933 0.719 
121, ,5
SIEZ
Lb  0.051000 1.78444 0.074 
121,
SIET
Lb  0.000936467 4.42498 0.000 
Tokushima Bank (i=122) 
122,
SIE
Lb  -5.21732 -103.314 0.000 
122, ,4
SIEZ
Lb  0.00492585 2.93061 0.003 
122, ,5
SIEZ
Lb  0.184497 3.36356 0.001 
122,
SIET
Lb  -0.0000656242 -0.238828 0.811 
Kagawa Bank (i=123) 
123,
SIE
Lb  -5.04371 -41.2414 0.000 
123, ,4
SIEZ
Lb  0.00432451 3.29975 0.001 
123, ,5
SIEZ
Lb  0.00459526 0.035264 0.972 
123,
SIET
Lb  0.00121434 1.92298 0.054 
Ehime Bank (i=124) 
124,
SIE
Lb  -5.01076 -34.4427 0.000 
124, ,4
SIEZ
Lb  -0.00188542 -1.07567 0.282 
124, ,5
SIEZ
Lb  0.071802 0.492116 0.623 
124,
SIET
Lb  0.00300709 3.30549 0.001 
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Bank of Kochi (i=125) 
125,
SIE
Lb  -5.09706 -49.6819 0.000 
125, ,4
SIEZ
Lb  -0.00159219 -0.721983 0.470 
125, ,5
SIEZ
Lb  0.162630 1.68076 0.093 
125,
SIET
Lb  -0.000264836 -0.873577 0.382 
Nishi-Nippon Sogo Bank (i=126) 
126,
SIE
Lb  -4.94192 -4054.22 0.000 
Nishi-Nippon Bank (i=127) 
127,
SIE
Lb  -4.88856 -13876.5 0.000 
127,
SIET
Lb  0.00527598 48.3461 0.000 




Lb  -4.75639 -1691.29 0.000 
128,
SIET
Lb  -0.000760474 -3.44927 0.001 
Nishi-Nippon City Bank (merged with the Bank of Nagasaki) (i=129) 
Fukuoka City Bank (i=130) 
130,
SIE
Lb  -5.33642 -38.6384 0.000 
130, ,5
SIEZ
Lb  0.495780 2.92753 0.003 
130,
SIET
Lb  0.000505551 0.425305 0.671 





Lb  -5.08405 -1011.92 0.000 
131,
SIET
Lb  0.00119676 2.50624 0.012 
Saga Kyoei Bank (i=132) 
132,
SIE
Lb  -4.78104 -29.6534 0.000 
132, ,4
SIEZ
Lb  0.010129 2.50599 0.012 
132, ,5
SIEZ
Lb  -0.431790 -2.26007 0.024 
132,
SIET
Lb  -0.000708926 -0.637662 0.524 
Bank of Nagasaki (i=133) 
133,
SIE
Lb  -5.02105 -53.7422 0.000 
133, ,4
SIEZ
Lb  0.00171536 1.45355 0.146 
133, ,5
SIEZ
Lb  -0.080609 -0.730565 0.465 
133,
SIET
Lb  0.00151012 6.99698 0.000 
Kyushu Bank (i=134) 
134,
SIE
Lb  -4.73253 -31.8655 0.000 
134, ,5
SIEZ
Lb  -0.338324 -1.93131 0.053 
134,
SIET
Lb  -0.00139934 -1.47231 0.141 
Kumamoto Bank (i=135) 
135,
SIE





Lb  -0.00304580 -18.4299 0.000 
Kumamoto Family Bank (i=136) 
136,
SIE
Lb  -4.98181 -3927.08 0.000 
Higo Family Bank (i=137) 
137,
SIE
Lb  -5.08509 -1306.03 0.000 
137,
SIET
Lb  -0.00718691 -29.2776 0.000 
Howa Bank (i=138) 
138,
SIE
Lb  -5.20653 -153.281 0.000 
138, ,4
SIEZ
Lb  0.00220057 0.823271 0.410 
138, ,5
SIEZ
Lb  0.155448 3.54158 0.000 
138,
SIET
Lb  -0.00212027 -1.97420 0.048 
Miyazaki Taiyo Bank (i=139) 
139,
SIE
Lb  -5.18114 -17.1777 0.000 
139, ,4
SIEZ
Lb  0.00781066 3.64188 0.000 
139, ,5
SIEZ
Lb  0.081244 0.248736 0.804 
139,
SIET
Lb  0.00000887185 0.00709057 0.994 
Minami-Nippon Bank (i=140) 
140,
SIE
Lb  -5.23578 -80.2350 0.000 
140, ,4
SIEZ





Lb  0.240052 3.69640 0.000 
140,
SIET
Lb  -0.00243703 -4.64956 0.000 
Okinawa Kaiho Bank (i=141) 
141,
SIE
Lb  -4.78015 -153.955 0.000 
141, ,4
SIEZ
Lb  0.000878494 0.288446 0.773 
141, ,5
SIEZ
Lb  -0.212691 -3.85325 0.000 
141,
SIET
Lb  0.000165956 0.889565 0.374 
Tokyo Star Bank (i=142) 
142,
SIE
Lb  -5.18168 -1089.65 0.000 
142,
SIET
Lb  0.022476 76.6203 0.000 
Saitama Resona Bank (i=143) 
143,
SIE
Lb  -4.94215 -412.804 0.000 
143,
SIET




Order of MA for 







Value Function 0.131538 
Note: 1. Tables 4.1.3 to 4.1.5 show the results for the GMM estimations of Eqs. (3.2.1.1) 
to (3.2.1.3) composing Eq. (3.1.1.1.2), respectively. 
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2. The details of Eq. (3.1.1.2.4d) are as follows: 
( ), , , , , ,4 4, , , ,5 5, , ,,SIE Q SIE SIEZ Q SIEZ Q SIETi L L i t t i L i L i t i L i t i L tb b b z b z bτ τ∗ ∗= + ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅z , i=2, 3, 5, 6, 9-17, 21-38, 
40-43, 46, 47, 49, 50, 52, 53, 56-60, 63, 64, 66, 67, 70-75, 79, 81, 83-88, 90, 95-
105, 111, 116, 117, 121-125, 132, 133, 138-141,  
( ), , , , , ,5 5, , ,,SIE Q SIE SIEZ Q SIETi L L i t t i L i L i t i L tb b b z bτ τ∗ ∗= + ⋅ + ⋅z , i=1, 8, 18, 44, 55, 68, 76, 78, 82, 89, 
91, 94, 106-108, 112-114, 118, 119, 130, 134, 
( ), , , , ,,SIE Q SIE SIETi L L i t t i L i L tb b bτ τ∗ ∗= + ⋅z , i=7, 51, 54, 61, 62, 69, 80, 92, 115, 120, 127, 128, 
131, 135, 137, 142, 143, 
( ), , , ,,SIE Q SIEi L L i t t i Lb bτ ∗ =z , i=19, 20, 39, 45, 48, 65, 77, 93, 109, 110, 126, 136 
where 4, ,
Q
i tz , 5, ,
Q
i tz , and tτ
∗  are respectively the loan per case, the proportion of 
loans for small and medium firms, and the normalized time trend.  
3. This estimation takes into account the conditional heteroskedasticity and 
autocorrelation of the error terms. For instrumental variables, the following 
variables are used: the individual bank dummies, the products of these dummies 
and the estimate of the static cost share of the current goods, the products of these 
dummies and the normalized time trend, the products of these dummies and some 
endogenous quality variables in the previous period, the products of these 
dummies and the estimate of the static cost share of the labor, the products of these 
dummies, the normalized time trend, and this estimate, and the products of these 
dummies, quality variables, and this estimate. 
4. When new banks emerge due to consolidation, we treat the new banks and their 
predecessors as different entities. 
   5. The Seiwa Bank (i=4) is added to the Michinoku Bank (i=5) because of a lack of 
samples. For the same reason, the Nishi-Nippon City Bank (merged with the Bank 






Table 4.1.5 Estimation Results for Eq. (3.2.1.3) Composing Eq. (3.1.1.1.2) 
Parameter Estimate t-statistic p-value 
Yachiyo Bank (The present Kiraboshi Bank) (i=1) 
1,
SIE
Vb  -4.95829 -9.99725 0.000 
1, ,5
SIEZ
Vb  -0.029998 -0.060764 0.952 
1,
SIET
Vb  0.00413870 0.779396 0.436 
Hokkaido Bank (i=2) 
2,
SIE
Vb  -4.92101 -87.5359 0.000 
2, ,4
SIEZ
Vb  0.00251829 1.76163 0.078 
2, ,5
SIEZ
Vb  -0.047091 -0.678914 0.497 
2,
SIET
Vb  -0.00136006 -2.48201 0.013 
Aomori Bank (i=3) 
3,
SIE
Vb  -5.20225 -41.8322 0.000 
3, ,4
SIEZ
Vb  0.00314817 1.34364 0.179 
3, ,5
SIEZ
Vb  0.292053 1.76342 0.078 
3,
SIET
Vb  0.000823543 0.760924 0.447 
Seiwa Bank (i=4) 
Seiwa Bank and Michinoku Bank (i=5) 
5,
SIE





Vb  0.00162165 0.355200 0.722 
5, ,5
SIEZ
Vb  -0.282501 -0.442745 0.658 
5,
SIET
Vb  -0.00285160 -1.11931 0.263 
Akita Bank (i=6) 
6,
SIE
Vb  -5.26088 -49.5079 0.000 
6, ,4
SIEZ
Vb  0.00465259 1.76418 0.078 
6, ,5
SIEZ
Vb  0.325309 2.77467 0.006 
6,
SIET
Vb  0.000659588 0.864219 0.387 
Ugo Bank (i=7) 
7,
SIE
Vb  -5.10377 -1029.59 0.000 
7,
SIET
Vb  -0.00218026 -4.17366 0.000 
Hokuto Bank (i=8) 
8,
SIE
Vb  -4.97599 -157.973 0.000 
8, ,5
SIEZ
Vb  -0.016398 -0.487668 0.626 
8,
SIET
Vb  -0.00626420 -9.79487 0.000 
Shonai Bank (i=9) 
9,
SIE
Vb  -4.99764 -82.0658 0.000 
9, ,4
SIEZ





Vb  -0.129011 -2.36242 0.018 
9,
SIET
Vb  -0.0000349389 -0.037061 0.970 
Yamagata Bank (i=10) 
10,
SIE
Vb  -5.04764 -74.9125 0.000 
10, ,4
SIEZ
Vb  0.00278734 1.35786 0.175 
10, ,5
SIEZ
Vb  0.035709 0.371142 0.711 
10,
SIET
Vb  0.000262212 0.779074 0.436 
Bank of Iwate (i=11) 
11,
SIE
Vb  -5.03483 -88.3298 0.000 
11, ,4
SIEZ
Vb  -0.000853619 -0.583953 0.559 
11, ,5
SIEZ
Vb  0.131071 1.73941 0.082 
11,
SIET
Vb  0.000897046 1.35568 0.175 
Tohoku Bank (i=12) 
12,
SIE
Vb  -4.80558 -39.7693 0.000 
12, ,4
SIEZ
Vb  -0.011419 -3.07960 0.002 
12, ,5
SIEZ
Vb  -0.272837 -2.34046 0.019 
12,
SIET
Vb  -0.00215076 -4.37892 0.000 





Vb  -5.03525 -79.2111 0.000 
13, ,4
SIEZ
Vb  -0.000637151 -0.502769 0.615 
13, ,5
SIEZ
Vb  0.338647 4.15205 0.000 
13,
SIET
Vb  0.000281584 0.879565 0.379 
Toho Bank (i=14) 
14,
SIE
Vb  -5.16788 -43.2989 0.000 
14, ,4
SIEZ
Vb  0.00476601 1.33409 0.182 
14, ,5
SIEZ
Vb  0.286036 2.28259 0.022 
14,
SIET
Vb  0.00130306 1.47572 0.140 
Gunma Bank (i=15) 
15,
SIE
Vb  -4.96269 -9.25102 0.000 
15, ,4
SIEZ
Vb  0.000592168 0.150110 0.881 
15, ,5
SIEZ
Vb  0.206412 0.297499 0.766 
15,
SIET
Vb  0.00445567 0.936557 0.349 
Ashikaga Bank (i=16) 
16,
SIE
Vb  -4.89027 -125.217 0.000 
16, ,4
SIEZ
Vb  -0.000219623 -0.439630 0.660 
16, ,5
SIEZ





Vb  0.00370348 9.73976 0.000 
Joyo Bank (i=17) 
17,
SIE
Vb  -4.87814 -145.093 0.000 
17, ,4
SIEZ
Vb  0.000374595 0.951800 0.341 
17, ,5
SIEZ
Vb  0.198090 3.82728 0.000 
17,
SIET
Vb  0.00325013 15.7451 0.000 
Kanto Bank (i=18) 
18,
SIE
Vb  -5.07330 -34.6340 0.000 
18, ,5
SIEZ
Vb  -0.028264 -0.165393 0.869 
18,
SIET
Vb  0.00159108 1.19719 0.231 
Kanto Tsukuba Bank (i=19) 
19,
SIE
Vb  -5.03314 -3065.85 0.000 
Tsukuba Bank (i=20) 
20,
SIE
Vb  -4.91284 -3041.77 0.000 
Musashino Bank (i=21) 
21,
SIE
Vb  -5.03572 -151.164 0.000 
21, ,4
SIEZ
Vb  -0.000988549 -2.03815 0.042 
21, ,5
SIEZ
Vb  0.138035 3.28295 0.001 
21,
SIET
Vb  0.00757885 55.5350 0.000 
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Chiba Bank (i=22) 
22,
SIE
Vb  -4.52937 -22.5068 0.000 
22, ,4
SIEZ
Vb  -0.00274640 -0.798250 0.425 
22, ,5
SIEZ
Vb  -0.200726 -0.922868 0.356 
22,
SIET
Vb  0.00923366 3.69059 0.000 
Chiba Kogyo Bank (i=23) 
23,
SIE
Vb  -5.36830 -32.4405 0.000 
23, ,4
SIEZ
Vb  -0.0000222236 -0.00531796 0.996 
23, ,5
SIEZ
Vb  0.442497 2.11903 0.034 
23,
SIET
Vb  0.00273158 2.17158 0.030 
Tokyo Tomin Bank (i=24) 
24,
SIE
Vb  -4.96548 -57.8985 0.000 
24, ,4
SIEZ
Vb  -0.000622927 -0.293845 0.769 
24, ,5
SIEZ
Vb  0.00896638 0.096517 0.923 
24,
SIET
Vb  0.00330731 3.41763 0.001 
Bank of Yokohama (i=25) 
25,
SIE
Vb  -4.37619 -52.9570 0.000 
25, ,4
SIEZ





Vb  -0.322856 -2.78178 0.005 
25,
SIET
Vb  0.010160 5.49591 0.000 
Daishi Bank (i=26) 
26,
SIE
Vb  -4.91502 -74.0719 0.000 
26, ,4
SIEZ
Vb  -0.0000389700 -0.064824 0.948 
26, ,5
SIEZ
Vb  0.031539 0.344911 0.730 
26,
SIET
Vb  0.00122019 4.03233 0.000 
Hokuetsu Bank (i=27) 
27,
SIE
Vb  -5.08129 -162.525 0.000 
27, ,4
SIEZ
Vb  0.000891989 0.721938 0.470 
27, ,5
SIEZ
Vb  0.092655 1.95948 0.050 
27,
SIET
Vb  0.00113669 2.89549 0.004 
Yamanashi Chuo Bank (i=28) 
28,
SIE
Vb  -5.14771 -73.5083 0.000 
28, ,4
SIEZ
Vb  0.000814257 0.549238 0.583 
28, ,5
SIEZ
Vb  0.262253 3.36869 0.001 
28,
SIET
Vb  0.00196629 3.77573 0.000 





Vb  -4.95991 -57.2866 0.000 
29, ,4
SIEZ
Vb  0.00159748 2.32190 0.020 
29, ,5
SIEZ
Vb  0.161751 1.34265 0.179 
29,
SIET
Vb  0.000977328 2.33487 0.020 
Hokuriku Bank (i=30) 
30,
SIE
Vb  -4.64923 -38.2187 0.000 
30, ,4
SIEZ
Vb  -0.00148819 -2.04365 0.041 
30, ,5
SIEZ
Vb  -0.257332 -1.52159 0.128 
30,
SIET
Vb  -0.00184004 -4.93329 0.000 
Bank of Toyama (i=31) 
31,
SIE
Vb  -5.11546 -135.331 0.000 
31,
SIET
Vb  -0.00699394 -2.05701 0.040 
Hokkoku Bank (i=32) 
32,
SIE
Vb  -4.78171 -36.3361 0.000 
32, ,4
SIEZ
Vb  -0.00238012 -1.71936 0.086 
32, ,5
SIEZ
Vb  -0.127497 -0.683170 0.494 
32,
SIET
Vb  -0.000621356 -0.734679 0.463 





Vb  -4.89632 -62.5102 0.000 
33, ,4
SIEZ
Vb  -0.00211578 -1.66224 0.096 
33, ,5
SIEZ
Vb  -0.020208 -0.204701 0.838 
33,
SIET
Vb  -0.00155146 -3.28722 0.001 
Shizuoka Bank (i=34) 
34,
SIE
Vb  -4.86099 -72.5489 0.000 
34, ,4
SIEZ
Vb  -0.000633916 -1.12473 0.261 
34, ,5
SIEZ
Vb  0.113480 1.17334 0.241 
34,
SIET
Vb  -0.000648655 -1.31687 0.188 
Suruga Bank (i=35) 
35,
SIE
Vb  -4.88954 -84.0392 0.000 
35, ,4
SIEZ
Vb  -0.00106800 -1.36958 0.171 
35, ,5
SIEZ
Vb  -0.036927 -0.581011 0.561 
35,
SIET
Vb  -0.00136932 -2.53877 0.011 
Shimizu Bank (i=36) 
36,
SIE
Vb  -4.82737 -59.9584 0.000 
36, ,4
SIEZ
Vb  -0.00122743 -1.46891 0.142 
36, ,5
SIEZ





Vb  -0.000130010 -0.207948 0.835 
Ogaki Kyoritsu Bank (i=37) 
37,
SIE
Vb  -4.98815 -124.177 0.000 
37, ,4
SIEZ
Vb  -0.000916935 -1.16462 0.244 
37, ,5
SIEZ
Vb  0.112025 2.21893 0.026 
37,
SIET
Vb  0.00230472 8.61166 0.000 
Juroku Bank (i=38) 
38,
SIE
Vb  -4.87267 -287.104 0.000 
38, ,4
SIEZ
Vb  0.000202081 1.14820 0.251 
38, ,5
SIEZ
Vb  -0.042488 -2.23533 0.025 
38,
SIET
Vb  0.00108386 10.3779 0.000 
Juroku Bank (merged with the Gifu Bank) (i=39) 
39,
SIE
Vb  -4.87511 -2332.95 0.000 
Mie Bank (i=40) 
40,
SIE
Vb  -4.76882 -20.2361 0.000 
40, ,4
SIEZ
Vb  -0.00207003 -1.02161 0.307 
40, ,5
SIEZ
Vb  -0.337252 -1.20464 0.228 
40,
SIET
Vb  0.00212252 2.40858 0.016 





Vb  -5.03717 -88.8843 0.000 
41, ,4
SIEZ
Vb  0.000212968 0.267502 0.789 
41, ,5
SIEZ
Vb  0.181832 2.67272 0.008 
41,
SIET
Vb  0.000904401 2.80617 0.005 
Shiga Bank (i=42) 
42,
SIE
Vb  -5.04195 -147.270 0.000 
42, ,4
SIEZ
Vb  0.000361599 0.442732 0.658 
42, ,5
SIEZ
Vb  0.200427 4.04640 0.000 
42,
SIET
Vb  -0.000343966 -1.65186 0.099 
Bank of Kyoto (i=43) 
43,
SIE
Vb  -4.78442 -63.5937 0.000 
43, ,4
SIEZ
Vb  -0.000411725 -0.302257 0.762 
43, ,5
SIEZ
Vb  -0.083707 -1.09025 0.276 
43,
SIET
Vb  0.00274464 5.69441 0.000 
Osaka Bank (i=44) 
44,
SIE
Vb  -4.46950 -10.9227 0.000 
44, ,5
SIEZ
Vb  -0.540648 -1.16084 0.246 
44,
SIET
Vb  0.010617 1.78199 0.075 
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Kinki Osaka Bank (The present Kansai Mirai Bank) (i=45) 
45,
SIE
Vb  -4.87650 -1324.04 0.000 
Senshu Bank (i=46) 
46,
SIE
Vb  -5.18076 -36.0650 0.000 
46, ,4
SIEZ
Vb  0.00194075 1.71194 0.087 
46, ,5
SIEZ
Vb  0.147925 0.905163 0.365 
46,
SIET
Vb  0.0000685228 0.054911 0.956 
Ikeda Bank (i=47) 
47,
SIE
Vb  -5.36600 -50.9950 0.000 
47, ,4
SIEZ
Vb  0.00329284 1.55583 0.120 
47, ,5
SIEZ
Vb  0.372077 3.43535 0.001 
47,
SIET
Vb  -0.00106930 -0.744814 0.456 
Senshu Ikeda Bank (i=48) 
48,
SIE
Vb  -4.90066 -5424.92 0.000 
Nanto Bank (i=49) 
49,
SIE
Vb  -5.32849 -30.6659 0.000 
49, ,4
SIEZ
Vb  0.00237225 1.08176 0.279 
49, ,5
SIEZ
Vb  0.605270 2.85346 0.004 
49,
SIET
Vb  0.000957800 1.75670 0.079 
240 
 
Kiyo Bank (i=50) 
50,
SIE
Vb  -5.18734 -24.8904 0.000 
50, ,4
SIEZ
Vb  0.00387844 2.55740 0.011 
50, ,5
SIEZ
Vb  0.308197 1.16697 0.243 
50,
SIET
Vb  -0.000402167 -0.239704 0.811 
Kiyo Bank (merged with the Wakayama Bank) (i=51) 
51,
SIE
Vb  -4.91904 -403.306 0.000 
51,
SIET
Vb  0.000222657 0.303946 0.761 
Tajima Bank (i=52) 
52,
SIE
Vb  -5.33542 -57.0876 0.000 
52, ,4
SIEZ
Vb  -0.000635696 -0.207979 0.835 
52, ,5
SIEZ
Vb  0.259494 2.72281 0.006 
52,
SIET
Vb  -0.000964822 -1.40973 0.159 
Tottori Bank (i=53) 
53,
SIE
Vb  -5.14325 -284.701 0.000 
53, ,4
SIEZ
Vb  -0.000724102 -1.72146 0.085 
53, ,5
SIEZ
Vb  0.065878 2.94045 0.003 
53,
SIET
Vb  -0.00154516 -16.9021 0.000 





Vb  -4.89511 -1165.40 0.000 
54,
SIET
Vb  0.00400136 10.1821 0.000 
San-in Godo Bank (merged with the Fuso Bank) (i=55) 
55,
SIE
Vb  -4.98435 -132.353 0.000 
55, ,5
SIEZ
Vb  0.182880 3.47971 0.001 
55,
SIET
Vb  -0.00265259 -8.01534 0.000 
Chugoku Bank (i=56) 
56,
SIE
Vb  -4.82306 -60.9909 0.000 
56, ,4
SIEZ
Vb  -0.000847093 -1.42874 0.153 
56, ,5
SIEZ
Vb  0.050306 0.500604 0.617 
56,
SIET
Vb  0.00258668 13.7711 0.000 
Hiroshima Bank (i=57) 
57,
SIE
Vb  -4.97293 -40.2981 0.000 
57, ,4
SIEZ
Vb  0.00147990 1.85499 0.064 
57, ,5
SIEZ
Vb  0.246136 1.45862 0.145 
57,
SIET
Vb  0.000344940 0.564678 0.572 
Yamaguchi Bank (i=58) 
58,
SIE





Vb  0.00163657 0.773329 0.439 
58, ,5
SIEZ
Vb  0.432047 2.38576 0.017 
58,
SIET
Vb  -0.0000312480 -0.031169 0.975 
Awa Bank (i=59) 
59,
SIE
Vb  -5.38024 -45.7454 0.000 
59, ,4
SIEZ
Vb  0.00114208 0.531441 0.595 
59, ,5
SIEZ
Vb  0.470799 2.85635 0.004 
59,
SIET
Vb  -0.000462259 -0.508943 0.611 
Hyakujushi Bank (i=60) 
60,
SIE
Vb  -5.11290 -105.747 0.000 
60, ,4
SIEZ
Vb  0.000908565 1.67232 0.094 
60, ,5
SIEZ
Vb  0.274861 4.28595 0.000 
60,
SIET
Vb  0.00152319 5.28436 0.000 
Iyo Bank (i=61) 
61,
SIE
Vb  -4.83620 -828.558 0.000 
61,
SIET
Vb  0.00673965 10.3097 0.000 
Iyo Bank (merged with the Toho Sogo Bank) (i=62) 
62,
SIE





Vb  0.168829 6.14429 0.000 
62,
SIET
Vb  0.00323938 33.1339 0.000 
Shikoku Bank (i=63) 
63,
SIE
Vb  -5.48189 -26.0450 0.000 
63, ,4
SIEZ
Vb  -0.020990 -2.05044 0.040 
63, ,5
SIEZ
Vb  1.07955 2.92602 0.003 
63,
SIET
Vb  0.00275939 0.964291 0.335 
Bank of Fukuoka (i=64) 
64,
SIE
Vb  -4.44968 -21.0721 0.000 
64, ,4
SIEZ
Vb  -0.00123635 -0.526134 0.599 
64, ,5
SIEZ
Vb  -0.449768 -1.56236 0.118 
64,
SIET
Vb  0.00467046 2.52374 0.012 
Chikuho Bank (i=65) 
65,
SIE
Vb  -5.17552 -1807.34 0.000 
Bank of Saga (i=66) 
66,
SIE
Vb  -5.29833 -39.9464 0.000 
66, ,4
SIEZ
Vb  0.00565918 2.21364 0.027 
66, ,5
SIEZ





Vb  -0.000576957 -0.677539 0.498 
Eighteenth Bank (i=67) 
67,
SIE
Vb  -5.23678 -106.116 0.000 
67, ,4
SIEZ
Vb  0.00118749 1.04714 0.295 
67, ,5
SIEZ
Vb  0.365148 5.79109 0.000 
67,
SIET
Vb  0.000897510 2.64993 0.008 
Shinwa Bank (i=68) 
68,
SIE
Vb  -4.93536 -131.976 0.000 
68, ,5
SIEZ
Vb  -0.027305 -0.601999 0.547 
68,
SIET
Vb  0.00207760 9.05758 0.000 
Shinwa Bank (merged with the Kyushu Bank) (i=69) 
69,
SIE
Vb  -4.83193 -741.926 0.000 
69,
SIET
Vb  -0.00921979 -18.7459 0.000 
Higo Bank (i=70) 
70,
SIE
Vb  -5.25021 -25.1384 0.000 
70, ,4
SIEZ
Vb  -0.00236744 -0.562698 0.574 
70, ,5
SIEZ
Vb  0.556272 1.74591 0.081 
70,
SIET
Vb  0.00341496 2.28171 0.023 





Vb  -5.08086 -46.1988 0.000 
71, ,4
SIEZ
Vb  -0.000705454 -0.407273 0.684 
71, ,5
SIEZ
Vb  0.208268 1.27412 0.203 
71,
SIET
Vb  0.00164376 1.82645 0.068 
Miyazaki Bank (i=72) 
72,
SIE
Vb  -5.07247 -105.426 0.000 
72, ,4
SIEZ
Vb  0.000102689 0.237693 0.812 
72, ,5
SIEZ
Vb  0.106579 1.73501 0.083 
72,
SIET
Vb  0.00397687 30.0594 0.000 
Kagoshima Bank (i=73) 
73,
SIE
Vb  -4.61412 -83.0139 0.000 
73, ,4
SIEZ
Vb  -0.00135228 -1.74982 0.080 
73, ,5
SIEZ
Vb  -0.418857 -6.02062 0.000 
73,
SIET
Vb  0.00311489 21.7148 0.000 
Bank of Ryukyu (i=74) 
74,
SIE
Vb  -5.03584 -198.255 0.000 
74, ,4
SIEZ
Vb  -0.000585179 -1.33910 0.181 
74, ,5
SIEZ





Vb  0.0000934098 0.385397 0.700 
Bank of Okinawa (i=75) 
75,
SIE
Vb  -5.25070 -78.5926 0.000 
75, ,4
SIEZ
Vb  -0.000238311 -0.182780 0.855 
75, ,5
SIEZ
Vb  0.290737 4.25939 0.000 
75,
SIET
Vb  0.000384312 0.783556 0.433 
North Pacific Bank (i=76) 
76,
SIE
Vb  -4.82899 -28.1681 0.000 
76, ,5
SIEZ
Vb  -0.143713 -0.630402 0.528 
76,
SIET
Vb  -0.00458699 -3.12010 0.002 
North Pacific Bank (merged with the Sapporo Bank) (i=77) 
77,
SIE
Vb  -4.91016 -1290.28 0.000 
Sapporo Bank (i=78) 
78,
SIE
Vb  -5.24382 -32.4407 0.000 
78, ,5
SIEZ
Vb  0.345172 1.68012 0.093 
78,
SIET
Vb  -0.00636571 -5.94059 0.000 
Syokusan Bank (i=79) 
79,
SIE
Vb  -5.42340 -36.1186 0.000 
79, ,4
SIEZ





Vb  0.295274 2.06919 0.039 
79,
SIET
Vb  -0.00329917 -2.61186 0.009 
Kirayaka Bank (i=80) 
80,
SIE
Vb  -4.98777 -374.940 0.000 
80,
SIET
Vb  -0.000184434 -0.258921 0.796 
Kita-Nippon Bank (i=81) 
81,
SIE
Vb  -4.89007 -46.5584 0.000 
81, ,4
SIEZ
Vb  -0.00318777 -1.97215 0.049 
81, ,5
SIEZ
Vb  -0.076678 -0.626729 0.531 
81,
SIET
Vb  -0.00218346 -2.84474 0.004 
Tokuyo City Bank (i=82) 
82,
SIE
Vb  -5.00798 -123.245 0.000 
82, ,5
SIEZ
Vb  -0.020995 -0.428529 0.668 
82,
SIET
Vb  -0.00465021 -83.9920 0.000 
Sendai Bank (i=83) 
83,
SIE
Vb  -5.03582 -150.996 0.000 
83, ,4
SIEZ
Vb  -0.00262766 -2.00166 0.045 
83, ,5
SIEZ





Vb  -0.000989130 -3.66209 0.000 
Fukushima Bank (i=84) 
84,
SIE
Vb  -4.76658 -33.5204 0.000 
84, ,4
SIEZ
Vb  -0.010826 -3.58891 0.000 
84, ,5
SIEZ
Vb  -0.176304 -1.05582 0.291 
84,
SIET
Vb  -0.00388915 -5.55384 0.000 
Daito Bank (i=85) 
85,
SIE
Vb  -4.98374 -40.0422 0.000 
85, ,4
SIEZ
Vb  -0.00514653 -1.14965 0.250 
85, ,5
SIEZ
Vb  0.038794 0.322387 0.747 
85,
SIET
Vb  -0.00150439 -2.62124 0.009 
Towa Bank (i=86) 
86,
SIE
Vb  -5.10143 -16.0582 0.000 
86, ,4
SIEZ
Vb  0.00429091 1.52381 0.128 
86, ,5
SIEZ
Vb  0.116384 0.335205 0.737 
86,
SIET
Vb  0.00212017 3.29852 0.001 
Tochigi Bank (i=87) 
87,
SIE





Vb  0.00282509 1.77913 0.075 
87, ,5
SIEZ
Vb  0.020353 0.060520 0.952 
87,
SIET
Vb  0.00492316 1.74047 0.082 
Keiyo Bank (i=88) 
88,
SIE
Vb  -4.74901 -11.9653 0.000 
88, ,4
SIEZ
Vb  -0.00169596 -1.37603 0.169 
88, ,5
SIEZ
Vb  -0.155797 -0.343190 0.731 
88,
SIET
Vb  0.00931384 6.66061 0.000 
Taiheiyo Bank (i=89) 
89,
SIE
Vb  -5.28088 -12.4907 0.000 
89, ,5
SIEZ
Vb  0.103810 0.259431 0.795 
89,
SIET
Vb  -0.00766184 -1.27986 0.201 
Higashi-Nippon Bank (i=90) 
90,
SIE
Vb  -5.04700 -24.3191 0.000 
90, ,4
SIEZ
Vb  0.00384296 1.70752 0.088 
90, ,5
SIEZ
Vb  -0.00129099 -0.00606332 0.995 
90,
SIET
Vb  0.00226902 1.29893 0.194 





Vb  -4.97525 -102.238 0.000 
91, ,5
SIEZ
Vb  0.010851 0.198955 0.842 
91,
SIET
Vb  -0.000613114 -1.38034 0.167 
Heiwa Sogo Bank (i=92) 
92,
SIE
Vb  -5.09498 -458.417 0.000 
92,
SIET
Vb  -0.00970405 -13.4339 0.000 
Kanagawa Bank (i=93) 
93,
SIE
Vb  -5.08214 -491.191 0.000 
Niigata Chuo Bank (i=94) 
94,
SIE
Vb  -4.82790 -29.8947 0.000 
94, ,5
SIEZ
Vb  -0.187372 -1.08528 0.278 
94,
SIET
Vb  -0.00352526 -2.36643 0.018 
Taiko Bank (i=95) 
95,
SIE
Vb  -4.90510 -26.2911 0.000 
95, ,4
SIEZ
Vb  -0.011228 -1.34434 0.179 
95, ,5
SIEZ
Vb  0.069682 0.413554 0.679 
95,
SIET
Vb  0.000117821 0.121476 0.903 
Nagano Bank (i=96) 
96,
SIE





Vb  0.00225883 0.232323 0.816 
96, ,5
SIEZ
Vb  0.099214 0.659216 0.510 
96,
SIET
Vb  -0.000779614 -1.23596 0.216 
First Bank of Toyama (i=97) 
97,
SIE
Vb  0.158324 0.036812 0.971 
97, ,4
SIEZ
Vb  -0.163983 -1.48568 0.137 
97, ,5
SIEZ
Vb  -4.60619 -1.10881 0.268 
97,
SIET
Vb  -0.020133 -1.91864 0.055 
Fukuho Bank (i=98) 
98,
SIE
Vb  -13.7491 -3.57873 0.000 
98, ,4
SIEZ
Vb  0.153436 3.72492 0.000 
98, ,5
SIEZ
Vb  5.47010 1.62478 0.104 
98,
SIET
Vb  -0.184587 -4.98390 0.000 
Shizuokachuo Bank (i=99) 
99,
SIE
Vb  -5.11561 -72.1060 0.000 
99, ,4
SIEZ
Vb  0.00604584 1.30034 0.193 
99,
SIET
Vb  -0.00209076 -0.986733 0.324 





Vb  -5.14708 -25.7664 0.000 
100, ,4
SIEZ
Vb  0.016124 2.13098 0.033 
100, ,5
SIEZ
Vb  0.016635 0.094823 0.924 
100,
SIET
Vb  -0.00629430 -3.94821 0.000 
Aichi Bank (i=101) 
101,
SIE
Vb  -4.29916 -9.48374 0.000 
101, ,4
SIEZ
Vb  -0.00547873 -1.58334 0.113 
101, ,5
SIEZ
Vb  -0.641070 -1.27723 0.202 
101,
SIET
Vb  0.00357476 2.31890 0.020 
Bank of Nagoya (i=102) 
102,
SIE
Vb  -5.09871 -64.2302 0.000 
102, ,4
SIEZ
Vb  0.000495724 0.195116 0.845 
102, ,5
SIEZ
Vb  0.196693 1.78848 0.074 
102,
SIET
Vb  0.000382864 0.255315 0.798 
Chukyo Bank (i=103) 
103,
SIE
Vb  -5.15094 -9.26722 0.000 
103, ,4
SIEZ
Vb  0.00877738 0.936917 0.349 
103, ,5
SIEZ





Vb  -0.00544303 -1.12166 0.262 
Daisan Bank (i=104) 
104,
SIE
Vb  -4.97400 -24.1229 0.000 
104, ,4
SIEZ
Vb  0.00213198 1.11050 0.267 
104, ,5
SIEZ
Vb  0.014071 0.063207 0.950 
104,
SIET
Vb  0.00109915 0.846910 0.397 
Biwako Bank (i=105) 
105,
SIE
Vb  -4.92738 -210.341 0.000 
105, ,4
SIEZ
Vb  -0.000577702 -4.60662 0.000 
105, ,5
SIEZ
Vb  -0.058034 -2.32527 0.020 
105,
SIET
Vb  -0.00248524 -11.9827 0.000 
Bank of Kinki (i=106) 
106,
SIE
Vb  -4.76192 -17.1102 0.000 
106, ,5
SIEZ
Vb  -0.194978 -0.636977 0.524 
106,
SIET
Vb  -0.00108051 -0.453720 0.650 
Fukutoku Bank (i=107) 
107,
SIE
Vb  -5.10715 -42.9941 0.000 
107, ,5
SIEZ





Vb  -0.00349168 -2.88633 0.004 
Kansai Bank (i=108) 
108,
SIE
Vb  -4.91273 -26.6582 0.000 
108, ,5
SIEZ
Vb  -0.103635 -0.527662 0.598 
108,
SIET
Vb  -0.00147695 -1.21711 0.224 
Kansai Urban Banking Corporation (i=109) 
109,
SIE
Vb  -4.91810 -2390.65 0.000 
Kansai Urban Banking Corporation (merged with the Biwako Bank) (The present 
Kansai Mirai Bank) (i=110) 
110,
SIE
Vb  -4.86962 -1859.02 0.000 
Taisho Bank (i=111) 
111,
SIE
Vb  -5.04478 -18.9601 0.000 
111, ,4
SIEZ
Vb  0.00100481 0.235444 0.814 
111, ,5
SIEZ
Vb  -0.033892 -0.106559 0.915 
111,
SIET
Vb  -0.00549867 -1.92049 0.055 
Hanwa Bank (i=112) 
112,
SIE
Vb  -5.17034 -61.5898 0.000 
112, ,5
SIEZ
Vb  0.149625 0.990952 0.322 
112,
SIET
Vb  -0.00531459 -1.25354 0.210 





Vb  -4.96960 -123.394 0.000 
113, ,5
SIEZ
Vb  0.016900 0.365581 0.715 
113,
SIET
Vb  -0.00278945 -4.37641 0.000 
Hanshin Bank (i=114) 
114,
SIE
Vb  -5.21969 -20.9145 0.000 
114, ,5
SIEZ
Vb  0.246495 0.885545 0.376 
114,
SIET
Vb  -0.00403915 -2.20303 0.028 
Minato Bank (i=115) 
115,
SIE
Vb  -4.86566 -1520.45 0.000 
115,
SIET
Vb  0.000460978 1.81472 0.070 
Shimane Bank (i=116) 
116,
SIE
Vb  -4.96738 -9.34933 0.000 
116, ,4
SIEZ
Vb  -0.000240022 -0.017137 0.986 
116, ,5
SIEZ
Vb  -0.054578 -0.117676 0.906 
116,
SIET
Vb  -0.00180028 -2.81588 0.005 
Tomato Bank (i=117) 
117,
SIE
Vb  -5.08820 -39.9124 0.000 
117, ,4
SIEZ





Vb  0.081202 0.657113 0.511 
117,
SIET
Vb  0.00267286 1.57141 0.116 
Setouchi Bank (i=118) 
118,
SIE
Vb  -5.07188 -118.891 0.000 
118, ,5
SIEZ
Vb  0.020081 0.422376 0.673 
118,
SIET
Vb  0.000265136 0.819618 0.412 
Hiroshima Sogo Bank (i=119) 
119,
SIE
Vb  -5.09323 -75.4797 0.000 
119, ,5
SIEZ
Vb  0.147271 1.90539 0.057 
119,
SIET
Vb  -0.0000593281 -0.100877 0.920 
Momiji Bank (i=120) 
120,
SIE
Vb  -4.78726 -615.698 0.000 
120,
SIET
Vb  -0.010027 -18.5111 0.000 
Saikyo Bank (i=121) 
121,
SIE
Vb  -5.12131 -61.3834 0.000 
121, ,4
SIEZ
Vb  0.00250671 0.541024 0.588 
121, ,5
SIEZ
Vb  0.056552 0.681741 0.495 
121,
SIET
Vb  0.000281987 0.325501 0.745 





Vb  -5.32389 -26.6036 0.000 
122, ,4
SIEZ
Vb  0.00877784 1.85144 0.064 
122, ,5
SIEZ
Vb  0.257206 1.32421 0.185 
122,
SIET
Vb  -0.000676016 -0.756705 0.449 
Kagawa Bank (i=123) 
123,
SIE
Vb  -4.92877 -20.3369 0.000 
123, ,4
SIEZ
Vb  0.00183328 0.430581 0.667 
123, ,5
SIEZ
Vb  -0.091755 -0.345849 0.729 
123,
SIET
Vb  0.00104531 0.776017 0.438 
Ehime Bank (i=124) 
124,
SIE
Vb  -4.91915 -15.1424 0.000 
124, ,4
SIEZ
Vb  -0.00269733 -0.707032 0.480 
124, ,5
SIEZ
Vb  -0.023129 -0.070125 0.944 
124,
SIET
Vb  0.00248457 1.26933 0.204 
Bank of Kochi (i=125) 
125,
SIE
Vb  -5.21657 -27.5873 0.000 
125, ,4
SIEZ
Vb  -0.000734689 -0.173729 0.862 
125, ,5
SIEZ





Vb  -0.000136103 -0.230698 0.818 
Nishi-Nippon Sogo Bank (i=126) 
126,
SIE
Vb  -4.94217 -1778.78 0.000 
Nishi-Nippon Bank (i=127) 
127,
SIE
Vb  -4.88860 -8668.33 0.000 
127,
SIET
Vb  0.00530570 32.9761 0.000 




Vb  -4.75623 -1728.35 0.000 
128,
SIET
Vb  -0.000792433 -3.61776 0.000 
Nishi-Nippon City Bank (merged with the Bank of Nagasaki) (i=129) 
Fukuoka City Bank (i=130) 
130,
SIE
Vb  -5.27948 -23.5155 0.000 
130, ,5
SIEZ
Vb  0.425687 1.54537 0.122 
130,
SIET
Vb  0.000889926 0.439975 0.660 
Fukuoka Chuo Bank (i=131) 
131,
SIE
Vb  -5.08131 -527.954 0.000 
131,
SIET
Vb  0.000656438 1.02558 0.305 
Saga Kyoei Bank (i=132) 
132,
SIE





Vb  0.011341 1.56024 0.119 
132, ,5
SIEZ
Vb  -.583914 -1.70420 0.088 
132,
SIET
Vb  -0.00153972 -0.790636 0.429 
Bank of Nagasaki (i=133) 
133,
SIE
Vb  -4.75340 -17.2147 0.000 
133, ,4
SIEZ
Vb  0.00614317 1.59210 0.111 
133, ,5
SIEZ
Vb  -0.422122 -1.25965 0.208 
133,
SIET
Vb  0.000519660 0.610282 0.542 
Kyushu Bank (i=134) 
134,
SIE
Vb  -4.73950 -19.3900 0.000 
134, ,5
SIEZ
Vb  -0.330617 -1.14350 0.253 
134,
SIET
Vb  -0.00156960 -0.998000 0.318 
Kumamoto Bank (i=135) 
135,
SIE
Vb  -5.11499 -1123.44 0.000 
135,
SIET
Vb  -0.00314498 -7.02784 0.000 
Kumamoto Family Bank (i=136) 
136,
SIE
Vb  -5.01311 -117.967 0.000 
136, ,5
SIEZ





Vb  -0.00243159 -24.5498 0.000 
Higo Family Bank (i=137) 
137,
SIE
Vb  -5.08620 -586.699 0.000 
137,
SIET
Vb  -0.00721076 -13.0601 0.000 
Howa Bank (i=138) 
138,
SIE
Vb  -5.11241 -101.056 0.000 
138, ,4
SIEZ
Vb  -0.00246749 -0.704214 0.481 
138, ,5
SIEZ
Vb  0.098803 1.43544 0.151 
138,
SIET
Vb  -0.000153684 -0.116921 0.907 
Miyazaki Taiyo Bank (i=139) 
139,
SIE
Vb  -4.94712 -10.0577 0.000 
139, ,4
SIEZ
Vb  0.00508010 1.41154 0.158 
139, ,5
SIEZ
Vb  -0.155296 -0.290101 0.772 
139,
SIET
Vb  -0.000682699 -0.310828 0.756 
Minami-Nippon Bank (i=140) 
140,
SIE
Vb  -5.20108 -71.8281 0.000 
140, ,4
SIEZ
Vb  -0.000184763 -0.081248 0.935 
140, ,5
SIEZ





Vb  -0.00270015 -3.60431 0.000 
Okinawa Kaiho Bank (i=141) 
141,
SIE
Vb  -4.83882 -84.5908 0.000 
141, ,4
SIEZ
Vb  0.0000348873 0.00725659 0.994 
141, ,5
SIEZ
Vb  -0.136810 -1.49154 0.136 
141,
SIET
Vb  0.0000284734 0.100998 0.920 
Tokyo Star Bank (i=142) 
142,
SIE
Vb  -5.16838 -443.217 0.000 
142,
SIET
Vb  0.021591 24.4502 0.000 
Saitama Resona Bank (i=143) 
143,
SIE
Vb  -4.94711 -346.516 0.000 
143,
SIET




Order of MA for 







Value Function 0.131560 
Note: 1. Tables 4.1.3 to 4.1.5 show the results for the GMM estimations of Eqs. (3.2.1.1) 
to (3.2.1.3) composing Eq. (3.1.1.1.2), respectively. 
2. The details of Eq. (3.1.1.2.4d) are as follows: 
( ), , , , , ,4 4, , , ,5 5, , ,,SIE Q SIE SIEZ Q SIEZ Q SIETi V V i t t i V i V i t i V i t i V tb b b z b z bτ τ∗ ∗= + ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅z , i=2, 3, 5, 6, 9-17, 21-30, 
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32-38, 40-43, 46, 47, 49, 50, 52, 53, 56-60, 63, 64, 66, 67, 70-75, 79, 81, 83-88, 
90, 95-98, 100-105, 111, 116, 117, 121-125, 132, 133, 138-141, 
( ), , , , , ,5 5, , ,,SIE Q SIE SIEZ Q SIETi V V i t t i V i V i t i V tb b b z bτ τ∗ ∗= + ⋅ + ⋅z , i=1, 8, 18, 44, 55, 62, 68, 76, 78, 82, 
89, 91, 94, 106-108, 112-114, 118, 119, 130, 134, 136, 
( ), , , , , ,4 4, , ,,SIE Q SIE SIEZ Q SIETi V V i t t i V i V i t i V tb b b z bτ τ∗ ∗= + ⋅ + ⋅z , i=99, 
( ), , , , ,,SIE Q SIE SIETi V V i t t i V i V tb b bτ τ∗ ∗= + ⋅z , i=7, 31, 51, 54, 61, 69, 80, 92, 115, 120, 127, 128, 
131, 135, 137, 142, 143, 
( ), , , ,,SIE Q SIEi V V i t t i Vb bτ ∗ =z , i=19, 20, 39, 45, 48, 65, 77, 93, 109, 110, 126,  
where 4, ,
Q
i tz , 5, ,
Q
i tz , and tτ
∗  are respectively the loan per case, the proportion of 
loans for small and medium firms, and the normalized time trend.  
3. This estimation takes into account the conditional heteroskedasticity and 
autocorrelation of the error terms. For instrumental variables, the following 
variables are used: the individual bank dummies, the products of these dummies 
and the estimate of the static cost share of the current goods, the products of these 
dummies and the normalized time trend, the products of these dummies and some 
endogenous quality variables in the previous period, the products of these 
dummies and this estimate, the products of these dummies, the normalized time 
trend, and the estimate of the static cost share of the current goods, the products 
of these dummies, quality variables, and this estimate, the products of these 
dummies and the static cost unneutral efficiency in the previous period, and the 
products of these dummies and the Herfindahl index of loans in the previous 
period. 
4. When new banks emerge due to consolidation, we treat the new banks and their 
predecessors as different entities. 
   5. The Seiwa Bank (i=4) is added to the Michinoku Bank (i=5) because of a lack of 
samples. For the same reason, the Nishi-Nippon City Bank (merged with the Bank 















(Fig. 4.1.1) Static Cost Neutral and Unneutral 
Efficiencies
Static Cost Unneutral Efficiency Static Cost Neutral  Efficiency
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Table 4.2.1 Estimation Results for the Dynamic Variable Cost Function (1) 
Parameter Estimate t-statistic p-value 
SLa   0.195955 3.57748 0.000 
EF
SLa  0.231317 2.47625 0.013 
,
HI
SL La  -0.182866 -4.12135 0.000 
,1
Z
SLa   -1.62213 -6.70780 0.000 
,3
Z
SLa   -8.15102 -12.1839 0.000 
,4
Z
SLa   -0.00746860 -14.0356 0.000 
,5
Z
SLa   -0.089755 -2.57857 0.010 
,26
Z
SLa   0.118915 2.72417 0.006 
,7
Z
SLa   -0.179730 -6.19424 0.000 
,16
Z
SLa   0.280002 6.80780 0.000 
,17
Z
SLa   -0.158053 -2.98494 0.003 
,11
Z
SLa   -0.090380 -7.90952 0.000 
,13
Z
SLa   0.142341 3.94530 0.000 
LLa  -0.265104 -3.45195 0.001 
EF
LLa  0.866678 5.67093 0.000 
,
HI





LLa   -1.21801 -3.85304 0.000 
,2
Z
LLa   -0.155292 -1.89573 0.058 
,3
Z
LLa   13.8161 13.3223 0.000 
,4
Z
LLa   0.00291364 4.82806 0.000 
,6
Z
LLa   -0.256811 -4.76996 0.000 
,27
Z
LLa  -0.072207 -4.45818 0.000 
,16
Z
LLa  -0.185856 -4.22599 0.000 
,24
Z
LLa  0.255346 4.83222 0.000 
,21
Z
LLa  0.091028 2.89989 0.004 
,25
Z
LLa  0.086882 4.93302 0.000 
,9
Z
LLa  0.244655 3.87843 0.000 
,13
Z
LLa  -0.046783 -0.966931 0.334 
DDa  -0.196676 -2.79264 0.005 
EF
DDa  -0.506124 -3.87948 0.000 
,
HI
DD La  -0.010982 -0.175566 0.861 
,18
Z
DDa  2.48516 5.36587 0.000 
,19
Z





DDa  0.0000575692 8.75936 0.000 
,23
Z
DDa  0.379906 8.17442 0.000 
,7
Z
DDa  0.087116 2.56675 0.010 
,13
Z
DDa  0.331241 5.66828 0.000 
TDa  0.637677 6.31935 0.000 
EF
TDa  -0.867045 -3.92730 0.000 
,
HI
TD La  -0.043565 -0.482564 0.629 
,18
Z
TDa  -1.57468 -2.80826 0.005 
,22
Z
TDa  1.41406 2.63352 0.008 
,20
Z
TDa  -0.0000667036 -7.97178 0.000 
,7
Z
TDa  0.109196 3.28905 0.001 
,16
Z
TDa  -0.210503 -3.72569 0.000 
,24
Z
TDa  -0.093188 -2.58928 0.010 
,17
Z
TDa  0.326167 4.34824 0.000 
,9
Z
TDa  -0.353104 -6.89244 0.000 
,13
Z
TDa  0.026378 0.360134 0.719 




Sa  0.110076 1.11572 0.265 
,
HI
S La  -0.048184 -0.970675 0.332 
,23
Z
Sa  0.138640 3.52763 0.000 
,16
Z
Sa  0.184072 8.21743 0.000 
,21
Z
Sa  0.052545 1.67963 0.093 
,13
Z
Sa  -0.190924 -3.92674 0.000 
Ca  -0.052458 -1.60328 0.109 
EF
Ca  0.066823 1.01580 0.310 
,
HI
C La  0.047924 1.52878 0.126 
,13
Z
Ca  -0.111058 -4.16950 0.000 
CLa  -0.00306763 -0.178199 0.859 
EF
CLa  -0.023749 -0.661353 0.508 
,
HI
CL La  0.028061 1.80405 0.071 
,13
Z
CLa  -0.040953 -2.41814 0.016 
Aa  0.011038 0.730958 0.465 
EF
Aa  0.080522 2.71789 0.007 
,
HI





Aa  -0.041422 -2.97345 0.003 
,7
Z
Aa  -0.028406 -4.42831 0.000 
,16
Z
Aa  -0.060845 -7.40533 0.000 
,13
Z
Aa  -0.00856384 -0.581100 0.561 
CMa  -0.012911 -3.79884 0.000 
EF
CMa  0.018291 5.13006 0.000 
,
HI
CM La  0.00202005 0.664002 0.507 
,9
Z
CMa  0.072760 7.37317 0.000 
,13
Z
CMa  0.00576709 2.05458 0.040 
CDa  0.016613 2.46804 0.014 
EF
CDa  -0.059732 -7.19667 0.000 
,
HI
CD La  -0.015183 -2.57901 0.010 
,13
Z
CDa  0.049785 5.54749 0.000 
La  0.486922 84.9468 0.000 
SIE
La  -0.000222417 -1.58989 0.112 
,
HI
L La  0.00410728 3.26340 0.001 
,14
Z





La  0.135176 8.96537 0.000 
,3
Z
La  -0.514562 -14.6298 0.000 
,4
Z
La  -0.0000771321 -1.20629 0.228 
,5
Z
La  -0.043544 -13.3470 0.000 
,6
Z
La  -0.063278 -6.26421 0.000 
,26
Z
La  0.089819 12.6714 0.000 
,15
Z
La  0.00769822 2.30843 0.021 
,27
Z
La  0.00268101 1.00207 0.316 
,18
Z
La  -0.234813 -1.94309 0.052 
,22
Z
La  2.13303 20.8594 0.000 
,20
Z
La  0.0000115346 14.9144 0.000 
,23
Z
La  0.00753050 3.25678 0.001 
,7
Z
La  0.00494849 2.66610 0.008 
,16
Z
La  0.017538 9.19307 0.000 
,24
Z
La  0.00891358 4.31459 0.000 
,21
Z
La  0.00950152 4.35934 0.000 
,25
Z





La  0.014714 7.37228 0.000 
,17
Z
La  0.00731785 3.28221 0.001 
,9
Z
La  0.015448 7.14705 0.000 
,10
Z
La  0.022777 10.8852 0.000 
,11
Z
La  0.00171576 0.948969 0.343 
,12
Z
La  0.018543 21.1740 0.000 
,13
Z
La  -0.010915 -10.2144 0.000 
B
La  0.0000000788263 1.15054 0.250 
Ka  0.027792 14.6540 0.000 
SIE
Ka  0.000145301 4.30666 0.000 
,
HI
K La  -0.00133697 -3.19959 0.001 
,14
Z
Ka  0.794227 16.5710 0.000 
,2
Z
Ka  -0.088380 -16.5006 0.000 
,3
Z
Ka  -0.053864 -3.60746 0.000 
,4
Z
Ka  -0.0000934590 -4.38896 0.000 
,5
Z
Ka  0.00885258 7.82645 0.000 
,6
Z





Ka  -0.031142 -16.1247 0.000 
,15
Z
Ka  -0.000648688 -0.812527 0.416 
,27
Z
Ka  -0.00735316 -8.20146 0.000 
,18
Z
Ka  -0.396550 -9.93534 0.000 
,22
Z
Ka  0.543991 14.8028 0.000 
,20
Z
Ka  0.00000619027 25.8678 0.000 
,23
Z
Ka  -0.00322737 -4.71334 0.000 
,7
Z
Ka  -0.00335717 -6.47782 0.000 
,16
Z
Ka  -0.00491366 -9.32115 0.000 
,24
Z
Ka  -0.00303922 -5.11127 0.000 
,21
Z
Ka  -0.00525064 -8.59778 0.000 
,25
Z
Ka  -0.00284030 -5.19034 0.000 
,8
Z
Ka  -0.00207633 -3.78566 0.000 
,17
Z
Ka  0.00305614 4.69227 0.000 
,9
Z
Ka  -0.000303071 -0.487529 0.626 
,10
Z
Ka  -0.000856110 -1.39886 0.162 
,11
Z





Ka  -0.000211155 -0.805782 0.420 
,13
Z
Ka  0.00102905 2.96760 0.003 
B
Ka  -0.000000161329 -0.149556 0.881 
Va  0.355622 41.6137 0.000 
SIE
Va  0.000186389 0.879266 0.379 
,
HI
V La  -0.00483039 -2.63287 0.008 
,14
Z
Va  2.24173 9.53984 0.000 
,2
Z
Va  -0.113207 -4.98745 0.000 
,3
Z
Va  0.833446 16.0946 0.000 
,4
Z
Va  0.000212992 2.19981 0.028 
,5
Z
Va  0.056699 11.6650 0.000 
,6
Z
Va  0.111359 7.55057 0.000 
,26
Z
Va  -0.103668 -9.81416 0.000 
,15
Z
Va  -0.010969 -2.17546 0.030 
,27
Z
Va  0.00353041 0.873044 0.383 
,18
Z
Va  0.763951 4.23704 0.000 
,22
Z





Va  -0.0000238217 -20.3431 0.000 
,23
Z
Va  -0.00805588 -2.30427 0.021 
,7
Z
Va  -0.00401864 -1.46081 0.144 
,16
Z
Va  -0.021446 -7.57105 0.000 
,24
Z
Va  -0.010341 -3.37884 0.001 
,21
Z
Va  -0.00894895 -2.72226 0.006 
,25
Z
Va  -0.017776 -6.05666 0.000 
,8
Z
Va  -0.020103 -6.73437 0.000 
,17
Z
Va  -0.014215 -4.32974 0.000 
,9
Z
Va  -0.023041 -7.05904 0.000 
,10
Z
Va  -0.033550 -10.6741 0.000 
,11
Z
Va  -0.00507844 -1.89384 0.058 
,12
Z
Va  -0.027815 -21.6006 0.000 
,13
Z
Va  0.015439 9.86157 0.000 
QQ
SLSLb   0.095204 3.16542 0.002 
QQ
SLLLb  -0.177690 -2.98700 0.003 
QQ




SLTDb  -0.093902 -1.48449 0.138 
QQ
SLSb  0.229761 8.77048 0.000 
QQ
SLCb  0.126992 4.70830 0.000 
QQ
SLCLb  0.083484 5.87381 0.000 
QQ
SLAb  -0.032792 -2.17638 0.030 
QQ
SLCMb  0.00267878 1.36656 0.172 
QQ
SLCDb  -0.046939 -5.45291 0.000 
QQ
LLLLb  0.193065 1.65317 0.098 
QQ
LLDDb  -0.089788 -1.44524 0.148 
QQ
LLTDb  0.164012 1.20441 0.228 
QQ
LLSb  0.00294413 0.055103 0.956 
QQ
LLCb  -0.063644 -2.01773 0.044 
QQ
LLCLb  0.019085 0.890710 0.373 
QQ
LLAb  0.032813 2.23733 0.025 
QQ
LLCMb  -0.00665074 -1.66882 0.095 
QQ
LLCDb  -0.019014 -2.18990 0.029 
QQ




DDTDb  0.228804 3.13558 0.002 
QQ
DDSb  -0.034082 -1.67877 0.093 
QQ
DDCb  0.127717 5.06597 0.000 
QQ
DDCLb  0.00190813 0.116073 0.908 
QQ
DDAb  0.049809 3.79477 0.000 
QQ
DDCMb  0.011206 3.92833 0.000 
QQ
DDCDb  0.015386 2.43703 0.015 
QQ
TDTDb  -0.157389 -0.921512 0.357 
QQ
TDSb  -0.164569 -3.68892 0.000 
QQ
TDCb  0.061635 1.26591 0.206 
QQ
TDCLb  -0.083517 -2.98848 0.003 
QQ
TDAb  0.012887 0.584267 0.559 
QQ
TDCMb  0.00577339 1.43043 0.153 
QQ
TDCDb  0.055681 3.76341 0.000 
QQ
SSb  -0.00884182 -3.08374 0.002 
QQ
SCb  -0.090270 -4.23710 0.000 
QQ




SAb  0.029358 3.67955 0.000 
QQ
SCMb  -0.000495814 -0.667195 0.505 
QQ
SCDb  -0.016747 -3.83746 0.000 
QQ
CCb  -0.102404 -4.56896 0.000 
QQ
CCLb  -0.011498 -1.18962 0.234 
QQ
CAb  -0.033932 -4.44365 0.000 
QQ
CCMb  -0.000416246 -0.190196 0.849 
QQ
CCDb  0.016593 6.01921 0.000 
QQ
CLCLb  -0.00723165 -1.00021 0.317 
QQ
CLAb  -0.000252926 -0.049832 0.960 
QQ
CLCMb  0.000747221 0.752337 0.452 
QQ
CLCDb  -0.015410 -6.38203 0.000 
QQ
AAb  -0.00873112 -2.64433 0.008 
QQ
ACMb  -0.00609042 -7.80829 0.000 
QQ
ACDb  0.00556686 3.25274 0.001 
QQ
CMCMb  -0.000159303 -0.592317 0.554 
QQ




CDCDb  0.00438943 3.98077 0.000 
PP
LLb   0.197451 186.164 0.000 
PP
LKb  -0.00663165 -20.7537 0.000 
PP
LVb  -0.145950 -60.3152 0.000 
PP
KKb  0.00530513 43.2432 0.000 
PP
KVb  0.00621914 11.8607 0.000 
PP
VVb  0.139731 54.7099 0.000 
B
LLb   0.837321
1210−×  0.072792 0.942 
B
LKb  0.198619
610−×  2.09090 0.037 
B
KKb  0.758281
910−×  0.835162 0.404 
QP
SLLb   -0.00239537 -1.83737 0.066 
QP
SLKb  0.00307560 8.80007 0.000 
QP
SLVb  0.000449295 0.240850 0.810 
QP
LLLb   -0.047996 -26.4646 0.000 
QP
LLKb  -0.00699741 -11.4023 0.000 
QP
LLVb  0.079775 29.7524 0.000 
QP




DDKb  -0.00221826 -4.24117 0.000 
QP
DDVb  0.012436 4.73539 0.000 
QP
TDLb   0.033695 16.0778 0.000 
QP
TDKb  0.013619 22.0065 0.000 
QP
TDVb  -0.064984 -21.1695 0.000 
QP
SLb   0.000383125 0.662382 0.508 
QP
SKb  0.000749619 6.43982 0.000 
QP
SVb  -0.00135229 -1.50821 0.132 
QP
CLb   0.00613461 8.32547 0.000 
QP
CKb  -0.00124873 -4.67812 0.000 
QP
CVb  -0.00798624 -7.42908 0.000 
QP
CLLb   0.00283553 5.94965 0.000 
QP
CLKb  0.00165340 12.0857 0.000 
QP
CLVb  -0.00599183 -8.38538 0.000 
QP
ALb   -0.00344457 -6.12577 0.000 
QP
AKb  -0.00251043 -14.6713 0.000 
QP




CMLb   -0.000507408 -5.76785 0.000 
QP
CMKb  -0.0000125129 -0.578455 0.563 
QP
CMVb  0.000779985 5.69090 0.000 
QP
CDLb   0.00225449 13.9853 0.000 
QP
CDKb  0.0000742500 1.22739 0.220 
QP
CDVb  -0.00348483 -14.3630 0.000 
QT
SLTb  0.015680 7.05896 0.000 
QT
LLTb  -0.010920 -2.80524 0.005 
QT
DDTb  0.00764737 2.24691 0.025 
QT
TDTb  -0.00460475 -0.855540 0.392 
QT
STb  0.00912212 3.24117 0.001 
QT
CTb  -0.00177485 -1.07697 0.281 
QT
CLTb  0.00115000 1.18815 0.235 
QT
ATb  -0.00633267 -7.12981 0.000 
QT
CMTb  -0.000365761 -2.40475 0.016 
QT
CDTb  -0.00150343 -3.29490 0.001 
PT




KTb  0.00117574 17.7663 0.000 
PT
VTb  0.00467561 20.2766 0.000 
R-squared Variable Cost Function 0.992079 
Share of Labor 0.530480 




Order of MA for 







Value Function 0.232551 
Note: 1. Tables 4.2.1 and 4.2.2 show the results of the simultaneous GMM estimation of 
the dynamic variable cost function explained in Subsection 3.1.2.2, with the 
dynamic cost share equations explained in the same subsection. Table 4.2.1 gives 
the estimates of the parameters other than the coefficients of the individual bank 
dummies in Eq. (3.1.2.2.1a); Table 4.2.2 gives the estimates of the coefficients. 
2. The details of Eqs. (3.1.2.2.1b) and (3.1.2.2.1c) are as follows: 
( )
{ }
, 1 , 1 , , , 1 , , 1 , , ,
1,3,4,5,7,11,13,16,17,26
, ,S Q EF S HI Z QSL i t L t SL i t SL SL i t SL L L t SL h h i t
h
a EF HI a a EF a HI a z− − − −
∈
= + ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅∑z , 
( )
{ }
, 1 , 1 , , , 1 , , 1 , , ,
2,3,4,6,9,13,14,16,21,24,25,27
, ,S Q EF S HI Z QLL i t L t LL i t LL LL i t LL L L t LL h h i t
h
a EF HI a a EF a HI a z− − − −
∈
= + ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅∑z , 
( )
{ }
, 1 , 1 , , , 1 , , 1 , , ,
7,13,18 20,23
, ,S Q EF S HI Z QDD i t L t DD i t DD DD i t DD L L t DD h h i t
h
a EF HI a a EF a HI a z− − − −
∈ −
= + ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅∑z , 
( )
{ }
, 1 , 1 , , , 1 , , 1 , , ,
7,9,13,16 18,20,22,24
, ,S Q EF S HI Z QTD i t L t TD i t TD TD i t TD L L t TD h h i t
h
a EF HI a a EF a HI a z− − − −
∈ −
= + ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅∑z , 
( )
{ }
, 1 , 1 , , , 1 , , 1 , , ,
13,16,21,23
, ,S Q EF S HI Z QS i t L t S i t S S i t S L L t S h h i t
h
a EF HI a a EF a HI a z− − − −
∈
= + ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅∑z , 
( ), 1 , 1 , , , 1 , , 1 ,13 13, ,, ,S Q EF S HI Z QC i t L t C i t C C i t C L L t C i ta EF HI a a EF a HI a z− − − −= + ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅z , 
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( ), 1 , 1 , , , 1 , , 1 ,13 13, ,, ,S Q EF S HI Z QCL i t L t CL i t CL CL i t CL L L t CL i ta EF HI a a EF a HI a z− − − −= + ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅z , 
( )
{ }
, 1 , 1 , , , 1 , , 1 , , ,
7,13,16,23
, ,S Q EF S HI Z QA i t L t A i t A A i t A L L t A h h i t
h
a EF HI a a EF a HI a z− − − −
∈
= + ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅∑z , 
( )
{ }
, 1 , 1 , , , 1 , , 1 , , ,
9,13
, ,S Q EF S HI Z QCM i t L t CM i t CM CM i t CM L L t CM h h i t
h
a EF HI a a EF a HI a z− − − −
∈
= + ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅∑z , 
( ), 1 , 1 , , , 1 , , 1 ,13 13, ,, ,S Q EF S HI Z QCD i t L t CD i t CD CD i t CD L L t CD i ta EF HI a a EF a HI a z− − − −= + ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅z , 
( )
{ }
, , 1 , 1 , , , , 1 , , 1 , , ,
2 18,20 27
, ,SIE Q SIE SIE HI Z Qj i j t L t j i t j j i j t j L L t j h h i t
h
a A HI a a A a HI a z− − − −
∈ − −
= + ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅∑z , { }, ,j L K V∈ , 
where , 1
S
i tEF −  is the static cost unneutral efficiency in the previous period, , 1L tHI −  
is the Herfindahl index of loans (i.e., the sum of the short-term and long-term loans) 
in the previous period, , , 1
SIE
i j tA −  ( { }, ,j L K V∈ ) are the inefficiency coefficients of 
static factor demand functions in the previous period, , ,
Q
h i tz  ( 1, ,27h =  ) are the 
short-term prime rate ( 1h = ), the capital ratio of borrower firms ( 2h = ), the loan 
loss provision rate ( 3h = ), the loan per case ( 4h = ), the proportion of loans for 
small and medium firms ( 5h = ), the Herfindahl index of loan proportions 
classified by industry ( 6h = ), the regional dummy in the Tohoku area, which takes 
a value of unity if the bank concerned operates in the Tohoku area ( 7h = ), the 
regional dummy in the Kinki area ( 8h = ), the regional dummy in the Chugoku 
area ( 9h = ), the regional dummy in the Sikoku area ( 10h = ), the regional dummy 
in the Kyusyu area ( 11h = ), the bank dummy in the second-tier regional banks, 
which takes a value of unity if the bank concerned is the member bank of the 
Second Association of Regional Banks ( 12h = ), the bank dummy in the large 
banks, which takes a value of unity if the total financial asset of the bank concerned 
is larger than that of the average bank ( 13h = ), the long-term prime rate ( 14h = ), 
the proportion of loans secured by real estate ( 15h = ), the regional dummy in the 
Kanto area ( 16h = ), the regional dummy in the Sanin area ( 17h = ), the yield on 
government bonds ( 18h = ), the postal savings interest rate of ordinary savings 
( 19h = ), the TOPIX ( 20h = ), the regional dummy in the Hokuriku area ( 21h = ), 
the postal savings interest rate of postal savings certificates ( 22h = ), the regional 
dummy in the Hokkaido area ( 23h = ), the regional dummy in the Koshinetsu area 
( 24h = ), the regional dummy in the Tokai area ( 25h = ), the proportion of loans 
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for real estate business ( 26h = ), and the proportion of loans without collateral and 
without warranty ( 27h = ). 
   3. The conditional heterosckedascity of the error term is explicitly controlled. The 
autocorrelation is, furthermore, corrected when it is found. When including the 
moving average of the error term in the estimate of the covariance matrix of the 
orthogonality conditions, we use Bartrett’s spectral density kernel proposed by 
Newey and West (1987) in order to guarantee that the estimate of the covariance 
matrix is a positive definite matrix.  
   4. The endogeneity of some variables is taken into account by using different 
instrumental variables for each equation. For the instrumental variables, in addition 
to those used in the estimation of the static variable cost function in the second 
stage (other than the products of the individual bank dummies and the square of the 
normalized time trend, and the products of these dummies and their cube), the 
following variables are used: the products of the individual bank dummies and the 
static cost unneutral efficiency in the previous period, and the products of these 
dummies and the Herfindahl index of loans in the previous period for all equations, 
the inefficiency coefficients of static factor demand functions in the previous period 
for each dynamic cost share equation, the Herfindahl index of loans in the previous 
period for all dynamic cost share equations, the products of the logarithms of the 
factor prices in the current period and the inefficiency coefficients of static factor 
demand functions in the previous period, and the products of the logarithms of their 
factor prices and the Herfindahl index of loans in the previous period for the 
dynamic variable cost function and each dynamic cost share equation, the products 
of the logarithms of the financial goods in the previous period and the static cost 
unneutral efficiency in the previous period, and the products of the logarithms of 
their financial goods and the Herfindahl index of loans in the previous period for 
the dynamic variable cost function. 
5. The estimates of parameters related to the current goods price ( , ,V i tp
∗ ) are calculated 
from the condition of linear homogeneity with respect to factor prices. 
   6. The number of the samples that violate the concavity conditions for factor prices is 
2425 out of 4678 (i.e., the number of all samples), meaning that these samples 
account for 52 percent of all samples. How to decrease these samples is a task for 




Table 4.2.2 Estimation Results for the Dynamic Variable Cost Function (2): 
( ), 1 , 1, ,Si i t L t ta EF HI τ ∗− −  
Parameter Estimate t-statistic p-value 
Yachiyo Bank (The present Kiraboshi Bank) (i=1) 
1a  8.27426 3.35895 0.001 
1
EFa  6.67609 0.875047 0.382 
1
Ta  0.049703 1.21920 0.223 
Hokkaido Bank (i=2) 
2a  9.78652 51.4333 0.000 
2
EFa  2.66339 3.07105 0.002 
2,
HI
La  -0.283551 -6.75097 0.000 
2
Ta  -0.029966 -11.0310 0.000 
Aomori Bank (i=3) 
3a  10.7364 97.0799 0.000 
3
EFa  -2.18011 -6.01758 0.000 
3,
HI
La  0.180320 2.49433 0.013 
3
Ta  -0.00956026 -4.93683 0.000 
Seiwa Bank (i=4) 
Seiwa Bank and Michinoku Bank (i=5) 
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5a  -2.09823 -0.615929 0.538 
5
EFa  -0.470445 -0.666903 0.505 
5,
HI
La  24.5560 3.68373 0.000 
5
Ta  -0.017825 -6.12583 0.000 
Akita Bank (i=6) 
6a  10.3267 69.2256 0.000 
6
EFa  -0.887780 -2.25382 0.024 
6,
HI
La  0.190507 2.26910 0.023 
6
Ta  -0.012789 -5.75479 0.000 
Ugo Bank (i=7) 
7a  9.64044 204.974 0.000 
7
Ta  -0.000184823 -0.068490 0.945 
Hokuto Bank (i=8) 
8a  8.59197 37.6802 0.000 
8
EFa  4.22568 6.20713 0.000 
8
Ta  -0.088667 -8.77920 0.000 
Shonai Bank (i=9) 




EFa  0.133695 0.358604 0.720 
9,
HI
La  0.255728 1.93591 0.053 
9
Ta  -0.00302612 -1.26764 0.205 
Yamagata Bank (i=10) 
10a  11.0069 42.8222 0.000 
10
EFa  -2.59210 -3.79141 0.000 
10,
HI
La  -0.303178 -1.23391 0.217 
10
Ta  -0.00887720 -3.95117 0.000 
Bank of Iwate (i=11) 
11a  11.0536 31.4160 0.000 
11
EFa  -1.03520 -2.53007 0.011 
11,
HI
La  -1.60423 -1.94348 0.052 
11
Ta  -0.00946355 -4.36193 0.000 
Tohoku Bank (i=12) 
12a  8.98087 23.8770 0.000 
12
EFa  -0.494783 -2.64212 0.008 
12,
HI
La  2.11708 2.26441 0.024 
12
Ta  -0.00185580 -0.604081 0.546 
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77 Bank (i=13) 
13a  10.5226 79.5388 0.000 
13
EFa  -1.71714 -2.64912 0.008 
13,
HI
La  0.477123 2.41031 0.016 
13
Ta  -0.026490 -7.21561 0.000 
Toho Bank (i=14) 
14a  10.6434 50.4257 0.000 
14
EFa  -0.194695 -0.302118 0.763 
14,
HI
La  -0.610102 -1.18485 0.236 
14
Ta  -0.00568056 -1.56533 0.118 
Gunma Bank (i=15) 
15a  9.72920 18.0784 0.000 
15
EFa  -0.033699 -0.041723 0.967 
15,
HI
La  1.40500 1.57766 0.115 
15
Ta  0.000360947 0.078670 0.937 
Ashikaga Bank (i=16) 
16a  9.31122 20.9067 0.000 
16





La  2.60130 4.29247 0.000 
16
Ta  0.000929160 0.208710 0.835 
Joyo Bank (i=17) 
17a  11.4820 81.1282 0.000 
17
EFa  -5.72902 -4.93119 0.000 
17,
HI
La  -0.195888 -2.96639 0.003 
17
Ta  -0.013817 -4.42134 0.000 
Kanto Bank (i=18) 
18a  6.52408 3.70988 0.000 
18
EFa  5.67784 1.85139 0.064 
18
Ta  0.027521 1.76995 0.077 
Kanto Tsukuba Bank (i=19) 
19a  10.0765 272.245 0.000 
Tsukuba Bank (i=20) 
20a  10.5461 200.512 0.000 
Musashino Bank (i=21) 
21a  10.6727 63.4237 0.000 
21
EFa  -1.23065 -3.14243 0.002 
21,
HI




Ta  -0.00132887 -0.234288 0.815 
Chiba Bank (i=22) 
22a  10.7952 36.4202 0.000 
22
EFa  0.886929 0.830976 0.406 
22,
HI
La  -0.138476 -0.267010 0.789 
22
Ta  0.011586 2.79899 0.005 
Chiba Kogyo Bank (i=23) 
23a  10.7797 47.4492 0.000 
23
EFa  -1.47670 -5.00034 0.000 
23,
HI
La  -0.270405 -0.541151 0.588 
23
Ta  -0.00986326 -3.16995 0.002 
Tokyo Tomin Bank (i=24) 
24a  10.2646 48.7808 0.000 
24
EFa  -0.182413 -0.297602 0.766 
24,
HI
La  0.032165 0.166958 0.867 
24
Ta  -0.00334711 -0.841177 0.400 
Bank of Yokohama (i=25) 




EFa  -5.66485 -1.46000 0.144 
25,
HI
La  8.54839 3.71889 0.000 
25
Ta  -0.011428 -1.66099 0.097 
Daishi Bank (i=26) 
26a  7.40516 18.0718 0.000 
26
EFa  14.1199 6.41237 0.000 
26,
HI
La  0.442318 1.57292 0.116 
26
Ta  -0.000715858 -0.159268 0.873 
Hokuetsu Bank (i=27) 
27a  10.5920 34.6387 0.000 
27
EFa  -1.22161 -1.82550 0.068 
27,
HI
La  -0.146569 -0.376331 0.707 
27
Ta  -0.016542 -5.08136 0.000 
Yamanashi Chuo Bank (i=28) 
28a  10.1963 86.1668 0.000 
28
EFa  0.320710 0.727462 0.467 
28
Ta  -0.017425 -5.49323 0.000 
Hachijuni Bank (i=29) 
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29a  11.9887 37.2438 0.000 
29
EFa  -0.370926 -0.446203 0.655 
29,
HI
La  -1.57449 -3.72010 0.000 
29
Ta  -0.025448 -7.63828 0.000 
Hokuriku Bank (i=30) 
30a  9.90663 27.4695 0.000 
30
EFa  3.42198 3.45510 0.001 
30,
HI
La  0.228790 0.464989 0.642 
30
Ta  -0.032693 -9.30213 0.000 
Bank of Toyama (i=31) 
31a  9.07523 35.6343 0.000 
31
EFa  0.375085 2.47531 0.013 
31,
HI
La  -0.126709 -0.453830 0.650 
31
Ta  -0.012889 -4.96734 0.000 
Hokkoku Bank (i=32) 
32a  9.97780 56.3169 0.000 
32
EFa  1.73848 2.30710 0.021 
32
Ta  -0.026565 -10.4909 0.000 
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Fukui Bank (i=33) 
33a  9.12753 17.8292 0.000 
33
EFa  3.22280 3.37687 0.001 
33,
HI
La  0.309320 0.492092 0.623 
33
Ta  -0.026344 -9.67415 0.000 
Shizuoka Bank (i=34) 
34a  11.1583 25.0655 0.000 
34
EFa  3.73733 1.14409 0.253 
34,
HI
La  -1.89387 -3.12241 0.002 
34
Ta  -0.020849 -7.78009 0.000 
Suruga Bank (i=35) 
35a  11.2918 17.4549 0.000 
35
EFa  -4.64183 -1.97727 0.048 
35,
HI
La  0.336779 0.537790 0.591 
35
Ta  -0.012254 -2.45644 0.014 
Shimizu Bank (i=36) 
36a  9.78795 43.5301 0.000 
36





La  -0.352691 -0.791049 0.429 
36
Ta  -0.00450362 -2.66864 0.008 
Ogaki Kyoritsu Bank (i=37) 
37a  10.0561 47.8000 0.000 
37
EFa  1.64359 1.74711 0.081 
37,
HI
La  -0.175010 -3.26155 0.001 
37
Ta  0.00610828 1.72120 0.085 
Juroku Bank (i=38) 
38a  13.9166 16.8912 0.000 
38
EFa  -12.9506 -5.60977 0.000 
38,
HI
La  -1.83204 -1.50895 0.131 
38
Ta  -0.016450 -5.11831 0.000 
Juroku Bank (merged with the Gifu Bank) (i=39) 
39a  10.2994 188.899 0.000 
Mie Bank (i=40) 
40a  8.67525 15.4097 0.000 
40
EFa  1.59932 2.90032 0.004 
40,
HI




Ta  0.00620328 2.13917 0.032 
Hyakugo Bank (i=41) 
41a  11.2762 41.1377 0.000 
41
EFa  1.01734 1.67519 0.094 
41,
HI
La  -3.06144 -3.77467 0.000 
41
Ta  -0.00517813 -2.45724 0.014 
Shiga Bank (i=42) 
42a  10.7400 90.0420 0.000 
42
EFa  -1.36100 -1.83646 0.066 
42,
HI
La  -0.125564 -1.65814 0.097 
42
Ta  -0.011800 -5.52301 0.000 
Bank of Kyoto (i=43) 
43a  11.1429 40.9020 0.000 
43
EFa  -3.07378 -1.87131 0.061 
43
Ta  -0.00554470 -1.35271 0.176 
Osaka Bank (i=44) 
44a  11.1428 53.2725 0.000 
44




Ta  -0.017514 -3.97784 0.000 
Kinki Osaka Bank (The present Kansai Mirai Bank) (i=45) 
45a  10.5290 232.653 0.000 
Senshu Bank (i=46) 
46a  9.77877 53.6720 0.000 
46
EFa  -0.183969 -0.460333 0.645 
46,
HI
La  0.326877 1.42691 0.154 
46
Ta  0.00226942 0.906407 0.365 
Ikeda Bank (i=47) 
47a  9.84814 91.7475 0.000 
47
EFa  -0.447452 -1.95313 0.051 
47,
HI
La  0.712329 3.07851 0.002 
47
Ta  -0.00529010 -1.80330 0.071 
Senshu Ikeda Bank (i=48) 
48a  10.3087 219.754 0.000 
Nanto Bank (i=49) 
49a  10.9671 155.805 0.000 
49
EFa  -2.56213 -8.05881 0.000 
49
Ta  -0.00977166 -3.79381 0.000 
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Kiyo Bank (i=50) 
50a  10.6732 116.703 0.000 
50
EFa  0.968982 2.23370 0.026 
50,
HI
La  -0.681112 -5.07966 0.000 
50
Ta  0.000827737 0.310544 0.756 
Kiyo Bank (merged with the Wakayama Bank) (i=51) 
51a  10.1215 228.035 0.000 
51
Ta  0.00803137 2.57402 0.010 
Tajima Bank (i=52) 
52a  10.1421 63.4065 0.000 
52
EFa  -0.867457 -4.32419 0.000 
52,
HI
La  -0.235258 -2.53650 0.011 
52
Ta  0.013416 5.44805 0.000 
Tottori Bank (i=53) 
53a  9.00181 21.8395 0.000 
53
EFa  1.06041 1.56066 0.119 
53
Ta  -0.022795 -4.76045 0.000 
San-in Godo Bank (i=54) 




Ta  -0.035726 -7.69344 0.000 
San-in Godo Bank (merged with the Fuso Bank) (i=55) 
55a  11.7645 52.6574 0.000 
55
EFa  -7.86088 -5.69975 0.000 
55
Ta  -0.000807544 -0.225519 0.822 
Chugoku Bank (i=56) 
56a  10.0127 26.2737 0.000 
56
EFa  10.3366 4.18380 0.000 
56,
HI
La  -0.804581 -1.52015 0.128 
56
Ta  -0.012034 -2.34568 0.019 
Hiroshima Bank (i=57) 
57a  11.6978 85.1264 0.000 
57
EFa  -8.04850 -7.53013 0.000 
57,
HI
La  0.046285 0.884866 0.376 
57
Ta  -0.028173 -7.52643 0.000 
Yamaguchi Bank (i=58) 
58a  11.7658 56.8079 0.000 
58





La  -0.329026 -1.24589 0.213 
58
Ta  -0.026780 -8.28041 0.000 
Awa Bank (i=59) 
59a  11.2734 29.9257 0.000 
59
EFa  -0.752814 -3.03319 0.002 
59,
HI
La  -1.70552 -2.42062 0.015 
59
Ta  -0.011680 -5.87258 0.000 
Hyakujushi Bank (i=60) 
60a  11.0546 32.2244 0.000 
60
EFa  0.645325 1.33220 0.183 
60,
HI
La  -1.39581 -2.05164 0.040 
60
Ta  -0.00632608 -3.41951 0.001 
Iyo Bank (i=61) 
61a  10.4973 489.866 0.000 
61
Ta  0.0000826738 0.031332 0.975 
Iyo Bank (merged with the Toho Sogo Bank) (i=62) 
62a  7.83897 16.1632 0.000 
62




Ta  0.026101 4.15409 0.000 
Shikoku Bank (i=63) 
63a  10.2740 46.0880 0.000 
63
EFa  -0.631983 -4.40632 0.000 
63,
HI
La  0.256888 0.640820 0.522 
63
Ta  -0.014459 -10.7126 0.000 
Bank of Fukuoka (i=64) 
64a  10.8557 87.5683 0.000 
64
EFa  0.461161 0.402672 0.687 
64,
HI
La  -0.012725 -0.199557 0.842 
64
Ta  -0.00918288 -2.81479 0.005 
Chikuho Bank (i=65) 
65a  8.50233 34.1931 0.000 
65
EFa  0.622761 2.48286 0.013 
65,
HI
La  -0.157253 -1.94653 0.052 
65
Ta  0.00893154 3.63245 0.000 
Bank of Saga (i=66) 




EFa  -0.061313 -0.305044 0.760 
66,
HI
La  -2.54969 -3.00126 0.003 
66
Ta  -0.00156548 -0.848968 0.396 
Eighteenth Bank (i=67) 
67a  10.6051 106.907 0.000 
67
EFa  -1.18190 -3.20167 0.001 
67,
HI
La  -0.182715 -3.30885 0.001 
67
Ta  -0.00624474 -3.73655 0.000 
Shinwa Bank (i=68) 
68a  10.2743 9.04585 0.000 
68
EFa  -0.361874 -0.089372 0.929 
68
Ta  -0.00660161 -0.515815 0.606 
Shinwa Bank (merged with the Kyushu Bank) (i=69) 
69a  10.3998 138.410 0.000 
69
Ta  -0.023764 -4.72867 0.000 
Higo Bank (i=70) 
70a  10.4087 129.713 0.000 
70





La  0.294934 5.98225 0.000 
70
Ta  -0.00610139 -3.05959 0.002 
Oita Bank (i=71) 
71a  11.9409 25.1935 0.000 
71
EFa  -0.288529 -0.882057 0.378 
71,
HI
La  -2.32717 -3.16076 0.002 
71
Ta  -0.014275 -7.30140 0.000 
Miyazaki Bank (i=72) 
72a  11.4725 39.9145 0.000 
72
EFa  0.767917 1.82666 0.068 
72,
HI
La  -2.66283 -5.82518 0.000 
72
Ta  0.00997017 2.83310 0.005 
Kagoshima Bank (i=73) 
73a  10.6724 33.1016 0.000 
73
EFa  -1.47159 -3.44697 0.001 
73,
HI
La  0.053387 0.102025 0.919 
73
Ta  -0.010041 -3.10582 0.002 
Bank of Ryukyu (i=74) 
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74a  9.21520 14.5408 0.000 
74
EFa  -0.706509 -0.936604 0.349 
74,
HI
La  2.69085 1.62191 0.105 
74
Ta  0.00132141 0.924053 0.355 
Bank of Okinawa (i=75) 
75a  9.09138 11.5115 0.000 
75
EFa  -0.831045 -3.73812 0.000 
75,
HI
La  2.85065 1.42467 0.154 
75
Ta  0.00549957 3.34157 0.001 
North Pacific Bank (i=76) 
76a  10.4117 156.408 0.000 
76
EFa  -0.420311 -1.62727 0.104 
76
Ta  -0.034028 -9.10432 0.000 
North Pacific Bank (merged with the Sapporo Bank) (i=77) 
77a  9.88837 141.865 0.000 
Sapporo Bank (i=78) 
78a  9.89447 43.4224 0.000 
78




Ta  -0.043236 -7.01075 0.000 
Syokusan Bank (i=79) 
79a  10.0293 25.0431 0.000 
79
EFa  -0.112016 -0.620558 0.535 
79,
HI
La  -1.15308 -1.04861 0.294 
79
Ta  -0.017021 -7.42174 0.000 
Kirayaka Bank (i=80) 
80a  8.96864 91.2574 0.000 
80
Ta  0.034227 6.34436 0.000 
Kita-Nippon Bank (i=81) 
81a  10.0852 30.4034 0.000 
81
EFa  1.04832 1.97524 0.048 
81,
HI
La  -1.65669 -2.07861 0.038 
81
Ta  -0.022212 -8.82688 0.000 
Tokuyo City Bank (i=82) 
82a  15.4271 15.9308 0.000 
82
EFa  -14.7794 -5.96558 0.000 
82
Ta  0.077683 4.14637 0.000 
Sendai Bank (i=83) 
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83a  8.97752 30.3230 0.000 
83
EFa  0.417385 0.648505 0.517 
83,
HI
La  0.737747 3.90045 0.000 
83
Ta  -0.017980 -4.72159 0.000 
Fukushima Bank (i=84) 
84a  10.1801 48.6838 0.000 
84
EFa  -0.459913 -2.16417 0.030 
84,
HI
La  -0.919029 -1.74691 0.081 
84
Ta  -0.011597 -4.30518 0.000 
Daito Bank (i=85) 
85a  10.2700 41.3321 0.000 
85
EFa  -0.645853 -1.50034 0.134 
85,
HI
La  -1.17916 -2.44756 0.014 
85
Ta  -0.00510076 -1.62326 0.105 
Towa Bank (i=86) 
86a  7.14655 8.29795 0.000 
86
EFa  3.23969 2.94234 0.003 
86,
HI




Ta  0.00677879 1.02873 0.304 
Tochigi Bank (i=87) 
87a  9.95577 92.3160 0.000 
87
EFa  0.378649 1.68761 0.091 
87,
HI
La  -0.097780 -1.04229 0.297 
87
Ta  0.019794 6.12863 0.000 
Keiyo Bank (i=88) 
88a  11.2328 37.9768 0.000 
88
EFa  0.321033 0.769309 0.442 
88,
HI
La  -2.09258 -3.99052 0.000 
88
Ta  0.018021 3.34959 0.001 
Taiheiyo Bank (i=89) 
89a  8.23356 16.6850 0.000 
89
EFa  1.76254 2.82761 0.005 
89
Ta  -0.017062 -1.59570 0.111 
Higashi-Nippon Bank (i=90) 
90a  9.89077 60.6023 0.000 
90





La  -0.661449 -3.14210 0.002 
90
Ta  0.00414144 1.15973 0.246 
Tokyo Sowa Bank (i=91) 
91a  8.59976 17.2024 0.000 
91
EFa  6.62684 3.82232 0.000 
91
Ta  -0.00155269 -0.459683 0.646 
Heiwa Sogo Bank (i=92) 
92a  10.2922 124.205 0.000 
92
Ta  -0.012414 -2.68036 0.007 
Kanagawa Bank (i=93) 
93a  8.80274 6.13885 0.000 
93
EFa  3.87988 3.04578 0.002 
93,
HI
La  -2.06356 -1.37978 0.168 
93
Ta  -0.00627918 -2.70641 0.007 
Niigata Chuo Bank (i=94) 
94a  9.68841 56.5996 0.000 
94
EFa  1.02094 2.13799 0.033 
94
Ta  -0.016345 -3.99467 0.000 
Taiko Bank (i=95) 
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95a  9.30642 68.1769 0.000 
95
EFa  1.01861 3.52053 0.000 
95,
HI
La  0.782235 3.38814 0.001 
95
Ta  -0.015400 -6.06293 0.000 
Nagano Bank (i=96) 
96a  10.1800 21.7498 0.000 
96
EFa  -0.499855 -0.514394 0.607 
96,
HI
La  -0.304884 -0.704905 0.481 
96
Ta  -0.016869 -7.01629 0.000 
First Bank of Toyama (i=97) 
97a  9.71442 47.9084 0.000 
97
EFa  1.43239 6.52691 0.000 
97,
HI
La  -0.622137 -2.15738 0.031 
97
Ta  -0.027781 -11.4762 0.000 
Fukuho Bank (i=98) 
98a  7.19580 11.9545 0.000 
98
EFa  -0.131010 -1.33389 0.182 
98,
HI




Ta  -0.018631 -9.70732 0.000 
Shizuokachuo Bank (i=99) 
99a  10.3580 26.8383 0.000 
99
EFa  -0.142689 -1.51957 0.129 
99,
HI
La  -2.44793 -2.88775 0.004 
99
Ta  -0.00855740 -4.79545 0.000 
Gifu Bank (i=100) 
100a  11.0405 13.6901 0.000 
100
EFa  0.773371 5.00207 0.000 
100,
HI
La  -3.89659 -1.95223 0.051 
100
Ta  -0.016586 -6.01209 0.000 
Aichi Bank (i=101) 
101a  6.74474 4.25413 0.000 
101
EFa  -0.380531 -2.00511 0.045 
101,
HI
La  10.3316 2.23409 0.025 
101
Ta  -0.00746129 -4.43081 0.000 
Bank of Nagoya (i=102) 




EFa  2.01515 4.23031 0.000 
102,
HI
La  -6.62189 -2.16359 0.030 
102
Ta  -0.00818316 -4.56968 0.000 
Chukyo Bank (i=103) 
103a  7.63679 5.97853 0.000 
103
EFa  -0.362914 -0.720706 0.471 
103,
HI
La  7.47078 1.97760 0.048 
103
Ta  -0.021271 -12.4619 0.000 
Daisan Bank (i=104) 
104a  6.35105 12.8305 0.000 
104
EFa  4.02914 2.63217 0.008 
104,
HI
La  7.11653 5.45166 0.000 
104
Ta  0.00212433 0.616907 0.537 
Biwako Bank (i=105) 
105a  3.04908 2.78896 0.005 
105
EFa  28.0182 9.60117 0.000 
105,
HI
La  -4.35043 -9.96251 0.000 
105
Ta  -0.149667 -11.1897 0.000 
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Bank of Kinki (i=106) 
106a  10.1705 28.7417 0.000 
106
EFa  0.482114 0.322274 0.747 
106
Ta  -0.023945 -7.03892 0.000 
Fukutoku Bank (i=107) 
107a  10.4028 50.8427 0.000 
107
EFa  -0.998520 -1.32999 0.184 
107
Ta  -0.016094 -5.23995 0.000 
Kansai Bank (i=108) 
108a  10.0771 72.0845 0.000 
108
EFa  -1.05065 -2.76880 0.006 
108
Ta  -0.014817 -5.29393 0.000 
Kansai Urban Banking Corporation (i=109) 
109a  9.88925 204.787 0.000 
Kansai Urban Banking Corporation (merged with the Biwako Bank) (The present 
Kansai Mirai Bank) (i=110) 
110a  9.72237 116.379 0.000 
Taisho Bank (i=111) 
111a  8.61117 69.7145 0.000 
111




Ta  -0.00565988 -1.68449 0.092 
Hanwa Bank (i=112) 
112a  6.44980 12.5972 0.000 
112
EFa  6.32574 5.76367 0.000 
112
Ta  -0.109774 -7.26087 0.000 
Hyogo Bank (i=113) 
113a  15.1040 6.40958 0.000 
113
EFa  -16.9459 -1.97305 0.048 
113
Ta  0.041849 1.53472 0.125 
Hanshin Bank (i=114) 
114a  9.70979 106.521 0.000 
114
EFa  -0.061939 -0.269702 0.787 
114
Ta  -0.017453 -7.94685 0.000 
Minato Bank (i=115) 
115a  10.2658 232.284 0.000 
115
Ta  -0.00502511 -1.51550 0.130 
Shimane Bank (i=116) 
116a  9.58075 18.2078 0.000 
116





La  -0.574156 -4.58014 0.000 
116
Ta  -0.018274 -3.94898 0.000 
Tomato Bank (i=117) 
117a  8.56788 17.3632 0.000 
117
EFa  -0.095460 -0.148526 0.882 
117,
HI
La  1.37700 3.02200 0.003 
117
Ta  -0.011105 -2.99306 0.003 
Setouchi Bank (i=118) 
118a  13.1886 5.66880 0.000 
118
EFa  -7.69378 -1.52519 0.127 
118
Ta  -0.016426 -2.86856 0.004 
Hiroshima Sogo Bank (i=119) 
119a  9.09308 21.4135 0.000 
119
EFa  3.55458 2.40612 0.016 
119
Ta  -0.022704 -6.92655 0.000 
Momiji Bank (i=120) 
120a  10.6581 215.958 0.000 
120
Ta  -0.046922 -10.3620 0.000 
Saikyo Bank (i=121) 
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121a  11.5986 35.0621 0.000 
121
EFa  -3.31202 -5.30693 0.000 
121,
HI
La  -0.525878 -3.49190 0.000 
121
Ta  -0.012464 -4.37547 0.000 
Tokushima Bank (i=122) 
122a  12.2556 28.5985 0.000 
122
EFa  -0.144964 -0.872798 0.383 
122,
HI
La  -4.45684 -5.74516 0.000 
122
Ta  -0.010592 -5.37644 0.000 
Kagawa Bank (i=123) 
123a  9.92375 28.5903 0.000 
123
EFa  1.37374 3.13241 0.002 
123,
HI
La  -1.01953 -2.02567 0.043 
123
Ta  -0.00243314 -1.23519 0.217 
Ehime Bank (i=124) 
124a  9.67622 87.3610 0.000 
124
EFa  0.860786 2.91924 0.004 
124,
HI




Ta  0.00403859 2.17606 0.030 
Bank of Kochi (i=125) 
125a  9.86393 35.9450 0.000 
125
EFa  -0.321229 -1.58796 0.112 
125,
HI
La  0.163508 0.369129 0.712 
125
Ta  -0.019562 -14.4977 0.000 
Nishi-Nippon Sogo Bank (i=126) 
126a  10.7039 256.175 0.000 
Nishi-Nippon Bank (i=127) 
127a  10.6335 466.317 0.000 
127
Ta  -0.00858539 -3.53339 0.000 
Nishi-Nippon City Bank and Nishi-Nippon City Bank (merged with the Bank of 
Nagasaki) (i=128) 
128a  11.0463 277.506 0.000 
128
Ta  -0.011185 -3.05450 0.002 
Nishi-Nippon City Bank (merged with the Bank of Nagasaki) (i=129) 
Fukuoka City Bank (i=130) 
130a  10.0072 54.6361 0.000 
130
EFa  1.14283 1.57191 0.116 
130
Ta  0.00405087 0.889481 0.374 
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Fukuoka Chuo Bank (i=131) 
131a  6.79294 10.7399 0.000 
131
EFa  3.90722 3.45168 0.001 
131,
HI
La  -0.030553 -0.370699 0.711 
131
Ta  0.014179 4.01031 0.000 
Saga Kyoei Bank (i=132) 
132a  8.76426 148.724 0.000 
Bank of Nagasaki (i=133) 
133a  9.59079 25.4960 0.000 
133
EFa  -1.00728 -1.35187 0.176 
133,
HI
La  -0.257529 -2.41084 0.016 
133
Ta  -0.000834021 -0.244513 0.807 
Kyushu Bank (i=134) 
  134a  10.4258 62.2162 0.000 
134
EFa  -2.02081 -4.99533 0.000 
134
Ta  -0.00528801 -2.63342 0.008 
Kumamoto Bank (i=135) 
135a  9.28792 197.599 0.000 
135
Ta  0.00334305 0.891755 0.373 
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Kumamoto Family Bank (i=136) 
  136a  5.42096 2.50256 0.012 
136
EFa  14.8072 2.06415 0.039 
136
Ta  -0.046524 -3.57207 0.000 
Higo Family Bank (i=137) 
137a  9.52146 169.270 0.000 
137
Ta  -0.022406 -4.38825 0.000 
Howa Bank (i=138) 
138a  12.2979 34.8238 0.000 
138
EFa  -0.089636 -0.382215 0.702 
138,
HI
La  -4.37197 -9.21896 0.000 
138
Ta  -0.011768 -8.36928 0.000 
Miyazaki Taiyo Bank (i=139) 
139a  10.5382 38.5364 0.000 
139
EFa  -0.759105 -2.92234 0.003 
139,
HI
La  -1.60097 -3.43794 0.001 
139
Ta  0.00395929 2.65707 0.008 
Minami-Nippon Bank (i=140) 




EFa  1.27593 5.35614 0.000 
140,
HI
La  1.64344 2.51575 0.012 
140
Ta  -0.030338 -12.2851 0.000 
Okinawa Kaiho Bank (i=141) 
141a  7.02852 7.05290 0.000 
141
EFa  -1.51036 -2.66400 0.008 
141,
HI
La  7.09361 2.69953 0.007 
141
Ta  0.00874724 5.11076 0.000 
Tokyo Star Bank (i=142) 
142a  9.16507 81.4630 0.000 
142
Ta  0.090324 12.1334 0.000 
Saitama Resona Bank (i=143) 
143a  10.5913 90.1020 0.000 
143
Ta  0.015953 1.82978 0.067 
Note: 1. Tables 4.2.1 and 4.2.2 show the results of the simultaneous GMM estimation of 
the dynamic variable cost function explained in Subsection 3.1.2.2, with the 
dynamic cost share equations explained in the same subsection. Table 4.2.1 gives 
the estimates of the parameters other than the coefficients of the individual bank 
dummies in Eq. (3.1.2.2.1a); Table 4.2.2 gives the estimates of the coefficients. 
2. When new banks emerge due to consolidation, we treat the new banks and their 
predecessors as different entities. 
     3. The Seiwa Bank (i=4) is added to the Michinoku Bank (i=5) because of a lack 
of samples. For the same reason, the Nishi-Nippon City Bank (merged with the 
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Table 4.2.3 Estimation Results for Eq. (3.2.1.1) Composing Eq. (3.1.2.1.2) 
Parameter Estimate t-statistic p-value 
Yachiyo Bank (The present Kiraboshi Bank) (i=1) 
1,
DIE
Ka   -5.13231 -310.481 0.000 
1,
DIEE
Ka  0.814188 15.9344 0.000 
1,
DIET
Ka  0.00766961 27.6601 0.000 
Hokkaido Bank (i=2) 
2,
DIE
Ka   -5.02259 -1824.58 0.000 
2,
DIEE
Ka  0.634296 55.2686 0.000 
2, ,
DIEH
K La  -0.054487 -207.625 0.000 
2,
DIET
Ka  -0.00545091 -168.357 0.000 
Aomori Bank (i=3) 
3,
DIE
Ka  -4.80728 -1650.69 0.000 
3,
DIEE
Ka  -0.446522 -42.2705 0.000 
3, ,
DIEH
K La  0.041636 38.2669 0.000 
3,
DIET
Ka  -0.00118695 -69.4969 0.000 
Seiwa Bank (i=4) 
Seiwa Bank and Michinoku Bank (i=5) 
5,
DIE





Ka  -0.025073 -0.904267 0.366 
5, ,
DIEH
K La  4.29800 22.4253 0.000 
5,
DIET
Ka  -0.00297272 -38.2914 0.000 
Akita Bank (i=6) 
6,
DIE
Ka  -4.89786 -995.343 0.000 
6,
DIEE
Ka  -0.147314 -10.9527 0.000 
6, ,
DIEH
K La  0.036231 16.8422 0.000 
6,
DIET
Ka  -0.00187354 -80.6924 0.000 
Ugo Bank (i=7) 
7,
DIE
Ka  -5.02697 -5824.66 0.000 
7,
DIET
Ka  0.000372854 6.71813 0.000 
Hokuto Bank (i=8) 
8,
DIE
Ka  -5.19287 -1803.33 0.000 
8,
DIEE
Ka  0.715851 80.0813 0.000 
8,
DIET
Ka  -0.015139 -113.762 0.000 
Shonai Bank (i=9) 
9,
DIE
Ka  -5.09564 -853.319 0.000 
9,
DIEE





K La  0.047647 24.9128 0.000 
9,
DIET
Ka  0.0000417825 2.39460 0.017 
Yamagata Bank (i=10) 
10,
DIE
Ka  -4.72854 -359.556 0.000 
10,
DIEE
Ka  -0.591278 -15.7460 0.000 
10, ,
DIEH
K La  -0.059935 -25.2578 0.000 
10,
DIET
Ka  -0.00116673 -25.9893 0.000 
Bank of Iwate (i=11) 
11,
DIE
Ka  -4.71737 -643.010 0.000 
11,
DIEE
Ka  -0.148925 -7.46963 0.000 
11, ,
DIEH
K La  -0.433987 -13.7885 0.000 
11,
DIET
Ka  -0.00113617 -38.5837 0.000 
Tohoku Bank (i=12) 
12,
DIE
Ka  -5.11572 -617.253 0.000 
12,
DIEE
Ka  -0.107241 -21.1937 0.000 
12, ,
DIEH
K La  0.340424 19.0244 0.000 
12,
DIET
Ka  0.000432118 7.44278 0.000 





Ka  -4.87013 -1120.15 0.000 
13,
DIEE
Ka  -0.290445 -26.8526 0.000 
13, ,
DIEH
K La  0.111504 25.6921 0.000 
13,
DIET
Ka  -0.00478759 -144.535 0.000 
Toho Bank (i=14) 
14,
DIE
Ka  -4.81883 -1090.33 0.000 
14,
DIEE
Ka  0.051459 3.10423 0.002 
14, ,
DIEH
K La  -0.183072 -16.0284 0.000 
14,
DIET
Ka  -0.0000627233 -0.845818 0.398 
Gunma Bank (i=15) 
15,
DIE
Ka  -4.90832 -303.738 0.000 
15,
DIEE
Ka  -0.061375 -2.58243 0.010 
15, ,
DIEH
K La  0.128646 4.50100 0.000 
15,
DIET
Ka  0.000755321 6.48624 0.000 
Ashikaga Bank (i=16) 
16,
DIE
Ka  -5.06125 -414.587 0.000 
16,
DIEE
Ka  -0.603385 -19.9876 0.000 
16, ,
DIEH





Ka  0.000538082 4.36319 0.000 
Joyo Bank (i=17) 
17,
DIE
Ka  -4.66165 -865.634 0.000 
17,
DIEE
Ka  -1.14817 -24.9644 0.000 
17, ,
DIEH
K La  -0.036921 -13.5148 0.000 
17,
DIET
Ka  -0.00211055 -26.5105 0.000 
Kanto Bank (i=18) 
18,
DIE
Ka  -5.80985 -152.043 0.000 
18,
DIEE
Ka  1.41544 21.3793 0.000 
18,
DIET
Ka  0.00753223 24.2345 0.000 
Kanto Tsukuba Bank (i=19) 
19,
DIE
Ka  -4.93103 -146118.0 0.000 
Tsukuba Bank (i=20) 
20,
DIE
Ka  -4.83647 -13822.5 0.000 
Musashino Bank (i=21) 
21,
DIE
Ka  -4.82419 -707.963 0.000 
21,
DIEE
Ka  -0.248086 -14.4321 0.000 
21, ,
DIEH
K La  0.000147343 0.056077 0.955 
21,
DIET
Ka  0.000375598 1.90196 0.057 
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Chiba Bank (i=22) 
22,
DIE
Ka  -4.77753 -568.784 0.000 
22,
DIEE
Ka  0.198365 5.07229 0.000 
22, ,
DIEH
K La  -0.073007 -5.38500 0.000 
22,
DIET
Ka  0.00303052 24.3272 0.000 
Chiba Kogyo Bank (i=23) 
23,
DIE
Ka  -4.77344 -869.306 0.000 
23,
DIEE
Ka  -0.275487 -38.7783 0.000 
23, ,
DIEH
K La  -0.123142 -8.05765 0.000 
23,
DIET
Ka  -0.00121273 -23.9672 0.000 
Tokyo Tomin Bank (i=24) 
24,
DIE
Ka  -4.87994 -880.674 0.000 
24,
DIEE
Ka  -0.109685 -6.09565 0.000 
24, ,
DIEH
K La  0.00865947 2.29438 0.022 
24,
DIET
Ka  -0.000378560 -3.91936 0.000 
Bank of Yokohama (i=25) 
25,
DIE
Ka  -6.14229 -493.185 0.000 
25,
DIEE





K La  1.57045 111.181 0.000 
25,
DIET
Ka  -0.00139041 -31.7935 0.000 
Daishi Bank (i=26) 
26,
DIE
Ka  -5.47349 -524.366 0.000 
26,
DIEE
Ka  2.77020 51.5055 0.000 
26, ,
DIEH
K La  0.115887 10.9335 0.000 
26,
DIET
Ka  0.000386391 5.16294 0.000 
Hokuetsu Bank (i=27) 
27,
DIE
Ka  -4.82283 -599.927 0.000 
27,
DIEE
Ka  -0.299535 -15.6112 0.000 
27, ,
DIEH
K La  -0.014614 -1.75083 0.080 
27,
DIET
Ka  -0.00274280 -63.0836 0.000 
Yamanashi Chuo Bank (i=28) 
28,
DIE
Ka  -4.91495 -1158.43 0.000 
28,
DIEE
Ka  0.058920 3.86447 0.000 
28,
DIET
Ka  -0.00278386 -78.2100 0.000 
Hachijuni Bank (i=29) 
29,
DIE





Ka  -0.00606025 -0.151695 0.879 
29, ,
DIEH
K La  -0.363017 -47.3052 0.000 
29,
DIET
Ka  -0.00439267 -188.759 0.000 
Hokuriku Bank (i=30) 
30,
DIE
Ka  -4.95648 -1005.41 0.000 
30,
DIEE
Ka  0.670699 21.0167 0.000 
30, ,
DIEH
K La  0.023786 4.87420 0.000 
30,
DIET
Ka  -0.00589446 -89.8855 0.000 
Bank of Toyama (i=31) 
31,
DIE
Ka  -5.12630 -1236.19 0.000 
31,
DIEE
Ka  0.079286 30.1177 0.000 
31, ,
DIEH
K La  -0.038017 -8.54133 0.000 
31,
DIET
Ka  -0.00196545 -56.3119 0.000 
Hokkoku Bank (i=32) 
32,
DIE
Ka  -4.94244 -1353.81 0.000 
32,
DIEE
Ka  0.270470 17.7407 0.000 
32,
DIET
Ka  -0.00453865 -151.938 0.000 





Ka  -5.11313 -292.080 0.000 
33,
DIEE
Ka  0.541515 16.1158 0.000 
33, ,
DIEH
K La  0.078035 2.50286 0.012 
33,
DIET
Ka  -0.00432014 -54.0978 0.000 
Shizuoka Bank (i=34) 
34,
DIE
Ka  -4.69922 -545.047 0.000 
34,
DIEE
Ka  0.866426 23.1962 0.000 
34, ,
DIEH
K La  -0.466625 -32.5542 0.000 
34,
DIET
Ka  -0.00353537 -150.623 0.000 
Suruga Bank (i=35) 
35,
DIE
Ka  -4.63228 -187.399 0.000 
35,
DIEE
Ka  -1.01914 -12.2546 0.000 
35, ,
DIEH
K La  -0.025876 -2.04227 0.041 
35,
DIET
Ka  -0.00152138 -9.29715 0.000 
Shimizu Bank (i=36) 
36,
DIE
Ka  -4.96130 -1696.05 0.000 
36,
DIEE
Ka  0.034853 2.49199 0.013 
36, ,
DIEH





Ka  -0.000213848 -5.55344 0.000 
Ogaki Kyoritsu Bank (i=37) 
37,
DIE
Ka  -4.90865 -654.380 0.000 
37,
DIEE
Ka  0.165396 4.73376 0.000 
37, ,
DIEH
K La  -0.031386 -19.8664 0.000 
37,
DIET
Ka  0.00142118 12.3282 0.000 
Juroku Bank (i=38) 
38,
DIE
Ka  -4.29947 -136.567 0.000 
38,
DIEE
Ka  -2.27652 -25.0495 0.000 
38, ,
DIEH
K La  -0.219087 -4.36818 0.000 
38,
DIET
Ka  -0.00245348 -22.0908 0.000 
Juroku Bank (merged with the Gifu Bank) (i=39) 
39,
DIE
Ka  -4.88649 -173808.0 0.000 
Mie Bank (i=40) 
40,
DIE
Ka  -5.16502 -221.488 0.000 
40,
DIEE
Ka  0.207900 9.25768 0.000 
40, ,
DIEH
K La  0.174628 3.98720 0.000 
40,
DIET
Ka  0.00143555 17.9754 0.000 





Ka  -4.73759 -604.823 0.000 
41,
DIEE
Ka  0.140258 7.41226 0.000 
41, ,
DIEH
K La  -0.478024 -23.1265 0.000 
41,
DIET
Ka  -0.000461421 -15.3056 0.000 
Shiga Bank (i=42) 
42,
DIE
Ka  -4.80618 -710.067 0.000 
42,
DIEE
Ka  -0.272351 -6.27510 0.000 
42, ,
DIEH
K La  -0.027750 -10.2381 0.000 
42,
DIET
Ka  -0.00163610 -36.3277 0.000 
Bank of Kyoto (i=43) 
43,
DIE
Ka  -4.71836 -269.792 0.000 
43,
DIEE
Ka  -0.671755 -6.36414 0.000 
43,
DIET
Ka  -0.000582078 -2.83588 0.005 
Osaka Bank (i=44) 
44,
DIE
Ka  -4.75553 -614.420 0.000 
44,
DIEE
Ka  -0.647661 -22.8582 0.000 
44,
DIET
Ka  -0.00224557 -13.8333 0.000 





Ka  -4.84207 -11367.3 0.000 
Senshu Bank (i=46) 
46,
DIE
Ka  -5.02389 -1783.34 0.000 
46,
DIEE
Ka  0.025152 3.71387 0.000 
46, ,
DIEH
K La  0.065245 33.9824 0.000 
46,
DIET
Ka  0.00118908 55.1146 0.000 
Ikeda Bank (i=47) 
47,
DIE
Ka  -4.99166 -3436.06 0.000 
47,
DIEE
Ka  -0.067094 -16.0409 0.000 
47, ,
DIEH
K La  0.140422 64.1201 0.000 
47,
DIET
Ka  -0.000242661 -5.04068 0.000 
Senshu Ikeda Bank (i=48) 
48,
DIE
Ka  -4.88345 -21035.1 0.000 
Nanto Bank (i=49) 
49,
DIE
Ka  -4.75820 -1132.16 0.000 
49,
DIEE
Ka  -0.538037 -22.1165 0.000 
49,
DIET
Ka  -0.00129233 -43.8674 0.000 
Kiyo Bank (i=50) 
50,
DIE





Ka  0.239424 46.0263 0.000 
50, ,
DIEH
K La  -0.127610 -157.180 0.000 
50,
DIET
Ka  0.000805198 52.5103 0.000 
Kiyo Bank (merged with the Wakayama Bank) (i=51) 
51,
DIE
Ka  -4.92270 -5332.47 0.000 
51,
DIET
Ka  0.00168963 29.6088 0.000 
Tajima Bank (i=52) 
52,
DIE
Ka  -4.94178 -1355.77 0.000 
52,
DIEE
Ka  -0.154477 -37.8660 0.000 
52, ,
DIEH
K La  -0.034456 -12.8190 0.000 
52,
DIET
Ka  0.00302755 52.9283 0.000 
Tottori Bank (i=53) 
53,
DIE
Ka  -5.14050 -456.404 0.000 
53,
DIEE
Ka  0.193704 10.3390 0.000 
53,
DIET
Ka  -0.00368745 -29.3086 0.000 
San-in Godo Bank (i=54) 
54,
DIE
Ka  -4.94500 -10687.0 0.000 
54,
DIET
Ka  -0.00677672 -243.255 0.000 





Ka  -4.59849 -883.245 0.000 
55,
DIEE
Ka  -1.59489 -49.7860 0.000 
55,
DIET
Ka  0.000571671 4.89512 0.000 
Chugoku Bank (i=56) 
56,
DIE
Ka  -4.88713 -591.833 0.000 
56,
DIEE
Ka  1.70282 24.7612 0.000 
56, ,
DIEH
K La  -0.186377 -15.1932 0.000 
56,
DIET
Ka  -0.00239869 -21.3587 0.000 
Hiroshima Bank (i=57) 
57,
DIE
Ka  -4.62892 -1714.87 0.000 
57,
DIEE
Ka  -1.51183 -58.6324 0.000 
57, ,
DIEH
K La  0.011138 10.0219 0.000 
57,
DIET
Ka  -0.00490524 -107.082 0.000 
Yamaguchi Bank (i=58) 
58,
DIE
Ka  -4.63885 -461.187 0.000 
58,
DIEE
Ka  -0.979079 -88.8884 0.000 
58, ,
DIEH
K La  -0.024797 -2.11400 0.035 
58,
DIET
Ka  -0.00464619 -164.573 0.000 
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Awa Bank (i=59) 
59,
DIE
Ka  -4.66046 -514.874 0.000 
59,
DIEE
Ka  -0.173347 -13.1723 0.000 
59, ,
DIEH
K La  -0.397211 -27.3785 0.000 
59,
DIET
Ka  -0.00184577 -38.8439 0.000 
Hyakujushi Bank (i=60) 
60,
DIE
Ka  -4.71124 -335.013 0.000 
60,
DIEE
Ka  0.134181 6.03569 0.000 
60, ,
DIEH
K La  -0.336099 -13.5625 0.000 
60,
DIET
Ka  -0.000651290 -16.7844 0.000 
Iyo Bank (i=61) 
61,
DIE
Ka  -4.86089 -4765.12 0.000 
61,
DIET
Ka  0.000383676 6.22582 0.000 
Iyo Bank (merged with the Toho Sogo Bank) (i=62) 
62,
DIE
Ka  -5.28228 -295.171 0.000 
62,
DIEE
Ka  2.55049 23.9411 0.000 
62,
DIET
Ka  0.00453288 19.4046 0.000 
Shikoku Bank (i=63) 
63,
DIE





Ka  -0.143848 -31.8577 0.000 
63, ,
DIEH
K La  0.157639 12.1686 0.000 
63,
DIET
Ka  -0.00225004 -221.370 0.000 
Bank of Fukuoka (i=64) 
64,
DIE
Ka  -4.79553 -1696.19 0.000 
64,
DIEE
Ka  0.208831 7.69495 0.000 
64, ,
DIEH
K La  -0.00721779 -3.65488 0.000 
64,
DIET
Ka  -0.00100541 -25.3816 0.000 
Chikuho Bank (i=65) 
65,
DIE
Ka  -5.25916 -695.717 0.000 
65,
DIEE
Ka  0.138099 19.0628 0.000 
65, ,
DIEH
K La  -0.031405 -22.9935 0.000 
65,
DIET
Ka  0.00234072 91.6257 0.000 
Bank of Saga (i=66) 
66,
DIE
Ka  -4.47016 -188.579 0.000 
66,
DIEE
Ka  -0.020361 -2.51328 0.012 
66, ,
DIEH
K La  -0.598605 -18.4877 0.000 
66,
DIET
Ka  0.000371501 8.21546 0.000 
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Eighteenth Bank (i=67) 
67,
DIE
Ka  -4.82852 -1975.10 0.000 
67,
DIEE
Ka  -0.263023 -29.0386 0.000 
67, ,
DIEH
K La  -0.031280 -20.2324 0.000 
67,
DIET
Ka  -0.000656334 -22.5198 0.000 
Shinwa Bank (i=68) 
68,
DIE
Ka  -4.98239 -109.719 0.000 
68,
DIEE
Ka  0.221100 1.36103 0.174 
68,
DIET
Ka  0.000329968 0.678054 0.498 
Shinwa Bank (merged with the Kyushu Bank) (i=69) 
69,
DIE
Ka  -4.87085 -9067.72 0.000 
69,
DIET
Ka  -0.00437530 -106.827 0.000 
Higo Bank (i=70) 
70,
DIE
Ka  -4.86738 -1905.69 0.000 
70,
DIEE
Ka  -0.214035 -19.1402 0.000 
70, ,
DIEH
K La  0.057792 52.3370 0.000 
70,
DIET
Ka  -0.000626664 -19.1959 0.000 
Oita Bank (i=71) 
71,
DIE





Ka  -0.044176 -4.35999 0.000 
71, ,
DIEH
K La  -0.463705 -17.3835 0.000 
71,
DIET
Ka  -0.00213961 -85.7598 0.000 
Miyazaki Bank (i=72) 
72,
DIE
Ka  -4.61693 -882.837 0.000 
72,
DIEE
Ka  0.171819 29.6779 0.000 
72, ,
DIEH
K La  -0.610809 -84.3167 0.000 
72,
DIET
Ka  0.00274661 71.5424 0.000 
Kagoshima Bank (i=73) 
73,
DIE
Ka  -4.83299 -504.220 0.000 
73,
DIEE
Ka  -0.330217 -27.7104 0.000 
73, ,
DIEH
K La  0.041013 3.30977 0.001 
73,
DIET
Ka  -0.00155400 -31.2504 0.000 
Bank of Ryukyu (i=74) 
74,
DIE
Ka  -5.04137 -443.832 0.000 
74,
DIEE
Ka  -0.145478 -11.6563 0.000 
74, ,
DIEH
K La  0.361996 11.6025 0.000 
74,
DIET
Ka  0.000889840 56.0421 0.000 
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Bank of Okinawa (i=75) 
75,
DIE
Ka  -5.06092 -413.683 0.000 
75,
DIEE
Ka  -0.163044 -30.2089 0.000 
75, ,
DIEH
K La  0.376212 12.2169 0.000 
75,
DIET
Ka  0.00169872 106.063 0.000 
North Pacific Bank (i=76) 
76,
DIE
Ka  -4.85901 -3312.56 0.000 
76,
DIEE
Ka  -0.142453 -22.2142 0.000 
76,
DIET
Ka  -0.00586751 -239.013 0.000 
North Pacific Bank (merged with the Sapporo Bank) (i=77) 
77,
DIE
Ka  -4.96603 -23514.7 0.000 
Sapporo Bank (i=78) 
78,
DIE
Ka  -4.95052 -756.992 0.000 
78,
DIEE
Ka  0.127867 5.28520 0.000 
78,
DIET
Ka  -0.00729426 -46.8645 0.000 
Syokusan Bank (i=79) 
79,
DIE
Ka  -4.89922 -574.101 0.000 
79,
DIEE
Ka  -0.033546 -12.4169 0.000 
79, ,
DIEH





Ka  -0.00260957 -106.330 0.000 
Kirayaka Bank (i=80) 
80,
DIE
Ka  -5.14394 -3350.40 0.000 
80,
DIET
Ka  0.00662346 74.1122 0.000 
Kita-Nippon Bank (i=81) 
81,
DIE
Ka  -4.89201 -677.194 0.000 
81,
DIEE
Ka  0.122285 6.86953 0.000 
81, ,
DIEH
K La  -0.370172 -20.3678 0.000 
81,
DIET
Ka  -0.00338827 -72.5996 0.000 
Tokuyo City Bank (i=82) 
82,
DIE
Ka  -4.03001 -146.847 0.000 
82,
DIEE
Ka  -2.54274 -36.8237 0.000 
82,
DIET
Ka  0.013110 24.0891 0.000 
Sendai Bank (i=83) 
83,
DIE
Ka  -5.14626 -552.917 0.000 
83,
DIEE
Ka  0.042071 1.96524 0.049 
83, ,
DIEH
K La  0.153999 30.2831 0.000 
83,
DIET
Ka  -0.00283099 -27.0113 0.000 





Ka  -4.91105 -900.563 0.000 
84,
DIEE
Ka  -0.105184 -16.4173 0.000 
84, ,
DIEH
K La  -0.182971 -14.7326 0.000 
84,
DIET
Ka  -0.00145893 -24.1034 0.000 
Daito Bank (i=85) 
85,
DIE
Ka  -4.88639 -928.320 0.000 
85,
DIEE
Ka  -0.171693 -7.64690 0.000 
85, ,
DIEH
K La  -0.225100 -13.7326 0.000 
85,
DIET
Ka  -0.000194658 -4.04514 0.000 
Towa Bank (i=86) 
86,
DIE
Ka  -5.44547 -249.201 0.000 
86,
DIEE
Ka  0.604744 21.0770 0.000 
86, ,
DIEH
K La  0.564648 12.4266 0.000 
86,
DIET
Ka  0.00197243 9.57335 0.000 
Tochigi Bank (i=87) 
87,
DIE
Ka  -4.96627 -1278.80 0.000 
87,
DIEE
Ka  0.074875 6.90999 0.000 
87, ,
DIEH





Ka  0.00447743 42.9578 0.000 
Keiyo Bank (i=88) 
88,
DIE
Ka  -4.69321 -953.290 0.000 
88,
DIEE
Ka  0.059108 5.50508 0.000 
88, ,
DIEH
K La  -0.448909 -40.0172 0.000 
88,
DIET
Ka  0.00414588 37.2131 0.000 
Taiheiyo Bank (i=89) 
89,
DIE
Ka  -5.26762 -613.318 0.000 
89,
DIEE
Ka  0.303384 28.0707 0.000 
89,
DIET
Ka  -0.00218420 -12.7089 0.000 
Higashi-Nippon Bank (i=90) 
90,
DIE
Ka  -4.96408 -1179.13 0.000 
90,
DIEE
Ka  0.159542 10.6252 0.000 
90, ,
DIEH
K La  -0.125992 -23.4395 0.000 
90,
DIET
Ka  0.00120423 11.8727 0.000 
Tokyo Sowa Bank (i=91) 
91,
DIE
Ka  -5.26091 -265.729 0.000 
91,
DIEE





Ka  0.000297879 2.93993 0.003 
Heiwa Sogo Bank (i=92) 
91,
DIE
Ka  -4.90786 -6374.13 0.000 
91,
DIET
Ka  -0.00248651 -47.4641 0.000 
Kanagawa Bank (i=93) 
93,
DIE
Ka  -5.08660 -878.803 0.000 
93,
DIEE
Ka  0.855799 97.3924 0.000 
93, ,
DIEH
K La  -0.564961 -67.2201 0.000 
93,
DIET
Ka  -0.000579413 -65.1080 0.000 
Niigata Chuo Bank (i=94) 
94,
DIE
Ka  -4.99493 -1683.94 0.000 
94,
DIEE
Ka  0.138525 15.5502 0.000 
94,
DIET
Ka  -0.00224458 -41.9028 0.000 
Taiko Bank (i=95) 
95,
DIE
Ka  -5.08448 -870.641 0.000 
95,
DIEE
Ka  0.158880 12.3808 0.000 
95, ,
DIEH
K La  0.172105 19.4553 0.000 
95,
DIET
Ka  -0.00244028 -58.4911 0.000 





Ka  -4.89465 -346.299 0.000 
96,
DIEE
Ka  -0.047741 -1.21140 0.226 
96, ,
DIEH
K La  -0.109782 -16.7078 0.000 
96,
DIET
Ka  -0.00270982 -54.7642 0.000 
First Bank of Toyama (i=97) 
97,
DIE
Ka  -4.99524 -1706.99 0.000 
97,
DIEE
Ka  0.259124 40.3623 0.000 
97, ,
DIEH
K La  -0.132248 -25.6367 0.000 
97,
DIET
Ka  -0.00464314 -95.6575 0.000 
Fukuho Bank (i=98) 
98,
DIE
Ka  -5.50331 -221.140 0.000 
98,
DIEE
Ka  -0.021817 -12.2697 0.000 
98, ,
DIEH
K La  0.665726 19.1974 0.000 
98,
DIET
Ka  -0.00296608 -121.508 0.000 
Shizuokachuo Bank (i=99) 
99,
DIE
Ka  -4.85019 -1234.07 0.000 
99,
DIEE
Ka  -0.023082 -20.5661 0.000 
99, ,
DIEH





Ka  -0.000989628 -71.4324 0.000 
Gifu Bank (i=100) 
100,
DIE
Ka  -4.80876 -453.725 0.000 
100,
DIEE
Ka  0.133687 40.1420 0.000 
100, ,
DIEH
K La  -0.605860 -23.0729 0.000 
100,
DIET
Ka  -0.00264225 -64.3236 0.000 
Aichi Bank (i=101) 
101,
DIE
Ka  -5.52533 -86.1819 0.000 
101,
DIEE
Ka  -0.098973 -25.4175 0.000 
101, ,
DIEH
K La  1.84774 9.96746 0.000 
101,
DIET
Ka  -0.000818324 -34.5464 0.000 
Bank of Nagoya (i=102) 
102,
DIE
Ka  -4.40245 -80.6952 0.000 
102,
DIEE
Ka  0.373301 18.5327 0.000 
102, ,
DIEH
K La  -1.63053 -10.4579 0.000 
102,
DIET
Ka  -0.000948490 -22.3843 0.000 
Chukyo Bank (i=103) 
103,
DIE





Ka  -0.112803 -11.3678 0.000 
103, ,
DIEH
K La  1.26663 7.65224 0.000 
103,
DIET
Ka  -0.00342022 -85.9004 0.000 
Daisan Bank (i=104) 
104,
DIE
Ka  -5.66871 -451.843 0.000 
104,
DIEE
Ka  0.633034 18.6153 0.000 
104, ,
DIEH
K La  1.49712 51.6308 0.000 
104,
DIET
Ka  0.000681984 8.84560 0.000 
Biwako Bank (i=105) 
105,
DIE
Ka  -6.23221 -442.745 0.000 
105,
DIEE
Ka  5.18687 134.463 0.000 
105, ,
DIEH
K La  -0.822999 -215.372 0.000 
105,
DIET
Ka  -0.027170 -159.148 0.000 
Bank of Kinki (i=106) 
106,
DIE
Ka  -4.90196 -1334.64 0.000 
106,
DIEE
Ka  0.00972302 0.624499 0.532 
106,
DIET
Ka  -0.00405742 -120.890 0.000 





Ka  -4.85907 -1434.87 0.000 
107,
DIEE
Ka  -0.259316 -21.6592 0.000 
107,
DIET
Ka  -0.00239939 -46.0821 0.000 
Kansai Bank (i=108) 
108,
DIE
Ka  -4.92825 -2550.95 0.000 
108,
DIEE
Ka  -0.234937 -43.4301 0.000 
108,
DIET
Ka  -0.00210710 -61.2230 0.000 
Kansai Urban Banking Corporation (i=109) 
109,
DIE
Ka  -4.96729 -68163.5 0.000 
Kansai Urban Banking Corporation (merged with the Biwako Bank) (The present 
Kansai Mirai Bank) (i=110) 
110,
DIE
Ka  -4.99779 -15098.9 0.000 
Taisho Bank (i=111) 
111,
DIE
Ka  -5.19826 -96473.8 0.000 
Hanwa Bank (i=112) 
112,
DIE
Ka  -5.68943 -365.807 0.000 
112,
DIEE
Ka  1.32571 39.3219 0.000 
112,
DIET
Ka  -0.021960 -52.8671 0.000 
Hyogo Bank (i=113) 
113,
DIE





Ka  -2.95054 -63.1834 0.000 
113,
DIET
Ka  0.00749712 48.3718 0.000 
Hanshin Bank (i=114) 
114,
DIE
Ka  -5.00422 -2860.42 0.000 
114,
DIEE
Ka  -0.032453 -6.69149 0.000 
114,
DIET
Ka  -0.00271659 -57.3778 0.000 
Minato Bank (i=115) 
115,
DIE
Ka  -4.89796 -6016.70 0.000 
115,
DIET
Ka  -0.000659579 -9.94933 0.000 
Shimane Bank (i=116) 
116,
DIE
Ka  -4.99207 -330.700 0.000 
116,
DIEE
Ka  0.010339 0.300625 0.764 
116, ,
DIEH
K La  -0.109823 -16.6440 0.000 
116,
DIET
Ka  -0.00252436 -21.8477 0.000 
Tomato Bank (i=117) 
117,
DIE
Ka  -5.19739 -237.742 0.000 
117,
DIEE
Ka  -0.069842 -1.95638 0.050 
117, ,
DIEH





Ka  -0.00168373 -13.7152 0.000 
Setouchi Bank (i=118) 
118,
DIE
Ka  -4.06609 -30.5434 0.000 
118,
DIEE
Ka  -2.07571 -7.19178 0.000 
118,
DIET
Ka  -0.00300698 -11.7435 0.000 
Hiroshima Sogo Bank (i=119) 
119,
DIE
Ka  -5.18280 -360.799 0.000 
119,
DIEE
Ka  0.870083 17.5716 0.000 
119,
DIET
Ka  -0.00370122 -47.4856 0.000 
Momiji Bank (i=120) 
120,
DIE
Ka  -4.81997 -13334.3 0.000 
120,
DIET
Ka  -0.00891766 -312.359 0.000 
Saikyo Bank (i=121) 
121,
DIE
Ka  -4.62098 -316.979 0.000 
121,
DIEE
Ka  -0.710259 -24.8881 0.000 
121, ,
DIEH
K La  -0.091036 -15.9017 0.000 
121,
DIET
Ka  -0.00191847 -26.4669 0.000 
Tokushima Bank (i=122) 
122,
DIE





Ka  -0.049837 -5.41078 0.000 
122, ,
DIEH
K La  -0.907401 -41.7673 0.000 
122,
DIET
Ka  -0.00153580 -35.1250 0.000 
Kagawa Bank (i=123) 
123,
DIE
Ka  -4.93796 -346.786 0.000 
123,
DIEE
Ka  0.269424 15.4225 0.000 
123, ,
DIEH
K La  -0.250250 -13.1344 0.000 
123,
DIET
Ka  0.000117297 1.80150 0.072 
Ehime Bank (i=124) 
124,
DIE
Ka  -4.99831 -2033.77 0.000 
124,
DIEE
Ka  0.111526 16.4457 0.000 
124, ,
DIEH
K La  0.00197185 3.34863 0.001 
124,
DIET
Ka  0.00119429 29.5004 0.000 
Bank of Kochi (i=125) 
125,
DIE
Ka  -5.01371 -716.613 0.000 
125,
DIEE
Ka  -0.093023 -15.6979 0.000 
125, ,
DIEH
K La  0.105938 10.3495 0.000 
125,
DIET
Ka  -0.00314590 -190.043 0.000 
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Nishi-Nippon Sogo Bank (i=126) 
126,
DIE
Ka  -4.82565 -21791.3 0.000 
Nishi-Nippon Bank (i=127) 
127,
DIE
Ka  -4.82954 -47656.4 0.000 
127,
DIET
Ka  -0.000858038 -39.1362 0.000 




Ka  -4.74344 -10545.4 0.000 
128,
DIET
Ka  -0.00180930 -52.1799 0.000 
Nishi-Nippon City Bank (merged with the Bank of Nagasaki) (i=129) 
Fukuoka City Bank (i=130) 
130,
DIE
Ka  -4.93591 -791.665 0.000 
130,
DIEE
Ka  0.156599 6.27942 0.000 
130,
DIET
Ka  0.00117314 8.76886 0.000 
Fukuoka Chuo Bank (i=131) 
131,
DIE
Ka  -5.57311 -508.050 0.000 
131,
DIEE
Ka  0.761365 37.7553 0.000 
131, ,
DIEH
K La  -0.010256 -4.40799 0.000 
131,
DIET
Ka  0.00337210 50.7081 0.000 





Ka  -5.12095 -430.930 0.000 
132,
DIEE
Ka  -0.010206 -12.9577 0.000 
132, ,
DIEH
K La  -0.081046 -5.21921 0.000 
132,
DIET
Ka  0.000610867 32.9418 0.000 
Bank of Nagasaki (i=133) 
133,
DIE
Ka  -5.02844 -915.276 0.000 
133,
DIEE
Ka  -0.205027 -18.8585 0.000 
133, ,
DIEH
K La  -0.042504 -19.5231 0.000 
133,
DIET
Ka  0.000346046 4.71279 0.000 
Kyushu Bank (i=134) 
134,
DIE
Ka  -4.85055 -1323.66 0.000 
134,
DIEE
Ka  -0.444274 -48.0857 0.000 
134,
DIET
Ka  -0.000275724 -7.55101 0.000 
Kumamoto Bank (i=135) 
135,
DIE
Ka  -5.09456 -6989.02 0.000 
135,
DIET
Ka  0.00101313 19.0344 0.000 
Kumamoto Family Bank (i=136) 
136,
DIE





Ka  2.47157 33.0599 0.000 
136,
DIET
Ka  -0.00770993 -61.1659 0.000 
Higo Family Bank (i=137) 
137,
DIE
Ka  -5.05107 -5853.84 0.000 
137,
DIET
Ka  -0.00398134 -76.5631 0.000 
Howa Bank (i=138) 
138,
DIE
Ka  -4.50440 -488.797 0.000 
138,
DIEE
Ka  -0.056482 -11.3830 0.000 
138, ,
DIEH
K La  -0.826006 -63.6537 0.000 
138,
DIET
Ka  -0.00148717 -114.156 0.000 
Miyazaki Taiyo Bank (i=139) 
139,
DIE
Ka  -4.80561 -1024.04 0.000 
139,
DIEE
Ka  -0.147845 -30.2910 0.000 
139, ,
DIEH
K La  -0.377340 -55.0022 0.000 
139,
DIET
Ka  0.00138399 59.2971 0.000 
Minami-Nippon Bank (i=140) 
140,
DIE
Ka  -5.26848 -441.338 0.000 
140,
DIEE





K La  0.270878 18.1328 0.000 
140,
DIET
Ka  -0.00487077 -77.4060 0.000 
Okinawa Kaiho Bank (i=141) 
141,
DIE
Ka  -5.45510 -459.825 0.000 
141,
DIEE
Ka  -0.302280 -22.7329 0.000 
141, ,
DIEH
K La  1.19159 37.3097 0.000 
141,
DIET
Ka  0.00225796 192.149 0.000 
Tokyo Star Bank (i=142) 
142,
DIE
Ka  -5.11498 -25578.4 0.000 
142,
DIET
Ka  0.018171 1006.65 0.000 
Saitama Resona Bank (i=143) 
143,
DIE
Ka  -4.83216 -9018.32 0.000 
143,
DIET




Order of MA for 







Value Function 0.134354 
Note: 1. Tables 4.2.3 to 4.2.5 show the results for the GMM estimations of Eqs. (3.2.1.1) 
to (3.2.1.3) composing Eq. (3.1.2.1.2), respectively. 
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2. The details of ( ), , 1 , 1, ,DIE Si K i t L t ta EF HI τ ∗− −  in Eq. (3.1.2.2.2a) are as follows: 
( ), , 1 , 1 , , , 1 , , , 1 ,, ,DIE S DIE DIEE S DIEH DIETi K i t L t t i K i K i t i K L L t i K ta EF HI a a EF a HI aτ τ∗ ∗− − − −= + ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ , i=2, 3, 5, 
6, 9-17, 21-27, 29-31, 33-38, 40-42, 46, 47, 50, 52, 56-60, 63, 64-66, 67, 70-75, 
79, 81, 83-88, 90, 93, 95-105, 116, 117, 121-125, 131-133, 138-141,  
( ), , 1 , 1 , , , 1 ,, ,DIE S DIE DIEE S DIETi K i t L t t i K i K i t i K ta EF HI a a EF aτ τ∗ ∗− − −= + ⋅ + ⋅ , i=1, 8, 18, 28, 32, 43, 44, 
49, 53, 55, 62, 68, 76, 78, 82, 89, 91, 94, 106-108, 112-114, 118, 119, 130, 134, 
136,  
( ), , 1 , 1 , ,, ,DIE S DIE DIETi K i t L t t i K i K ta EF HI a aτ τ∗ ∗− − = + ⋅ , i=7, 51, 54, 61, 69, 80, 92, 115, 120, 
127, 128, 135, 137, 142, 143,  
( ), , 1 , 1 ,, ,DIE S DIEi K i t L t t i Ka EF HI aτ ∗− − = , i=19, 20, 39, 45, 48, 77, 109, 110, 111, 126,  
where , 1
S
i tEF −  is the static cost unneutral efficiency in the previous period, 
, 1L tHI −  is the Herfindahl index of loans (i.e., the sum of the short-term and long-
term loans) in the previous period, and tτ
∗  is the normalized time trend.  
3. This estimation takes into account the conditional heteroskedasticity and 
autocorrelation of the error terms. For instrumental variables, the following 
variables are used: the individual bank dummies, the products of these dummies 
and the estimate of the static cost share of the current goods, the products of these 
dummies and the normalized time trend, the products of these dummies and the 
estimate of the static cost share of the physical capital, the products of these 
dummies, the normalized time trend, and this estimate, the products of these 
dummies and the static cost unneutral efficiency in the previous period, and the 
products of these dummies and the Herfindahl index of loans in the previous 
period. 
4. When new banks emerge due to consolidation, we treat the new banks and their 
predecessors as different entities. 
   5. The Seiwa Bank (i=4) is added to the Michinoku Bank (i=5) because of a lack of 
samples. For the same reason, the Nishi-Nippon City Bank (merged with the Bank 
of Nagasaki) (i=129) is added to the Nishi-Nippon City Bank (i=128). 
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Table 4.2.4 Estimation Results for Eq. (3.2.1.2) Composing Eq. (3.1.2.1.2) 
Parameter Estimate t-statistic p-value 
Yachiyo Bank (The present Kiraboshi Bank) (i=1) 
1,
DIE
Lb  -5.13698 -221.005 0.000 
1,
DIEE
Lb  0.828266 11.5281 0.000 
1,
DIET
Lb  0.00774860 19.5323 0.000 
Hokkaido Bank (i=2) 
2,
DIE
Lb  -5.02678 -646.681 0.000 
2,
DIEE
Lb  0.652243 18.7883 0.000 
2, ,
DIEH
L Lb  -0.054769 -62.1526 0.000 
2,
DIET
Lb  -0.00547755 -80.5588 0.000 
Aomori Bank (i=3) 
3,
DIE
Lb  -4.80573 -545.795 0.000 
3,
DIEE
Lb  -0.455192 -16.0236 0.000 
3, ,
DIEH
L Lb  0.043381 18.2136 0.000 
3,
DIET
Lb  -0.00116795 -33.5823 0.000 
Seiwa Bank (i=4) 
Seiwa Bank and Michinoku Bank (i=5) 
5,
DIE





Lb  -0.072604 -2.04230 0.041 
5, ,
DIEH
L Lb  3.96654 7.24167 0.000 
5,
DIET
Lb  -0.00285477 -25.2463 0.000 
Akita Bank (i=6) 
6,
DIE
Lb  -4.89803 -520.561 0.000 
6,
DIEE
Lb  -0.142742 -5.65483 0.000 
6, ,
DIEH
L Lb  0.033615 7.22467 0.000 
6,
DIET
Lb  -0.00187162 -38.8666 0.000 
Ugo Bank (i=7) 
7,
DIE
Lb  -5.02663 -5456.48 0.000 
7,
DIET
Lb  0.000393377 5.80996 0.000 
Hokuto Bank (i=8) 
8,
DIE
Lb  -5.19097 -947.182 0.000 
8,
DIEE
Lb  0.709670 41.2843 0.000 
8,
DIET
Lb  -0.015037 -57.9755 0.000 
Shonai Bank (i=9) 
9,
DIE
Lb  -5.09668 -494.710 0.000 
9,
DIEE





L Lb  0.047318 18.9177 0.000 
9,
DIET
Lb  0.0000155219 0.359422 0.719 
Yamagata Bank (i=10) 
10,
DIE
Lb  -4.73579 -200.017 0.000 
10,
DIEE
Lb  -0.572438 -8.11899 0.000 
10, ,
DIEH
L Lb  -0.058704 -14.7556 0.000 
10,
DIET
Lb  -0.00113837 -12.2403 0.000 
Bank of Iwate (i=11) 
11,
DIE
Lb  -4.71518 -372.626 0.000 
11,
DIEE
Lb  -0.151593 -6.08125 0.000 
11, ,
DIEH
L Lb  -0.437555 -9.19717 0.000 
11,
DIET
Lb  -0.00116132 -32.1978 0.000 
Tohoku Bank (i=12) 
12,
DIE
Lb  -5.11764 -386.746 0.000 
12,
DIEE
Lb  -0.106471 -14.5616 0.000 
12, ,
DIEH
L Lb  0.344308 12.5268 0.000 
12,
DIET
Lb  0.000414767 5.05487 0.000 





Lb  -4.87290 -684.580 0.000 
13,
DIEE
Lb  -0.297982 -19.2428 0.000 
13, ,
DIEH
L Lb  0.117999 14.0498 0.000 
13,
DIET
Lb  -0.00487893 -54.4937 0.000 
Toho Bank (i=14) 
14,
DIE
Lb  -4.81359 -545.315 0.000 
14,
DIEE
Lb  0.054278 1.42799 0.153 
14, ,
DIEH
L Lb  -0.196066 -10.0508 0.000 
14,
DIET
Lb  -0.0000166662 -0.133742 0.894 
Gunma Bank (i=15) 
15,
DIE
Lb  -4.93630 -200.362 0.000 
15,
DIEE
Lb  -0.064939 -1.95277 0.051 
15, ,
DIEH
L Lb  0.175077 4.22586 0.000 
15,
DIET
Lb  0.000648063 4.27933 0.000 
Ashikaga Bank (i=16) 
16,
DIE
Lb  -5.06758 -363.383 0.000 
16,
DIEE
Lb  -0.584108 -13.1644 0.000 
16, ,
DIEH





Lb  0.000648521 3.87236 0.000 
Joyo Bank (i=17) 
17,
DIE
Lb  -4.66650 -640.182 0.000 
17,
DIEE
Lb  -1.11559 -18.6992 0.000 
17, ,
DIEH
L Lb  -0.035184 -8.81825 0.000 
17,
DIET
Lb  -0.00203597 -14.2700 0.000 
Kanto Bank (i=18) 
18,
DIE
Lb  -5.80109 -110.080 0.000 
18,
DIEE
Lb  1.40060 15.3484 0.000 
18,
DIET
Lb  0.00744803 16.6903 0.000 
Kanto Tsukuba Bank (i=19) 
19,
DIE
Lb  -4.93097 -85308.0 0.000 
Tsukuba Bank (i=20) 
20,
DIE
Lb  -4.83649 -10205.5 0.000 
Musashino Bank (i=21) 
21,
DIE
Lb  -4.82257 -565.095 0.000 
21,
DIEE
Lb  -0.250942 -12.1833 0.000 
21, ,
DIEH
L Lb  -0.000533693 -0.144046 0.885 
21,
DIET
Lb  0.000316237 1.40300 0.161 
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Chiba Bank (i=22) 
22,
DIE
Lb  -4.76796 -355.122 0.000 
22,
DIEE
Lb  0.173955 4.23003 0.000 
22, ,
DIEH
L Lb  -0.088044 -3.13075 0.002 
22,
DIET
Lb  0.00291702 20.3736 0.000 
Chiba Kogyo Bank (i=23) 
23,
DIE
Lb  -4.77608 -354.394 0.000 
23,
DIEE
Lb  -0.283159 -22.0457 0.000 
23, ,
DIEH
L Lb  -0.111707 -3.20776 0.001 
23,
DIET
Lb  -0.00129099 -12.6831 0.000 
Tokyo Tomin Bank (i=24) 
24,
DIE
Lb  -4.88411 -553.237 0.000 
24,
DIEE
Lb  -0.099121 -2.95855 0.003 
24, ,
DIEH
L Lb  0.011541 1.14380 0.253 
24,
DIET
Lb  -0.000346986 -1.92978 0.054 
Bank of Yokohama (i=25) 
25,
DIE
Lb  -6.14380 -403.916 0.000 
25,
DIEE





L Lb  1.57190 92.5473 0.000 
25,
DIET
Lb  -0.00139653 -15.4492 0.000 
Daishi Bank (i=26) 
26,
DIE
Lb  -5.46941 -248.592 0.000 
26,
DIEE
Lb  2.76160 24.9405 0.000 
26, ,
DIEH
L Lb  0.109320 6.67300 0.000 
26,
DIET
Lb  0.000377143 2.82721 0.005 
Hokuetsu Bank (i=27) 
27,
DIE
Lb  -4.82903 -406.453 0.000 
27,
DIEE
Lb  -0.289831 -13.3060 0.000 
27, ,
DIEH
L Lb  -0.00604224 -0.324934 0.745 
27,
DIET
Lb  -0.00278111 -40.0639 0.000 
Yamanashi Chuo Bank (i=28) 
28,
DIE
Lb  -4.91475 -951.332 0.000 
28,
DIEE
Lb  0.058593 3.24337 0.001 
28,
DIET
Lb  -0.00279706 -40.4487 0.000 
Hachijuni Bank (i=29) 
29,
DIE





Lb  -0.079095 -1.47198 0.141 
29, ,
DIEH
L Lb  -0.377664 -25.0729 0.000 
29,
DIET
Lb  -0.00447183 -99.0584 0.000 
Hokuriku Bank (i=30) 
30,
DIE
Lb  -4.95945 -797.474 0.000 
30,
DIEE
Lb  0.662412 17.6175 0.000 
30, ,
DIEH
L Lb  0.029412 2.92779 0.003 
30,
DIET
Lb  -0.00584992 -66.6399 0.000 
Bank of Toyama (i=31) 
31,
DIE
Lb  -5.12372 -853.477 0.000 
31,
DIEE
Lb  0.076658 14.9878 0.000 
31, ,
DIEH
L Lb  -0.039570 -7.79857 0.000 
31,
DIET
Lb  -0.00190245 -22.3611 0.000 
Hokkoku Bank (i=32) 
32,
DIE
Lb  -4.93994 -514.827 0.000 
32,
DIEE
Lb  0.260166 6.40825 0.000 
32,
DIET
Lb  -0.00453045 -78.4586 0.000 





Lb  -5.07167 -158.357 0.000 
33,
DIEE
Lb  0.529440 7.57185 0.000 
33, ,
DIEH
L Lb  0.023788 0.514708 0.607 
33,
DIET
Lb  -0.00434482 -29.3543 0.000 
Shizuoka Bank (i=34) 
34,
DIE
Lb  -4.70600 -311.301 0.000 
34,
DIEE
Lb  0.868338 15.1011 0.000 
34, ,
DIEH
L Lb  -0.451916 -17.8742 0.000 
34,
DIET
Lb  -0.00352002 -84.5996 0.000 
Suruga Bank (i=35) 
35,
DIE
Lb  -4.64556 -149.513 0.000 
35,
DIEE
Lb  -0.992636 -8.69437 0.000 
35, ,
DIEH
L Lb  -0.010896 -0.614091 0.539 
35,
DIET
Lb  -0.00158248 -7.14748 0.000 
Shimizu Bank (i=36) 
36,
DIE
Lb  -4.96203 -803.262 0.000 
36,
DIEE
Lb  0.061064 2.59880 0.009 
36, ,
DIEH





Lb  -0.000281926 -4.71653 0.000 
Ogaki Kyoritsu Bank (i=37) 
37,
DIE
Lb  -4.91354 -389.497 0.000 
37,
DIEE
Lb  0.186597 3.16179 0.002 
37, ,
DIEH
L Lb  -0.031364 -10.5514 0.000 
37,
DIET
Lb  0.00146178 7.52171 0.000 
Juroku Bank (i=38) 
38,
DIE
Lb  -4.26506 -71.0446 0.000 
38,
DIEE
Lb  -2.31804 -18.2176 0.000 
38, ,
DIEH
L Lb  -0.280831 -2.21664 0.027 
38,
DIET
Lb  -0.00241438 -10.9010 0.000 
Juroku Bank (merged with the Gifu Bank) (i=39) 
39,
DIE
Lb  -4.88649 -122645.0 0.000 
Mie Bank (i=40) 
40,
DIE
Lb  -5.19328 -117.042 0.000 
40,
DIEE
Lb  0.212009 7.24540 0.000 
40, ,
DIEH
L Lb  0.243506 2.64206 0.008 
40,
DIET
Lb  0.00143812 13.3421 0.000 





Lb  -4.73228 -467.002 0.000 
41,
DIEE
Lb  0.143348 4.83771 0.000 
41, ,
DIEH
L Lb  -0.493435 -16.6489 0.000 
41,
DIET
Lb  -0.000470590 -8.43349 0.000 
Shiga Bank (i=42) 
42,
DIE
Lb  -4.80555 -457.801 0.000 
42,
DIEE
Lb  -0.274264 -4.56497 0.000 
42, ,
DIEH
L Lb  -0.028011 -10.1773 0.000 
42,
DIET
Lb  -0.00166006 -29.2018 0.000 
Bank of Kyoto (i=43) 
43,
DIE
Lb  -4.71841 -128.017 0.000 
43,
DIEE
Lb  -0.672848 -3.02077 0.003 
43,
DIET
Lb  -0.000576292 -1.30220 0.193 
Osaka Bank (i=44) 
44,
DIE
Lb  -4.74395 -560.956 0.000 
44,
DIEE
Lb  -0.690838 -22.0345 0.000 
44,
DIET
Lb  -0.00251050 -13.3550 0.000 





Lb  -4.84197 -7940.53 0.000 
Senshu Bank (i=46) 
46,
DIE
Lb  -5.01733 -835.527 0.000 
46,
DIEE
Lb  0.00838054 0.613512 0.540 
46, ,
DIEH
L Lb  0.068511 20.4306 0.000 
46,
DIET
Lb  0.00114771 30.2844 0.000 
Ikeda Bank (i=47) 
47,
DIE
Lb  -4.99003 -2894.91 0.000 
47,
DIEE
Lb  -0.071320 -15.3534 0.000 
47, ,
DIEH
L Lb  0.140374 33.8935 0.000 
47,
DIET
Lb  -0.000260279 -4.14045 0.000 
Senshu Ikeda Bank (i=48) 
48,
DIE
Lb  -4.88349 -14410.5 0.000 
Nanto Bank (i=49) 
49,
DIE
Lb  -4.75902 -1002.20 0.000 
49,
DIEE
Lb  -0.532944 -18.8434 0.000 
49,
DIET
Lb  -0.00132483 -24.8112 0.000 
Kiyo Bank (i=50) 
50,
DIE





Lb  0.239379 17.1683 0.000 
50, ,
DIEH
L Lb  -0.128069 -77.6697 0.000 
50,
DIET
Lb  0.000815624 19.1355 0.000 
Kiyo Bank (merged with the Wakayama Bank) (i=51) 
51,
DIE
Lb  -4.92230 -2591.22 0.000 
51,
DIET
Lb  0.00166747 13.9061 0.000 
Tajima Bank (i=52) 
52,
DIE
Lb  -4.94428 -524.711 0.000 
52,
DIEE
Lb  -0.151554 -17.6684 0.000 
52, ,
DIEH
L Lb  -0.033550 -4.81171 0.000 
52,
DIET
Lb  0.00300337 27.0020 0.000 
Tottori Bank (i=53) 
53,
DIE
Lb  -5.13570 -370.857 0.000 
53,
DIEE
Lb  0.185744 8.09921 0.000 
53,
DIET
Lb  -0.00366018 -24.0961 0.000 
San-in Godo Bank (i=54) 
54,
DIE
Lb  -4.94463 -6467.75 0.000 
54,
DIET
Lb  -0.00675677 -132.056 0.000 





Lb  -4.59408 -625.236 0.000 
55,
DIEE
Lb  -1.62117 -36.9604 0.000 
55,
DIET
Lb  0.000631137 4.43079 0.000 
Chugoku Bank (i=56) 
56,
DIE
Lb  -4.89518 -291.118 0.000 
56,
DIEE
Lb  1.64859 12.3737 0.000 
56, ,
DIEH
L Lb  -0.165447 -10.1417 0.000 
56,
DIET
Lb  -0.00248543 -12.4747 0.000 
Hiroshima Bank (i=57) 
57,
DIE
Lb  -4.63438 -699.839 0.000 
57,
DIEE
Lb  -1.47522 -25.5242 0.000 
57, ,
DIEH
L Lb  0.012737 4.47984 0.000 
57,
DIET
Lb  -0.00486394 -49.2621 0.000 
Yamaguchi Bank (i=58) 
58,
DIE
Lb  -4.63180 -255.955 0.000 
58,
DIEE
Lb  -0.986228 -46.9194 0.000 
58, ,
DIEH
L Lb  -0.032586 -1.60709 0.108 
58,
DIET
Lb  -0.00464561 -93.8041 0.000 
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Awa Bank (i=59) 
59,
DIE
Lb  -4.65481 -309.077 0.000 
59,
DIEE
Lb  -0.172013 -9.39521 0.000 
59, ,
DIEH
L Lb  -0.407844 -15.1616 0.000 
59,
DIET
Lb  -0.00186583 -22.6933 0.000 
Hyakujushi Bank (i=60) 
60,
DIE
Lb  -4.71400 -294.935 0.000 
60,
DIEE
Lb  0.132461 4.84673 0.000 
60, ,
DIEH
L Lb  -0.330764 -11.1409 0.000 
60,
DIET
Lb  -0.000647618 -11.7951 0.000 
Iyo Bank (i=61) 
61,
DIE
Lb  -4.86000 -3919.96 0.000 
61,
DIET
Lb  0.000429205 4.28094 0.000 
Iyo Bank (merged with the Toho Sogo Bank) (i=62) 
62,
DIE
Lb  -5.29525 -152.215 0.000 
62,
DIEE
Lb  2.62802 12.6612 0.000 
62,
DIET
Lb  0.00467323 10.3916 0.000 
Shikoku Bank (i=63) 
63,
DIE





Lb  -0.146136 -21.7224 0.000 
63, ,
DIEH
L Lb  0.161443 7.73343 0.000 
63,
DIET
Lb  -0.00225935 -181.297 0.000 
Bank of Fukuoka (i=64) 
64,
DIE
Lb  -4.79627 -771.430 0.000 
64,
DIEE
Lb  0.213494 3.70828 0.000 
64, ,
DIEH
L Lb  -0.00737487 -2.32218 0.020 
64,
DIET
Lb  -0.000978939 -11.1557 0.000 
Chikuho Bank (i=65) 
65,
DIE
Lb  -5.25514 -564.945 0.000 
65,
DIEE
Lb  0.134416 15.0555 0.000 
65, ,
DIEH
L Lb  -0.032384 -15.5694 0.000 
65,
DIET
Lb  0.00233679 46.9723 0.000 
Bank of Saga (i=66) 
66,
DIE
Lb  -4.46377 -66.6775 0.000 
66,
DIEE
Lb  -0.019258 -1.25773 0.208 
66, ,
DIEH
L Lb  -0.607267 -6.60947 0.000 
66,
DIET
Lb  0.000369562 3.29155 0.001 
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Eighteenth Bank (i=67) 
67,
DIE
Lb  -4.82779 -1080.66 0.000 
67,
DIEE
Lb  -0.266450 -15.5068 0.000 
67, ,
DIEH
L Lb  -0.030847 -10.1488 0.000 
67,
DIET
Lb  -0.000671785 -10.8682 0.000 
Shinwa Bank (i=68) 
68,
DIE
Lb  -4.99256 -88.3900 0.000 
68,
DIEE
Lb  0.257308 1.27108 0.204 
68,
DIET
Lb  0.000417284 0.665308 0.506 
Shinwa Bank (merged with the Kyushu Bank) (i=69) 
69,
DIE
Lb  -4.87040 -3582.46 0.000 
69,
DIET
Lb  -0.00440835 -42.6862 0.000 
Higo Bank (i=70) 
70,
DIE
Lb  -4.86812 -1319.36 0.000 
70,
DIEE
Lb  -0.213938 -11.6060 0.000 
70, ,
DIEH
L Lb  0.058930 22.4317 0.000 
70,
DIET
Lb  -0.000675465 -8.69400 0.000 
Oita Bank (i=71) 
71,
DIE





Lb  -0.043797 -2.11017 0.035 
71, ,
DIEH
L Lb  -0.476504 -10.0137 0.000 
71,
DIET
Lb  -0.00213796 -57.6644 0.000 
Miyazaki Bank (i=72) 
72,
DIE
Lb  -4.61720 -549.148 0.000 
72,
DIEE
Lb  0.167523 12.6898 0.000 
72, ,
DIEH
L Lb  -0.608030 -50.8275 0.000 
72,
DIET
Lb  0.00271932 32.7610 0.000 
Kagoshima Bank (i=73) 
73,
DIE
Lb  -4.82039 -367.012 0.000 
73,
DIEE
Lb  -0.342030 -17.6900 0.000 
73, ,
DIEH
L Lb  0.024947 1.49342 0.135 
73,
DIET
Lb  -0.00156385 -19.0051 0.000 
Bank of Ryukyu (i=74) 
74,
DIE
Lb  -5.03743 -299.584 0.000 
74,
DIEE
Lb  -0.159199 -6.31937 0.000 
74, ,
DIEH
L Lb  0.362379 9.39383 0.000 
74,
DIET
Lb  0.000880753 26.3536 0.000 
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Bank of Okinawa (i=75) 
75,
DIE
Lb  -5.05929 -273.558 0.000 
75,
DIEE
Lb  -0.168019 -16.3720 0.000 
75, ,
DIEH
L Lb  0.375960 8.37832 0.000 
75,
DIET
Lb  0.00168503 76.6460 0.000 
North Pacific Bank (i=76) 
76,
DIE
Lb  -4.86115 -1753.86 0.000 
76,
DIEE
Lb  -0.132303 -11.2638 0.000 
76,
DIET
Lb  -0.00588699 -125.719 0.000 
North Pacific Bank (merged with the Sapporo Bank) (i=77) 
77,
DIE
Lb  -4.96597 -16114.7 0.000 
Sapporo Bank (i=78) 
78,
DIE
Lb  -4.95729 -503.748 0.000 
78,
DIEE
Lb  0.153435 4.12033 0.000 
78,
DIET
Lb  -0.00745543 -30.2875 0.000 
Syokusan Bank (i=79) 
79,
DIE
Lb  -4.88439 -219.401 0.000 
79,
DIEE
Lb  -0.034108 -3.77640 0.000 
79, ,
DIEH





Lb  -0.00263813 -53.3177 0.000 
Kirayaka Bank (i=80) 
80,
DIE
Lb  -5.14307 -1833.62 0.000 
80,
DIET
Lb  0.00657854 41.3321 0.000 
Kita-Nippon Bank (i=81) 
81,
DIE
Lb  -4.90048 -463.891 0.000 
81,
DIEE
Lb  0.121495 4.29514 0.000 
81, ,
DIEH
L Lb  -0.347482 -14.4310 0.000 
81,
DIET
Lb  -0.00339840 -42.3772 0.000 
Tokuyo City Bank (i=82) 
82,
DIE
Lb  -4.05013 -98.7343 0.000 
82,
DIEE
Lb  -2.49146 -23.9912 0.000 
82,
DIET
Lb  0.012722 15.9884 0.000 
Sendai Bank (i=83) 
83,
DIE
Lb  -5.15335 -298.266 0.000 
83,
DIEE
Lb  0.060110 1.61862 0.106 
83, ,
DIEH
L Lb  0.155715 17.2545 0.000 
83,
DIET
Lb  -0.00291559 -15.1579 0.000 





Lb  -4.91100 -635.459 0.000 
84,
DIEE
Lb  -0.101898 -9.73394 0.000 
84, ,
DIEH
L Lb  -0.185493 -10.2657 0.000 
84,
DIET
Lb  -0.00149018 -17.7330 0.000 
Daito Bank (i=85) 
85,
DIE
Lb  -4.88743 -641.379 0.000 
85,
DIEE
Lb  -0.161623 -4.84666 0.000 
85, ,
DIEH
L Lb  -0.230819 -10.2046 0.000 
85,
DIET
Lb  -0.000211690 -2.91095 0.004 
Towa Bank (i=86) 
86,
DIE
Lb  -5.41496 -136.660 0.000 
86,
DIEE
Lb  0.643445 11.0486 0.000 
86, ,
DIEH
L Lb  0.497757 5.81154 0.000 
86,
DIET
Lb  0.00226598 5.60959 0.000 
Tochigi Bank (i=87) 
87,
DIE
Lb  -4.96659 -713.665 0.000 
87,
DIEE
Lb  0.075698 3.87623 0.000 
87, ,
DIEH





Lb  0.00450708 22.5111 0.000 
Keiyo Bank (i=88) 
88,
DIE
Lb  -4.69449 -379.451 0.000 
88,
DIEE
Lb  0.041534 2.02683 0.043 
88, ,
DIEH
L Lb  -0.436998 -13.7976 0.000 
88,
DIET
Lb  0.00395147 19.2386 0.000 
Taiheiyo Bank (i=89) 
89,
DIE
Lb  -5.27000 -473.867 0.000 
89,
DIEE
Lb  0.306479 22.1185 0.000 
89,
DIET
Lb  -0.00221625 -9.78738 0.000 
Higashi-Nippon Bank (i=90) 
90,
DIE
Lb  -4.96649 -794.423 0.000 
90,
DIEE
Lb  0.165206 5.51329 0.000 
90, ,
DIEH
L Lb  -0.124594 -7.90875 0.000 
90,
DIET
Lb  0.00124418 5.94214 0.000 
Tokyo Sowa Bank (i=91) 
91,
DIE
Lb  -5.26759 -171.557 0.000 
91,
DIEE





Lb  0.000292905 2.41045 0.016 
Heiwa Sogo Bank (i=92) 
92,
DIE
Lb  -4.90785 -4195.94 0.000 
92,
DIET
Lb  -0.00249284 -32.4911 0.000 
Kanagawa Bank (i=93) 
93,
DIE
Lb  -5.08721 -357.402 0.000 
93,
DIEE
Lb  0.885788 39.5236 0.000 
93, ,
DIEH
L Lb  -0.582224 -24.5660 0.000 
93,
DIET
Lb  -0.000574979 -31.6402 0.000 
Niigata Chuo Bank (i=94) 
94,
DIE
Lb  -4.99714 -1424.06 0.000 
94,
DIEE
Lb  0.145838 13.1656 0.000 
94,
DIET
Lb  -0.00227826 -35.0960 0.000 
Taiko Bank (i=95) 
95,
DIE
Lb  -5.08440 -468.776 0.000 
95,
DIEE
Lb  0.160875 5.96630 0.000 
95, ,
DIEH
L Lb  0.169721 13.7181 0.000 
95,
DIET
Lb  -0.00243924 -40.9577 0.000 





Lb  -4.88737 -230.565 0.000 
96,
DIEE
Lb  -0.055227 -1.04200 0.297 
96, ,
DIEH
L Lb  -0.116157 -8.97753 0.000 
96,
DIET
Lb  -0.00270996 -42.6332 0.000 
First Bank of Toyama (i=97) 
97,
DIE
Lb  -4.99940 -1198.01 0.000 
97,
DIEE
Lb  0.265773 17.7492 0.000 
97, ,
DIEH
L Lb  -0.129500 -18.1164 0.000 
97,
DIET
Lb  -0.00466120 -44.7358 0.000 
Fukuho Bank (i=98) 
98,
DIE
Lb  -5.43327 -157.370 0.000 
98,
DIEE
Lb  -0.028552 -6.55082 0.000 
98, ,
DIEH
L Lb  0.572305 12.1801 0.000 
98,
DIET
Lb  -0.00311404 -60.0117 0.000 
Shizuokachuo Bank (i=99) 
99,
DIE
Lb  -4.85168 -863.590 0.000 
99,
DIEE
Lb  -0.024068 -7.61403 0.000 
99, ,
DIEH





Lb  -0.000985218 -39.4501 0.000 
Gifu Bank (i=100) 
100,
DIE
Lb  -4.81939 -346.846 0.000 
100,
DIEE
Lb  0.135310 40.1349 0.000 
100, ,
DIEH
L Lb  -0.581155 -16.9109 0.000 
100,
DIET
Lb  -0.00268530 -58.3697 0.000 
Aichi Bank (i=101) 
101,
DIE
Lb  -5.47753 -58.0492 0.000 
101,
DIEE
Lb  -0.102969 -17.0924 0.000 
101, ,
DIEH
L Lb  1.71298 6.27005 0.000 
101,
DIET
Lb  -0.000810207 -20.3621 0.000 
Bank of Nagoya (i=102) 
102,
DIE
Lb  -4.35939 -42.2953 0.000 
102,
DIEE
Lb  0.378837 14.7488 0.000 
102, ,
DIEH
L Lb  -1.75867 -5.94788 0.000 
102,
DIET
Lb  -0.000923762 -14.5137 0.000 
Chukyo Bank (i=103) 
103,
DIE





Lb  -0.113330 -9.53511 0.000 
103, ,
DIEH
L Lb  1.27198 4.74936 0.000 
103,
DIET
Lb  -0.00342446 -57.7577 0.000 
Daisan Bank (i=104) 
104,
DIE
Lb  -5.67157 -248.698 0.000 
104,
DIEE
Lb  0.598119 14.3224 0.000 
104, ,
DIEH
L Lb  1.52767 25.3935 0.000 
104,
DIET
Lb  0.000608305 6.40566 0.000 
Biwako Bank (i=105) 
105,
DIE
Lb  -6.51785 -81.7760 0.000 
105,
DIEE
Lb  5.95912 27.0849 0.000 
105, ,
DIEH
L Lb  -0.774506 -55.1602 0.000 
105,
DIET
Lb  -0.030751 -30.2159 0.000 
Bank of Kinki (i=106) 
106,
DIE
Lb  -4.90423 -1302.14 0.000 
106,
DIEE
Lb  0.021712 1.35504 0.175 
106,
DIET
Lb  -0.00402895 -84.9595 0.000 





Lb  -4.85665 -975.701 0.000 
107,
DIEE
Lb  -0.267683 -15.0484 0.000 
107,
DIET
Lb  -0.00236756 -35.4627 0.000 
Kansai Bank (i=108) 
108,
DIE
Lb  -4.92892 -1074.98 0.000 
108,
DIEE
Lb  -0.232617 -19.0048 0.000 
108,
DIET
Lb  -0.00211727 -44.9719 0.000 
Kansai Urban Banking Corporation (i=109) 
109,
DIE
Lb  -4.96721 -36269.0 0.000 
Kansai Urban Banking Corporation (merged with the Biwako Bank) (The present 
Kansai Mirai Bank) (i=110) 
110,
DIE
Lb  -4.99782 -10520.7 0.000 
Taisho Bank (i=111) 
111,
DIE
Lb  -5.19835 -78668.9 0.000 
Hanwa Bank (i=112) 
112,
DIE
Lb  -5.69190 -358.031 0.000 
112,
DIEE
Lb  1.33105 38.9537 0.000 
112,
DIET
Lb  -0.022029 -50.8630 0.000 
Hyogo Bank (i=113) 
113,
DIE





Lb  -2.95487 -30.2740 0.000 
113,
DIET
Lb  0.00752938 20.4885 0.000 
Hanshin Bank (i=114) 
114,
DIE
Lb  -5.00232 -600.046 0.000 
114,
DIEE
Lb  -0.036489 -1.57932 0.114 
114,
DIET
Lb  -0.00270069 -30.8789 0.000 
Minato Bank (i=115) 
115,
DIE
Lb  -4.89866 -6358.41 0.000 
115,
DIET
Lb  -0.000623022 -8.77885 0.000 
Shimane Bank (i=116) 
116,
DIE
Lb  -4.98920 -293.147 0.000 
116,
DIEE
Lb  -0.00892578 -0.251005 0.802 
116, ,
DIEH
L Lb  -0.103839 -9.39540 0.000 
116,
DIET
Lb  -0.00247523 -19.8965 0.000 
Tomato Bank (i=117) 
117,
DIE
Lb  -5.19299 -137.242 0.000 
117,
DIEE
Lb  -0.075965 -1.30295 0.193 
117, ,
DIEH





Lb  -0.00173037 -7.95150 0.000 
Setouchi Bank (i=118) 
118,
DIE
Lb  -4.19572 -24.9893 0.000 
118,
DIEE
Lb  -1.79476 -4.92607 0.000 
118,
DIET
Lb  -0.00276033 -7.55985 0.000 
Hiroshima Sogo Bank (i=119) 
119,
DIE
Lb  -5.16513 -196.525 0.000 
119,
DIEE
Lb  0.810381 9.10848 0.000 
119,
DIET
Lb  -0.00374776 -43.7112 0.000 
Momiji Bank (i=120) 
120,
DIE
Lb  -4.81955 -5950.91 0.000 
120,
DIET
Lb  -0.00894391 -141.761 0.000 
Saikyo Bank (i=121) 
121,
DIE
Lb  -4.62557 -259.379 0.000 
121,
DIEE
Lb  -0.704958 -21.0551 0.000 
121, ,
DIEH
L Lb  -0.088262 -10.9516 0.000 
121,
DIET
Lb  -0.00191997 -20.2929 0.000 
Tokushima Bank (i=122) 
122,
DIE





Lb  -0.049901 -3.95358 0.000 
122, ,
DIEH
L Lb  -0.904482 -34.2353 0.000 
122,
DIET
Lb  -0.00153114 -25.7377 0.000 
Kagawa Bank (i=123) 
123,
DIE
Lb  -4.93858 -234.725 0.000 
123,
DIEE
Lb  0.288114 11.9933 0.000 
123, ,
DIEH
L Lb  -0.259406 -9.05276 0.000 
123,
DIET
Lb  0.000168846 1.50944 0.131 
Ehime Bank (i=124) 
124,
DIE
Lb  -4.99592 -1200.04 0.000 
124,
DIEE
Lb  0.104209 8.88239 0.000 
124, ,
DIEH
L Lb  0.00161887 1.67935 0.093 
124,
DIET
Lb  0.00115123 15.9940 0.000 
Bank of Kochi (i=125) 
125,
DIE
Lb  -5.01144 -659.899 0.000 
125,
DIEE
Lb  -0.093282 -15.2735 0.000 
125, ,
DIEH
L Lb  0.101936 9.06745 0.000 
125,
DIET
Lb  -0.00313086 -141.229 0.000 
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Nishi-Nippon Sogo Bank (i=126) 
126,
DIE
Lb  -4.82556 -17595.4 0.000 
Nishi-Nippon Bank (i=127) 
127,
DIE
Lb  -4.82957 -39283.2 0.000 
127,
DIET
Lb  -0.000844299 -30.1274 0.000 




Lb  -4.74319 -11533.2 0.000 
128,
DIET
Lb  -0.00182736 -62.4371 0.000 
Nishi-Nippon City Bank (merged with the Bank of Nagasaki) (i=129) 
Fukuoka City Bank (i=130) 
130,
DIE
Lb  -4.94035 -460.852 0.000 
130,
DIEE
Lb  0.174631 3.97800 0.000 
130,
DIET
Lb  0.00125416 4.78945 0.000 
Fukuoka Chuo Bank (i=131) 
131,
DIE
Lb  -5.56801 -302.459 0.000 
131,
DIEE
Lb  0.751376 22.1077 0.000 
131, ,
DIEH
L Lb  -0.00892313 -3.46543 0.001 
131,
DIET
Lb  0.00332911 26.9910 0.000 





Lb  -5.11296 -280.595 0.000 
132,
DIEE
Lb  -0.011234 -9.78147 0.000 
132, ,
DIEH
L Lb  -0.090328 -3.87857 0.000 
132,
DIET
Lb  0.000599811 25.1015 0.000 
Bank of Nagasaki (i=133) 
133,
DIE
Lb  -5.03201 -571.838 0.000 
133,
DIEE
Lb  -0.197873 -11.1849 0.000 
133, ,
DIEH
L Lb  -0.043167 -13.0219 0.000 
133,
DIET
Lb  0.000392177 3.24997 0.001 
Kyushu Bank (i=134) 
134,
DIE
Lb  -4.85153 -692.173 0.000 
134,
DIEE
Lb  -0.441043 -25.2063 0.000 
134,
DIET
Lb  -0.000258707 -5.10573 0.000 
Kumamoto Bank (i=135) 
135,
DIE
Lb  -5.09425 -5268.36 0.000 
135,
DIET
Lb  0.00102290 13.9011 0.000 
Kumamoto Family Bank (i=136) 
136,
DIE





Lb  2.45710 25.8361 0.000 
136,
DIET
Lb  -0.00770244 -49.5003 0.000 
Higo Family Bank (i=137) 
137,
DIE
Lb  -5.04993 -4254.66 0.000 
137,
DIET
Lb  -0.00391025 -48.1069 0.000 
Howa Bank (i=138) 
138,
DIE
Lb  -4.51060 -328.323 0.000 
138,
DIEE
Lb  -0.056255 -7.39427 0.000 
138, ,
DIEH
L Lb  -0.817432 -41.8109 0.000 
138,
DIET
Lb  -0.00149555 -40.3158 0.000 
Miyazaki Taiyo Bank (i=139) 
139,
DIE
Lb  -4.80825 -671.569 0.000 
139,
DIEE
Lb  -0.146429 -11.9378 0.000 
139, ,
DIEH
L Lb  -0.374154 -22.3457 0.000 
139,
DIET
Lb  0.00138115 31.9613 0.000 
Minami-Nippon Bank (i=140) 
140,
DIE
Lb  -5.28637 -277.968 0.000 
140,
DIEE





L Lb  0.291999 11.6878 0.000 
140,
DIET
Lb  -0.00496440 -56.8272 0.000 
Okinawa Kaiho Bank (i=141) 
141,
DIE
Lb  -5.45404 -361.200 0.000 
141,
DIEE
Lb  -0.301316 -20.5658 0.000 
141, ,
DIEH
L Lb  1.18888 31.1418 0.000 
141,
DIET
Lb  0.00227188 127.500 0.000 
Tokyo Star Bank (i=142) 
142,
DIE
Lb  -5.11476 -15763.8 0.000 
142,
DIET
Lb  0.018164 720.872 0.000 
Saitama Resona Bank (i=143) 
143,
DIE
Lb  -4.83194 -5123.53 0.000 
143,
DIET




Order of MA for 







Value Function 0.096840 
Note: 1. Tables 4.2.3 to 4.2.5 show the results for the GMM estimations of Eqs. (3.2.1.1) 
to (3.2.1.3) composing Eq. (3.1.2.1.2), respectively. 
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2. The details of ( ), , 1 , 1, ,DIE Si L i t L t tb EF HI τ ∗− −  in Eqs. (3.1.2.2.2b) and (3.1.2.2.2c) are as 
follows: 
( ), , 1 , 1 , , , 1 , , , 1 ,, ,DIE S DIE DIEE S DIEH DIETi L i t L t t i L i L i t i L L L t i L tb EF HI b b EF b HI bτ τ∗ ∗− − − −= + ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ , i=2, 3, 5, 
6, 9-17, 21-27, 29-31, 33-38, 40-42, 46, 47, 50, 52, 56-60, 63-66, 67, 70-75, 79, 
81, 83-88, 90, 93, 95-105, 116, 117, 121-125, 131-133, 138-141,  
( ), , 1 , 1 , , , 1 ,, ,DIE S DIE DIEE S DIETi L i t L t t i L i L i t i L tb EF HI b b EF bτ τ∗ ∗− − −= + ⋅ + ⋅ , i=1, 8, 18, 28, 32, 43, 44, 
49, 53, 55, 62, 68, 76, 78, 82, 89, 91, 94, 106-108, 112-114, 118, 119, 130, 134, 
136,  
( ), , 1 , 1 , ,, ,DIE S DIE DIETi L i t L t t i L i L tb EF HI b bτ τ∗ ∗− − = + ⋅ , i=7, 51, 54, 61, 69, 80, 92, 115, 120, 
127, 128, 135, 137, 142, 143, 
( ), , 1 , 1 ,, ,DIE S DIEi L i t L t t i Lb EF HI bτ ∗− − = , i=19, 20, 39, 45, 48, 77, 109, 110, 111, 126,  
where , 1
S
i tEF −  is the static cost unneutral efficiency in the previous period, 
, 1L tHI −  is the Herfindahl index of loans (i.e., the sum of the short-term and long-
term loans) in the previous period, and tτ
∗  is the normalized time trend.  
3. This estimation takes into account the conditional heteroskedasticity and 
autocorrelation of the error terms. For instrumental variables, the following 
variables are used: the individual bank dummies, the products of these dummies 
and the estimate of the static cost share of the current goods, the products of these 
dummies and the normalized time trend, the products of these dummies and the 
estimate of the static cost share of the labor, the products of these dummies, the 
normalized time trend, and this estimate, the products of these dummies and the 
static cost unneutral efficiency in the previous period, and the products of these 
dummies and the Herfindahl index of loans in the previous period 
4. When new banks emerge due to consolidation, we treat the new banks and their 
predecessors as different entities. 
   5. The Seiwa Bank (i=4) is added to the Michinoku Bank (i=5) because of a lack of 
samples. For the same reason, the Nishi-Nippon City Bank (merged with the Bank 
of Nagasaki) (i=129) is added to the Nishi-Nippon City Bank (i=128). 
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Table 4.2.5 Estimation Results for Eq. (3.2.1.3) Composing Eq. (3.1.2.1.2) 
Parameter Estimate t-statistic p-value 
Yachiyo Bank (The present Kiraboshi Bank) (i=1) 
1,
DIE
Vb  -5.11449 -171.331 0.000 
1,
DIEE
Vb  0.758644 8.19497 0.000 
1,
DIET
Vb  0.00738140 14.8073 0.000 
Hokkaido Bank (i=2) 
2,
DIE
Vb  -5.02577 -358.075 0.000 
2,
DIEE
Vb  0.648431 10.4370 0.000 
2, ,
DIEH
V Lb  -0.054608 -37.0787 0.000 
2,
DIET
Vb  -0.00548665 -48.8085 0.000 
Aomori Bank (i=3) 
3,
DIE
Vb  -4.81299 -267.733 0.000 
3,
DIEE
Vb  -0.423677 -7.51761 0.000 
3, ,
DIEH
V Lb  0.038786 8.83805 0.000 
3,
DIET
Vb  -0.00122982 -18.1115 0.000 
Seiwa Bank (i=4) 
Seiwa Bank and Michinoku Bank (i=5) 
5,
DIE





Vb  -0.00519632 -0.077753 0.938 
5, ,
DIEH
V Lb  4.29778 4.98549 0.000 
5,
DIET
Vb  -0.00303316 -14.4156 0.000 
Akita Bank (i=6) 
6,
DIE
Vb  -4.90286 -348.596 0.000 
6,
DIEE
Vb  -0.135853 -3.62084 0.000 
6, ,
DIEH
V Lb  0.038705 5.78826 0.000 
6,
DIET
Vb  -0.00185841 -21.3966 0.000 
Ugo Bank (i=7) 
7,
DIE
Vb  -5.02709 -2381.85 0.000 
7,
DIET
Vb  0.000373191 2.20674 0.027 
Hokuto Bank (i=8) 
8,
DIE
Vb  -5.19138 -642.937 0.000 
8,
DIEE
Vb  0.711143 28.3287 0.000 
8,
DIET
Vb  -0.015065 -40.1310 0.000 
Shonai Bank (i=9) 
9,
DIE
Vb  -5.09183 -280.252 0.000 
9,
DIEE





V Lb  0.046666 9.38065 0.000 
9,
DIET
Vb  0.0000333092 0.469011 0.639 
Yamagata Bank (i=10) 
10,
DIE
Vb  -4.74886 -115.374 0.000 
10,
DIEE
Vb  -0.529450 -4.34623 0.000 
10, ,
DIEH
V Lb  -0.061543 -7.35394 0.000 
10,
DIET
Vb  -0.00113642 -6.99094 0.000 
Bank of Iwate (i=11) 
11,
DIE
Vb  -4.72663 -193.611 0.000 
11,
DIEE
Vb  -0.178506 -3.33255 0.001 
11, ,
DIEH
V Lb  -0.388553 -4.05237 0.000 
11,
DIET
Vb  -0.00116333 -13.8559 0.000 
Tohoku Bank (i=12) 
12,
DIE
Vb  -5.11871 -243.817 0.000 
12,
DIEE
Vb  -0.109409 -9.52120 0.000 
12, ,
DIEH
V Lb  0.352775 7.10663 0.000 
12,
DIET
Vb  0.000426714 3.19542 0.001 





Vb  -4.87136 -421.656 0.000 
13,
DIEE
Vb  -0.287884 -10.9233 0.000 
13, ,
DIEH
V Lb  0.112501 8.99820 0.000 
13,
DIET
Vb  -0.00478595 -36.6111 0.000 
Toho Bank (i=14) 
14,
DIE
Vb  -4.82213 -405.303 0.000 
14,
DIEE
Vb  0.065975 1.06423 0.287 
14, ,
DIEH
V Lb  -0.182774 -6.38272 0.000 
14,
DIET
Vb  -0.0000534135 -0.253485 0.800 
Gunma Bank (i=15) 
15,
DIE
Vb  -4.87720 -109.694 0.000 
15,
DIEE
Vb  -0.025868 -0.362967 0.717 
15, ,
DIEH
V Lb  0.070254 0.901366 0.367 
15,
DIET
Vb  0.000991334 3.04398 0.002 
Ashikaga Bank (i=16) 
16,
DIE
Vb  -5.05690 -262.574 0.000 
16,
DIEE
Vb  -.571133 -6.63679 0.000 
16, ,
DIEH





Vb  0.000562673 2.63586 0.008 
Joyo Bank (i=17) 
17,
DIE
Vb  -4.66882 -339.274 0.000 
17,
DIEE
Vb  -1.08169 -8.61031 0.000 
17, ,
DIEH
V Lb  -0.036762 -6.12142 0.000 
17,
DIET
Vb  -0.00197974 -8.82257 0.000 
Kanto Bank (i=18) 
18,
DIE
Vb  -5.79602 -46.1934 0.000 
18,
DIEE
Vb  1.39116 6.40207 0.000 
18,
DIET
Vb  0.00739407 6.94397 0.000 
Kanto Tsukuba Bank (i=19) 
19,
DIE
Vb  -4.93117 -94436.9 0.000 
Tsukuba Bank (i=20) 
20,
DIE
Vb  -4.83645 -7541.04 0.000 
Musashino Bank (i=21) 
21,
DIE
Vb  -4.83648 -323.771 0.000 
21,
DIEE
Vb  -0.218498 -5.45832 0.000 
21, ,
DIEH
V Lb  0.00395853 0.732579 0.464 
21,
DIET
Vb  0.000737497 1.85033 0.064 
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Chiba Bank (i=22) 
22,
DIE
Vb  -4.77630 -205.072 0.000 
22,
DIEE
Vb  0.290853 3.30996 0.001 
22, ,
DIEH
V Lb  -0.092775 -2.07665 0.038 
22,
DIET
Vb  0.00327447 11.8368 0.000 
Chiba Kogyo Bank (i=23) 
23,
DIE
Vb  -4.76036 -262.963 0.000 
23,
DIEE
Vb  -0.262997 -15.0481 0.000 
23, ,
DIEH
V Lb  -0.160151 -3.55717 0.000 
23,
DIET
Vb  -0.00113220 -8.38327 0.000 
Tokyo Tomin Bank (i=24) 
24,
DIE
Vb  -4.87202 -305.625 0.000 
24,
DIEE
Vb  -0.133352 -2.21220 0.027 
24, ,
DIEH
V Lb  0.00680020 0.381602 0.703 
24,
DIET
Vb  -0.000498260 -1.58346 0.113 
Bank of Yokohama (i=25) 
25,
DIE
Vb  -6.14353 -210.069 0.000 
25,
DIEE





V Lb  1.57198 49.4684 0.000 
25,
DIET
Vb  -0.00139593 -7.89936 0.000 
Daishi Bank (i=26) 
26,
DIE
Vb  -5.48276 -108.408 0.000 
26,
DIEE
Vb  2.80121 11.5471 0.000 
26, ,
DIEH
V Lb  0.123560 4.05943 0.000 
26,
DIET
Vb  0.000395764 1.50682 0.132 
Hokuetsu Bank (i=27) 
27,
DIE
Vb  -4.82905 -184.739 0.000 
27,
DIEE
Vb  -0.293130 -6.06805 0.000 
27, ,
DIEH
V Lb  -0.00409599 -0.104543 0.917 
27,
DIET
Vb  -0.00275018 -20.2494 0.000 
Yamanashi Chuo Bank (i=28) 
28,
DIE
Vb  -4.92177 -411.838 0.000 
28,
DIEE
Vb  0.082506 1.92295 0.054 
28,
DIET
Vb  -0.00274751 -20.7696 0.000 
Hachijuni Bank (i=29) 
29,
DIE





Vb  0.026642 0.258462 0.796 
29, ,
DIEH
V Lb  -0.371377 -14.2835 0.000 
29,
DIET
Vb  -0.00437410 -54.9696 0.000 
Hokuriku Bank (i=30) 
30,
DIE
Vb  -4.95053 -386.118 0.000 
30,
DIEE
Vb  0.646447 9.76151 0.000 
30, ,
DIEH
V Lb  0.021485 1.35227 0.176 
30,
DIET
Vb  -0.00584541 -33.0302 0.000 
Bank of Toyama (i=31) 
31,
DIE
Vb  -5.11672 -346.847 0.000 
31,
DIEE
Vb  0.073184 6.26449 0.000 
31, ,
DIEH
V Lb  -0.046235 -3.50982 0.000 
31,
DIET
Vb  -0.00190600 -10.4628 0.000 
Hokkoku Bank (i=32) 
32,
DIE
Vb  -4.93406 -253.219 0.000 
32,
DIEE
Vb  0.233553 2.79935 0.005 
32,
DIET
Vb  -0.00451791 -52.5973 0.000 





Vb  -5.16154 -71.3312 0.000 
33,
DIEE
Vb  0.464955 3.50302 0.000 
33, ,
DIEH
V Lb  0.176205 1.68941 0.091 
33,
DIET
Vb  -0.00418933 -14.8433 0.000 
Shizuoka Bank (i=34) 
34,
DIE
Vb  -4.68642 -158.790 0.000 
34,
DIEE
Vb  0.844538 7.15372 0.000 
34, ,
DIEH
V Lb  -0.489213 -10.1750 0.000 
34,
DIET
Vb  -0.00353002 -43.5262 0.000 
Suruga Bank (i=35) 
35,
DIE
Vb  -4.59615 -68.2046 0.000 
35,
DIEE
Vb  -1.08209 -4.56760 0.000 
35, ,
DIEH
V Lb  -0.071276 -1.81651 0.069 
35,
DIET
Vb  -0.00141890 -3.01326 0.003 
Shimizu Bank (i=36) 
36,
DIE
Vb  -4.94367 -266.807 0.000 
36,
DIEE
Vb  0.014713 0.324092 0.746 
36, ,
DIEH





Vb  -0.000172972 -1.55062 0.121 
Ogaki Kyoritsu Bank (i=37) 
37,
DIE
Vb  -4.90979 -248.416 0.000 
37,
DIEE
Vb  0.170213 1.86990 0.061 
37, ,
DIEH
V Lb  -0.031050 -8.46918 0.000 
37,
DIET
Vb  0.00142410 5.38833 0.000 
Juroku Bank (i=38) 
38,
DIE
Vb  -4.36226 -33.9729 0.000 
38,
DIEE
Vb  -2.27670 -7.70008 0.000 
38, ,
DIEH
V Lb  -0.066269 -0.285280 0.775 
38,
DIET
Vb  -0.00269734 -6.39609 0.000 
Juroku Bank (merged with the Gifu Bank) (i=39) 
39,
DIE
Vb  -4.88649 -97888.7 0.000 
Mie Bank (i=40) 
40,
DIE
Vb  -5.16998 -65.2067 0.000 
40,
DIEE
Vb  0.218248 4.21411 0.000 
40, ,
DIEH
V Lb  0.175922 1.08795 0.277 
40,
DIET
Vb  0.00145765 7.90413 0.000 





Vb  -4.77047 -188.212 0.000 
41,
DIEE
Vb  0.117308 2.17413 0.030 
41, ,
DIEH
V Lb  -0.378356 -6.17505 0.000 
41,
DIET
Vb  -0.000499257 -4.91177 0.000 
Shiga Bank (i=42) 
42,
DIE
Vb  -4.81350 -235.583 0.000 
42,
DIEE
Vb  -0.232472 -1.97546 0.048 
42, ,
DIEH
V Lb  -0.028451 -4.86385 0.000 
42,
DIET
Vb  -0.00165664 -12.4560 0.000 
Bank of Kyoto (i=43) 
43,
DIE
Vb  -4.68111 -86.9432 0.000 
43,
DIEE
Vb  -0.896717 -2.74903 0.006 
43,
DIET
Vb  -0.00104950 -1.59636 0.110 
Osaka Bank (i=44) 
44,
DIE
Vb  -4.76576 -241.439 0.000 
44,
DIEE
Vb  -0.612934 -8.31273 0.000 
44,
DIET
Vb  -0.00214064 -4.86696 0.000 





Vb  -4.84249 -6083.88 0.000 
Senshu Bank (i=46) 
46,
DIE
Vb  -5.02731 -333.434 0.000 
46,
DIEE
Vb  0.030492 0.898155 0.369 
46, ,
DIEH
V Lb  0.069663 9.04206 0.000 
46,
DIET
Vb  0.00114506 12.5757 0.000 
Ikeda Bank (i=47) 
47,
DIE
Vb  -4.99403 -1208.89 0.000 
47,
DIEE
Vb  -0.063244 -5.71364 0.000 
47, ,
DIEH
V Lb  0.144154 17.5159 0.000 
47,
DIET
Vb  -0.000248816 -1.76761 0.077 
Senshu Ikeda Bank (i=48) 
48,
DIE
Vb  -4.88345 -11441.5 0.000 
Nanto Bank (i=49) 
49,
DIE
Vb  -4.76600 -415.872 0.000 
49,
DIEE
Vb  -0.497725 -7.37197 0.000 
49,
DIET
Vb  -0.00126757 -12.2001 0.000 
Kiyo Bank (i=50) 
50,
DIE





Vb  0.249562 8.03030 0.000 
50, ,
DIEH
V Lb  -0.126482 -39.6699 0.000 
50,
DIET
Vb  0.000799515 8.87675 0.000 
Kiyo Bank (merged with the Wakayama Bank) (i=51) 
51,
DIE
Vb  -4.92279 -2408.21 0.000 
51,
DIET
Vb  0.00170058 13.5032 0.000 
Tajima Bank (i=52) 
52,
DIE
Vb  -4.93776 -311.634 0.000 
52,
DIEE
Vb  -0.159149 -10.0419 0.000 
52, ,
DIEH
V Lb  -0.036196 -3.46786 0.001 
52,
DIET
Vb  0.00308546 14.3357 0.000 
Tottori Bank (i=53) 
53,
DIE
Vb  -5.15788 -186.932 0.000 
53,
DIEE
Vb  0.222309 4.84274 0.000 
53,
DIET
Vb  -0.00388932 -11.6285 0.000 
San-in Godo Bank (i=54) 
54,
DIE
Vb  -4.94540 -2570.57 0.000 
54,
DIET
Vb  -0.00680660 -49.3124 0.000 





Vb  -4.59938 -430.975 0.000 
55,
DIEE
Vb  -1.58991 -24.9760 0.000 
55,
DIET
Vb  0.000563394 2.74928 0.006 
Chugoku Bank (i=56) 
56,
DIE
Vb  -4.86384 -153.426 0.000 
56,
DIEE
Vb  1.71643 5.86213 0.000 
56, ,
DIEH
V Lb  -0.220524 -6.99297 0.000 
56,
DIET
Vb  -0.00242544 -5.78158 0.000 
Hiroshima Bank (i=57) 
57,
DIE
Vb  -4.63593 -335.066 0.000 
57,
DIEE
Vb  -1.46020 -12.8151 0.000 
57, ,
DIEH
V Lb  0.012923 3.00215 0.003 
57,
DIET
Vb  -0.00487421 -36.6639 0.000 
Yamaguchi Bank (i=58) 
58,
DIE
Vb  -4.63928 -127.591 0.000 
58,
DIEE
Vb  -0.968362 -20.7462 0.000 
58, ,
DIEH
V Lb  -0.026740 -0.681578 0.496 
58,
DIET
Vb  -0.00468153 -46.2106 0.000 
402 
 
Awa Bank (i=59) 
59,
DIE
Vb  -4.66492 -128.630 0.000 
59,
DIEE
Vb  -0.161760 -3.46566 0.001 
59, ,
DIEH
V Lb  -0.395921 -5.85418 0.000 
59,
DIET
Vb  -0.00180405 -9.53638 0.000 
Hyakujushi Bank (i=60) 
60,
DIE
Vb  -4.75387 -97.3264 0.000 
60,
DIEE
Vb  0.174493 2.58583 0.010 
60, ,
DIEH
V Lb  -0.281274 -3.36765 0.001 
60,
DIET
Vb  -0.000469677 -3.01703 0.003 
Iyo Bank (i=61) 
61,
DIE
Vb  -4.86164 -1859.94 0.000 
61,
DIET
Vb  0.000313363 1.35065 0.177 
Iyo Bank (merged with the Toho Sogo Bank) (i=62) 
62,
DIE
Vb  -5.27717 -151.261 0.000 
62,
DIEE
Vb  2.51995 12.1027 0.000 
62,
DIET
Vb  0.00447769 9.83502 0.000 
Shikoku Bank (i=63) 
63,
DIE





Vb  -0.146077 -12.4373 0.000 
63, ,
DIEH
V Lb  0.164188 3.93337 0.000 
63,
DIET
Vb  -0.00225477 -106.241 0.000 
Bank of Fukuoka (i=64) 
64,
DIE
Vb  -4.79789 -476.121 0.000 
64,
DIEE
Vb  0.233051 2.54504 0.011 
64, ,
DIEH
V Lb  -0.00813213 -1.68799 0.091 
64,
DIET
Vb  -0.000964334 -6.76596 0.000 
Chikuho Bank (i=65) 
65,
DIE
Vb  -5.25870 -383.751 0.000 
65,
DIEE
Vb  0.137663 10.5577 0.000 
65, ,
DIEH
V Lb  -0.031414 -7.99577 0.000 
65,
DIET
Vb  0.00233710 21.5352 0.000 
Bank of Saga (i=66) 
66,
DIE
Vb  -4.45656 -33.7333 0.000 
66,
DIEE
Vb  -0.00939025 -0.283046 0.777 
66, ,
DIEH
V Lb  -0.620894 -3.38906 0.001 
66,
DIET
Vb  0.000399218 1.71188 0.087 
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Eighteenth Bank (i=67) 
67,
DIE
Vb  -4.83019 -661.456 0.000 
67,
DIEE
Vb  -0.259967 -9.63276 0.000 
67, ,
DIEH
V Lb  -0.029192 -5.18630 0.000 
67,
DIET
Vb  -0.000673235 -8.34231 0.000 
Shinwa Bank (i=68) 
68,
DIE
Vb  -4.97800 -44.1164 0.000 
68,
DIEE
Vb  0.204995 0.507119 0.612 
68,
DIET
Vb  0.000259804 0.208868 0.835 
Shinwa Bank (merged with the Kyushu Bank) (i=69) 
69,
DIE
Vb  -4.87080 -3513.20 0.000 
69,
DIET
Vb  -0.00437896 -40.6694 0.000 
Higo Bank (i=70) 
70,
DIE
Vb  -4.86870 -568.462 0.000 
70,
DIEE
Vb  -0.211717 -5.46553 0.000 
70, ,
DIEH
V Lb  0.059140 11.4623 0.000 
70,
DIET
Vb  -0.000617280 -5.34963 0.000 
Oita Bank (i=71) 
71,
DIE





Vb  -0.047601 -1.21668 0.224 
71, ,
DIEH
V Lb  -0.445804 -4.92878 0.000 
71,
DIET
Vb  -0.00215342 -27.6875 0.000 
Miyazaki Bank (i=72) 
72,
DIE
Vb  -4.61996 -363.868 0.000 
72,
DIEE
Vb  0.184877 9.18401 0.000 
72, ,
DIEH
V Lb  -0.613181 -37.6491 0.000 
72,
DIET
Vb  0.00283012 22.3362 0.000 
Kagoshima Bank (i=73) 
73,
DIE
Vb  -4.84482 -249.767 0.000 
73,
DIEE
Vb  -0.318955 -11.8894 0.000 
73, ,
DIEH
V Lb  0.055883 2.34274 0.019 
73,
DIET
Vb  -0.00157451 -15.8754 0.000 
Bank of Ryukyu (i=74) 
74,
DIE
Vb  -5.03502 -188.517 0.000 
74,
DIEE
Vb  -0.144203 -2.99352 0.003 
74, ,
DIEH
V Lb  0.344568 5.11202 0.000 
74,
DIET
Vb  0.000886584 14.6617 0.000 
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Bank of Okinawa (i=75) 
75,
DIE
Vb  -5.05274 -178.048 0.000 
75,
DIEE
Vb  -0.159707 -9.15888 0.000 
75, ,
DIEH
V Lb  0.352309 4.90442 0.000 
75,
DIET
Vb  0.00170444 40.3403 0.000 
North Pacific Bank (i=76) 
76,
DIE
Vb  -4.85745 -889.068 0.000 
76,
DIEE
Vb  -0.152403 -6.49127 0.000 
76,
DIET
Vb  -0.00590748 -59.5373 0.000 
North Pacific Bank (merged with the Sapporo Bank) (i=77) 
77,
DIE
Vb  -4.96597 -13798.1 0.000 
Sapporo Bank (i=78) 
78,
DIE
Vb  -4.94264 -256.751 0.000 
78,
DIEE
Vb  0.096590 1.33325 0.182 
78,
DIET
Vb  -0.00716785 -14.7426 0.000 
Syokusan Bank (i=79) 
79,
DIE
Vb  -4.87491 -118.132 0.000 
79,
DIEE
Vb  -0.024613 -1.43926 0.150 
79, ,
DIEH





Vb  -0.00268346 -32.0381 0.000 
Kirayaka Bank (i=80) 
80,
DIE
Vb  -5.14406 -1426.18 0.000 
80,
DIET
Vb  0.00663424 32.7546 0.000 
Kita-Nippon Bank (i=81) 
81,
DIE
Vb  -4.89246 -262.016 0.000 
81,
DIEE
Vb  0.118877 2.20873 0.027 
81, ,
DIEH
V Lb  -0.366433 -8.80752 0.000 
81,
DIET
Vb  -0.00338395 -22.7129 0.000 
Tokuyo City Bank (i=82) 
82,
DIE
Vb  -4.00714 -74.6682 0.000 
82,
DIEE
Vb  -2.60075 -19.3296 0.000 
82,
DIET
Vb  0.013563 12.5197 0.000 
Sendai Bank (i=83) 
83,
DIE
Vb  -5.13468 -170.877 0.000 
83,
DIEE
Vb  0.010836 0.159240 0.873 
83, ,
DIEH
V Lb  0.152447 10.4986 0.000 
83,
DIET
Vb  -0.00275343 -8.33286 0.000 





Vb  -4.91265 -347.168 0.000 
84,
DIEE
Vb  -0.120287 -6.79949 0.000 
84, ,
DIEH
V Lb  -0.168209 -5.24545 0.000 
84,
DIET
Vb  -0.00148737 -9.08760 0.000 
Daito Bank (i=85) 
85,
DIE
Vb  -4.88738 -321.630 0.000 
85,
DIEE
Vb  -0.195986 -3.02969 0.002 
85, ,
DIEH
V Lb  -0.204285 -4.93841 0.000 
85,
DIET
Vb  -0.000260754 -1.60228 0.109 
Towa Bank (i=86) 
86,
DIE
Vb  -5.43084 -61.8843 0.000 
86,
DIEE
Vb  0.632815 5.01822 0.000 
86, ,
DIEH
V Lb  0.528683 2.79242 0.005 
86,
DIET
Vb  0.00214816 2.44775 0.014 
Tochigi Bank (i=87) 
87,
DIE
Vb  -4.97262 -310.800 0.000 
87,
DIEE
Vb  0.092617 2.13959 0.032 
87, ,
DIEH





Vb  0.00462704 10.7473 0.000 
Keiyo Bank (i=88) 
88,
DIE
Vb  -4.68174 -234.936 0.000 
88,
DIEE
Vb  0.096256 2.65097 0.008 
88, ,
DIEH
V Lb  -0.490924 -10.0769 0.000 
88,
DIET
Vb  0.00446232 12.9707 0.000 
Taiheiyo Bank (i=89) 
89,
DIE
Vb  -5.27535 -120.335 0.000 
89,
DIEE
Vb  0.312564 5.73768 0.000 
89,
DIET
Vb  -0.00239199 -2.70549 0.007 
Higashi-Nippon Bank (i=90) 
90,
DIE
Vb  -4.96565 -387.318 0.000 
90,
DIEE
Vb  0.171096 3.33405 0.001 
90, ,
DIEH
V Lb  -0.134259 -5.35874 0.000 
90,
DIET
Vb  0.00128193 3.39673 0.001 
Tokyo Sowa Bank (i=91) 
91,
DIE
Vb  -5.24750 -66.2078 0.000 
91,
DIEE





Vb  0.000232375 0.747625 0.455 
Heiwa Sogo Bank (i=92) 
92,
DIE
Vb  -4.90764 -1154.06 0.000 
92,
DIET
Vb  -0.00248488 -8.86489 0.000 
Kanagawa Bank (i=93) 
93,
DIE
Vb  -5.06980 -158.136 0.000 
93,
DIEE
Vb  0.848506 18.3940 0.000 
93, ,
DIEH
V Lb  -0.578507 -11.0325 0.000 
93,
DIET
Vb  -0.000586750 -17.5734 0.000 
Niigata Chuo Bank (i=94) 
94,
DIE
Vb  -4.99767 -612.237 0.000 
94,
DIEE
Vb  0.144974 5.62571 0.000 
94,
DIET
Vb  -0.00233428 -15.7506 0.000 
Taiko Bank (i=95) 
95,
DIE
Vb  -5.09040 -281.870 0.000 
95,
DIEE
Vb  0.168269 4.70782 0.000 
95, ,
DIEH
V Lb  0.180828 6.76003 0.000 
95,
DIET
Vb  -0.00246822 -20.8488 0.000 





Vb  -4.90110 -123.032 0.000 
96,
DIEE
Vb  -0.046642 -0.433308 0.665 
96, ,
DIEH
V Lb  -0.102102 -4.16943 0.000 
96,
DIET
Vb  -0.00271432 -20.1630 0.000 
First Bank of Toyama (i=97) 
97,
DIE
Vb  -4.99324 -534.195 0.000 
97,
DIEE
Vb  0.248350 7.84698 0.000 
97, ,
DIEH
V Lb  -0.130250 -7.74321 0.000 
97,
DIET
Vb  -0.00458488 -19.8859 0.000 
Fukuho Bank (i=98) 
98,
DIE
Vb  -5.56977 -53.0771 0.000 
98,
DIEE
Vb  -0.014499 -2.00951 0.044 
98, ,
DIEH
V Lb  0.750817 5.13369 0.000 
98,
DIET
Vb  -0.00272049 -27.8375 0.000 
Shizuokachuo Bank (i=99) 
99,
DIE
Vb  -4.83515 -251.302 0.000 
99,
DIEE
Vb  -0.019093 -2.86025 0.004 
99, ,
DIEH





Vb  -0.000981080 -14.0710 0.000 
Gifu Bank (i=100) 
100,
DIE
Vb  -4.82145 -168.859 0.000 
100,
DIEE
Vb  0.130203 15.5282 0.000 
100, ,
DIEH
V Lb  -0.572531 -7.90156 0.000 
100,
DIET
Vb  -0.00267669 -26.2807 0.000 
Aichi Bank (i=101) 
101,
DIE
Vb  -5.61812 -29.4912 0.000 
101,
DIEE
Vb  -0.091824 -7.16422 0.000 
101, ,
DIEH
V Lb  2.11020 3.84249 0.000 
101,
DIET
Vb  -0.000864569 -8.65884 0.000 
Bank of Nagoya (i=102) 
102,
DIE
Vb  -4.43321 -23.2548 0.000 
102,
DIEE
Vb  0.379187 6.33612 0.000 
102, ,
DIEH
V Lb  -1.54548 -2.82114 0.005 
102,
DIET
Vb  -0.000974051 -6.94376 0.000 
Chukyo Bank (i=103) 
103,
DIE





Vb  -0.117137 -5.97599 0.000 
103, ,
DIEH
V Lb  1.52986 2.85323 0.004 
103,
DIET
Vb  -0.00345925 -30.0865 0.000 
Daisan Bank (i=104) 
104,
DIE
Vb  -5.69277 -126.494 0.000 
104,
DIEE
Vb  0.642615 7.45101 0.000 
104, ,
DIEH
V Lb  1.55388 12.8491 0.000 
104,
DIET
Vb  0.000703862 3.60836 0.000 
Biwako Bank (i=105) 
105,
DIE
Vb  -5.96501 -91.6655 0.000 
105,
DIEE
Vb  4.47978 25.9268 0.000 
105, ,
DIEH
V Lb  -0.876443 -58.8393 0.000 
105,
DIET
Vb  -0.023919 -30.9680 0.000 
Bank of Kinki (i=106) 
106,
DIE
Vb  -4.90362 -673.293 0.000 
106,
DIEE
Vb  0.012776 0.408808 0.683 
106,
DIET
Vb  -0.00412791 -54.9462 0.000 





Vb  -4.86071 -474.756 0.000 
107,
DIEE
Vb  -0.254755 -6.89113 0.000 
107,
DIET
Vb  -0.00242463 -17.6911 0.000 
Kansai Bank (i=108) 
108,
DIE
Vb  -4.92519 -633.538 0.000 
108,
DIEE
Vb  -0.244588 -11.4991 0.000 
108,
DIET
Vb  -0.00212463 -19.8933 0.000 
Kansai Urban Banking Corporation (i=109) 
109,
DIE
Vb  -4.96745 -40720.2 0.000 
Kansai Urban Banking Corporation (merged with the Biwako Bank) (The present 
Kansai Mirai Bank) (i=110) 
110,
DIE
Vb  -4.99775 -8494.66 0.000 
Taisho Bank (i=111) 
111,
DIE
Vb  -5.19831 -29654.5 0.000 
Hanwa Bank (i=112) 
112,
DIE
Vb  -5.68297 -128.621 0.000 
112,
DIEE
Vb  1.31007 13.8781 0.000 
112,
DIET
Vb  -0.021805 -18.0704 0.000 
Hyogo Bank (i=113) 
113,
DIE





Vb  -2.99508 -14.6858 0.000 
113,
DIET
Vb  0.00760551 9.50233 0.000 
Hanshin Bank (i=114) 
114,
DIE
Vb  -5.00668 -265.292 0.000 
114,
DIEE
Vb  -0.027855 -0.528705 0.597 
114,
DIET
Vb  -0.00277837 -16.5355 0.000 
Minato Bank (i=115) 
115,
DIE
Vb  -4.89812 -4329.00 0.000 
115,
DIET
Vb  -0.000645699 -6.90522 0.000 
Shimane Bank (i=116) 
116,
DIE
Vb  -4.99181 -151.817 0.000 
116,
DIEE
Vb  0.013621 0.215820 0.829 
116, ,
DIEH
V Lb  -0.111895 -4.65723 0.000 
116,
DIET
Vb  -0.00253819 -10.7996 0.000 
Tomato Bank (i=117) 
117,
DIE
Vb  -5.19613 -68.9890 0.000 
117,
DIEE
Vb  -0.042176 -0.333258 0.739 
117, ,
DIEH





Vb  -0.00156037 -3.41188 0.001 
Setouchi Bank (i=118) 
118,
DIE
Vb  -4.07422 -9.92791 0.000 
118,
DIEE
Vb  -2.05847 -2.31128 0.021 
118,
DIET
Vb  -0.00304546 -3.57126 0.000 
Hiroshima Sogo Bank (i=119) 
119,
DIE
Vb  -5.20234 -89.3153 0.000 
119,
DIEE
Vb  0.935120 4.76816 0.000 
119,
DIET
Vb  -0.00374916 -18.9816 0.000 
Momiji Bank (i=120) 
120,
DIE
Vb  -4.82032 -4259.51 0.000 
120,
DIET
Vb  -0.00889082 -99.6262 0.000 
Saikyo Bank (i=121) 
121,
DIE
Vb  -4.63236 -102.063 0.000 
121,
DIEE
Vb  -0.692680 -7.98325 0.000 
121, ,
DIEH
V Lb  -0.086825 -6.37821 0.000 
121,
DIET
Vb  -0.00188440 -7.84936 0.000 
Tokushima Bank (i=122) 
122,
DIE





Vb  -0.048575 -1.97076 0.049 
122, ,
DIEH
V Lb  -0.906957 -13.0273 0.000 
122,
DIET
Vb  -0.00152464 -9.75519 0.000 
Kagawa Bank (i=123) 
123,
DIE
Vb  -4.95980 -87.0946 0.000 
123,
DIEE
Vb  0.303721 4.76070 0.000 
123, ,
DIEH
V Lb  -0.233244 -3.06920 0.002 
123,
DIET
Vb  0.000231028 0.776403 0.438 
Ehime Bank (i=124) 
124,
DIE
Vb  -4.99953 -576.398 0.000 
124,
DIEE
Vb  0.115414 4.77415 0.000 
124, ,
DIEH
V Lb  0.00203071 0.993747 0.320 
124,
DIET
Vb  0.00121263 8.35022 0.000 
Bank of Kochi (i=125) 
125,
DIE
Vb  -5.01175 -287.189 0.000 
125,
DIEE
Vb  -0.097036 -7.72936 0.000 
125, ,
DIEH
V Lb  0.104775 4.04636 0.000 
125,
DIET
Vb  -0.00315536 -73.6956 0.000 
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Nishi-Nippon Sogo Bank (i=126) 
126,
DIE
Vb  -4.82549 -6734.91 0.000 
Nishi-Nippon Bank (i=127) 
127,
DIE
Vb  -4.82955 -22996.1 0.000 
127,
DIET
Vb  -0.000848304 -19.0322 0.000 




Vb  -4.74340 -6828.98 0.000 
128,
DIET
Vb  -0.00181388 -36.3131 0.000 
Nishi-Nippon City Bank (merged with the Bank of Nagasaki) (i=129) 
Fukuoka City Bank (i=130) 
130,
DIE
Vb  -4.92911 -303.954 0.000 
130,
DIEE
Vb  0.129177 1.94535 0.052 
130,
DIET
Vb  0.00102288 2.70318 0.007 
Fukuoka Chuo Bank (i=131) 
131,
DIE
Vb  -5.59380 -115.653 0.000 
131,
DIEE
Vb  0.799309 8.86773 0.000 
131, ,
DIEH
V Lb  -0.010184 -1.79389 0.073 
131,
DIET
Vb  0.00346879 11.2152 0.000 





Vb  -5.13184 -190.787 0.000 
132,
DIEE
Vb  -0.012161 -7.44124 0.000 
132, ,
DIEH
V Lb  -0.065727 -1.91188 0.056 
132,
DIET
Vb  0.000594293 13.7832 0.000 
Bank of Nagasaki (i=133) 
133,
DIE
Vb  -5.03274 -248.467 0.000 
133,
DIEE
Vb  -0.197308 -4.71843 0.000 
133, ,
DIEH
V Lb  -0.041736 -5.74073 0.000 
133,
DIET
Vb  0.000391002 1.33703 0.181 
Kyushu Bank (i=134) 
134,
DIE
Vb  -4.84320 -381.874 0.000 
134,
DIEE
Vb  -0.463100 -14.6394 0.000 
134,
DIET
Vb  -0.000273595 -2.55312 0.011 
Kumamoto Bank (i=135) 
135,
DIE
Vb  -5.09474 -2372.37 0.000 
135,
DIET
Vb  0.000986661 6.12847 0.000 
Kumamoto Family Bank (i=136) 
136,
DIE





Vb  2.45264 18.5446 0.000 
136,
DIET
Vb  -0.00766364 -34.2060 0.000 
Higo Family Bank (i=137) 
137,
DIE
Vb  -5.05168 -2465.24 0.000 
137,
DIET
Vb  -0.00401985 -26.8861 0.000 
Howa Bank (i=138) 
138,
DIE
Vb  -4.50073 -226.930 0.000 
138,
DIEE
Vb  -0.052049 -3.40506 0.001 
138, ,
DIEH
V Lb  -0.834464 -28.1718 0.000 
138,
DIET
Vb  -0.00148449 -27.8424 0.000 
Miyazaki Taiyo Bank (i=139) 
139,
DIE
Vb  -4.80826 -377.420 0.000 
139,
DIEE
Vb  -0.140531 -5.94516 0.000 
139, ,
DIEH
V Lb  -0.378271 -11.8491 0.000 
139,
DIET
Vb  0.00139823 15.7674 0.000 
Minami-Nippon Bank (i=140) 
140,
DIE
Vb  -5.28144 -271.455 0.000 
140,
DIEE





V Lb  0.289425 10.7626 0.000 
140,
DIET
Vb  -0.00493655 -54.9734 0.000 
Okinawa Kaiho Bank (i=141) 
141,
DIE
Vb  -5.44959 -217.896 0.000 
141,
DIEE
Vb  -0.298686 -11.5166 0.000 
141, ,
DIEH
V Lb  1.17453 19.9784 0.000 
141,
DIET
Vb  0.00226933 59.8354 0.000 
Tokyo Star Bank (i=142) 
142,
DIE
Vb  -5.11501 -8634.88 0.000 
142,
DIET
Vb  0.018173 425.200 0.000 
Saitama Resona Bank (i=143) 
143,
DIE
Vb  -4.83230 -4365.84 0.000 
143,
DIET




Order of MA for 







Value Function 0.093880 
Note: 1. Tables 4.2.3 to 4.2.5 show the results for the GMM estimations of Eqs. (3.2.1.1) 
to (3.2.1.3) composing Eq. (3.1.2.1.2), respectively. 
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2. The details of ( ), , 1 , 1, ,DIE Si V i t L t tb EF HI τ ∗− −  in Eqs. (3.1.2.2.2b) and (3.1.2.2.2c) are 
as follows: 
( ), , 1 , 1 , , , 1 , , , 1 ,, ,DIE S DIE DIEE S DIEH DIETi V i t L t t i V i V i t i V L L t i V tb EF HI b b EF b HI bτ τ∗ ∗− − − −= + ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ , i=2, 3, 5, 
6, 9-17, 21-27, 29, 30, 33-38, 40-42, 46, 47, 50, 52, 56-60, 63-66, 67, 70-75, 79, 
81, 83-88, 90, 93, 95-98, 100-105, 116, 117, 121-125, 131-133, 138-141, 
( ), , 1 , 1 , , , 1 ,, ,DIE S DIE DIEE S DIETi V i t L t t i V i V i t i V tb EF HI b b EF bτ τ∗ ∗− − −= + ⋅ + ⋅ , i=1, 8, 18, 28, 32, 43, 44, 
49, 53, 55, 62, 68, 76, 78, 82, 89, 91, 94, 99, 106-108, 112-114, 118, 119, 130, 
134, 136, 
( ), , 1 , 1 , ,, ,DIE S DIE DIETi V i t L t t i V i V tb EF HI b bτ τ∗ ∗− − = + ⋅ , i=7, 31, 51, 54, 61, 69, 80, 92, 115, 120, 
127, 128, 135, 137, 142, 143, 
( ), , 1 , 1 ,, ,DIE S DIEi V i t L t t i Vb EF HI bτ ∗− − = , i=19, 20, 39, 45, 48, 77, 109, 110, 111, 126,  
where , 1
S
i tEF −  is the static cost unneutral efficiency in the previous period, 
, 1L tHI −  is the Herfindahl index of loans (i.e., the sum of the short-term and long-
term loans) in the previous period, and tτ
∗  is the normalized time trend. 
3. This estimation takes into account the conditional heteroskedasticity and 
autocorrelation of the error terms. For instrumental variables, the following 
variables are used: the individual bank dummies, the products of these dummies 
and the estimate of the static cost share of the current goods, the products of these 
dummies and the normalized time trend, the products of these dummies and this 
estimate, the products of these dummies, the normalized time trend, and this 
estimate, the products of these dummies and the static cost unneutral efficiency in 
the previous period, and the products of these dummies and the Herfindahl index 
of loans in the previous period. 
4. When new banks emerge due to consolidation, we treat the new banks and their 
predecessors as different entities. 
   5. The Seiwa Bank (i=4) is added to the Michinoku Bank (i=5) because of a lack of 
samples. For the same reason, the Nishi-Nippon City Bank (merged with the Bank 













(Fig. 4.2.1) Dynamic Cost Neutral and Unneutral 
Efficiencies
Dynamic Cost Unneutral Efficiency Dynamic Cost Neutral  Efficiency
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Table 4.3.1 Estimation Results for the Parameters Other Than the Coefficients of the 
Individual Bank Dummies in Eq. (3.1.3.2.13) for Short-Term Loans 
Parameter Estimate t-statistic p-value 
,1SLρ  (1976-1986) 0.382765 6.85787 0.000 
,2SLρ  (1987-1989) 0.577666 11.8464 0.000 
,3SLρ  (1990-1995) 0.551897 12.5087 0.000 
,4SLρ  (1996-2001) 0.497380 10.4551 0.000 
,5SLρ  (2002-2007) 0.424005 5.79806 0.000 
,6SLρ  (2008-2010) 0.461378 5.52383 0.000 
,7SLρ  (2011-2016) 0.524681 6.21624 0.000 
CVE
SLa   299730 2.73299 0.006 
CVH
SLa   -0.120416
710×  -14.0678 0.000 
,1
CVZ




710×  2.04021 0.041 
,3
CVZ
SLa  -160211 -6.38637 0.000 
,4
CVZ







Order of MA for 8 
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Value Function 0.067157 
Note: 1. Tables 4.3.1 and 4.3.2 show the results for the GMM estimation of the conjectural 
derivative parameters in Eq. (3.1.3.2.13) for short-term loans ( j SL= ). Table 
4.3.1 shows the estimates of the parameters other than the coefficients of the 
individual bank dummies; Table 4.3.2 shows the estimates of these coefficients. 
2. The details of Eq. (3.1.3.2.13) for short-term loans ( j SL= ) are as follows: 
7
, , , , , , , 1 , 1
1
CVI B Y CVE S CVH
SL i t i SL i SL s s SL i t SL i t SL SL t
i s
Q a D D q a EF a HIρ− − −
=
 = ⋅ + ⋅ ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ 
 
∑ ∑  
4
, , , , ,
1
CVZ Q CV




+ ⋅ +∑ , 
where ,SL sρ  ( 1, ,7s =  ) are the conjectural derivative parameters in the 1976-
1986 ( 1s = ), 1987-1989 ( 2s = ), 1990-1995 ( 3s = ), 1996-2001 ( 4s = ), 2002-
2007 ( 5s = ), 2008-2010 ( 6s = ), and 2011-2016 ( 7s = ) periods, respectively. 
Furthermore, , ,
Q
h i tz  ( 1, ,4h =  ) are the certain or predictable component of the 
SDEHRR of short-term loans ( 1h = ), the loan loss provision rate ( 2h = ), the 
logarithm of the loan per case ( 3h = ), and the proportion of loans for small and 
medium firms ( 4h = ), respectively. All others are as per Eq. (3.1.3.2.13). 
     3. This estimation takes into account the conditional heteroskedasticity and 
autocorrelation of the error terms. For the instrumental variables, the following 
variables are used: the individual bank dummies, the products of these dummies 
and the normalized time trend, the products of these dummies and the Herfindahl 
index of short-term loans in the previous period, the static cost unneutral 
efficiency in the previous period, the Herfindahl index of short-term loans in the 
previous period, the short-term loans in the previous period, the certain or 
predictable component of the SDEHRR of short-term loans in the current period, 
the loan loss provision rate in the previous period, the logarithm of the loan per 
case in the previous period, the proportion of loans for small and medium firms 
426 
 
in the previous period, and the products of period dummies and the short-term 




Table 4.3.2 Estimation Results for the Coefficients of the Individual Bank Dummies in 
Eq. (3.1.3.2.13) for Short-Term Loans 








710×  6.87663 0.000 
3,
CVI
SLa  848981 7.96395 0.000 
5,
CVI
SLa  773740 6.52948 0.000 
6,
CVI
SLa  749506 6.23320 0.000 
7,
CVI
SLa  990880 7.02156 0.000 
8,
CVI
SLa  867597 6.86467 0.000 
9,
CVI
SLa  738530 5.53991 0.000 
10,
CVI
SLa  667522 6.30182 0.000 
11,
CVI
SLa  703234 7.00243 0.000 
12,
CVI
SLa  870485 5.58397 0.000 
13,
CVI
SLa  707131 5.40586 0.000 
14,
CVI
SLa  718500 6.49009 0.000 
15,
CVI
SLa  778555 6.11435 0.000 
16,
CVI
SLa  662840 4.26882 0.000 
17,
CVI










710×  8.87845 0.000 
22,
CVI








710×  6.13399 0.000 
25,
CVI
SLa  675883 3.29152 0.001 
26,
CVI








710×  8.16726 0.000 
29,
CVI
SLa  708884 4.86485 0.000 
30,
CVI








710×  6.94361 0.000 
33,
CVI
SLa  901998 7.34135 0.000 
34,
CVI






















710×  9.61071 0.000 
41,
CVI
SLa  836417 7.86235 0.000 
42,
CVI
SLa  866111 6.96091 0.000 
43,
CVI
















710×  6.81162 0.000 
50,
CVI












710×  7.50407 0.000 
54,
CVI
SLa  796711 6.38401 0.000 
55,
CVI
SLa  871307 6.82007 0.000 
56,
CVI





SLa  777234 6.64223 0.000 
58,
CVI
SLa  770110 5.58061 0.000 
59,
CVI
SLa  787075 6.21834 0.000 
60,
CVI
SLa  876018 7.14807 0.000 
61,
CVI
SLa  829696 7.18663 0.000 
62,
CVI
SLa  832981 7.22703 0.000 
63,
CVI








710×  9.78255 0.000 
66,
CVI
SLa  942350 7.07166 0.000 
67,
CVI
SLa  817141 6.56200 0.000 
68,
CVI
SLa  933932 7.68203 0.000 
69,
CVI
SLa  832351 6.47171 0.000 
70,
CVI
SLa  762953 7.05283 0.000 
71,
CVI
SLa  745076 5.52631 0.000 
72,
CVI
SLa  805586 6.31778 0.000 
73,
CVI





SLa  706944 6.01636 0.000 
75,
CVI








710×  15.3688 0.000 
79,
CVI
SLa  779330 6.43688 0.000 
80,
CVI
SLa  766923 6.11968 0.000 
81,
CVI








710×  12.1249 0.000 
84,
CVI






































































710×  9.48963 0.000 
102,
CVI


































710×  7.93826 0.000 
113,
CVI




710×  7.14419 0.000 
115,
CVI
























710×  10.9232 0.000 
122,
CVI








710×  10.9800 0.000 
125,
CVI






































710×  8.52478 0.000 
137,
CVI




710×  7.26274 0.000 
139,
CVI




710×  7.36861 0.000 
141,
CVI
SLa  890669 7.23014 0.000 
142,
CVI
SLa  967717 7.13093 0.000 
143,
CVI
SLa  889433 7.67113 0.000 
Note: 1. Tables 4.3.1 and 4.3.2 show the results for the GMM estimation of the conjectural 
derivative parameters in Eq. (3.1.3.2.13) for short-term loans ( j SL= ). Table 
4.3.1 shows the estimates of the parameters other than the coefficients of the 
individual bank dummies; Table 4.3.2 shows the estimates of these coefficients. 
    2. ,
CVI
i SLa  (i=1,2,3,5,  ,18,21,  ,38,40,  ,44,46,47,49,  ,76,78,  ,108,111, 
 ,125,127,128,130, ,143) are the coefficients of the Yachiyo Bank (The 
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present Kiraboshi Bank) (i=1), the Hokkaido Bank (i=2), the Aomori Bank (i=3), 
the sum of the Seiwa Bank and Michinoku Bank (i=5), the Akita Bank (i=6), the 
Ugo Bank (i=7), the Hokuto Bank (i=8), the Shonai Bank (i=9), the Yamagata 
Bank (i=10), the Bank of Iwate (i=11), the Tohoku Bank (i=12), the 77 Bank 
(i=13), the Toho Bank (i=14), the Gunma Bank (i=15), the Ashikaga Bank (i=16), 
the Joyo Bank (i=17), the sum of the Kanto Bank, Kanto Tsukuba Bank, and 
Tsukuba Bank (i=18), the Musashino Bank (i=21), the Chiba Bank (i=22), the 
Chiba Kogyo Bank (i=23), the Tokyo Tomin Bank (i=24), the Bank of Yokohama 
(i=25), the Daishi Bank (i=26), the Hokuetsu Bank (i=27), the Yamanashi Chuo 
Bank (i=28), the Hachijuni Bank (i=29), the Hokuriku Bank (i=30), the Bank of 
Toyama (i=31), the Hokkoku Bank (i=32), the Fukui Bank (i=33), the Shizuoka 
Bank (i=34), the Suruga Bank (i=35), the Shimizu Bank (i=36), the Ogaki 
Kyoritsu Bank (i=37), the sum of the Juroku Bank and Juroku Bank (merged with 
the Gifu Bank) (i=38), the Mie Bank (i=40), the Hyakugo Bank (i=41), the Shiga 
Bank (i=42), the Bank of Kyoto (i=43), the sum of the Osaka Bank and Kinki 
Osaka Bank (The present Kansai Mirai Bank) (i=44), the Senshu Bank (i=46), the 
sum of the Ikeda Bank and Senshu Ikeda Bank (i=47), the Nanto Bank (i=49), the 
Kiyo Bank (i=50), the Kiyo Bank (merged with the Wakayama Bank) (i=51), the 
Tajima Bank (i=52), the Tottori Bank (i=53), the San-in Godo Bank (i=54), the 
San-in Godo Bank (merged with the Fuso Bank) (i=55), the Chugoku Bank (i=56), 
the Hiroshima Bank (i=57), the Yamaguchi Bank (i=58), the Awa Bank (i=59), 
the Hyakujushi Bank (i=60), the Iyo Bank (i=61), the Iyo Bank (merged with the 
Toho Sogo Bank) (i=62), the Shikoku Bank (i=63), the Bank of Fukuoka (i=64), 
the Chikuho Bank (i=65), the Bank of Saga (i=66), the Eighteenth Bank (i=67), 
the Shinwa Bank (i=68), the Shinwa Bank (merged with the Kyushu Bank) (i=69), 
the Higo Bank (i=70), the Oita Bank (i=71), the Miyazaki Bank (i=72), the 
Kagoshima Bank (i=73), the Bank of Ryukyu (i=74), the Bank of Okinawa (i=75), 
the sum of the North Pacific Bank and North Pacific Bank (merged with the 
Sapporo Bank) (i=76), the Sapporo Bank (i=78), the Syokusan Bank (i=79), the 
Kirayaka Bank (i=80), the Kita-Nippon Bank (i=81), the Tokuyo City Bank (i=82), 
the Sendai Bank (i=83), the Fukushima Bank (i=84), the Daito Bank (i=85), the 
Towa Bank (i=86), the Tochigi Bank (i=87), the Keiyo Bank (i=88), the Taiheiyo 
Bank (i=89), the Higashi-Nippon Bank (i=90), the Tokyo Sowa Bank (i=91), the 
Heiwa Sogo Bank (i=92), the Kanagawa Bank (i=93), the Niigata Chuo Bank 
(i=94), the Taiko Bank (i=95), the Nagano Bank (i=96), the First Bank of Toyama 
(i=97), the Fukuho Bank (i=98), the Shizuokachuo Bank (i=99), the Gifu Bank 
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(i=100), the Aichi Bank (i=101), the Bank of Nagoya (i=102), the Chukyo Bank 
(i=103), the Daisan Bank (i=104), the Biwako Bank (i=105), the Bank of Kinki 
(i=106), the Fukutoku Bank (i=107), the sum of the Kansai Bank, Kansai Urban 
Banking Corporation, and Kansai Urban Banking Corporation (merged with the 
Biwako Bank) (The present Kansai Mirai Bank) (i=108), the Taisho Bank (i=111), 
the Hanwa Bank (i=112), the Hyogo Bank (i=113), the Hanshin Bank (i=114), the 
Minato Bank (i=115), the Shimane Bank (i=116), the Tomato Bank (i=117), the 
Setouchi Bank (i=118), the Hiroshima Sogo Bank (i=119), the Momiji Bank 
(i=120), the Saikyo Bank (i=121), the Tokushima Bank (i=122), the Kagawa Bank 
(i=123), the Ehime Bank (i=124), the Bank of Kochi (i=125), the Nishi-Nippon 
Sogo Bank (i=126), the sum of the Nishi-Nippon Bank and Nishi-Nippon City 
Bank (i=127), the sum of the Nishi-Nippon City Bank and Nishi-Nippon City 
Bank (merged with the Bank of Nagasaki) (i=128), the Fukuoka City Bank 
(i=130), the Fukuoka Chuo Bank (i=131), the Saga Kyoei Bank (i=132), the Bank 
of Nagasaki (i=133), the Kyushu Bank (i=134), the Kumamoto Bank (i=135), the 
Kumamoto Family Bank (i=136), the Higo Family Bank (i=137), the Howa Bank 
(i=138), the Miyazaki Taiyo Bank (i=139), the Minami-Nippon Bank (i=140), the 
Okinawa Kaiho Bank (i=141), the Tokyo Star Bank (i=142), and the Saitama 
Resona Bank (i=143).  
3. When new banks emerge due to consolidation, we treat the new banks and their 




Table 4.3.3 Estimation Results for the Parameters Other Than the Coefficients of the 
Individual Bank Dummies in Eq. (3.1.3.2.13) for Long-Term Loans 
Parameter Estimate t-statistic p-value 
,1LLρ  (1976-1986) 0.090816 0.613403 0.540 
,2LLρ  (1987-1989) 0.010846 0.139078 0.889 
,3LLρ  (1990-1995) 0.300277 4.90341 0.000 
,4LLρ  (1996-2001) -0.206396 -3.88635 0.000 
,5LLρ  (2002-2007) -0.396236 -6.55521 0.000 
,6LLρ  (2008-2010) 0.052746 1.43560 0.151 
,7LLρ  (2011-2016) 0.107300 3.95008 0.000 
CVE
LLa   -0.120168
710×  -7.26937 0.000 
CVH
LLa   -451091 -3.95489 0.000 
,1
CVZ
LLa   -0.277408




910×  -24.2772 0.000 
,3
CVZ
LLa  373820 11.9195 0.000 
,4
CVZ







Order of MA for 15 
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Value Function 0.068134 
Note: 1. Tables 4.3.3 and 4.3.4 show the results for the GMM estimation of the conjectural 
derivative parameters in Eq. (3.1.3.2.13) for long-term loans ( j LL= ). Table 
4.3.3 shows the estimates of the parameters other than the coefficients of the 
individual bank dummies; Table 4.3.4 shows the estimates of these coefficients. 
2. The details of Eq. (3.1.3.2.13) for long-term loans ( j LL= ) are as follows: 
     
7
, , , , , , , 1 , 1
1
CVI B Y CVE S CVH
LL i t i LL i LL s s LL i t LL i t LL LL t
i s
Q a D D q a EF a HIρ− − −
=
 = ⋅ + ⋅ ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ 
 
∑ ∑  
4
, , , , ,
1
CVZ Q CV




+ ⋅ +∑ , 
where ,LL sρ  ( 1, ,7s =  ) are the conjectural derivative parameters in the 1976-
1986 ( 1s = ), 1987-1989 ( 2s = ), 1990-1995 ( 3s = ), 1996-2001 ( 4s = ), 2002-
2007 ( 5s = ), 2008-2010 ( 6s = ), and 2011-2016 ( 7s = ) periods, respectively. 
Furthermore, , ,
Q
h i tz  ( 1, ,4h =  ) are the certain or predictable component of the 
SDEHRR of long-term loans ( 1h = ), the loan loss provision rate ( 2h = ), the 
logarithm of the loan per case ( 3h = ), and the proportion of loans for small and 
medium firms ( 4h = ), respectively. All others are as per Eq. (3.1.3.2.13). 
3. This estimation takes into account the conditional heteroskedasticity and 
autocorrelation of the error terms. For the instrumental variables, the following 
variables are used: the individual bank dummies, the products of these dummies 
and the normalized time trend, the products of these dummies and the Herfindahl 
index of long-term loans in the previous period, the static cost unneutral 
efficiency in the previous period, the Herfindahl index of long-term loans in the 
previous period, the long-term loans in the previous period, the certain or 
predictable component of the SDEHRR of long-term loans in the current period, 
the loan loss provision rate in the previous period, the logarithm of the loan per 
case in the previous period, the proportion of loans for small and medium firms 
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in the previous period, and the products of period dummies and the long-term 




Table 4.3.4 Estimation Results for the Coefficients of the Individual Bank Dummies in 
Eq. (3.1.3.2.13) for Long-Term Loans 






















































































710×  15.2938 0.000 
25,
CVI
















710×  9.39864 0.000 
30,
CVI














































710×  5.95487 0.000 
43,
CVI












710×  17.4714 0.000 
49,
CVI




710×  7.70088 0.000 
51,
CVI


































710×  6.70782 0.000 
60,
CVI




710×  9.28363 0.000 
62,
CVI










































































































































































































710×  14.0145 0.000 
115,
CVI










































































































710×  6.59980 0.000 
Note: 1. Tables 4.3.3 and 4.3.4 show the results for the GMM estimation of the conjectural 
derivative parameters in Eq. (3.1.3.2.13) for long-term loans ( j LL= ). Table 
4.3.3 shows the estimates of the parameters other than the coefficients of the 
individual bank dummies; Table 4.3.4 shows the estimates of these coefficients. 
    2. ,
CVI
i LLa  (i=1,2,3,5, ,18,21,  ,38,40,  ,44,46,47,49,  ,76,78,  ,108,111, 
,125,127,128,130,,143) are similar to ,
CVI
i SLa  (i=1,2,3,5,,18,21,,38,40,
448 
 
 ,44,46,47,49, ,76,78, ,108,111,  ,125,127,128,130, ,143) in Table 
4.3.2. 
3. When new banks emerge due to consolidation, we treat the new banks and their 








Table 4.3.5. Estimation Results for the Parameters Other Than the Coefficients of the 
Individual Bank Dummies in Eq. (3.1.3.2.13) for Demand Deposits 
Parameter Estimate t-statistic p-value 
,1DDρ  (1992-1995)  -0.162145 -1.45875 0.145 
,2DDρ  (1996-2001)  -0.432546 -5.69415 0.000 
,3DDρ  (2002-2007) -0.357909 -5.38180 0.000 
,4DDρ  (2008-2010) -0.203459 -4.23274 0.000 
,5DDρ  (2011-2016) -0.185688 -4.71051 0.000 
CVE
DDa   -0.272728
710×  -9.28644 0.000 
CVH












810×  19.4043 0.000 
,4
CVZ







Order of MA for 









Value Function 0.108418 
Note: 1. Tables 4.3.5 and 4.3.6 show the results for the GMM estimation of the conjectural 
derivative parameters in Eq. (3.1.3.2.13) for demand deposits ( j DD= ). Table 
4.3.5 shows the estimates of the parameters other than the coefficients of the 
individual bank dummies; Table 4.3.6 shows the estimates of these coefficients. 
2. The details of Eq. (3.1.3.2.13) for demand deposits ( j DD= ) are as follows: 
5
, , , , , , , 1 , 1
1
CVI B Y CVE S CVH
DD i t i DD i DD s s DD i t DD i t DD DD t
i s
Q a D D q a EF a HIρ− − −
=
 = ⋅ + ⋅ ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ 
 
∑ ∑  
4
, , , , ,
1
CVZ Q CV




+ ⋅ +∑ , 
where ,DD sρ  ( 1, ,5s =  ) are the conjectural derivative parameters in the 
1992-1995 ( 1s = ), 1996-2001 ( 2s = ), 2002-2007 ( 3s = ), 2008-2010 ( 4s = ), 
and 2011-2016 ( 5s = ) periods, respectively. Furthermore, , ,
Q
h i tz  ( 1, ,4h =  ) 
are the certain or predictable component of the SDEHCR of demand deposits 
( 1h = ), the yield on government bonds ( 2h = ), the postal savings interest rate 
of ordinary savings ( 3h = ), and the TOPIX ( 4h = ), respectively. All others 
are as per Eq. (3.1.3.2.13). 
3. This estimation takes into account the conditional heteroskedasticity and 
autocorrelation of the error terms. For the instrumental variables, the following 
variables are used: the individual bank dummies, the products of these dummies 
and the normalized time trend, the products of these dummies and the Herfindahl 
index of demand deposits in the previous period, the static cost unneutral 
efficiency in the previous period, the Herfindahl index of demand deposits in the 
previous period, the demand deposits in the previous period, the certain or 
predictable component of the SDEHCR of demand deposits in the current period, 
the yield on government bonds in the current period, the postal savings interest 
rate of ordinary savings in the current period, the TOPIX in the current period, 




Table 4.3.6 Estimation Results for the Coefficients of the Individual Bank Dummies in 
Eq. (3.1.3.2.13) for Demand Deposits 






































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































710×  14.2049 0.000 
Note: 1. Tables 4.3.5 and 4.3.6 show the results for the GMM estimation of the conjectural 
derivative parameters in Eq. (3.1.3.2.13) for demand deposits ( j DD= ). Table 
4.3.5 shows the estimates of the parameters other than the coefficients of the 
individual bank dummies; Table 4.3.6 shows the estimates of these coefficients. 
     2. ,
CVI
i DDa  (i=1,2,3,5,6,8, ,18,21, ,38,40, ,44,46,47,49, ,53,55, ,60,62, 
,76,78,,91,93,,108,111,,125,127,128,130,,134,136,138,,143) are 
the coefficients of the Yachiyo Bank (The present Kiraboshi Bank) (i=1), the 
Hokkaido Bank (i=2), the Aomori Bank (i=3), the sum of the Seiwa Bank and 
Michinoku Bank (i=5), the Akita Bank (i=6), the Hokuto Bank (i=8), the Shonai 
Bank (i=9), the Yamagata Bank (i=10), the Bank of Iwate (i=11), the Tohoku 
Bank (i=12), the 77 Bank (i=13), the Toho Bank (i=14), the Gunma Bank (i=15), 
the Ashikaga Bank (i=16), the Joyo Bank (i=17), the sum of the Kanto Bank, 
Kanto Tsukuba Bank, and Tsukuba Bank (i=18), the Musashino Bank (i=21), the 
Chiba Bank (i=22), the Chiba Kogyo Bank (i=23), the Tokyo Tomin Bank (i=24), 
the Bank of Yokohama (i=25), the Daishi Bank (i=26), the Hokuetsu Bank (i=27), 
the Yamanashi Chuo Bank (i=28), the Hachijuni Bank (i=29), the Hokuriku Bank 
(i=30), the Bank of Toyama (i=31), the Hokkoku Bank (i=32), the Fukui Bank 
(i=33), the Shizuoka Bank (i=34), the Suruga Bank (i=35), the Shimizu Bank 
(i=36), the Ogaki Kyoritsu Bank (i=37), the sum of the Juroku Bank and Juroku 
459 
 
Bank (merged with the Gifu Bank) (i=38), the Mie Bank (i=40), the Hyakugo 
Bank (i=41), the Shiga Bank (i=42), the Bank of Kyoto (i=43), the sum of the 
Osaka Bank and Kinki Osaka Bank (The present Kansai Mirai Bank) (i=44), the 
Senshu Bank (i=46), the sum of the Ikeda Bank and Senshu Ikeda Bank (i=47), 
the Nanto Bank (i=49), the Kiyo Bank (i=50), the Kiyo Bank (merged with the 
Wakayama Bank) (i=51), the Tajima Bank (i=52), the Tottori Bank (i=53), the 
San-in Godo Bank (merged with the Fuso Bank) (i=55), the Chugoku Bank (i=56), 
the Hiroshima Bank (i=57), the Yamaguchi Bank (i=58), the Awa Bank (i=59), 
the Hyakujushi Bank (i=60), the Iyo Bank (merged with the Toho Sogo Bank) 
(i=62), the Shikoku Bank (i=63), the Bank of Fukuoka (i=64), the Chikuho Bank 
(i=65), the Bank of Saga (i=66), the Eighteenth Bank (i=67), the Shinwa Bank 
(i=68), the Shinwa Bank (merged with the Kyushu Bank) (i=69), the Higo Bank 
(i=70), the Oita Bank (i=71), the Miyazaki Bank (i=72), the Kagoshima Bank 
(i=73), the Bank of Ryukyu (i=74), the Bank of Okinawa (i=75), the sum of the 
North Pacific Bank and North Pacific Bank (merged with the Sapporo Bank) 
(i=76), the Sapporo Bank (i=78), the Syokusan Bank (i=79), the Kirayaka Bank 
(i=80), the Kita-Nippon Bank (i=81), the Tokuyo City Bank (i=82), the Sendai 
Bank (i=83), the Fukushima Bank (i=84), the Daito Bank (i=85), the Towa Bank 
(i=86), the Tochigi Bank (i=87), the Keiyo Bank (i=88), the Taiheiyo Bank (i=89), 
the Higashi-Nippon Bank (i=90), the Tokyo Sowa Bank (i=91), the Kanagawa 
Bank (i=93), the Niigata Chuo Bank (i=94), the Taiko Bank (i=95), the Nagano 
Bank (i=96), the First Bank of Toyama (i=97), the Fukuho Bank (i=98), the 
Shizuokachuo Bank (i=99), the Gifu Bank (i=100), the Aichi Bank (i=101), the 
Bank of Nagoya (i=102), the Chukyo Bank (i=103), the Daisan Bank (i=104), the 
Biwako Bank (i=105), the Bank of Kinki (i=106), the Fukutoku Bank (i=107), the 
sum of the Kansai Bank, Kansai Urban Banking Corporation, and Kansai Urban 
Banking Corporation (merged with the Biwako Bank) (The present Kansai Mirai 
Bank) (i=108), the Taisho Bank (i=111), the Hanwa Bank (i=112), the Hyogo 
Bank (i=113), the Hanshin Bank (i=114), the Minato Bank (i=115), the Shimane 
Bank (i=116), the Tomato Bank (i=117), the Setouchi Bank (i=118), the 
Hiroshima Sogo Bank (i=119), the Momiji Bank (i=120), the Saikyo Bank (i=121), 
the Tokushima Bank (i=122), the Kagawa Bank (i=123), the Ehime Bank (i=124), 
the Bank of Kochi (i=125), the sum of the Nishi-Nippon Bank and Nishi-Nippon 
City Bank (i=127), the sum of the Nishi-Nippon City Bank and Nishi-Nippon City 
Bank (merged with the Bank of Nagasaki) (i=128), the Fukuoka City Bank 
(i=130), the Fukuoka Chuo Bank (i=131), the Saga Kyoei Bank (i=132), the Bank 
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of Nagasaki (i=133), the Kyushu Bank (i=134), the Kumamoto Family Bank 
(i=136), the Howa Bank (i=138), the Miyazaki Taiyo Bank (i=139), the Minami-
Nippon Bank (i=140), the Okinawa Kaiho Bank (i=141), the Tokyo Star Bank 
(i=142), and the Saitama Resona Bank (i=143).  
3. When new banks emerge due to consolidation, we treat the new banks and their 
predecessors as different entities. 
4. The Ugo Bank (i=7), San-in Godo Bank (i=54), Iyo Bank (i=61), Heiwa Sogo 
Bank (i=92), Nishi-Nippon Sogo Bank (i=126), Kumamoto Bank (i=135), and 




Table 4.3.7. Estimation Results for the Parameters Other Than the Coefficients of the 
Individual Bank Dummies in Eq. (3.1.3.2.13) for Time Deposits 
Parameter Estimate t-statistic p-value 
,1TDρ  (1985-1989) -0.495968 -7.38575 0.000 
,2TDρ  (1990-1995)  -0.00412006 -0.107848 0.914 
,3TDρ  (1996-2001)  -0.075980 -1.53985 0.124 
,4TDρ  (2002-2007) -0.594124 -7.65511 0.000 
,5TDρ  (2008-2010) -0.212478 -3.57658 0.000 
,6TDρ  (2011-2016) -0.060453 -1.15851 0.247 
CVE
TDa   986025 5.34064 0.000 
CVH
TDa  -0.199250












810×  -5.98148 0.000 
,4
CVZ







Order of MA for 
the Error Term 
8 






Value Function 0.083849 
Note: 1. Tables 4.3.7 and 4.3.8 show the results for the GMM estimation of the conjectural 
derivative parameters in Eq. (3.1.3.2.13) for time deposits ( j TD= ). Table 4.3.7 
shows the estimates of the parameters other than the coefficients of the individual 
bank dummies; Table 4.3.8 shows the estimates of these coefficients. 
2. The details of Eq. (3.1.3.2.13) for time deposits ( j TD= ) are as follows: 
    
6
, , , , , , , 1 , 1
1
CVI B Y CVE S CVH
TD i t i TD i TD s s TD i t TD i t TD TD t
i s
Q a D D q a EF a HIρ− − −
=
 = ⋅ + ⋅ ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ 
 
∑ ∑  
4
, , , , ,
1
CVZ Q CV




+ ⋅ +∑ , 
where ,TD sρ  ( 1, ,6s =  ) are the conjectural derivative parameters in the 1985-
1989 ( 1s = ), 1990-1995 ( 2s = ), 1996-2001 ( 3s = ), 2002-2007 ( 4s = ), 2008-
2010 ( 5s = ), and 2011-2016 ( 6s = ) periods, respectively. Furthermore, , ,
Q
h i tz  
( 1, ,4h =  ) are the certain or predictable component of the SDEHCR of time 
deposits ( 1h = ), the yield on government bonds ( 2h = ), the postal savings 
interest rate of postal savings certificates ( 3h = ), and the TOPIX ( 4h = ), 
respectively. All others are as per Eq. (3.1.3.2.13). 
3. This estimation takes into account the conditional heteroskedasticity and 
autocorrelation of the error terms. For the instrumental variables, the following 
variables are used: the individual bank dummies, the products of these dummies 
and the normalized time trend, the products of these dummies and the Herfindahl 
index of time deposits in the previous period, the static cost unneutral efficiency 
in the previous period, the Herfindahl index of time deposits in the previous 
period, the time deposits in the previous period, the certain or predictable 
component of the SDEHCR of time deposits in the current period, the yield on 
government bonds in the current period, the postal savings interest rate of postal 
savings certificates in the current period, the TOPIX in the current period, and 
the products of period dummies and the time deposits in the previous period. 
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Table 4.3.8 Estimation Results for the Coefficients of the Individual Bank Dummies in 
Eq. (3.1.3.2.13) for Time Deposits 




















710×  9.71645 0.000 
7,
CVI




710×  9.79139 0.000 
9,
CVI
TDa  826140 5.91321 0.000 
10,
CVI














































































710×  8.83006 0.000 
33,
CVI


































































710×  5.81843 0.000 
53,
CVI


















































710×  11.2518 0.000 
66,
CVI
















710×  12.4262 0.000 
71,
CVI
TDa  973813 8.70254 0.000 
72,
CVI




710×  10.1341 0.000 
74,
CVI













710×  20.2326 0.000 
79,
CVI






























































































































































































































710×  8.89787 0.000 
139,
CVI




710×  12.6283 0.000 
141,
CVI








710×  14.5616 0.000 
Note: 1. Tables 4.3.7 and 4.3.8 show the results for the GMM estimation of the conjectural 
derivative parameters in Eq. (3.1.3.2.13) for time deposits ( j TD= ). Table 4.3.7 
shows the estimates of the parameters other than the coefficients of the individual 
bank dummies; Table 4.3.8 shows the estimates of these coefficients. 
     2. ,
CVI
i TDa  (i=1,2,3,5,6, ,17,21,  ,38,40,  ,44,46,47,49,  ,76,78,  ,91,93,
,108,111,,125,127,128,130,,143) are the coefficients of the Yachiyo Bank 
(The present Kiraboshi Bank) (i=1), the Hokkaido Bank (i=2), the Aomori Bank 
(i=3), the sum of the Seiwa Bank and Michinoku Bank (i=5), the Akita Bank (i=6), 
the Ugo Bank (i=7), the Hokuto Bank (i=8), the Shonai Bank (i=9), the Yamagata 
Bank (i=10), the Bank of Iwate (i=11), the Tohoku Bank (i=12), the 77 Bank 
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(i=13), the Toho Bank (i=14), the Gunma Bank (i=15), the Ashikaga Bank (i=16), 
the sum of the Joyo Bank, Kanto Bank, Kanto Tsukuba Bank, and Tsukuba Bank 
(i=17), the Musashino Bank (i=21), the Chiba Bank (i=22), the Chiba Kogyo Bank 
(i=23), the Tokyo Tomin Bank (i=24), the Bank of Yokohama (i=25), the Daishi 
Bank (i=26), the Hokuetsu Bank (i=27), the Yamanashi Chuo Bank (i=28), the 
Hachijuni Bank (i=29), the Hokuriku Bank (i=30), the Bank of Toyama (i=31), 
the Hokkoku Bank (i=32), the Fukui Bank (i=33), the Shizuoka Bank (i=34), the 
Suruga Bank (i=35), the Shimizu Bank (i=36), the Ogaki Kyoritsu Bank (i=37), 
the sum of the Juroku Bank and Juroku Bank (merged with the Gifu Bank) (i=38), 
the Mie Bank (i=40), the Hyakugo Bank (i=41), the Shiga Bank (i=42), the Bank 
of Kyoto (i=43), the sum of the Osaka Bank and Kinki Osaka Bank (The present 
Kansai Mirai Bank) (i=44), the Senshu Bank (i=46), the sum of the Ikeda Bank 
and Senshu Ikeda Bank (i=47), the Nanto Bank (i=49), the Kiyo Bank (i=50), the 
Kiyo Bank (merged with the Wakayama Bank) (i=51), the Tajima Bank (i=52), 
the Tottori Bank (i=53), the San-in Godo Bank (i=54), the San-in Godo Bank 
(merged with the Fuso Bank) (i=55), the Chugoku Bank (i=56), the Hiroshima 
Bank (i=57), the Yamaguchi Bank (i=58), the Awa Bank (i=59), the Hyakujushi 
Bank (i=60), Iyo Bank (i=61), the Iyo Bank (merged with the Toho Sogo Bank) 
(i=62), the Shikoku Bank (i=63), the Bank of Fukuoka (i=64), the Chikuho Bank 
(i=65), the Bank of Saga (i=66), the Eighteenth Bank (i=67), the Shinwa Bank 
(i=68), the Shinwa Bank (merged with the Kyushu Bank) (i=69), the Higo Bank 
(i=70), the Oita Bank (i=71), the Miyazaki Bank (i=72), the Kagoshima Bank 
(i=73), the Bank of Ryukyu (i=74), the Bank of Okinawa (i=75), the sum of the 
North Pacific Bank and North Pacific Bank (merged with the Sapporo Bank) 
(i=76), the Sapporo Bank (i=78), the Syokusan Bank (i=79), the Kirayaka Bank 
(i=80), the Kita-Nippon Bank (i=81), the Tokuyo City Bank (i=82), the Sendai 
Bank (i=83), the Fukushima Bank (i=84), the Daito Bank (i=85), the Towa Bank 
(i=86), the Tochigi Bank (i=87), the Keiyo Bank (i=88), the Taiheiyo Bank (i=89), 
the Higashi-Nippon Bank (i=90), the Tokyo Sowa Bank (i=91), the Kanagawa 
Bank (i=93), the Niigata Chuo Bank (i=94), the Taiko Bank (i=95), the Nagano 
Bank (i=96), the First Bank of Toyama (i=97), the Fukuho Bank (i=98), the 
Shizuokachuo Bank (i=99), the Gifu Bank (i=100), the Aichi Bank (i=101), the 
Bank of Nagoya (i=102), the Chukyo Bank (i=103), the Daisan Bank (i=104), the 
Biwako Bank (i=105), the Bank of Kinki (i=106), the Fukutoku Bank (i=107), the 
sum of the Kansai Bank, Kansai Urban Banking Corporation, and Kansai Urban 
Banking Corporation (merged with the Biwako Bank) (The present Kansai Mirai 
472 
 
Bank) (i=108), the Taisho Bank (i=111), the Hanwa Bank (i=112), the Hyogo 
Bank (i=113), the Hanshin Bank (i=114), the Minato Bank (i=115), the Shimane 
Bank (i=116), the Tomato Bank (i=117), the Setouchi Bank (i=118), the 
Hiroshima Sogo Bank (i=119), the Momiji Bank (i=120), the Saikyo Bank (i=121), 
the Tokushima Bank (i=122), the Kagawa Bank (i=123), the Ehime Bank (i=124), 
the Bank of Kochi (i=125), the sum of the Nishi-Nippon Bank and Nishi-Nippon 
City Bank (i=127), the sum of the Nishi-Nippon City Bank and Nishi-Nippon City 
Bank (merged with the Bank of Nagasaki) (i=128), the Fukuoka City Bank 
(i=130), the Fukuoka Chuo Bank (i=131), the Saga Kyoei Bank (i=132), the Bank 
of Nagasaki (i=133), the Kyushu Bank (i=134), the Kumamoto Bank (i=135), the 
Kumamoto Family Bank (i=136), the Higo Family Bank (i=137), the Howa Bank 
(i=138), the Miyazaki Taiyo Bank (i=139), the Minami-Nippon Bank (i=140), the 
Okinawa Kaiho Bank (i=141), the Tokyo Star Bank (i=142), and the Saitama 
Resona Bank (i=143).  
3. When new banks emerge due to consolidation, we treat the new banks and their 
predecessors as different entities. 
4. The Heiwa Sogo Bank (i=92) and Nishi-Nippon Sogo Bank (i=126) are excluded 




Table 4.4.1 Estimation Results for the Stochastic Euler Equations Using the Utility 
Functions of Banks on the Cost Frontier (1): the parameters other than the coefficients 
of the individual bank dummies in Eqs. (3.1.3.2.6a) and (3.1.3.2.6b) 
Parameter Estimate t-statistic p-value 
*
1
Fγ  (1976-1986) 1.68103 19.7368 0.000 
1
Fγ (= ( )2 *1sin Fγ )  0.987897 53.0379 0.000 
*
2
Fγ  (1987-1989) 1.71438 26.7047 0.000 
2
Fγ (= ( )2 *2sin Fγ ) 0.979525 53.8703 0.000 
*
3
Fγ  (1990-1995) 1.64378 12.7527 0.000 
3
Fγ (= ( )2 *3sin Fγ ) 0.994683 53.0589 0.000 
*
4
Fγ  (1996-2001) 1.72278 28.4343 0.000 
4
Fγ (= ( )2 *4sin Fγ ) 0.977080 53.8812 0.000 
*
5
Fγ  (2002-2007) 1.56867 0.352578 0.724 
5
Fγ (= ( )2 *5sin Fγ ) 0.999995 52.8398 0.000 
*
6
Fγ  (2008-2010) 4.57316 69.2791 0.000 
6
Fγ (= ( )2 *6sin Fγ ) 0.980741 54.0527 0.000 
*
7
Fγ  (2011-2016) 1.71428 26.5061 0.000 
7
Fγ (= ( )2 *7sin Fγ ) 0.979553 53.5090 0.000 
,1
F
eα  (1976-1986) 0.406865 18.3310 0.000 
,2
F
eα  (1987-1989) 0.803198 81.4229 0.000 
,3
F





eα  (1996-2001) 0.235809 1.47709 0.140 
,5
F
eα  (2002-2007) 0.111346 10.0490 0.000 
,6
F
eα  (2008-2010) 0.303870 2.14204 0.032 
,7
F
eα  (2011-2016) 0.741625 44.3618 0.000 
F
eπα  -0.132753 510−×  -4.27106 0.000 
F
πφ  957891 209.698 0.000 
Sδ  1.04872 5.06093 0.000 
( )( )2sinD CR St tr r δ=  0.751322 4.19404 0.000 
MU
EFb  -85.0769 -6.96508 0.000 
MU
HIb  13.3839 1.58309 0.113 
,1
MU
Qb  -3247.24 -8.75510 0.000 
,2
MU
Qb  -93.8653 -3.37891 0.001 
,3
MU
Qb  996.035 3.42355 0.001 
,4
MU
Qb  -11.8777 -4.84445 0.000 
,5
MU
Qb  -32.8258 -2.99068 0.003 
,6
MU
Qb  -214.481 -8.73831 0.000 
,7
MU
Qb  125.666 5.76333 0.000 
,8
MU





Qb  96.6301 8.88315 0.000 
,10
MU
Qb  -30.4187 -2.51484 0.012 
,11
MU
Qb  958.023 3.24929 0.001 
,12
MU
Qb  3622.92 8.88211 0.000 
,13
MU
Qb  -0.016521 -12.2723 0.000 
,1
MU
Rb  -697.079 -3.88163 0.000 
,2
MU
Rb  672.986 16.9989 0.000 
,3
MU
Rb  -22.7423 -1.60946 0.108 
,4
MU
Rb  -49.8387 -1.91595 0.055 
,5
MU
Rb  40.7279 2.95121 0.003 
MU
Ib  -956.908 -0.146775 0.883 
MU




Order of MA for 







Value Function 0.313153 
Note: 1. Tables 4.4.1 and 4.4.2 show the results for the simultaneous GMM estimation of 
the stochastic Euler equations using the utility functions of banks on the cost 
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frontier in Eq. (3.1.3.2.9) for , , , , ,j SL LL C CL DD TD= . Table 4.4.1 shows the 
estimates of the parameters other than the coefficients of the individual bank 
dummies in Eqs. (3.1.3.2.6a) and (3.1.3.2.6b); Table 4.4.2 shows the estimates of 
these coefficients. 
    2. *Fsγ  ( 1, ,7s =  ) and ,
F
e sα  ( 1, ,7s =  ) are the risk attitude parameters to be 
estimated and the coefficient parameters of the utility function in the 1976-1986 
( 1s = ), 1987-1989 ( 2s = ), 1990-1995 ( 3s = ), 1996-2001 ( 4s = ), 2002-2007 
( 5s = ), 2008-2010 ( 6s = ), and 2011-2016 ( 7s = ) periods, respectively. 
3. The details of ,
MU
i t
′ ⋅b z  in Eqs. (3.1.3.2.6a) and (3.1.3.2.6b) are as follows: 
13 5
, , 1 , 1 , , , , , ,1 1
MU MU S MU MU Q MU R
i t EF i t HI L t Q h h i t R k k i th k
b EF b HI b z b h− − = =′ ⋅ = ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅∑ ∑b z  
, 1 , 1
MU I MU K
I TD t K TD tb h b h− −+ ⋅ + ⋅ , 
      where , 1
S
i tEF −  and , 1L tHI −  are the static cost unneutral efficiency in the previous 
period and the Herfindahl index of loans in the previous period, respectively. 
Moreover, , ,
Q
h i tz  (h=1,,13) are the long-term prime rate (h=1), the capital ratio 
of borrower firms (h=2), the default loss rate for long-term loans (h=3), the 
logarithms of the loan per case (h=4), the proportion of loans for small and 
medium firms (h=5), the Herfindahl index of loan proportions classified by 
industry (h=6), the proportion of loans for the real estate business (h=7), the 
proportion of loans secured by real estate (h=8), the proportion of loans without 
collateral and without warranty (h=9), the logarithms of the disposable income for 
workers’ households (except farmers) (h=10), the yield on government bonds 
(h=11), the interest rate of postal savings certificates (h=12), and the TOPIX 
(h=13), respectively. Furthermore, , ,
R
k i th  (k=1, ,5) are the interest rate of 
securities (k=1), the interest rate due from banks and call loans (k=2), the interest 
rate of other financial assets (k=3), the interest rate of call money and borrowed 
money (k=4), and the interest rate of certificates of deposit and other liabilities 
(k=5), respectively. In addition, , 1
I
TD th −  and , 1
K
TD th −  are the insurance rate of time 
deposits in the previous period and the reserve requirement ratio for time deposits 
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in the previous period, respectively. 
4. This estimation takes into account the conditional heteroskedasticity and 
autocorrelation of the error terms. It is assumed that the degree of the moving 
average is two. For the instrumental variables, the following variables are used: 
the individual bank dummies, the static cost unneutral efficiency in the previous 
period, the Herfindahl index of loans in the previous period, the estimates of the 
dynamic actual variable costs in the current and next periods, the period dummies, 
the interest rates of some financial goods, some exogenous components of the 
actual SDEHCR for time deposits, some endogenous quality variables in the 
previous period, some exogenous quality variables in the current period, and the 
call rates in the previous and current periods for all stochastic Euler equations, the 
products of the individual bank dummies and the estimates of the dynamic frontier 
marginal variable costs with respect to some financial goods, the estimates of the 
dynamic actual marginal variable costs with respect to some financial goods, the 
market shares of some financial goods in the previous period, the elasticities of 
the certain or predictable components of the SDEHRRs and SDEHCRs for some 
financial goods with respect to the total market balances in the next period, these 
certain or predictable components in the same period, the uncertainty components 
of the actual SDEHRRs and SDEHCRs for some financial goods, and some 
exogenous components of the actual SDEHCRs of demand and time deposits for 







Table 4.4.2 Estimation Results for the Stochastic Euler Equations Using the Utility 
Functions of Banks on the Cost Frontier (2): the coefficients of the individual bank 
dummies in Eqs. (3.1.3.2.6a) and (3.1.3.2.6b) 
Parameter Estimate t-statistic p-value 
1
MUa  541.731 3.20438 0.001 
2
MUa  529.219 3.02077 0.003 
3
MUa  560.057 3.15559 0.002 
5
MUa  520.364 3.03212 0.002 
6
MUa  532.994 3.09632 0.002 
7
MUa  603.870 3.59414 0.000 
8
MUa  714.649 4.89036 0.000 
9
MUa  565.945 3.25627 0.001 
10
MUa  509.587 2.95802 0.003 
11
MUa  529.573 3.07705 0.002 
12
MUa  532.299 3.00812 0.003 
13
MUa  498.306 2.85729 0.004 
14
MUa  544.634 3.03528 0.002 
15
MUa  476.489 2.81924 0.005 
16




MUa  511.538 2.92555 0.003 
18
MUa  609.976 3.59510 0.000 
21
MUa  543.384 3.11996 0.002 
22
MUa  484.282 2.76180 0.006 
23
MUa  515.519 2.99992 0.003 
24
MUa  586.237 3.48242 0.000 
25
MUa  446.771 2.55381 0.011 
26
MUa  580.588 3.20629 0.001 
27
MUa  569.545 3.33393 0.001 
28
MUa  485.352 2.81424 0.005 
29
MUa  490.151 2.70206 0.007 
30
MUa  549.502 3.03463 0.002 
31
MUa  813.012 4.56850 0.000 
32
MUa  545.787 3.08363 0.002 
33
MUa  525.403 3.01855 0.003 
34
MUa  514.143 3.10195 0.002 
35




MUa  550.783 3.15933 0.002 
37
MUa  530.408 3.05621 0.002 
38
MUa  579.286 3.31215 0.001 
40
MUa  543.079 3.17838 0.001 
41
MUa  521.782 3.01241 0.003 
42
MUa  550.480 3.20223 0.001 
43
MUa  998.603 5.15925 0.000 
44
MUa  821.953 5.02071 0.000 
46
MUa  589.352 3.42277 0.001 
47
MUa  649.322 3.69715 0.000 
49
MUa  507.209 2.90873 0.004 
50
MUa  598.039 3.39841 0.001 
51
MUa  691.269 3.92190 0.000 
52
MUa  524.199 3.02786 0.002 
53
MUa  561.311 3.28901 0.001 
54
MUa  582.378 3.28308 0.001 
55




MUa  517.588 2.93718 0.003 
57
MUa  485.950 2.77091 0.006 
58
MUa  491.993 2.78049 0.005 
59
MUa  529.889 3.06643 0.002 
60
MUa  519.061 2.97782 0.003 
61
MUa  544.587 3.06478 0.002 
62
MUa  497.209 2.87867 0.004 
63
MUa  529.598 3.10453 0.002 
64
MUa  468.847 2.70542 0.007 
65
MUa  580.788 3.38017 0.001 
66
MUa  551.078 3.22681 0.001 
67
MUa  547.782 3.17944 0.001 
68
MUa  633.004 3.73290 0.000 
69
MUa  577.956 3.37658 0.001 
70
MUa  501.933 2.94897 0.003 
71
MUa  541.702 3.27127 0.001 
72




MUa  514.007 3.00469 0.003 
74
MUa  721.133 3.88738 0.000 
75
MUa  429.588 2.55592 0.011 
76
MUa  575.986 3.39962 0.001 
78
MUa  524.031 3.07596 0.002 
79
MUa  536.872 3.15443 0.002 
80
MUa  643.298 3.71840 0.000 
81
MUa  548.094 3.21445 0.001 
82
MUa  623.960 3.79874 0.000 
83
MUa  563.090 3.20919 0.001 
84
MUa  530.281 3.15227 0.002 
85
MUa  539.764 3.19502 0.001 
86
MUa  514.260 3.02096 0.003 
87
MUa  574.127 3.27889 0.001 
88
MUa  371.904 2.21419 0.027 
89
MUa  603.777 3.53144 0.000 
90




MUa  538.498 3.15739 0.002 
92
MUa  1160.18 5.00022 0.000 
93
MUa  523.414 3.10862 0.002 
94
MUa  552.526 3.28660 0.001 
95
MUa  538.485 3.13326 0.002 
96
MUa  508.551 2.88603 0.004 
97
MUa  518.818 2.96712 0.003 
98
MUa  570.880 3.38679 0.001 
99
MUa  548.222 3.16762 0.002 
100
MUa  468.119 2.60738 0.009 
101
MUa  444.398 2.39832 0.016 
102
MUa  496.769 2.88462 0.004 
103
MUa  480.149 2.80976 0.005 
104
MUa  501.826 2.91859 0.004 
105
MUa  513.555 2.98658 0.003 
106
MUa  554.913 3.10128 0.002 
107




MUa  572.210 3.33594 0.001 
111
MUa  564.758 3.51671 0.000 
112
MUa  582.451 3.31690 0.001 
113
MUa  687.068 4.38527 0.000 
114
MUa  491.644 2.85845 0.004 
115
MUa  596.865 3.51066 0.000 
116
MUa  531.046 3.10607 0.002 
117
MUa  534.782 3.08275 0.002 
118
MUa  574.640 3.50563 0.000 
119
MUa  502.039 2.92959 0.003 
120
MUa  564.854 3.27953 0.001 
121
MUa  537.777 3.17705 0.001 
122
MUa  506.187 2.94730 0.003 
123
MUa  510.439 3.00955 0.003 
124
MUa  510.431 2.97397 0.003 
125
MUa  490.731 2.90346 0.004 
127




MUa  566.831 3.31770 0.001 
130
MUa  505.402 2.96509 0.003 
131
MUa  646.982 3.62462 0.000 
132
MUa  592.304 3.41947 0.001 
133
MUa  566.912 3.28260 0.001 
134
MUa  570.085 3.38127 0.001 
135
MUa  590.520 3.50423 0.000 
136
MUa  526.297 3.08296 0.002 
137
MUa  470.471 2.72982 0.006 
138
MUa  525.996 3.07588 0.002 
139
MUa  584.372 3.28163 0.001 
140
MUa  563.955 3.46675 0.001 
141
MUa  481.521 2.85264 0.004 
142
MUa  606.981 3.61244 0.000 
143
MUa  575.167 3.30514 0.001 
Note: 1. Tables 4.4.1 and 4.4.2 show the results for the simultaneous GMM estimation of 
the stochastic Euler equations using the utility functions of banks on the cost 
frontier in Eq. (3.1.3.2.9) for , , , , ,j SL LL C CL DD TD= . Table 4.4.1 shows the 
estimates of the parameters other than the coefficients of the individual bank 




2.   MUia  (i=1,2,3,5,  ,18,21,  ,38,40,  ,44,46,47,49,  ,76,78,  ,108,111, 
 ,125,127,128,130, ,143) are the coefficients of the Yachiyo Bank (The 
present Kiraboshi Bank) (i=1), the Hokkaido Bank (i=2), the Aomori Bank (i=3), 
the sum of the Seiwa Bank and Michinoku Bank (i=5), the Akita Bank (i=6), the 
Ugo Bank (i=7), the Hokuto Bank (i=8), the Shonai Bank (i=9), the Yamagata 
Bank (i=10), the Bank of Iwate (i=11), the Tohoku Bank (i=12), the 77 Bank 
(i=13), the Toho Bank (i=14), the Gunma Bank (i=15), the Ashikaga Bank (i=16), 
the Joyo Bank (i=17), the sum of the Kanto Bank, Kanto Tsukuba Bank, and 
Tsukuba Bank (i=18), the Musashino Bank (i=21), the Chiba Bank (i=22), the 
Chiba Kogyo Bank (i=23), the Tokyo Tomin Bank (i=24), the Bank of Yokohama 
(i=25), the Daishi Bank (i=26), the Hokuetsu Bank (i=27), the Yamanashi Chuo 
Bank (i=28), the Hachijuni Bank (i=29), the Hokuriku Bank (i=30), the Bank of 
Toyama (i=31), the Hokkoku Bank (i=32), the Fukui Bank (i=33), the Shizuoka 
Bank (i=34), the Suruga Bank (i=35), the Shimizu Bank (i=36), the Ogaki 
Kyoritsu Bank (i=37), the sum of the Juroku Bank and Juroku Bank (merged with 
the Gifu Bank) (i=38), the Mie Bank (i=40), the Hyakugo Bank (i=41), the Shiga 
Bank (i=42), the Bank of Kyoto (i=43), the sum of the Osaka Bank and Kinki 
Osaka Bank (The present Kansai Mirai Bank) (i=44), the Senshu Bank (i=46), the 
sum of the Ikeda Bank and Senshu Ikeda Bank (i=47), the Nanto Bank (i=49), the 
Kiyo Bank (i=50), the Kiyo Bank (merged with the Wakayama Bank) (i=51), the 
Tajima Bank (i=52), the Tottori Bank (i=53), the San-in Godo Bank (i=54), the 
San-in Godo Bank (merged with the Fuso Bank) (i=55), the Chugoku Bank (i=56), 
the Hiroshima Bank (i=57), the Yamaguchi Bank (i=58), the Awa Bank (i=59), 
the Hyakujushi Bank (i=60), the Iyo Bank (i=61), the Iyo Bank (merged with the 
Toho Sogo Bank) (i=62), the Shikoku Bank (i=63), the Bank of Fukuoka (i=64), 
the Chikuho Bank (i=65), the Bank of Saga (i=66), the Eighteenth Bank (i=67), 
the Shinwa Bank (i=68), the Shinwa Bank (merged with the Kyushu Bank) (i=69), 
the Higo Bank (i=70), the Oita Bank (i=71), the Miyazaki Bank (i=72), the 
Kagoshima Bank (i=73), the Bank of Ryukyu (i=74), the Bank of Okinawa (i=75), 
the sum of the North Pacific Bank and North Pacific Bank (merged with the 
Sapporo Bank) (i=76), the Sapporo Bank (i=78), the Syokusan Bank (i=79), the 
Kirayaka Bank (i=80), the Kita-Nippon Bank (i=81), the Tokuyo City Bank (i=82), 
the Sendai Bank (i=83), the Fukushima Bank (i=84), the Daito Bank (i=85), the 
Towa Bank (i=86), the Tochigi Bank (i=87), the Keiyo Bank (i=88), the Taiheiyo 
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Bank (i=89), the Higashi-Nippon Bank (i=90), the Tokyo Sowa Bank (i=91), the 
Heiwa Sogo Bank (i=92), the Kanagawa Bank (i=93), the Niigata Chuo Bank 
(i=94), the Taiko Bank (i=95), the Nagano Bank (i=96), the First Bank of Toyama 
(i=97), the Fukuho Bank (i=98), the Shizuokachuo Bank (i=99), the Gifu Bank 
(i=100), the Aichi Bank (i=101), the Bank of Nagoya (i=102), the Chukyo Bank 
(i=103), the Daisan Bank (i=104), the Biwako Bank (i=105), the Bank of Kinki 
(i=106), the Fukutoku Bank (i=107), the sum of the Kansai Bank, Kansai Urban 
Banking Corporation, and Kansai Urban Banking Corporation (merged with the 
Biwako Bank) (The present Kansai Mirai Bank) (i=108), the Taisho Bank (i=111), 
the Hanwa Bank (i=112), the Hyogo Bank (i=113), the Hanshin Bank (i=114), the 
Minato Bank (i=115), the Shimane Bank (i=116), the Tomato Bank (i=117), the 
Setouchi Bank (i=118), the Hiroshima Sogo Bank (i=119), the Momiji Bank 
(i=120), the Saikyo Bank (i=121), the Tokushima Bank (i=122), the Kagawa Bank 
(i=123), the Ehime Bank (i=124), the Bank of Kochi (i=125), the Nishi-Nippon 
Sogo Bank (i=126), the sum of the Nishi-Nippon Bank and Nishi-Nippon City 
Bank (i=127), the sum of the Nishi-Nippon City Bank and Nishi-Nippon City 
Bank (merged with the Bank of Nagasaki) (i=128), the Fukuoka City Bank 
(i=130), the Fukuoka Chuo Bank (i=131), the Saga Kyoei Bank (i=132), the Bank 
of Nagasaki (i=133), the Kyushu Bank (i=134), the Kumamoto Bank (i=135), the 
Kumamoto Family Bank (i=136), the Higo Family Bank (i=137), the Howa Bank 
(i=138), the Miyazaki Taiyo Bank (i=139), the Minami-Nippon Bank (i=140), the 
Okinawa Kaiho Bank (i=141), the Tokyo Star Bank (i=142), and the Saitama 
Resona Bank (i=143).  
3. When new banks emerge due to consolidation, we treat the new banks and their 








Table 4.5.1 Estimation Results for the Stochastic Euler Equations Using the Utility 
Functions of Banks on the Actual Cost (1): the Parameters Other Than the Parameters 
of Eq. (3.1.3.2.8b) 
Parameter Estimate t-statistic p-value 
*
1
DAγ  (1976-1986) -0.088047 -0.884895 0.376 
1
DAγ (= ( )2 *1sin DAγ )  0.00773228 0.443595 0.657 
*
2
DAγ  (1987-1989) 0.618348 99.3408 0.000 
2
DAγ (= ( )2 *2sin DAγ ) 0.336040 57.1465 0.000 
*
3
DAγ  (1990-1995) 0.594367 111.777 0.000 
3
DAγ (= ( )2 *3sin DAγ ) 0.313583 63.5549 0.000 
*
4
DAγ  (1996-2001) 0.338531 4.15421 0.000 
4
DAγ (= ( )2 *4sin DAγ ) 0.110292 2.16027 0.031 
*
5
DAγ  (2002-2007) 0.444839 17.7005 0.000 
5
DAγ (= ( )2 *5sin DAγ ) 0.185169 9.48427 0.000 
*
6
DAγ  (2008-2010) 0.649590 69.1807 0.000 
6
DAγ (= ( )2 *6sin DAγ ) 0.365856 40.4461 0.000 
*
7
DAγ  (2011-2016) 0.609244 68.7539 0.000 
7
DAγ (= ( )2 *7sin DAγ ) 0.327468 39.3735 0.000 
MUAb  0.019717 7.11492 0.000 
,1
DA
eα  (1976-1986) -0.334888 -12.0903 0.000 
,2
DA





eα  (1990-1995) -0.131081 -15.4670 0.000 
,4
DA
eα  (1996-2001) -0.179376 -7.24611 0.000 
,5
DA
eα  (2002-2007) -0.035274 -2.04906 0.040 
,6
DA
eα  (2008-2010) 0.446456 47.7622 0.000 
,7
DA
eα  (2011-2016) -0.109992 -13.7494 0.000 
DA
eπα  0.400069 610−×  1.76861 0.077 
A




Order of MA for 







Value Function 0.272095 
Note: 1. Tables 4.5.1 to 4.5.5 show the results for the simultaneous GMM estimation of 
the stochastic Euler equations using the utility functions of banks on the actual 
cost in Eq. (3.1.3.2.10) for , , ,j SL LL DD TD= , taking the estimated parameters 
in Tables 4.4.1 and 4.4.2 as given. Table 4.5.1 shows the estimates of the 
parameters other than the parameters of , ,
P
i j tε  in Eq. (3.1.3.2.8b); Tables 4.5.2 to 
4.5.5 show the estimates of the rest of the parameters. 
    2. *DAsγ  ( 1, ,7s =  ) and ,
DA
e sα  ( 1, ,7s =  ) are the difference parameters to be 
estimated and the additive parameters to ,Fe sα  ( 1, ,7s =  ) of the utility function 
in the 1976-1986 ( 1s = ), 1987-1989 ( 2s = ), 1990-1995 ( 3s = ), 1996-2001 
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( 4s = ), 2002-2007 ( 5s = ), 2008-2010 ( 6s = ), and 2011-2016 ( 7s = ) periods, 
respectively. 
3. This estimation takes into account the conditional heteroskedasticity and 
autocorrelation of the error terms. For the instrumental variables, in addition to 
those in the estimation in Tables 4.4.1 and 4.4.2, the following variables are used: 
the products of the individual bank dummies and the estimate of the quasi-short-
run profit based on the dynamic frontier cost, the estimates of the quasi-short-run 
profits based on the dynamic actual costs in the current and next periods, the 
equity capital in the previous period, the estimate of , 1 , 1 ,
F QSF
i t i t i tE u π+ + ∂ ∂ z  in Eq. 
(3.1.3.2.6a), the estimates of , ,
F QSF
i t i tu π∂ ∂ , , 1 , 1
F QSF
i t i tu π+ +∂ ∂ , and , , ,
F
i t e i tu q∂ ∂  in Eqs. 
(3.1.3.2.14a) to (3.1.3.2.14c), the estimate of , ,
F
e i tMRS
π  in Eq. (3.1.3.2.15a), and 
the estimate of ( ) ( ), 1 , 1 , ,F QSF F QSFi t i t i t i tu uπ π+ +∂ ∂ ∂ ∂  for all stochastic Euler equations, 
and the Herfindahl indices corresponding to each financial good for each 





Table 4.5.2 Estimation Results for the Stochastic Euler Equations Using the Utility 
Functions of Banks on the Actual Cost (2): the Parameters of Eq. (3.1.3.2.8b) for j=SL 
Parameter Estimate t-statistic p-value 
PIEE
SLa  0.00307410 1.76091 0.078 
PIEH
SLa  -0.00155461 -5.14201 0.000 
,1
PIEZ
SLa  -0.015695 -3.06179 0.002 
,2
PIEZ
SLa  -0.00706636 -2.08262 0.037 
,3
PIEZ
SLa  0.032449 1.10185 0.271 
,4
PIEZ
SLa  -0.000133349 -1.06778 0.286 
,5
PIEZ
SLa  0.000408509 0.869671 0.384 
,6
PIEZ
SLa  0.00528091 2.69970 0.007 
,7
PIEZ
SLa  -0.00526913 -4.77258 0.000 
,8
PIEZ
SLa  -0.000761389 -1.28812 0.198 
,9
PIEZ
SLa  0.0000537348 0.143001 0.886 
The coefficients of the individual bank dummy variables are omitted due to space 
restrictions. 
The parameters that the p-value is less than 0.1 account for 92 percent of all parameters 
(where the number is 132 out of 143). 
Note: 1. Tables 4.5.1 to 4.5.5 show the results for the simultaneous GMM estimation of 
the stochastic Euler equations using the utility functions of banks on the actual 
cost in Eq. (3.1.3.2.10) for , , ,j SL LL DD TD= , taking the estimated parameters 
in Tables 4.4.1 and 4.4.2 as given. Table 4.5.1 shows the estimates of the 
parameters other than the parameters of , ,
P
i j tε  in Eq. (3.1.3.2.8b); Tables 4.5.2 to 
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4.5.5 show the estimates of the rest of the parameters. 
2. The details of Eq. (3.1.3.2.8b) for short-term loans ( j SL= ) are as follows: 
9
, , , , 1 , 1 , , ,1
P PIE B PIEE S PIEH PIEZ Q
i SL t i SL i SL i t SL SL t SL h h i ti h
a D a EF a HI a zε − − == ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅∑ ∑ , 
      where BiD , , 1
S
i tEF − , and , 1SL tHI −  are the individual bank dummy variable, the 
static cost unneutral efficiency in the previous period, and the Herfindahl index of 
short-term loans in the previous period, respectively. Furthermore, , ,
Q
h i tz  (h=1,
,9) are the short-term prime rate (h=1), the capital ratio of borrower firms (h=2), 
the default loss rate for long-term loans (h=3), the logarithms of the loan per case 
(h=4), the proportion of loans for small and medium firms (h=5), the Herfindahl 
index of loan proportions classified by industry (h=6), the proportion of loans for 
the real estate business (h=7), the proportion of loans secured by real estate (h=8), 






Table 4.5.3 Estimation Results for the Stochastic Euler Equations Using the Utility 
Functions of Banks on the Actual Cost (3): the Parameters of Eq. (3.1.3.2.8b) for j=LL 
Parameter Estimate t-statistic p-value 
PIEE
LLa  0.00388048 2.31678 0.021 
PIEH
LLa  -0.00226263 -7.62056 0.000 
,1
PIEZ
LLa  -0.028941 -5.62493 0.000 
,2
PIEZ
LLa  -0.011259 -3.54995 0.000 
,3
PIEZ
LLa  0.00736642 0.211633 0.832 
,4
PIEZ
LLa  0.000237881 1.59636 0.110 
,5
PIEZ
LLa  0.00118261 1.97821 0.048 
,6
PIEZ
LLa  -0.000439921 -0.309848 0.757 
,7
PIEZ
LLa  -0.00442733 -3.18190 0.001 
,8
PIEZ
LLa  -0.000805793 -1.52632 0.127 
,9
PIEZ
LLa  -0.00116301 -2.44670 0.014 
The coefficients of the individual bank dummy variables are omitted due to space 
restrictions. 
The parameters that the p-value is less than 0.1 account for 94 percent of all parameters 
(where the number is 135 out of 143). 
Note: 1. Tables 4.5.1 to 4.5.5 show the results for the simultaneous GMM estimation of 
the stochastic Euler equations using the utility functions of banks on the actual 
cost in Eq. (3.1.3.2.10) for , , ,j SL LL DD TD= , taking the estimated parameters 
in Tables 4.4.1 and 4.4.2 as given. Table 4.5.1 shows the estimates of the 
parameters other than the parameters of , ,
P
i j tε  in Eq. (3.1.3.2.8b); Tables 4.5.2 to 
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4.5.5 show the estimates of the rest of the parameters. 
2. The details of Eq. (3.1.3.2.8b) for long-term loans ( j LL= ) are as follows: 
9
, , , , 1 , 1 , , ,1
P PIE B PIEE S PIEH PIEZ Q
i LL t i LL i LL i t LL LL t LL h h i ti h
a D a EF a HI a zε − − == ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅∑ ∑ , 
      where BiD , , 1
S
i tEF − , and , 1LL tHI −  are the individual bank dummy variable, the 
static cost unneutral efficiency in the previous period, and the Herfindahl index of 
long-term loans in the previous period, respectively. Furthermore, , ,
Q
h i tz  (h=1,
,9) are the long-term prime rate (h=1), the capital ratio of borrower firms (h=2), 
the default loss rate for long-term loans (h=3), the logarithms of the loan per case 
(h=4), the proportion of loans for small and medium firms (h=5), the Herfindahl 
index of loan proportions classified by industry (h=6), the proportion of loans for 
the real estate business (h=7), the proportion of loans secured by real estate (h=8), 





Table 4.5.4 Estimation Results for the Stochastic Euler Equations Using the Utility 
Functions of Banks on the Actual Cost (4): the Parameters of Eq. (3.1.3.2.8b) for j=DD 
Parameter Estimate t-statistic p-value 
PIEE
DDa  -0.00722283 -8.23513 0.000 
PIEH
DDa  0.00300281 6.11191 0.000 
,1
PIEZ
DDa  0.00414621 3.53774 0.000 
,2
PIEZ
DDa  -0.053468 -1.59444 0.111 
,3
PIEZ




610−×  2.64998 0.008 
,5
PIEZ
DDa  0.640198 1.14583 0.252 
,6
PIEZ
DDa  0.030265 1.90340 0.057 
The coefficients of the individual bank dummy variables are omitted due to space 
restrictions. 
The parameters that the p-value is less than 0.1 account for 99 percent of all parameters 
(where the number is 138 out of 140). 
Note: 1. Tables 4.5.1 to 4.5.5 show the results for the simultaneous GMM estimation of 
the stochastic Euler equations using the utility functions of banks on the actual 
cost in Eq. (3.1.3.2.10) for , , ,j SL LL DD TD= , taking the estimated parameters 
in Tables 4.4.1 and 4.4.2 as given. Table 4.5.1 shows the estimates of the 
parameters other than the parameters of , ,
P
i j tε  in Eq. (3.1.3.2.8b); Tables 4.5.2 to 
4.5.5 show the estimates of the rest of the parameters. 
2. The details of Eq. (3.1.3.2.8b) for demand deposits ( j DD= ) are as follows: 
6
, , , , 1 , 1 , , ,1
P PIE B PIEE S PIEH PIEZ Q
i DD t i DD i DD i t DD DD t DD h h i ti h
a D a EF a HI a zε − − == ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅∑ ∑ , 
      where BiD , , 1
S
i tEF − , and , 1DD tHI −  are the individual bank dummy variable, the 
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static cost unneutral efficiency in the previous period, and the Herfindahl index of 
demand deposits in the previous period, respectively. Furthermore, , ,
Q
h i tz  (h=1,
,6) are the logarithms of the disposable income for workers’ households (except 
farmers) (h=1), the yield on government bonds (h=2), the interest rate of ordinary 
savings (h=3), the TOPIX (h=4), the insurance rate of demand deposits in the 
previous period (h=5), and the reserve requirement ratio for demand deposits in 




Table 4.5.5 Estimation Results for the Stochastic Euler Equations Using the Utility 
Functions of Banks on the Actual Cost (5): the Parameters of Eq. (3.1.3.2.8b) for j=TD 
Parameter Estimate t-statistic p-value 
PIEE
TDa  -0.00314273 -1.96392 0.050 
PIEH
TDa  0.00222257 6.84027 0.000 
,1
PIEZ
TDa  -0.00324594 -3.43875 0.001 
,2
PIEZ
TDa  -0.106901 -6.80802 0.000 
,3
PIEZ




610−×  -5.04073 0.000 
,5
PIEZ
TDa  0.141335 0.181733 0.856 
,6
PIEZ
TDa  0.00980552 0.754934 0.450 
The coefficients of the individual bank dummy variables are omitted due to space 
restrictions. 
The parameters that the p-value is less than 0.1 account for 95 percent of all parameters 
(where the number is 133 out of 140). 
Note: 1. Tables 4.5.1 to 4.5.5 show the results for the simultaneous GMM estimation of 
the stochastic Euler equations using the utility functions of banks on the actual 
cost in Eq. (3.1.3.2.10) for , , ,j SL LL DD TD= , taking the estimated parameters 
in Tables 4.4.1 and 4.4.2 as given. Table 4.5.1 shows the estimates of the 
parameters other than the parameters of , ,
P
i j tε  in Eq. (3.1.3.2.8b); Tables 4.5.2 to 
4.5.5 show the estimates of the rest of the parameters. 
2. The details of Eq. (3.1.3.2.8b) for time deposits ( j TD= ) are as follows: 
6
, , , , 1 , 1 , , ,1
P PIE B PIEE S PIEH PIEZ Q
i TD t i TD i TD i t TD TD t TD h h i ti h
a D a EF a HI a zε − − == ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅∑ ∑ , 
      where BiD , , 1
S
i tEF − , and , 1TD tHI −  are the individual bank dummy variable, the 
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static cost unneutral efficiency in the previous period, and the Herfindahl index of 
time deposits in the previous period, respectively. Furthermore, , ,
Q
h i tz  (h=1,,6) 
are the logarithms of the disposable income for workers’ households (except 
farmers) (h=1), the yield on government bonds (h=2), the interest rate of postal 
savings certificates (h=3), the TOPIX (h=4), the insurance rate of time deposits in 
the previous period (h=5), and the reserve requirement ratio for time deposits in 





Table 4.5.6 Estimation Results for Eq. (3.1.3.2.8b) for Securities (j=S) 
Parameter Estimate t-statistic p-value 
PIEE
Sa  0.00487494 11.3971 0.000 
PIEH
Sa  -0.00204643 -3.08815 0.002 
PIEZ
Sa  0.032248 4.87792 0.000 
The coefficients of the individual bank dummy variables are omitted due to space 
restrictions. 
The parameters that the p-value is less than 0.1 account for 97 percent of all parameters 




Order of MA for 







Value Function 0.104239 
Note: 1. Tables 4.5.6 shows the results for the GMM estimation of , ,
P
i j tε  in Eq. 
(3.1.3.2.8b) for securities ( j S= ), taking the estimated parameters in Table 4.5.1 
as given. 
2. The details of Eq. (3.1.3.2.8b) for securities ( j S= ) are as follows: 
, , , , 1 , 1 ,
P PIE B PIEE S PIEH PIEZ Q
i S t i S i S i t S L t S i ti
a D a EF a HI a zε − −= ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅∑ , 
      where BiD , , 1
S
i tEF − , , 1L tHI − , and ,
Q
i tz  are the individual bank dummy variable, 
the static cost unneutral efficiency in the previous period, the Herfindahl index of 
loans in the previous period, and the interest rate of securities, respectively. 
3. This estimation takes into account the conditional heteroskedasticity and 
autocorrelation of the error terms. For the instrumental variables, the following 
variables are used: the individual bank dummies, the products of these dummies 
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and the normalized time trend, the products of these dummies and the estimate of 
the quasi-short-run profit based on the dynamic frontier cost, the products of these 
dummies and the estimate of the dynamic frontier marginal variable cost with 
respect to the financial good concerned, the static cost unneutral efficiency in the 
previous period, the Herfindahl index of loans in the previous period, the estimates 
of the dynamic actual variable costs in the current and next periods, the estimates 
of the dynamic actual marginal variable costs with respect to some financial goods, 
the period dummies, the market shares of some financial goods in the previous 
period, the elasticities of the certain or predictable components of the SDEHRRs 
and SDEHCRs for some financial goods with respect to the total market balances 
in the next period, these certain or predictable components in the same period, the 
uncertainty components of the actual SDEHRRs and SDEHCRs for some 
financial goods, some exogenous components of the actual SDEHCRs of demand 
and time deposits, the interest rates of some financial goods, some exogenous 
components of the actual SDEHCR for time deposits, some endogenous quality 
variables in the previous period, some exogenous quality variables in the current 





Table 4.5.7 Estimation Results for Eq. (3.1.3.2.8b) for Cash (j=C) 
Parameter Estimate t-statistic p-value 
PIEE
Ca  0.00462957 9.35578 0.000 
PIEH
Ca  -0.00372563 -7.40003 0.000 
The coefficients of the individual bank dummy variables are omitted due to space 
restrictions. 
The parameters that the p-value is less than 0.1 account for 100 percent of all 




Order of MA for 







Value Function 0.118556 
Note: 1. Tables 4.5.7 shows the results for the GMM estimation of , ,
P
i j tε  in Eq. 
(3.1.3.2.8b) for cash ( j C= ), taking the estimated parameters in Table 4.5.1 as 
given. 
2. The details of Eq. (3.1.3.2.8b) for cash ( j C= ) are as follows: 
, , , , 1 , 1
P PIE B PIEE S PIEH
i C t i C i C i t C L ti
a D a EF a HIε − −= ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅∑ , 
      where BiD , , 1
S
i tEF − , and , 1L tHI −  are the individual bank dummy variable, the 
static cost unneutral efficiency in the previous period, and the Herfindahl index of 
loans in the previous period, respectively. 
3. This estimation takes into account the conditional heteroskedasticity and 
autocorrelation of the error terms. The instrumental variables are similar to Eq. 




Table 4.5.8 Estimation Results for Eq. (3.1.3.2.8b) for Due from Banks and Call Loans 
(j=CL) 
Parameter Estimate t-statistic p-value 
PIEE
CLa  0.00530412 8.33654 0.000 
PIEH
CLa  -0.00900420 -17.2320 0.000 
PIEZ
CLa  0.023215 14.0659 0.000 
The coefficients of the individual bank dummy variables are omitted due to space 
restrictions. 
The parameters that the p-value is less than 0.1 account for 100 percent of all 




Order of MA for 







Value Function 0.096934 
Note: 1. Tables 4.5.8 shows the results for the GMM estimation of , ,
P
i j tε  in Eq. 
(3.1.3.2.8b) for due from banks and call loans ( j CL= ), taking the estimated 
parameters in Table 4.5.1 as given. 
2. The details of Eq. (3.1.3.2.8b) for due from banks and call loans ( j CL= ) are as 
follows: 
, , , , 1 , 1 ,
P PIE B PIEE S PIEH PIEZ Q
i CL t i CL i CL i t CL L t CL i ti
a D a EF a HI a zε − −= ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅∑ , 
      where BiD , , 1
S
i tEF − , , 1L tHI − , and ,
Q
i tz  are the individual bank dummy variable, 
the static cost unneutral efficiency in the previous period, the Herfindahl index of 




3. This estimation takes into account the conditional heteroskedasticity and 
autocorrelation of the error terms. The instrumental variables are similar to Eq. 




Table 4.5.9 Estimation Results for Eq. (3.1.3.2.8b) for Other Financial Assets (j=A) 
Parameter Estimate t-statistic p-value 
PIEE
Aa  0.010986 16.3730 0.000 
PIEH
Aa  -0.000343731 -0.461628 0.644 
PIEZ
Aa  0.013783 23.9472 0.000 
The coefficients of the individual bank dummy variables are omitted due to space 
restrictions. 
The parameters that the p-value is less than 0.1 account for 99 percent of all parameters 




Order of MA for 







Value Function 0.108353 
Note: 1. Tables 4.5.9 shows the results for the GMM estimation of , ,
P
i j tε  in Eq. 
(3.1.3.2.8b) for other financial assets ( j A= ), taking the estimated parameters in 
Table 4.5.1 as given. 
2. The details of Eq. (3.1.3.2.8b) for other financial assets ( j A= ) are as follows: 
, , , , 1 , 1 ,
P PIE B PIEE S PIEH PIEZ Q
i A t i A i A i t A L t A i ti
a D a EF a HI a zε − −= ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅∑ , 
      where BiD , , 1
S
i tEF − , , 1L tHI − , and ,
Q
i tz  are the individual bank dummy variable, 
the static cost unneutral efficiency in the previous period, the Herfindahl index of 
loans in the previous period, and the interest rate of other financial assets, 
respectively. 
3. This estimation takes into account the conditional heteroskedasticity and 
autocorrelation of the error terms. The instrumental variables are similar to Eq. 
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Table 4.5.10 Estimation Results for Eq. (3.1.3.2.8b) for Call Money and Borrowed 
Money (j=CM) 
Parameter Estimate t-statistic p-value 
PIEE
CMa  -0.012667 -14.0326 0.000 
PIEH
CMa  0.00350058 5.88304 0.000 
PIEZ
CMa  -0.00993750 -9.65830 0.000 
The coefficients of the individual bank dummy variables are omitted due to space 
restrictions. 
The parameters that the p-value is less than 0.1 account for 99 percent of all parameters 




Order of MA for 







Value Function 0.107213 
Note: 1. Tables 4.5.10 shows the results for the GMM estimation of , ,
P
i j tε  in Eq. 
(3.1.3.2.8b) for call money and borrowed money ( j CM= ), taking the estimated 
parameters in Table 4.5.1 as given. 
2. The details of Eq. (3.1.3.2.8b) for call money and borrowed money ( j CM= ) are 
as follows: 
, , , , 1 , 1 ,
P PIE B PIEE S PIEH PIEZ Q
i CM t i CM i CM i t CM D t CM i ti
a D a EF a HI a zε − −= ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅∑ , 
      where BiD , , 1
S
i tEF − , , 1D tHI − , and ,
Q
i tz  are the individual bank dummy variable, 
the static cost unneutral efficiency in the previous period, the Herfindahl index of 
deposits in the previous period, and the interest rate of call money and borrowed 
money other financial assets, respectively. 
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3. This estimation takes into account the conditional heteroskedasticity and 
autocorrelation of the error terms. The instrumental variables are similar to Eq. 









Table 4.5.11 Estimation Results for Eq. (3.1.3.2.8b) for Certificates of Deposit and 
Other Liabilities (j=CD) 
Parameter Estimate t-statistic p-value 
PIEE
CDa  -0.00651465 -8.97419 0.000 
PIEH
CDa  0.00765939 11.9100 0.000 
PIEZ
CDa  -0.012556 -27.9629 0.000 
The coefficients of the individual bank dummy variables are omitted due to space 
restrictions. 
The parameters that the p-value is less than 0.1 account for 100 percent of all 




Order of MA for 







Value Function 0.126295 
Note: 1. Tables 4.5.11 shows the results for the GMM estimation of , ,
P
i j tε  in Eq. 
(3.1.3.2.8b) for certificates of deposit and other liabilities ( j CD= ), taking the 
estimated parameters in Table 4.5.1 as given. 
2. The details of Eq. (3.1.3.2.8b) for certificates of deposit and other liabilities 
( j CD= ) are as follows: 
, , , , 1 , 1 ,
P PIE B PIEE S PIEH PIEZ Q
i CD t i CD i CD i t CD D t CD i ti
a D a EF a HI a zε − −= ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅∑ , 
      where BiD , , 1
S
i tEF − , , 1D tHI − , and ,
Q
i tz  are the individual bank dummy variable, 
the static cost unneutral efficiency in the previous period, the Herfindahl index of 
deposits in the previous period, and the interest rate of certificates of deposit and 
other liabilities, respectively. 
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3. This estimation takes into account the conditional heteroskedasticity and 
autocorrelation of the error terms. The instrumental variables are similar to Eq. 




Table 4.6.1 Risk Attitude and Coefficient Parameters of Utility Functions 



























































0.45234 510−×  



















































i tπ  
Growth Rate 
of Real GDP 
(GRRG) 
1976-1986 129262.96 31739.05 32875.60 0.040144 
1987-1989 331482.21 94135.91 100770.08 0.051644 
1990-1995 330951.76 84603.07 76125.57 0.020302 
1996-2001 198141.27 78767.34 73136.43 0.0076905 
2002-2007 216314.78 58206.86 53944.52 0.014894 
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2008-2010 208932.30 56309.84 51694.35 -0.0089948 













1976-1986 0.0087490 112.51530 0.044658 0.011770 
1987-1989 0.0088464 374.27000 0.041621 0.011755 
1990-1995 0.019719 -199.51185 0.030876 0.011458 
1996-2001 0.014078 -48.05838 0.021984 0.011352 
2002-2007 0.0039634 66.60897 0.029747 0.011268 
2008-2010 0.029318 -226.37638 0.021828 0.014831 
2011-2016 0.0097245 87.72512 0.031693 0.0098749 
Note: 1. Table 4.6.1 shows the estimates of the degrees of relative risk-aversions of banks 
on the cost frontier and the actual cost, and the coefficient parameters of the utility 
functions of these banks (i.e., Feα  in Eq. (3.1.3.1.7a) and F DAe eα α+  in Eq. 
(3.1.3.1.14a)). 
     2. The numbers in parentheses represent estimated t-values. 









i tr   Effect on ,
FF
i tr  
Subjective 








































































































i tr   Effect on ,
FA



















































































Note: 1. Table 4.7.1 shows the estimates of the reference rates on the cost frontier and the 
actual cost. 
     2. The numbers in parentheses represent estimated t-values. 
     3. The numbers in brackets represent estimated p-values. 
     4. The effect of the subjective rate of time preference on the reference rate on the 





Table 4.8.1 Dynamic Price Inefficiencies 
Period 


























































































































































































































































SL i tMC  , ,
DAV
LL i tMC  , ,
DAV
S i tMC  , ,
DAV
C i tMC  




CL i tMC  , ,
DAV
A i tMC  , ,
DAV
DD i tMC  , ,
DAV
TD i tMC  




CM i tMC  , ,
DAV
CD i tMC  
1976-2016 -0.035950 0.0068499 
Note: 1. Table 4.8.1 shows the estimates of the dynamic price inefficiencies (normalized 
by the marginal utility of quasi-short-run profits based on dynamic actual cost), 
, ,i j tPIE  ( , , , , , , , , ,j SL LL S C CL A DD TD CM CD= ) in Eq. (3.1.3.2.8a). 
     2. The numbers in parentheses represent estimated t-values. 




Table 4.9.1 GURPs on the Cost Frontier Over the Entire Period 
Financial 
Good 





















SL i tϖ   , , , ,
BPF BPF
e i t SL i tMRS



































LL i tϖ  , , , ,
BPF BPF
e i t LL i tMRS



































DD i tϖ   , , , ,
BPF BPF
e i t DD i tMRS



































TD i tϖ   , , , ,
BPF BPF
e i t TD i tMRS













( ), , , ,GURF DFVS i t S i tp MC=  , ,SURFS i tp   , ,BPFS i tη  





















S i tϖ   , , , ,
BPF BPF
e i t S i tMRS













( ), , , ,GURF DFVA i t A i tp MC=  , ,SURFA i tp   , ,BPFA i tη  























A i tϖ   , , , ,
BPF BPF
e i t A i tMRS
π ϖ+  














( ), , , ,GURF DFVC i t C i tp MC=  , ,SURFC i tp   , ,BPFC i tη  





















C i tϖ  
is assumed to be 
zero. 
Unexplained Residual  









( ), , , ,GURF DFVCL i t CL i tp MC=  , ,SURFCL i tp   , ,BPFCL i tη  
























CL i tϖ  
is assumed to be 
zero. 
Unexplained Residual 












( ), , , ,GURF DFVCM i t CM i tp MC=  , ,SURFCM i tp   , ,BPFCM i tη  

























CM i tϖ  
is assumed to be 
zero. 
Unexplained Residual 











( ), , , ,GURF DFVCD i t CD i tp MC=  , ,SURFCD i tp   , ,BPFCD i tη  
























CD i tϖ  
is assumed to be 
zero. 
Unexplained Residual 










Note: 1. Tables 4.9.1 shows the estimates of the GURPs on the cost frontier over the entire 
period. 
     2. The numbers in parentheses represent estimated t-values. 
     3. The numbers in brackets represent estimated p-values. 
     4. The numbers in double parentheses represent proportions with respect to , ,
GURF
j i tp . 
     5. , ,
BPF
j i tη  ( , , , , ,j S C CL A CM CD= ) and , ,
BPF
j i tϖ  ( , , ,j C CL CM CD= ) are assumed 
to be zero because it is unrealistic that these effects are not negligible. 
     6. There are unexplained residuals (i.e., ( ), , , , , , 0GURF SURF BPFj i t j i t e i tp p MRS π− + ≠ ) for 
, , ,j C CL CM CD= . How to decrease these residuals is a task for the future. 
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SL i tp  , ,
SURA
SL i tp  , ,
BPA
SL i tη  , ,
BPA
e i tMRS























SL i tϖ (B) (A)+(B) , ,i SL tPIE  , ,
DAV



















LL i tp   , ,
SURA
LL i tp   , ,
BPA


























LL i tϖ (B) (A)+(B) , ,i LL tPIE  , ,
DAV



















DD i tp  , ,
SURA
DD i tp   , ,
BPA
DD i tη  , ,
BPA
e i tMRS























DD i tϖ (B) (A)+(B) , ,i DD tPIE  , ,
DAV




















TD i tp  , ,
SURA
TD i tp   , ,
BPA
TD i tη  , ,
BPA
e i tMRS























TD i tϖ (B) (A)+(B) , ,i TD tPIE  , ,
DAV



















S i tp  , ,
SURA
S i tp   , ,
BPA
S i tη  























S i tϖ (B)  (A)+(B) , ,i S tPIE  , ,
DAV


















A i tp  , ,
SURA
A i tp   , ,
BPA
A i tη  

























A i tϖ (B) (A)+(B) , ,i A tPIE  , ,
DAV
A i tMC  

















C i tp (A) , ,
SURA
C i tp (B) , ,
BPA
C i tη  























C i tϖ  





, ,i C tPIE  , ,
DAV














CL i tp (A) , ,
SURA
CL i tp (B) , ,
BPA
CL i tη  


























CL i tϖ  





, ,i CL tPIE  , ,
DAV

















CM i tp (A) , ,
SURA
CM i tp (B) , ,
BPA
CM i tη  
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, ,i CM tPIE  , ,
DAV

















CD i tp (A) , ,
SURA
CD i tp (B) , ,
BPA
CD i tη  


























CD i tϖ  





, ,i CD tPIE  , ,
DAV














Note: 1. Tables 4.9.2 shows the estimates of the GURPs on the actual cost over the entire 
period. 
     2. The numbers in parentheses represent estimated t-values. 
     3. The numbers in brackets represent estimated p-values. 
     4. The numbers in double parentheses represent proportions with respect to , ,
GURA
j i tp . 
     5. , ,
BPA
j i tη  ( , , , , ,j S C CL A CM CD= ) and , ,
BPA
j i tϖ  ( , , ,j C CL CM CD= ) are assumed 
to be zero because it is unrealistic that these effects are not negligible. 
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     6. There are unexplained residuals (i.e., ( ), , , , , , 0GURA SURA BPAj i t j i t e i tp p MRS π− + ≠ ) for 

















Table 4.9.3 GURPs on the Cost Frontier in Each Period 
































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































( ), , , ,GURF DFVS i t S i tp MC=  , ,SURFS i tp  , ,BPFS i tη  is 





π  , ,
BPF









































































































































( ), , , ,GURF DFVA i t A i tp MC=  , ,SURFA i tp  , ,BPFA i tη  is 





π  , ,
BPF










































































































































Note: 1. Tables 4.9.3 shows the estimates of the GURPs on the cost frontier, which have 
a risk-adjustment effect, in each period.  
     2. The numbers in parentheses represent estimated t-values. 
     3. The numbers in brackets represent estimated p-values. 
     4. The numbers in double parentheses represent proportions with respect to , ,
GURF
j i tp . 
     5. , ,
BPF
j i tη  ( ,j S A= ) are assumed to be zero because it is unrealistic that these 
effects are not negligible. 





Table 4.9.4 GURPs on the Actual Cost in Each Period 
, ,
GURA
SL i tp  , ,
SURA
SL i tp  , ,
BPA
SL i tη  , ,
BPA
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Note: 1. Tables 4.9.4 shows the estimates of the GURPs on the actual cost, which have a 
risk-adjustment effect, in each period. 
     2. The numbers in parentheses represent estimated t-values. 
     3. The numbers in brackets represent estimated p-values. 
     4. The numbers in double parentheses represent proportions with respect to , ,
GURA
j i tp . 
     5. , ,
BPA
j i tη  ( ,j S A= ) are assumed to be zero because it is unrealistic that these 
effects are not negligible. 





Table 4.10.1 EGLIs on the Cost Frontier and the Actual Cost for the Entire Period 
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j i t i th r−   
−  −  1.21482 
((1.39421)) 
Note: 1. Table 4.10.1 shows the estimates of the EGLIs on the cost frontier and the actual 
cost for the entire period. 
     2. The numbers in parentheses represent estimated t-values. 
     3. The numbers in brackets represent estimated p-values. 
     4. The numbers in double parentheses represent proportions with respect to 
, ,
F
j i tEGLI  or , ,
A
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Note: 1. Table 4.10.2 shows the estimates of the EGLIs of the long-term loans on the 
actual cost in each period. 
     2. The numbers in parentheses represent estimated t-values. 
     3. The numbers in brackets represent estimated p-values. 
     4. The numbers in double parentheses represent proportions with respect to 
, ,
A





Table 4.11.1 Tests of the Efficient Structure Hypothesis 
Financial Good 
, , , 1
D
j i t i tq EF −∂ ∂  
Estimate t-statistic p-value 
Short-Term Loans 
(j=SL) 
-4.77017 -0.568399 0.570 
Long-Term Loans 
(j=LL) 
-0.320886 -1.82756 0.068 
Securities (j=S) 1.22273 1.21341 0.225 
Cash (j=C) 0.304329 0.822100 0.411 
Amount Due from 
Banks and Call 
Loans (j=CL) 
2.40958 0.493530 0.622 
Other Financial 
Assets (j=A) 
0.738585 2.94020 0.003 
Total Financial 
Assets 
-0.415839 -0.040699 0.968 










i t L tEF HI −∂ ∂  
Estimate t-statistic p-value 
1976-2016 -0.078631 -2.25797 0.024 
1976-1986 -0.178414 -1.72318 0.085 
1987-1989 -0.064770 -2.26680 0.023 
1990-1995 -0.059613 -2.33101 0.020 
1996-2001 -0.054850 -2.37207 0.018 
2002-2007 -0.091973 -2.03499 0.042 
2008-2010 -0.073649 -2.44896 0.014 
2011-2016 -0.135264 -1.77840 0.075 







Table 4.12.1 Quiet-Life Hypothesis and the EGLI on the Cost Frontier 





LL i tp  0.00702861 
( ), , , ,DFV GURFLL i t LL i tMC p=  0.00264542 
, ,
DAV












, ,LL i tMH  (Eq. (4.12.1)) 0.00137672 
, , , ,
, , , 1
DFV SURF
LL i t LL i t
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LL i tp , , ,
DFV
LL i tMC , , ,
DAV
LL i tMC >0 
(A4): , , , , , ,, ,
, 1 , , , 1
GURF DFV SURF
LL i t LL i t LL i t
LL i t SURF
L t LL i t L t
p MC p
MH





Note: Table 4.12.1 shows the relation between the quiet-life hypothesis and the EGLI on 











Table 4.13.1 Intertemporal Regular Linkage of Single-Period Dynamic Cost 
Efficiencies 
T (t=1977) 
, 1 2 , 1
D D
i t T i tEF EF− + −∂ ∂  (A0) , 2 2 , 3 2
D D
i t T i t TEF EF− + − +∂ ∂  
T=1 -4.29201 810−×  −  
T=2 3.20682 1510−×  1.64909 710−×  
T=3 -2.20974 2210−×  8.04109 810−×  
T=4 1.50636 2910−×  9.35874 810−×  
T=5 -5.04673 3710−×  3.90337 810−×  
T=6 1.87914 4410−×  1.07441 710−×  
T=7 -1.06036 5110−×  1.48935 710−×  
T=8 5.91678 5910−×  1.00870 710−×  
T=9 -3.32560 6610−×  1.20761 710−×  
T=10 2.85999 7310−×  1.54222 710−×  
T=11 -1.19826 8010−×  1.12841 710−×  
T=12 1.20628 8710−×  5.30645 710−×  
T=13 -5.67902 9510−×  2.33954 710−×  
T=14 0.00000 5.68929 810−×  
T=15 -0.00000 9.02005 810−×  
T=16 0.00000 5.93909 810−×  
T=17 -0.00000 2.35155 710−×  
T=18 0.00000 3.39908 710−×  
T=19 -0.00000 1.75244 710−×  
T=20 0.00000 9.01049 810−×  
k (t=1977) (B1) (B2) 
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, , 2 2LL i t kq − +  , , 2 2
M
LL i t kq − +  , , 2 2
, 3 2





















k =1 150449.16915 406921.49106 -0.753842 -0.173807 
k =2 187555.71428 472013.34710 -0.891348 -0.299322 
k =3 215737.27698 540769.81055 -0.970881 -0.274311 
k =4 230276.71632 587019.92278 -1.09804 -0.240719 
k =5 297254.73748 734452.83914 -1.68997 -0.087686 
k =6 429847.01700 979630.40895 -3.19773 -0.064846 
k =7 603707.43075 1260743.23938 -4.95467 -0.076624 
k =8 720080.24562 1389264.31390 -5.01264 -0.065206 
k =9 808181.73827 1497951.51814 -7.03849 -0.055520 
k =10 867891.80650 1499750.77556 -11.3254 -0.053990 
k =11 881363.02666 1478001.01176 -10.5415 -0.045175 
k =12 937761.63571 1461628.89460 -18.5025 -0.056370 
k =13 853747.96303 1287292.32902 -4.49850 -0.087903 
k =14 800818.36460 1088023.19883 -5.24855 -0.092258 
k =15 873859.01041 1152981.90620 -4.51795 -0.105097 
k =16 1035012.48199 1339923.13449 -4.53428 -0.074841 
k =17 1257422.89555 1544309.85778 -14.8893 -0.077919 
k =18 1423713.17088 1692288.72432 -7.18147 -0.100336 
k =19 1747227.73910 2049089.20519 -4.58729 -0.151774 




i tEF   Period ,
D
i tEF  
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1977 0.29388 1997 0.30486 
1978 0.29389 1998 0.30589 
1979 0.29348 1999 0.30982 
1980 0.29474 2000 0.31393 
1981 0.29612 2001 0.31529 
1982 0.29696 2002 0.31566 
1983 0.29910 2003 0.32008 
1984 0.29973 2004 0.32236 
1985 0.30232 2005 0.32463 
1986 0.30389 2006 0.32369 
1987 0.30395 2007 0.32253 
1988 0.30446 2008 0.32480 
1989 0.30511 2009 0.32456 
1990 0.30565 2010 0.32784 
1991 0.30476 2011 0.32779 
1992 0.30587 2012 0.32917 
1993 0.30721 2013 0.32846 
1994 0.30612 2014 0.33030 
1995 0.30538 2015 0.33503 
1996 0.30355 2016 0.33663 
Note: 1. Table 4.13.1 shows the intertemporal regular linkage of single-period dynamic 
cost efficiencies.  
     2. The details of , , 2 2
M
LL i t kq − +  are as follows: 
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( )2, , 2 2 , , 2 2 , , 2 2
, , 2 2 , , 2 2
, , 2 2 , , 2 2 , , 2 2
1LL i t kM LL k t k LL h t kiLL i t k LL h t k




− + − + − +
− + − +
≠ ≠− + − + − +
   
= ⋅ + − ⋅      
   
∑ ∑ ∑∑
 
( )2, , 2 2 ,
, , , 2 2




LL i t k LL s sYi s
LL s s LL h t k





ρ− + − +
≠− +
⋅ = ⋅ + ⋅ − ⋅  − 
∑ ∑∑ ∑∑
, 
      where ,LL sρ  is the conjectural derivative of long-term loans in period s, and N   












Table 4.13.2 Intertemporal Regular Linkage of Single-Period Optimal Financial Goods 
T (t=1977) , , 2
, ,






 (E0) , , 1 2
, , 2 2
LL i t T








T=1 -5.07491 810−×  1.34829 710−×  
T=2 4.13010 1510−×  9.77434 810−×  
T=3 -3.21869 2210−×  8.81016 810−×  
T=4 3.37696 2910−×  8.82824 810−×  
T=5 -2.14078 3610−×  1.36267 710−×  
T=6 1.23508 4310−×  1.72106 710−×  
T=7 -7.05083 5110−×  1.02443 710−×  
T=8 5.52439 5810−×  1.50230 710−×  
T=9 -4.99623 6510−×  1.76289 710−×  
T=10 3.99932 7210−×  1.86321 710−×  
T=11 -2.94104 7910−×  4.78877 710−×  
T=12 7.19837 8710−×  1.42015 710−×  
T=13 -3.95396 9410−×  7.21725 810−×  
T=14 0.00000 7.95955 810−×  
T=15 -0.00000 6.81849 810−×  
T=16 0.00000 1.42289 710−×  
T=17 -0.00000 3.00527 710−×  
T=18 0.00000 1.66600 710−×  
T=19 -0.00000 8.12967 810−×  
T=20 −  6.52357 810−×  
k (t=1977) (B1) (D2) 
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, , 2 2LL i t kq − +  , , 2 2
M
LL i t kq − +  , , 2
, 1 2





















k =1 150449.16915 406921.49106 -0.891348 -0.173807 
k =2 187555.71428 472013.34710 -0.970881 -0.299322 
k =3 215737.27698 540769.81055 -1.09804 -0.274311 
k =4 230276.71632 587019.92278 -1.68997 -0.240719 
k =5 297254.73748 734452.83914 -3.19773 -0.087686 
k =6 429847.01700 979630.40895 -4.95467 -0.064846 
k =7 603707.43075 1260743.23938 -5.01264 -0.076624 
k =8 720080.24562 1389264.31390 -7.03849 -0.065206 
k =9 808181.73827 1497951.51814 -11.3254 -0.055520 
k =10 867891.80650 1499750.77556 -10.5415 -0.053990 
k =11 881363.02666 1478001.01176 -18.5025 -0.045175 
k =12 937761.63571 1461628.89460 -4.49850 -0.056370 
k =13 853747.96303 1287292.32902 -5.24855 -0.087903 
k =14 800818.36460 1088023.19883 -4.51795 -0.092258 
k =15 873859.01041 1152981.90620 -4.53428 -0.105097 
k =16 1035012.48199 1339923.13449 -14.8893 -0.074841 
k =17 1257422.89555 1544309.85778 -7.18147 -0.077919 
k =18 1423713.17088 1692288.72432 -4.58729 -0.100336 
k =19 1747227.73910 2049089.20519 -3.09432 -0.151774 
k =20 1934024.56863 2240826.90196 −  -0.206258 
Period 
, ,LL i tq   Period , ,LL i tq  
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1977 150449.1692 1997 881363.0267 
1978 183067.8722 1998 946679.9006 
1979 187555.7143 1999 937761.6357 
1980 184941.2798 2000 948275.6975 
1981 215737.2770 2001 853747.9630 
1982 211075.9673 2002 826697.3125 
1983 230276.7163 2003 800818.3646 
1984 274638.8021 2004 832042.5517 
1985 297254.7375 2005 873859.0104 
1986 359064.4422 2006 932373.2201 
1987 429847.0170 2007 1035012.482 
1988 510170.6712 2008 1121730.667 
1989 603707.4308 2009 1257422.896 
1990 661648.3906 2010 1302203.537 
1991 720080.2456 2011 1423713.171 
1992 771472.3449 2012 1567524.288 
1993 808181.7383 2013 1747227.739 
1994 821645.3461 2014 1829578.720 
1995 867891.8065 2015 1934024.569 
1996 852470.3526 2016 2039485.737 
Note: 1. Table 4.13.2 shows the intertemporal regular linkage of single-period optimal 
financial goods. 
     2. For details of , , 2 2
M




Table 4.13.3 Intertemporal Regular Linkage of Single-Period Herfindahl Indices 



















T=1 -4.33853 810−×  1.16545 710−×  
T=2 3.26215 1510−×  9.83116 810−×  
T=3 -2.53410 2210−×  9.37908 810−×  
T=4 2.33070 2910−×  8.03138 810−×  
T=5 -1.17350 3610−×  1.29634 710−×  
T=6 5.60397 4410−×  1.58211 710−×  
T=7 -3.67455 5110−×  1.20488 710−×  
T=8 2.42564 5810−×  1.35054 710−×  
T=9 -2.14515 6510−×  1.67684 710−×  
T=10 1.07413 7210−×  1.18054 710−×  
T=11 -8.66573 8010−×  4.84653 710−×  
T=12 2.61623 8710−×  1.57834 710−×  
T=13 -1.44831 9410−×  6.18101 810−×  
T=14 0.00000 8.92725 810−×  
T=15 -0.00000 6.48324 810−×  
T=16 0.00000 2.54434 710−×  
T=17 -0.00000 3.12850 710−×  
T=18 0.00000 1.52739 710−×  
T=19 -0.00000 7.63002 810−×  
T=20 −  5.68909 810−×  
k (t=1977) (F1) (D2) 
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, , 2LL i t kq +  , , 2
M
LL i t kq +  , , 2
, 1 2





















k =1 187555.71428 472013.34710 -0.891348 -0.173807 
k =2 215737.27698 540769.81055 -0.970881 -0.299322 
k =3 230276.71632 587019.92278 -1.09804 -0.274311 
k =4 297254.73748 734452.83914 -1.68997 -0.240719 
k =5 429847.01700 979630.40895 -3.19773 -0.087686 
k =6 603707.43075 1260743.23938 -4.95467 -0.064846 
k =7 720080.24562 1389264.31390 -5.01264 -0.076624 
k =8 808181.73827 1497951.51814 -7.03849 -0.065206 
k =9 867891.80650 1499750.77556 -11.3254 -0.055520 
k =10 881363.02666 1478001.01176 -10.5415 -0.053990 
k =11 937761.63571 1461628.89460 -18.5025 -0.045175 
k =12 853747.96303 1287292.32902 -4.49850 -0.056370 
k =13 800818.36460 1088023.19883 -5.24855 -0.087903 
k =14 873859.01041 1152981.90620 -4.51795 -0.092258 
k =15 1035012.48199 1339923.13449 -4.53428 -0.105097 
k =16 1257422.89555 1544309.85778 -14.8893 -0.074841 
k =17 1423713.17088 1692288.72432 -7.18147 -0.077919 
k =18 1747227.73910 2049089.20519 -4.58729 -0.100336 
k =19 1934024.56863 2240826.90196 -3.09432 -0.151774 
k =20 −  −  −  -0.206258 
Period 
,L tHI  Period ,L tHI  
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1977 0.51571 1997 0.53127 
1978 0.51418 1998 0.53261 
1979 0.51260 1999 0.54260 
1980 0.51353 2000 0.54874 
1981 0.51421 2001 0.55609 
1982 0.51392 2002 0.55803 
1983 0.51756 2003 0.57961 
1984 0.52566 2004 0.59632 
1985 0.52448 2005 0.57593 
1986 0.5295 2006 0.58027 
1987 0.52875 2007 0.57267 
1988 0.53034 2008 0.58143 
1989 0.53135 2009 0.58455 
1990 0.52581 2010 0.59294 
1991 0.52731 2011 0.58510 
1992 0.53073 2012 0.58307 
1993 0.52567 2013 0.58682 
1994 0.51994 2014 0.58614 
1995 0.52349 2015 0.59562 
1996 0.52190 2016 0.57911 
Note: 1. Table 4.13.3 shows the intertemporal regular linkage of single-period Herfindahl 
indices. 
     2. , , 2
M
LL i t kq +  is similar to , , 2 2
M
LL i t kq − + . For details of , , 2 2
M
LL i t kq − + , see the second note 
in Table 4.13.1.  
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Table 4.13.4 Intertemporal Regular Linkage of Single-Period EGLIs on the Cost 
Frontier 
T , , 2
, ,
F







 , , 1 2
, , 2 2
F
LL i t T
F








T=1 (t=1977) -2.81389 610−×  −  
T=2 2.82182 1410−×  1.75233 810−×  
T=1 (t=1989) -3.67026 810−×  3.65141 710−×  
T=2 6.33858 1310−×  2.22625 610−×  
T=3 -3.60594 2210−×  2.59835 910−×  
T=4 2.37083 2910−×  6.18718 810−×  
T=5 -5.68077 3610−×  5.60645 810−×  
T=6 4.15950 4310−×  6.64354 810−×  
T=1 (t=2005) -6.86082 810−×  1.17794 710−×  












 , , 2
, 1 2
F









 , , 2 2
, 3 2
F









 , , 1 2
, 2 2
F










t=1977 -0.430504 −  −  −  
T=1 −  -28.2243 -0.430504 -0.827618 
T=2 −  -3.78819 -28.2243 -2.99914 
t=1989 -0.252031 −  −  −  
T=1 −  -0.163929 -0.252031 -0.617899 
T=2 −  -50.7365 -0.163929 -3.61799 
T=3 −  -0.513526 -50.7365 -1.09167 
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T=4 −  -0.392600 -0.513526 -0.206019 
T=5 −  -2.24528 -0.392600 -0.195061 
T=6 −  -1.63308 -2.24528 -0.281103 
t=2005 -0.113262 −  −  −  
T=1 −  -0.134693 -0.113262 -0.147910 




LL i tEGLI  Period , ,
F
LL i tEGLI  
1977 0.811265 1997 0.916377 
1978 0.832765 1998 0.943484 
1979 -0.64221 1999 −  
1980 0.338125 2000 0.930527 
1981 0.394288 2001 0.765832 
1982 −  2002 0.699734 
1983 0.284905 2003 −  
1984 −  2004 −  
1985 −  2005 0.969358 
1986 −  2006 0.972632 
1987 −  2007 0.970397 
1988 −  2008 −  
1989 0.912851 2009 0.842594 
1990 0.821292 2010 0.859408 
1991 0.947061 2011 −  
1992 0.783136 2012 −  
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1993 0.950286 2013 −  
1994 0.958187 2014 −  
1995 0.908508 2015 −  
1996 0.957912 2016 0.942315 
Note: 1. Table 4.13.4 shows the intertemporal regular linkage of single-period EGLIs on 
the cost frontier. 
     2. The EGLIs on the cost frontier in some periods are not shown because the SURPs 







Table 6.1 Estimation Results for the Modified Equation for Homma (2012, Eq. 
(6.2.3.1.6a) for j=SL; p.86) 
Parameter Estimate t-statistic p-value 
,1
R
SLβ  (1976-1986) -0.00223352 -4.41397 0.000 
,2
R
SLβ  (1987-1989) -0.00246922 -5.00475 0.000 
,3
R
SLβ  (1990-1995) -0.00187898 -3.84610 0.000 
,4
R
SLβ  (1996-2001) -0.00235895 -4.68181 0.000 
,5
R
SLβ  (2002-2007) -0.00232455 -4.39989 0.000 
,6
R
SLβ  (2008-2010) -0.00196843 -3.65124 0.000 
,7
R
SLβ  (2011-2016) -0.00203843 -3.75347 0.000 
,
R
SL Eγ  -0.00165671 -0.787563 0.431 
,
R
SL Hγ  -0.000379026 -0.315101 0.753 
,1
R
SLγ  0.400055 90.9401 0.000 
,2
R
SLγ  -0.108788 -38.3281 0.000 
,3
R
SLγ  0.817965 47.9001 0.000 
,4
R
SLγ  0.340257 7.09057 0.000 
,5
R
SLγ  0.00221822 4.90803 0.000 
,6
R
SLγ  -0.00623863 -3.40569 0.001 
,7
R





SLγ  0.000307511 0.044394 0.965 
,9
R
SLγ  0.000780025 0.696137 0.486 
,10
R
SLγ  -0.00389243 -2.12092 0.034 






Note: 1. Tables 6.1 to 6.3 show the results for the simultaneous estimation of the modified 
equations that add the Herfindahl index of each financial good in the previous 
period and the static cost unneutral efficiency in the previous period to the 
independent variables in Homma (2012, Eqs. (6.2.3.1.6a) and (6.2.3.2.3); pp. 86-
87). Table 6.1 shows the estimates of the parameters in the modified equation for 
Homma (2012, Eq. (6.2.3.1.6a) for j=SL; p.86). 
    2. This modified equation is as follows:  
( )7, , , , , 1 , , 1 , , 11 lnR R B R Y R S RSL i t SL i i SL s s SL t SL E i t SL H SL ti sH D D Q EF HIα β γ γ− − −== ⋅ + ⋅ ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅∑ ∑  
10
, , , , 1 , ,1
R RQ R
SL k L k i t SL i tk
zγ ζ−=+ ⋅ +∑ , 
where , ,
R
SL i tH  is the actual collected interest rate for short-term loans in the 
current period, BiD  is the individual bank dummy variable, 
Y
sD  is the period 
dummy variable for cases where the period covered by the analysis is split into 
several sub-periods (i.e., the dummy variable equals 1 in period s and 0 in the 









SL SL s ss
Dβ β
=
= ⋅∑ ), , 1SL tQ −  is the total short-term loans in the short-term loans 
market in the previous period, , 1
S
i tEF −  is the static cost unneutral efficiency in the 
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previous period, , 1SL tHI −  is the Herfindahl index of short-term loans in the 
previous period,  , , , 1
RQ
L k i tz −  (k=1, ,10) are the short-term prime rate in the 
previous period (k=1), the capital ratio of borrower firms in the previous period 
(k=2), the ratio of operating profit to total capital of borrower firms in the previous 
period (k=3), the loan loss provision rate in the previous period (k=4), the 
logarithm of the loan per case in the previous period (k=5), the proportion of loans 
for small and medium firms in the previous period (k=6), the Herfindahl index of 
loan proportions classified by industry in the previous period (k=7), the proportion 
of loans for real estate business in the previous period (k=8), the proportion of 
loans secured by real estate in the previous period (k=9), and the proportion of 
loans without collateral and without warranty in the previous period (k=10), and 
, ,
R
SL i tζ  is the ordinary error term in the current period. 





Table 6.2 Estimation Results for the Modified Equation for Homma (2012, Eq. 
(6.2.3.1.6a) for j=LL; p.86) 
Parameter Estimate t-statistic p-value 
,1
R
LLβ  (1976-1986) -0.00227444 -2.22793 0.026 
,2
R
LLβ  (1987-1989) -0.00201266 -2.01302 0.044 
,3
R
LLβ  (1990-1995) -0.00215324 -2.24012 0.025 
,4
R
LLβ  (1996-2001) -0.00244962 -2.51306 0.012 
,5
R
LLβ  (2002-2007) -0.00234401 -2.32893 0.020 
,6
R
LLβ  (2008-2010) -0.00223024 -2.22365 0.026 
,7
R
LLβ  (2011-2016) -0.00210508 -2.10886 0.035 
,
R
LL Eγ  -0.00341942 -0.984647 0.325 
,
R
LL Hγ  0.000253870 0.127739 0.898 
,1
R
LLγ  0.466753 37.1860 0.000 
,2
R
LLγ  -0.067137 -12.3797 0.000 
,3
R
LLγ  0.304488 12.7018 0.000 
,4
R
LLγ  0.092218 2.22822 0.026 
,5
R
LLγ  0.00171424 2.13292 0.033 
,6
R
LLγ  0.00433167 1.21338 0.225 
,7
R





LLγ  -0.014825 -1.25416 0.210 
,9
R
LLγ  0.00552369 1.76969 0.077 
,10
R
LLγ  -0.000732469 -0.239862 0.810 






Note: 1. Tables 6.1 to 6.3 show the results for the simultaneous estimation of the modified 
equations that add the Herfindahl index of each financial good in the previous 
period and the static cost unneutral efficiency in the previous period to the 
independent variables in Homma (2012, Eqs. (6.2.3.1.6a) and (6.2.3.2.3); pp. 86-
87). Table 6.2 shows the estimates of the parameters in the modified equation for 
Homma (2012, Eq. (6.2.3.1.6a) for j=LL; p.86). 
    2. This modified equation is as follows: 
( )7, , , , , 1 , , 1 , , 11 lnR R B R Y R S RLL i t LL i i LL s s LL t LL E i t LL H LL ti sH D D Q EF HIα β γ γ− − −== ⋅ + ⋅ ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅∑ ∑  
10
, , , , 1 , ,1
R RQ R
LL k L k i t LL i tk
zγ ζ−=+ ⋅ +∑ , 
where , ,
R






⋅∑  is RLLβ  in Eq. (3.1.3.2.12) (i.e., 7 ,1R R YLL LL s ss Dβ β== ⋅∑ ), 
, 1LL tQ −  is the total long-term loans in the long-term loans market in the previous 
period, , 1LL tHI −  is the Herfindahl index of long-term loans in the previous period,  
,1, , 1
RQ
L i tz −  is the long-term prime rate in the previous period, and all others are as per 
the second note in Table 6.1. 




Table 6.3 Estimation Results for the Modified Equation for Homma (2012, Eq. 
(6.2.3.2.3); p.87) 
Parameter Estimate t-statistic p-value 
,
D
L Eγ  0.00243181 1.09128 0.275 
,
D
L Hγ  -0.00295086 -1.83380 0.067 
,1
D
Lγ  -0.091858 -13.4851 0.000 
,2
D
Lγ  -0.033746 -8.58164 0.000 
,3
D
Lγ  -0.191883 -8.36138 0.000 
,5
D
Lγ  -0.000511418 -1.00127 0.317 
,6
D
Lγ  0.00977097 5.84702 0.000 
,7
D
Lγ  -0.00151872 -0.277649 0.781 
,8
D
Lγ  0.010304 2.33519 0.020 
,9
D
Lγ  -0.000862979 -0.473511 0.636 
,10
D
Lγ  0.00466001 1.71394 0.087 






Note: 1. Tables 6.1 to 6.3 show the results for the simultaneous estimation of the modified 
equations that add the Herfindahl index of each financial good in the previous 
period and the static cost unneutral efficiency in the previous period to the 
independent variables in Homma (2012, Eqs. (6.2.3.1.6a) and (6.2.3.2.3); pp. 86-
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87). Table 6.3 shows the estimates of the parameters in the modified equation for 
Homma (2012, Eq. (6.2.3.2.3); p.87). 
    2. This modified equation is as follows: 
{ }
, , , , , 1 , , 1 , , , , 1 , ,
1 3,5 10
D D B D S D D RQ D
L i t L i i L E i t L H SL t L k L k i t L i ti
k
H D EF HI zα γ γ γ ζ− − −
∈ − −
= ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ +∑ ∑ , 
where , ,
D
L i tH  is the actual default loss rate for loans in the current period (i.e., 
, , , , , ,
D D D
L i t SL i t LL i tH H H= = ), and all others are as per the second note in Table 6.1. 









Table 6.4 Estimation Results for the Modified Equation for Homma (2012, Eq. 
(6.2.3.1.6b) for j=SL; p.86) 
Parameter Estimate t-statistic p-value 
,
Q
SL Eγ  0.00144106 1.94453 0.052 
,
Q
SL Hγ  -0.000237239 -1.29589 0.195 
,1
Q
SLγ  0.041905 8.96873 0.000 
,2
Q
SLγ  -0.00247387 -6.34230 0.000 
,3
Q
SLγ  0.00330686 2.62315 0.009 
,4
Q
SLγ  0.011572 2.68060 0.007 
,7
Q
SLγ  -0.00122233 -1.77071 0.077 








Note: 1. Tables 6.4 shows the results for the estimation of the modified equation that adds 
the Herfindahl index of short-term loans in the previous period and the static cost 
unneutral efficiency in the previous period to the independent variables in Homma 
(2012, Eqs. (6.2.3.1.6b) for j=SL; pp. 86-87). 
    2. This modified equation is as follows: 
{ }
, , , , , 1 , , 1 , , , , 1 , ,
1,2,3,4,7
Q Q B Q S Q Q RQ Q
SL i t SL i i SL E i t SL H SL t SL k L k i t SL i ti
k
H D EF HI zα γ γ γ ζ− − −
∈
= ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ +∑ ∑ , 
where , ,
Q
SL i tH  is the actual uncollected interest rate for short-term loans in the 
current period, and all others are as per the second note in Table 6.1. 




Table 6.5 Estimation Results for the Modified Equation for Homma (2012, Eq. 
(6.2.3.1.6b) for j=LL; p.86) 
Parameter Estimate t-statistic p-value 
,
Q
LL Eγ  0.00147511 1.95585 0.050 
,
Q
LL Hγ  -0.000204113 -1.03426 0.301 
,1
Q
LLγ  0.020893 10.6872 0.000 
,2
Q
LLγ  -0.00144029 -4.01989 0.000 
,3
Q
LLγ  0.00349106 2.83672 0.005 
,4
Q
LLγ  0.00989985 2.30656 0.021 
,7
Q
LLγ  -0.00114155 -1.59851 0.110 








Note: 1. Tables 6.5 shows the results for the estimation of the modified equation that adds 
the Herfindahl index of long-term loans in the previous period and the static cost 
unneutral efficiency in the previous period to the independent variables in Homma 
(2012, Eqs. (6.2.3.1.6b) for j=LL; pp. 86-87). 
    2. This modified equation is as follows: 
{ }
, , , , , 1 , , 1 , , , , 1 , ,
1,2,3,4,7
Q Q B Q S Q Q RQ Q
LL i t LL i i LL E i t LL H LL t LL k L k i t LL i ti
k
H D EF HI zα γ γ γ ζ− − −
∈
= ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ +∑ ∑ , 
where , ,
Q
LL i tH  is the actual uncollected interest rate for long-term loans in the 
current period, and all others are as per the second note in Table 6.2. 




Table 6.6 Estimation Results for the Modified Equation for Homma (2012, Eq. 
(6.2.3.1.7a) for j=DD; p.86) 
Parameter Estimate t-statistic p-value 
,3
R
DDβ  (1990-1995) 0.000680991 6.49630 0.000 
,4
R
DDβ  (1996-2001) 0.000655912 6.22836 0.000 
,5
R
DDβ  (2002-2007) 0.000646485 6.12901 0.000 
,6
R
DDβ  (2008-2010) 0.000636965 6.09294 0.000 
,7
R
DDβ  (2011-2016) 0.000633794 6.17143 0.000 
,
R
DD Eγ  -0.00184176 -2.75728 0.006 
,
R
DD Hγ  0.000434124 1.31671 0.188 
,1
R
DDγ  -0.00439639 -11.1153 0.000 
,2
R
DDγ  0.099776 46.9430 0.000 








Note: 1. Tables 6.6 shows the results for the estimation of the modified equation that adds 
the Herfindahl index of demand deposits in the previous period and the static cost 
unneutral efficiency in the previous period to the independent variables in Homma 
(2012, Eqs. (6.2.3.1.7a) for j=DD; p. 86). 
    2. This modified equation is as follows:  




, , , , 1 , ,1
R RQ R
DD k D k i t DD i tk
zγ ζ−=+ ⋅ +∑ , 
where , ,
R
DD i tH  is the actual collected interest rate for demand deposits in the 









DD DD s ss
Dβ β
=
= ⋅∑ ), , 1DD tQ −  is the total demand deposits in the demand 
deposits market in the previous period, , 1DD tHI −  is the Herfindahl index of 
demand deposits in the previous period,  , , , 1
RQ
D k i tz −  (k=1,2) are the logarithms of 
the disposable income for workers’ households (except farmers) (k=1) and the 
yield on government bonds (k=2), and all others are as per the second note in 
Table 6.1. 





Table 6.7 Estimation Results for the Modified Equation for Homma (2012, Eq. 
(6.2.3.1.7b) for j=DD; p.86) 
Parameter Estimate t-statistic p-value 
,2
Q
DDγ  0.049383 8.92692 0.000 
,3
Q




610−×   -4.45802 0.000 








Note: 1. Tables 6.7 shows the results for the estimation of the modified equation for 
Homma (2012, Eqs. (6.2.3.1.7b) for j=DD; p. 86). 
    2. This modified equation is as follows: 
{ }
, , , , , , , 1 , ,
2,3,4
Q Q B Q RQ Q
DD i t DD i i DD k D k i t DD i ti
k
H D zα γ ζ−
∈
= ⋅ + ⋅ +∑ ∑ , 
where , ,
Q
DD i tH  is the actual uncollected interest rate for demand deposits in the 
current period, , , , 1
RQ
D k i tz −  ( { }2,3,4k ∈ ) are the yield on government bonds (k=2), 
the interest rate of ordinary savings (k=3), and the TOPIX (k=4), and all others 
are as per the second note in Table 6.1. 
    3. The conditional heteroskedasticity of the error term is explicitly controlled. 
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Table 6.8 Estimation Results for the Modified Equation for Homma (2012, Eq. 
(6.2.3.1.7a) for j=TD; p.86) 
Parameter Estimate t-statistic p-value 
,1
R
TDβ  (1980-1986) 0.00274183 2.48785 0.013 
,2
R
TDβ  (1987-1989) 0.00369885 3.36775 0.001 
,3
R
TDβ  (1990-1995) 0.00506134 4.61318 0.000 
,4
R
TDβ  (1996-2001) 0.00475978 4.29178 0.000 
,5
R
TDβ  (2002-2007) 0.00419667 3.73105 0.000 
,6
R
TDβ  (2008-2010) 0.00396048 3.57069 0.000 
,7
R
TDβ  (2011-2016) 0.00397213 3.64740 0.000 
,
R
TD Eγ  0.00715878 3.08222 0.002 
,
R
TD Hγ  0.00687255 3.10191 0.002 
,1
R
TDγ  -0.146166 -37.0608 0.000 
,2
R
TDγ  0.795027 99.0544 0.000 








Note: 1. Tables 6.8 shows the results for the estimation of the modified equation that adds 
the Herfindahl index of time deposits in the previous period and the static cost 
unneutral efficiency in the previous period to the independent variables in Homma 
(2012, Eqs. (6.2.3.1.7a) for j=TD; p. 86). 
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    2. This modified equation is as follows:  
( )7, , , , , 1 , , 1 , , 11 lnR R B R Y R S RTD i t TD i i TD s s TD t TD E i t TD H TD ti sH D D Q EF HIα β γ γ− − −== ⋅ + ⋅ ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅∑ ∑  
2
, , , , 1 , ,1
R RQ R
TD k D k i t TD i tk
zγ ζ−=+ ⋅ +∑ , 
where , ,
R






⋅∑  is RTDβ  in Eq. (3.1.3.2.12) (i.e., 7 ,1R R YTD TD s ss Dβ β== ⋅∑ ), 
, 1TD tQ −  is the total time deposits in the time deposits market in the previous period, 
, 1TD tHI −  is the Herfindahl index of time deposits in the previous period, and all 
others are as per the second note in Table 6.6. 





Table 6.9 Estimation Results for the Modified Equation for Homma (2012, Eq. 
(6.2.3.1.7b) for j=TD; p.86) 
Parameter Estimate t-statistic p-value 
,2
Q
TDγ  -0.047259 -3.84573 0.000 
,3
Q




610−×  2.52058 0.012 








Note: 1. Tables 6.9 shows the results for the estimation of the modified equation for 
Homma (2012, Eqs. (6.2.3.1.7b) for j=TD; p. 86). 
    2. This modified equation is as follows: 
{ }
, , , , , , , 1 , ,
2,3,4
Q Q B Q RQ Q
TD i t TD i i TD k D k i t TD i ti
k
H D zα γ ζ−
∈
= ⋅ + ⋅ +∑ ∑ , 
where , ,
Q
TD i tH  is the actual uncollected interest rate for time deposits in the 
current period, ,3, , 1
RQ
D i tz −  is the interest rate of postal savings certificates in the 
previous period, and all others are as per the second note in Table 6.7. 
    3. The conditional heteroskedasticity of the error term is explicitly controlled. 
 
 
